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Study of Mahayana Buddhism.

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EDITORS

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
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THE EASTERN BUDDHIST

THE SECRET MESSAGE OF BODHI-DHARMA (OR, THE CONTENT OF ZEN EXPERIENCE)

“What is the meaning of Bodhi-Dharma’s coming from the west?” (如何是祖師西來意.) This is one of the questions most frequently met with in the history of Zen Buddhism and considered one of the most important subjects in the study of Zen. The question, however, is not at all concerned with the coming of Bodhi-Dharma to China as an historical event, that is, with the historical signification of Bodhi-Dharma in Chinese Buddhism. His landing on the southern shore of China is recorded as taking place in the first year of P’u-t’ung (520 A.D.). But the question has nothing to do with these things. Zen is above space-time relations, and naturally even above historical facts. Its followers are a singular set of transcendentalists. When they ask about the first coming of Bodhi-Dharma to China, their idea is to get into the inner meaning, if there were any, of his special teaching, which is thought to be spiritually transmitted to his successors. For there had been so many foreign Buddhist teachers and scholars who came to China before Bodhi-Dharma, and they were all learned and pious and translated many Buddhist texts into the Chinese language; some of them were even great adepts in meditation, and performed wonderful deeds moving the affections of unseen spiritual beings who used to live all over China in those ancient days. This being so, perhaps there was no special need for Bodhi-Dharma to appear among them, if not for some well-defined purpose characteristically distinguishing him from his numerous predecessors. What was this message then? What mission did he have for the people of the Far East?

As to that, Bodhi-Dharma did not make any open declaration, he simply vanished from the world keeping himself in complete retirement at Sung-shan in the dominion of Wei for nine long years as tradition has it. If he had any message to give to Chinese Buddhists concerning the truth of Buddhism, it must have been something quite unique and quite out of the way. What was his reason to keep himself in absolute secrecy? What is the signification of his silent teaching? Perhaps when this is mastered, Buddhism may yet open up some hidden treasure which cannot be described in words and reasoned out logically. The question, therefore, "What is the meaning of Bodhi-Dharma's coming from the west?" points directly to the presence of some truth innerly and mystically lying in the system of Buddhism. It amounts to this: What is the essence of Buddhism as understood by the first patriarch of Zen Buddhism? Is there anything in Buddhism which cannot be expressed and explained in the canonical writings classified into the "three baskets" and arranged in twelve divisions? Shortly, what is the truth of Zen? All the answers, therefore, given to this all-important question are so many different ways of pointing to the ultimate truth.

As far as it is recorded in history still in existence, the question seems to have been first raised in the latter half of the seventh century, that is, about one hundred and fifty years after the coming of Bodhi-Dharma, but the idea must have been in a state of brewing for some time before. When Hui-nêng, the sixth patriarch, established what may be called the native Chinese school of Zen in contradistinction to the Indian Zen of the first patriarch, Chinese Buddhists must have come to realise the significance of the spiritual message of the Zen patriarchs. Since then the question, "What is the meaning of the first patriarch's coming from the west?" naturally came to be one of the most meaningful subjects to be discussed among the Zen followers.

The first questioner as to the meaning of Dharma's coming to China was Tan-nen (坦然) and Yejo (懷讓), according to *The Transmission of the Lamp*, who in the latter half of the seventh century came to Ye-an (慧安) the national teacher and asked "What is the meaning of the first patriarch's coming from the west?" The teacher answered, "Why don't you ask about your own mind?" "What is our own mind, sir?" "You should contemplate the secret working." "What is the secret working, sir?" The teacher merely opened and closed his eyes, instead of giving any oral explanation.

Perhaps the next questioner on record was a certain monk who came to Genso (玄素), of Kakurin (鶴林), very early in the eighth century and asked the question to which the master answered, "When you understand, it is not understood; when you doubt, it is not doubted." Another time his answer was, "It is that which is neither understood nor doubted, again neither doubted nor understood."

As in other cases the masters' answers to the question show such an endless variety as to bewilder the uninitiated, making them wonder how they could ever expect to see into its essence through this labyrinth of thought. And the worst thing is that the variety of answers increases in proportion with the frequency of the question asked, for no masters will ever give the same answer as far as wording goes: indeed if they did there would have been no Zen long before this. The originality and individuality, however, thus shown by the masters, instead of clearing up the matter, complicates it to the utmost. But when one goes carefully over the answers, it is not so difficult to handle them under a certain number of headings. Of course, this classifying does not mean that the unintelligibility grows thereby less unintelligible, only that it may help the student to a certain extent, however tentatively, to find some clues to the orientation of Zen. The following is thus my imperfect attempt to erect a few signposts for the guidance of the Zen student.

(1) Cases where an object near-by is made use of in answering the question. The master when questioned may happen to be engaged in some work, or looking out of the window, or sitting quietly in meditation, and without a moment's hesitation will come his response. The objects thus connected with his doing at the time may be alluded to in his answer. Whatever he may say therefore on such occasions is not an abstract assertion on an object deliberately chosen for the illustration of his point. Yisan (潯山), for instance, questioned by Kyōzan (仰山) answered, "What a fine lantern this!" Probably he was looking at a lantern at the moment, or it stood nearest to them and came in most convenient for the master to be utilised for his immediate purpose. On another occasion his answer to the same question may not be the same; he is sure to find it more desirable and appropriate to demonstrate Zen in some other way. This is where Zen differs from the conceptual arguments of the philosopher.

Joshu's (趙州) answer was, "The cypress-tree in the court"; and Funnyo Zensho's (汾陽善昭), "How cool this blue silk fan is!" The connection between the Zen patriarch's visit to China and all those objects such as the lantern, cypress-tree, or silk-fan may seem to be the remotest possible one and charges our imaginative faculty to do its utmost. But this is what the Zen student is asked to find; for, according to these masters, when the cypress-tree in the court is understood, the reason of Zen Buddhism is understood, and when the reason of Zen Buddhism is understood, everything else will be understood, that is, all the variety of answers to be given below will be more or less thoroughly understood. One string passes through the one hundred and eight beads of a rosary.

(2) Cases where definite judgments are given concerning the question itself or the position of the questioner. Daibai Hojo's (大梅法常) answer was quite decisive, "There is no meaning in his coming from the west." Bokushu Ju (睦州

蹤)—"I have no answer to give." Ryozan Yenkwān (梁山緣觀)—"Don't talk nonsense." Kyuho Fuman (九峰普滿)—"What is the use of asking others?" Homei Dosei (保明道誠)—"I have never been to the western world." Nangaku Shi (南嶽思)—"Here goes another walking the same old way." Hongaku Shuichi (本覺守一)—"It is like selling water by the riverside." Honei Jinyu (保寧仁勇)—"It is like adding frost to snow." Ryuge Kyoton (龍牙居遁)—"This is the hardest question to answer." Sekito Kisen (石頭希遷)—"Ask the post standing there." When this was not comprehended by the inquiring monk the master said, "My ignorance is worse than yours." Kinzan Dokin (徑山道欽)—"Your question is not to the point." The monk asked, "How shall I get it to the point?" "I will tell you when I am dead," was the master's way to get it to the point.

I cannot help quoting Rinzai (臨濟) here, who was singularly logical with regard to this question though he was notorious for his "rough" treatment of the monks and for his exclamation "*Kwats*." When he was asked about the meaning of the patriarchal arrival from the west, he said, "If there were any meaning, no one could save even himself." "If there were no meaning here what is it that the second patriarch is said to have attained the truth under Bodhi-Dharma?" "What is called 'attained,' " said the master, "is really 'not-attained.' " "If that is the case, what is the meaning of 'not-attained'?" Rinzai explained: "Just because your mind is ever running after every object that comes before it and knows not where to restrain itself, it is declared by a patriarch that you are the foolish seeker of another head over your own. If you turn your light within yourself as you are told to do, without delay, and reflect, and stop seeking things external, you will realise that your own mind and those of the Buddhas and patriarchs do not differ one from the other. When you thus come to a state of doing nothing, you are said to have attained to the truth."

(3) Cases where the masters appeal to "direct action." This has not taken place frequently with regard to the present question, though appealing to direct action is quite an ordinary proceeding in the demonstration of Zen Buddhism since the time of Baso (馬祖) whose case is related here. He was one of the greatest masters in the history of Zen, and in fact it was due to his masterly way of handling Zen that it came to be recognised as a great spiritual force in China. When Suiryō (水滌) asked Baso as to the meaning of Dharma's coming from the west, Baso at once gave the questioner a kick over the chest which sent him down to the ground. This however awakened Suiryō to the realisation of the truth of Buddhism, for when he stood up again on his feet he declared this, clapping his hands and laughing loudly: "How very strange! how very strange! all the samadhis without number and all the religious truths unfathomable—I know them all now through and through even as they are revealed at the tip of one single hair." He then made a bow and quietly retired.

(4) Cases in which some kind of movement is involved either on the part of the master or on the part of the monk. This is a most favourite method with the master, and we can readily see why it is so. Inasmuch as Zen is not to be explained in words, acting must be resorted to in order to bring its truth nearer home to the student. Since Zen is the truth of life, something more intimate and immediate than words is to be made use of, and this can be found in some kind of movement symbolising life as it moves on. Words may be used too, but in this case they are not meant to convey ideas, but merely as expressive of something living and doing work. This also explains why cries or exclamations or ejaculations serve as answers by the Zen masters.

When Seppo (雪峰) and Gensha (玄沙) were mending a fence, Gensha asked, "What is the meaning of Dharma's coming from the west?" Seppo shook the fence. Gensha

said, "What is the use of making so much ado?" Seppo requested, "How with you then!" Gensha said, "Kindly pass me the mieh-t'ou." (篋頭). *

When Tosu Daido (投子大同) met Suibi (翠微) in the Dharma Hall, he asked the master about the meaning of the patriarchal visit from India. Suibi the master kept on looking back for a while. Daido wanted some express instruction, whereupon Suibi said, "Do you want another dipperful of dirt over your head?" This latter remark means that the questioner had already been once bathed in dirt and did not know the fact. When Suibi turned back, there was an answer to the question, and if Daido had his eye already opened he could have seen into the meaning without further asking for special wordy instruction. But he failed, hence the master's reproach, which, however, ought not to be understood as implying any feeling of slight or unkindness on the part of the master. In all Zen "mondo" or transactions, absolute sincerity and confidence exists between master and disciple. Wording may be quite frequently strong and impatient, but this is the way with the Zen master, who only wants to attract such souls as do not break down under his training staff. Zen is by no means a democratic religion. It is in essence meant for the élite.

A monk came from Isan (潯山) to Kyōgen (香嚴) when the latter asked the monk; "There was once a monk who asked Isan concerning the patriarch's idea of coming to China, and Isan in answer held up his hossu. Now how do you understand the meaning of Isan's action?" Replied the monk, "The master's idea is to elucidate mind along with matter, to reveal truth by means of an objective reality." "Your understanding," the master said, "is all right as far as it goes. But what is the use of hurrying so to theorise?" The monk now turned round and asked, "What will be your

* An instrument used for mending or making a fence.

understanding?" Kyōgen held up his *hossu* like the other master.

Kyōgen once put his hand into his pocket, and when he got it out it was formed into a fist, which he opened as if handing the contents over to the questioner. The latter kneeled down and extended both hands in the attitude of receiving. Said Kyōgen, "What is this?" The monk made no reply.

It was again this same Kyōgen who proposed the well-known *kō-an* of a man in a tree. The *kō-an* runs thus: "It is like a man over a precipice one thousand feet high, he is hanging himself there with a branch of a tree between his teeth, his feet are off the ground, and his hands are not taking hold of anything. Suppose now some one come to him and ask him the question, 'What is the meaning of the first patriarch coming from the west?' If this man should open his mouth to answer, he is sure to fall and lose his life: but if he should make no answer, he must be said to ignore the questioner. At this critical moment what ought he to do?"

A monk asked Rakuho (洛浦) about Dharma's coming, and the master striking his straw-chair with the *hossu*, said, "Do you understand?" When the monk confessed his inability to understand, the master gave this to him, "A sudden thundering up in the sky and the whole world is taken aback, while a frog way down in the well has not even raised its head." Was the inquisitive monk the frog in the old well? The master's tongue was sharp and sarcastic. Basho, the great Japanese "haiku" poet, has the following verse: "The old pond—a frog jumps in—the sound of water!" It was this sound that awakened him to the truth of Zen Buddhism. The experience itself could not be expressed in any other way, hence the haiku merely descriptive of the occasion. The frog often figures in Japanese literature and has many

* A short epigrammatic verse consisting of seventeen syllables.

poetical associations often suggestive of peace and loneliness.

(5) Cases where things impossible in this relative world of causation are referred to. Ryūge Kyōton (龍牙居遁) said, "Wait until the dark stone turtle begins to talk, when I shall tell you what is the meaning of the patriarch's visit here." Dosan's answer to Ryūge was of the same impossible order when the latter wished to know the meaning of this historical event, for he said, "Wait until the River Tung flows backwards when this will be told you." The strange thing was that the River did run backwards and Ryūge understood the meaning of this remark.

Baso, who, as I repeatedly said, figures most prominently in the history of Zen, proposed a similar condition to Hō the lay Buddhist disciple, in his answer to the question at issue: "When you drink up in one draught all the waters in the River Hsi, I will tell you the meaning of the patriarchal adventure." All these are impossibilities so long as space-time relations remain what they are to our final consciousness; they will only be intelligible when we are ushered into a realm beyond our relative experience. But as the Zen masters abhor all abstractions and theorisations, their propositions read so outrageously incoherent and nonsensical. Notice how the following answers too harp on the same string of transcendentalism:

Hoku-in Tsu (北院通) answered, "A dead pine-tree is hung over the wall, and the bees are busily sucking the flowers." Sekimon So (石門聰) answered, "See the ships sailing over the mountains of Chiu-li."

A monk came to a master called Sekiso Shōku (石霜性空) to be enlightened on the subject of the patriarchal visit, and the master said; "Suppose a man is down at the bottom of a well one thousand feet deep; if you could get him out without using a bit of rope, I would give you the answer as to the meaning of our patriarchal visit here." The monk did not evidently take this very seriously, for he said,

"Lately, venerable Cho of Konan was given a monastery to preside over, and he is also giving us all kinds of instruction on the subject." Shōku called a boy-attendant and ordered him "to take this lifeless fellow out." The boy-attendant, who later came to be known as Kyōzan, one of the most masterful hands in Zen, afterwards asked Tange (耽源) how to get out the man in the well, when the master exclaimed, "Why, this fool, who is in the well?" The boy-attendant still later asked Isan as to the means of getting the man out of the bottom of the well. Isan called out, "O Yejaku!" (慧寂) as this was the name of the young monk. When Yejaku responded "Yes, master!" the master said, "There, he is out!" When the monk later became a fully-qualified adept in Zen and took charge of the monastery at Kyōzan, he referred to these adventures of his, saying, "Under Tange, I got the name, while under Isan I got the ground." May we substitute here philosophy for "name" and experience for "ground"?

(6) Cases where truism is asserted. This is just the opposite of the foregoing. Ummon (雲門) said: "O monks, you go around the world trying to see into the meaning of the patriarch's coming from the west, but this is known better by the pillar standing in front of you. Do you want to know how it is that the pillar understands the meaning of the patriarchal visit to this country?" This seems so far to go against truism, but after proposing this question Ummon proceeds to answer it himself, saying, "Nine times nine are eighty-one." The Zen master has here turned into a mathematician. Evidently he thinks that the multiplication table explains the truth of Buddhism. His allusion to the pillar appears to complicate his position, but this is his artful device (*upāya-kauśalya*); when "nine times nine are eighty-one" is grasped, the whole procedure gives up its secrets if there are any.

The Zen student is now asked how to establish an in-

herent relationship between the impossible statements mentioned above and the truism asserted by Ummon. Are they at all reconcilable? They must be. Otherwise, the masters would not be giving the irreconcilables as solutions of the same problem. If there is such a thing as Zen, there must be some way in which all contradictions are to be synthesised. This is indeed where all the masters of Zen Buddhism exhaust their genius, and as they are not philosophers but pragmatists, they appeal to an experience and not to verbalism,—an experience which is so fundamental as to dissolve all doubts into a harmonious unification. All the matter-of-factness as well as the impossibility of the master's statements must thus be regarded as issuing directly from their inmost unified experience.

Temmoku Man (天目滿) said, "Once in three years there is a leap year." This was a truism when the lunar calendar was in vogue. Everbody knew it, but what connection has it to the patriarchal visit? The inquiring monk said, "What are you talking about?" The master's reply was, "The chrysanthemum festival takes place in the ninth month of the year." This is another truism, for the ninth day of the ninth month has been celebrated by the Chinese as well as by the Japanese when the chrysanthemum is at the height of its season. The number nine is a lucky number with the Chinese, and when it is doubled, it is doubly lucky, hence the celebration. But does this explain the meaning of Dharma's coming over to China early in the sixth century? Bukkan Yegon's (佛鑑慧慙) answer was, "When you taste vinegar you know it is sour; when you taste salt you know it is salty."

A monk asked Sansho Yenen (三聖慧然) as to the meaning of the patriarch's coming from the west, and the master answered, "Tainted meat collects flies." The monk reported this to Kōke (興化), who however expressed his disagreement. Whereupon the monk asked, "What is the meaning of the

patriarch's arrival here?" Kōke replied, "On the back of a broken-down donkey there are enough flies." In what point does Kōke differ from Shansho as he claims he does? As far as flies go, does it make much difference to them whether they are upon tainted meat or on a donkey about to die?

(7) Cases of silence are not many, I quote one. When Ryōju Nyobin (靈樹如敏) was approached with the question of Dharma's visit, he kept silent. Later when he died, his disciples wanted to erect a stone monument recording his life and sayings; among the latter there was this incident of silence. At the time Ummon was head-monk and they asked him how they should proceed to write out this silence on the part of the master. Ummon simply said, "Master!"

Ummon was famous for his one-word answers, he was no waster of words. Indeed if one had to say something and this to the utmost limit of bare necessity, a single word, no more and no less, must be pressed to answer the purpose. The one character, "master," here implies many things as we can readily observe and which of those implications was in Ummon's mind when he uttered it will be a problem indeed for the Zen student to unravel. Does it really clarify the meaning of the silence which was to be engraved on the monumental stone? Hakuun Shutan (白雲守端) later wrote a Zen poem on this:

"One character, 'master,' stands majestically like a mountain,
On it alone is the standard established for all rights and wrongs in the world:
All the waters ultimately flow towards the ocean and pour themselves into it;
Clouds massy and overhanging finally get back to the mountains and find their home there."

(8) Cases where the masters make meaningless remarks which are perfectly incomprehensible to the rational mind. While most Zen statements are apparently meaningless and unapproachable, the answers grouped here have by no manner

of means any relation whatever to the main issue, except that the uninitiated are hereby led further and further astray. For instance, consider this: A monk came to Sekiso Keisho (石霜慶諸) and asked him concerning the patriarchal visit, to which the master's reply was, "A solitary stone in the air!" When the monk made a bow probably thanking him for the uninformative instruction, the master asked, "Do you understand?" "No, sir." "It is fortunate," said the master, "that you do not understand; if you did your head would surely be smashed into pieces."

Nandai Gon's (南臺勤) answer was "A tortoise's hair, an inch long, weighs seven pounds."

Yengyo's (演教大師) was, "Today, and tomorrow." This seems to refer to the succession of time but may just as well mean anything else.

Ummon Doshin (雲門道信) said, "A graveyard snake one thousand years old has today grown a pair of horns on its head." The monk remarked, "Is this not your habitual way of teaching?" Replied the master, "He who interprets loses life." Does the Zen-understanding snake bite such a self-complacent monk as this? It is hard to make sense out of these remarks if we are mere literary interpreters. The Zen experience so called must then be such as to annihilate all space-time relations in which we find ourselves living and working and reasoning. It is only when we once pass through this baptism that a single hair of the tortoise begins to weigh seven pounds and an event of one thousand years ago becomes a living experience of this very moment.

(9) Cases in which the masters make some conventional remarks which are not exactly truisms, nor entirely meaningless statements as in the preceding cases, but such as people make in their daily life. As far as our rationality goes, such conventionalism has not the remotest relation to the meaning of the question here at issue. But no doubt the masters here as elsewhere are in earnest and the truth-seekers are

frequently awakened to the inner sense of the remarks so casually dropped from the master's lips. It is therefore for us to try to see underneath the superficial verbalism.

Gwaccho Dōrin (月頂道輪) gave this answer, "How refreshingly cool! The breeze has driven the heat away from the porch." The following three masters referring to natural phenomena may be said to belong to the same order: Hōge Ken (寶華顯) said, "The frost-bearing wind causes the forest leaves to fall." The monk asked, "What is the meaning of this?" The reply was, "When the spring comes they bud out again." When Kōfuku Donshō (廣福曇章) was asked about the patriarchal visit to China, he said, "When the spring comes all plants bloom." The monk expressed as usual his inability to comprehend, the master continued, "When the autumn comes, the leaves fall." Hōzen Fu's (褒禪溥) answer was also concerned with the season and vegetation: he said, "As to the tree-peony we look for its flowers in spring." The monk failed to get into the meaning of this, and the master helped him by this further comment on botany, "As to the yellow chrysanthemum, it blooms in the auspicious ninth month of the year." The monk who apparently liked to talk said, "If so, you are exerting yourself for the edification of others." The master's final dictum was, "Mistaken!"

The statements grouped here are more intelligible than those concerning the tortoise's hair weighing seven pounds or the river swallowed up in one draught, but the intelligibility does not go very far; for when we consider how they are to explain the meaning of Bodhi-Dharma's arrival in China, we realise an irrelevancy here, our imagination fails to penetrate the veil of mystery hanging over the entire field. As to making reference to natural events in the interpretation of Zen problems, the literature gives many instances and we are almost led to think that all the masters are naïve realists.

(10) Cases where the immediate surroundings are poet-

ically depicted. The masters are generally poets. Their way of viewing the world and life is synthetical and imaginative more than anything else. They do not criticise, they appreciate; they do not keep themselves away from nature, they are merged in it. Therefore, when they sing, their "ego" does not stand out prominently, it is rather seen among others as one of them, as naturally belonging to their order and doing their work in their co-partnership. That is to say, the "ego" turns into a blade of grass when the poet walks in the field; it stands as one of the cloud-kissing peaks when he is among the Himalayas; it murmurs in a mountain stream; it roars in the ocean; it sways with the bamboo-grove; it jumps into an old well and croaks as a frog under the moonlight. When the Zen masters take to the natural course of events in the world, their poetic spirit seems to roam among them freely, serenely, and worshippingly.

A monk asked Daido Sai (大同濟), "What is the meaning of the patriarch's coming from the west?" The master replied, "The bamboo grove in the front court-yard, how yet freshly green they look even after the frost!" When the monk wanted to know what was the ultimate signification of the remark, the master went on in the same strain, "I listen to the wind rustling through the grove, and realise how many thousands of bamboos are swaying there."

Kyōzan Yu's (仰山湧) way of describing the pagoda, perhaps in his own monastery grounds among the mountains, was quite poetic, though the English rendering altogether misses the poetic ring contained in each of the five Chinese ideograms: "A solitary spire penetrating the wintry sky!"

Tenye Yetsu (天衣慧通) was another Zen poet who beautifully describes a lonely mountain path which meanders along a purling stream; his monastery too must have been situated like so many others in mountainous district far away from human habitation. When asked about the patriarchal visit, he said, "Hanging over a lone unfrequented path, the

pine-trees, ever green, cast their shadows." The monk did not understand and the master added this: "Through a green bamboo grove, in refreshing rustle, there flows the mountain stream, murmuring and dancing." When the monk thanked the master saying, "Following this instruction of yours, we shall all be freed from doubt," the master cautioned him, "Take your time, don't be too premature."

Tenchu Shūye (天柱崇慧) who died towards the end of the eighth century gave out many poetic Zen statements, and his answer to this question on the patriarchal visit is a most widely known one: "A grey-coloured monkey with her children in arms comes down from the verdant peaks, while the bees and butterflies busily suck the flowers among the green leaves." In this what I wish to call to the special attention of the reader is that while other Zen masters are altogether too objective and apparently so coldly above the affectional side of life, Tenchu Ye has a fine touch of emotion in his reference to the motherly monkey and the industrial insects. Something tenderly human gleams out of his view of the patriarchal visit to China.

(11) We now come to a group of singular cases, the like of which I wonder if we can find anywhere in the history of religion or philosophy. The method adopted by the Zen master in the following cases is altogether unique and makes one wonder how the master ever came to conceive it, except in his earnest desire to impart the knowledge of Zen Buddhism to his disciples.

A monk came to Baso and asked, "Transcending the four propositions and one hundred negations, please tell me directly what is the meaning of the patriarchal visit to this country." In the master's answer there was nothing "direct", for he excused himself by saying, "I am tired today and unable to tell you anything about it, you had better go to Chizo (智藏) and ask." The monk went to Chizo as directed, and proposed him the question. Zo said, "Why do you not

ask the master about it?" "It was the master himself who told me to come to you." Zo then made the following excuse, "I have a headache today and do not feel like explaining the matter to you. You better go to our brother Kai." The monk now came to Kai (懷海) and asked him to be enlightened. Said Kai, "When it comes to this, I don't know anything." When the monk reported the whole affair to the master, the latter made this proclamation, "Zo's head is white while Kai's black."

Whatever Zen truth is concealed here, is it not the most astounding story to find an earnest truth-seeker sent away from one teacher to another, who evidently pretends to be too sick to elucidate the point to him? But is it possible that Zen is cunningly conveyed in this triviality itself?

Funshu Mugo (汾州無業) asked Baso, "What secret spiritual seal did the patriarch transmit when he came from the west?" This differs from the question under consideration at present as it is differently worded, but its ultimate sense comes to the same. In this case too Baso, the teacher of more than eighty fully-qualified masters, resorted almost to the same method as the one just related. For Baso excused himself again from answering the inquirer by saying thus, "I am busy just now, O venerable monk; come some other time." But when Mugo was about to leave, the master called out, "O venerable monk!" and the monk turned back. Said the master, "What is this?" Mugo at once understood the meaning and made bows when another remark came from the master, "What is the use of bowing, O this block-headed fellow?"

Seihei Reijun (清平令遵) asked Suibi (翠微無學), "What is the meaning of the patriarch's coming from the west!" Bi said, "Wait till there is nobody about us, I will tell you then." After a while Jun said again, "Nobody is here now, pray tell." Instead of answering this, Bi took the monk with him to a bamboo grove. Seeing the master still

in silence, Jun the monk reminded the master of the question and of there being nobody about them. Bi then pointed at the bamboos and announced, "What a long bamboo this! and what a short one that!" This awakened Jun's mind to the realisation of Zen truth. When later he came to preside over a monastery, he told his monks how kindheartedly his late master exercised himself for the sake of others, and how since then he did not know what was good and what was not.

This last case reminds one of Kisu Dosen's (歸宗道詮) observation about stones. When the monk asked the master if there were any Buddhism in the mountains of Chiu-feng Shan where he resided, the master answered, "Yes." The monk's further inquiry brought this from the master, "Big stones are big, and smaller ones small."

(12) Cases where the master makes the questioner perform an act. This method has not been resorted to so very much in the present case as in some other cases. I have just one or two examples to offer here. When Ryuge (龍牙居遁) first saw Suibi, he asked, "What is the meaning of the patriarch's coming from the west?" Suibi said, "Kindly pass me the zempan (禪版) over there." When this was handed to Suibi, the latter took it and struck Ryuge therewith. Ryuge later went to Rinzai and asked him the same question. Rinzai ordered him to perform a similar act as if they were in consultation beforehand. Rinzai said, "Please pass me the cushion over there." When this was done, Rinzai struck him with it just as Suibi did with his zempan. In both cases however Suibi refused to accept the treatment as proper, for he said, "As to striking, they may do so as much as they please; but as to the meaning of the patriarchal visit, there is none whatever in this."

The following case may not be classed exactly as belonging to this group; there is something in it which reminds us of the cases mentioned under (11). When Rokutan Hōye (沓潭法會) asked Baso about the patriarchal visit, Baso said,

"Softly, come nearer." The questioner approached, and was boxed by Baso who said, "Six ears are out of harmony today, you'd better come tomorrow." The following day Ye came into the Hall of the Dharma and accosting the master implored to be edified on the subject. Baso however said, "Wait till I get up on the platform when I will testify for you." This proved to be the eye-opener to the mind of the monk, who then declared, "I thank you for the testimony of the whole congregation." So saying, he went around the Hall for once and left.

A monk asked Bokuju Ju (睦州蹤) about the patriarch's coming from the west, and the master answered. "Why doesn't that monk come nearer?" The monk approached and the master wondered, "I called upon the one from the east of the Chê (浙) and what has the one from the west of the Chê to do with me?"

(13) Cases in which answers are merely indicated with no definite settling of the point raised in the question. This is generally the case with most answers given by the Zen masters and in this respect their answers so called are no answers at all in the logical sense of the word. Mere poetical descriptions of objects one sees about, or suggestions to perform a certain act are not at all satisfactory to those who have been educated to look for conceptual interpretations in everything they encounter. The cases enumerated here thus partake of the general characteristic of all the Zen statements. The reason why they are grouped here as one special class is chiefly that they do not properly fall in with any of the other cases already mentioned. The reader will understand this when actual examples are given.

A monk approached Chikuan Kei (竹庵珪) with the inevitable question about the patriarch, and the master answered, "While the eastern house is lighted, the western house sits in the dark." Failing to understand this, the monk asked for further enlightenment. The master added, "In the case

in silence, Jun the monk reminded the master of the question and of there being nobody about them. Bi then pointed at the bamboos and announced, "What a long bamboo this! and what a short one that!" This awakened Jun's mind to the realisation of Zen truth. When later he came to preside over a monastery, he told his monks how kindheartedly his late master exercised himself for the sake of others, and how since then he did not know what was good and what was not.

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of a horse we saddle it, but in the case of a donkey we let it turn a millstone."

Tendo Yesci's (天童懷清) answer was, "Don't get sand into your eyes." When asked how to take the statement, the master said, "Don't get water into your ears."

Tōyen Giro's (桃園曉朗) rejoinder was a grim one, for he declared, "If there is any meaning in it, cut my head off." When asked why, he reasoned, "Don't you know the teaching, 'Give your life for the Dharma'?"

Ungai Shigū's (雲蓋志願) reference to an old stone monument gives one some hope to get into the idea he had of the patriarchal visit: "The inscription on an old monastery stone is hard to read." Does this refer to the difficulty of explaining the matter in any intelligible way to an average mind? For he added when requested for further comment, "Readers all wrinkle their foreheads."

As I remarked elsewhere, Chinese is the language of Zen Buddhism par excellence. As its grammatical connections are very loose, much is often wholly left to the reader's imagination and judgment, and for this very reason an apparently indifferent expression from the mouth of the master may grow laden with meaning. For instance, when Shoshin So (稱心淙) answered, "The foot-passenger thinks of his trip," was he thinking of the patriarch's journey to China? Or did he intend to liken the monk's attempt to understand Zen unto the hardships of a traveller on foot, over the stormy roads for which China is notorious? Or did he want the questioner, perhaps in a travelling attire, to think of his own doings? The text has nothing explicit about all these possibilities except the bare saying itself of the master. When he was asked to say something further to make the sense clearer, he simply remarked, "Tighten the sandals well." No more, no less.

To give another example: Chomei Soku (朝明則) said, "A refreshing breeze is stirred in the azure heavens." Does it refer to Dharma's subjective mind in which all the egotistic

impulses are dead like unto the vastness of the sky? Or does it refer to the stirring of the wind, the whence and whither of which one is absolutely ignorant of? The master's further statement leaves the question in no better light: "The full moon is reflected in the Yang-tzu-chiang." Does this mean to say that while the moon has no idea to see its reflection in the water, it does so just because there is water which reflects it and will continue to do so whenever there is a moon and wherever there is water, even a dirty puddle of water on the roadside? Was Dharma's coming from the west like the lunar reflection in the Yang-tzu-chiang river? A thought was awakened in him to come to China just as the moon comes out of the clouds when they are dispersed, and he came and taught and died,—even as the moon sheds its silvery rays over the waves of the Yang-tzu-chiang.

Kokusui Shōkei's (黒水承璟) idea which is quoted below has something grander and more energetic than the last-mentioned which excels in serenity and aloofness. According to Kokusui, the meaning of Dharma's coming to China was this:

"How vastly, broadly, infinitely it expands all over the universe! Look at the illumining Buddha-sun as the murky fog rises and dissipates itself away!"

When he was further questioned about the functioning of the Buddha-sun, he said, "Even the great earth could not hide it, and it is manifesting itself this very moment!"

(14) We now come to the last group, which, however, may not be the last if we more closely examine all the answers given to the question under consideration, "What is the meaning of Dharma's coming from the west?" For there may some more cases to be found in Zen literature, which cannot very well be classified under any of the fourteen groups I have here enumerated. But I believe the above have almost exhausted all the variety enough to give the reader a general idea as regards what Zen statements are, concerning at least one particular theme. This therefore may fairly be

regarded as the last group of answers given to the patriarchal visit to China.

This will then include cases where the master's answers are more or less directly concerned with the person of the patriarch himself. So far the answers had nothing to do with the principal figure in the question; but they now begin to take him up and assertions are made about his doings. Still, the answers do not touch the central point of the question, that is, the meaning of the patriarchal visit to China is not explained in any way we of plain mind like to have done. In this respect the cases mentioned here are just as far off the mark as the other cases already mentioned.

Kōrin Chō-on's (香林澄遠) answer was "Sitting long makes one fatigued." Did the nine years' sitting make Dharma all tired out? Or is this just a general assertion concerning sitting in meditation, including the master's own case? One may find it hard to decide which. Perhaps it is both, perhaps it is neither. But in the case of Chōhei San (長平山), the reference is obvious, for he said, "He came from the western kingdom and disappeared in the land of the T'ang." The next one is concerned with the second patriarch and not with the first. According to Fukusei Gi (福清巍), "It was not quite hard to be standing in snow; the mark was hit when the arm was cut off." Evidently in his view the second patriarch's self-mutilation was the meaning of Dharma's coming overseas. Or did he mean that the meaning in question was to be realised only after the severest spiritual training? If so, this was not at all an answer to the question, but only pointing at the way to its final solution.

Gekkwa's (月華) answer was, "The Emperor of the Liang dynasty did not know him." Requested to be further enlightened, he said, "He went home carrying one shoe with him." This is simply a narration of the life of Bodhi-Dharma, with which Kōzan Rin's (黃山輪) remark is of the same order, when he says, "At the palace of Liang nothing was achieved,

and in the kingdom of Wei he was most profoundly absorbed in meditation." With these two masters Jōsen Ko (上泉古) keeps company as is to be observed in the following, "He never appeared at the Liang palace; after Wei he went home westwardly with one shoe in hand." Keifuku Nichiyo's (景福日餘) reply also falls in with these masters: "Nobody knew him when he spent nine years gazing at the wall, but he was heard all over when he returned west with one shoe in hand." To further enlighten the questioner, the master added, "If one wants to know about the event in the remote era of P'u-tung, it is not necessary to get an intelligence at the T'sung-ling range." The T'sung-ling (葱嶺) is a range of mountains dividing China from central Asia, which Bodhi-Dharma, the first patriarch of Zen Buddhism in China, is reported to have crossed on his way back to India. He was then bare-footed and carried one of his shoes in hand while the other was found in his grave which was opened when the report of his return over the T'sung-ling range got widely known among his Chinese followers. As we can see plainly, all these remarks have really no connection with the question at issue, which wants to know the meaning or reason of the patriarch's coming from the west, that is to say, the truth of Zen Buddhism as distinguishing itself from the philosophical teaching of the other Buddhist schools. While the statements touch the life of the patriarch, the masters are not evidently willing to disclose the meaning of Zen in any more intelligible manner than others.

After enumerating all these varieties of Zen answers given to one single question, there is at least one conclusion which we can draw out of them as a most legitimate one. It is this: the truth of Zen Buddhism as symbolised in the coming of the first patriarch to China is something demonstrable by every possible means of expression under human control, but at the same time incommunicable to others when the latter are not mentally prepared for it. The truth can be

expressed in words, and also interpreted by action, though it is not quite proper to say that it is thus explained or interpreted or demonstrated. For what the Zen master aims at in giving out those impossible propositions or nonsensical phrases or in performing mysterious movements is merely to let his disciples perceive by themselves wherein lies the reality which is to be grasped. They are all so many indicators and have in fact nothing with interpretation or definition or any other such terms as are used in our so-called scientific parlance. If we seek the latter in the Zen answers we shall be altogether off the track. And for this very reason all the contradictions and absurdities which we have seen are made to serve the the purpose of the master. When they are understood to be indicators pointing at one truth, we shall inevitably be led to look where all these divers hands converge. At the point where they all converge there sits the master quite at home with himself and with the world.

It is like so many rays radiating from one central luminary. The rays are innumerable and as long as we stand at the end of each ray, we do not know to reconcile one ray with another. Here is a range of mountains towering high, there is a sheet of water extending far out to the horizon, and how can we make mountains out of the foams and foams out of the mountains as long as we but see the foam-end or mountain-end of the ray? When a Zen irrationality alone is considered, it remains forever as such, and there is no way to see it merged with rationality. The contradiction will ever keep us awake at night. The point is to walk along with a ray of absurdity and see with one's own eyes into the very origin where it shoots out. The origin or the luminary itself once in view, we know to travel out into another ray at the end of which we may find another order of things. Most of us stand at the periphery and attempt to survey the whole; this position the Zen master wants us to change, he who sits at the centre of eternal harmony knows well where we are

bound, while we at the furthest end remain bewildered, perplexed, and quite at a loss how and where to proceed. If this were not the case, how could the master be so miraculously resourceful as to produce one absurdity or inconsistency after another and remain so comfortably self-complacent?

This is, however, the way we logic-ridden minds want to read in the answers given by the Zen master. As to the master himself, things may appear quite in another light. He may say that there is no periphery besides the centre, for centre is periphery and periphery is centre. To think that there are two things distinguishable the one from the other and to talk about travelling along the ray-end towards the luminary itself is due to a false discrimination (*parikalpa*). "When one dog barks at a shadow, ten thousand dogs turn it into a reality"—so runs the Chinese saying. Beware therefore of the first bark, the master will advise.

When Rakan Jin (羅漢仁) was asked as to the meaning of the patriarchal visit, he asked back, "What is it that you call the meaning?" "If so, there is no meaning in his coming from the west," concluded the inquiring monk. But the master said, "It comes from the tip of your own tongue." It may all be due to our subjective discrimination based on a false conception of reality, but, our good Zen master, without this discriminating faculty, false or true, how can we ever conceive of you as such? The master is a master because we are what we are. Discrimination has to start somewhere. It is quite true that a gold dust however valuable in itself injures the eye when it gets into it. The thing will then be to keep the eye open clear and use the gold dust in the way as it ought to be used.

After reviewing all these propositions, suggestions, or expressions as given by the masters, if some one comes to me and proposes the question, "What is after all the meaning of Bodhi-Dharma's coming from the west?" what shall I say to him? But as I am not an adept in Zen, I know not how

to answer from the standpoint of Zen transcendentalism, my answer will be that of a plain-minded person, for I will say "Inevitable!" How does this "inevitable" start? Nobody knows how and where and why; because it is just so and not otherwise. "That which abides nowhere" comes from nowhere and departs to nowhere. "For nine years he had been sitting and no one knew him; carrying a shoe in hand he went home quietly without ceremony."

DAISETZ TETTARO SUZUKI

A DISCUSSION OF THE ORIGIN OF MAHAYANA BUDDHISM¹

There are two great divisions in Buddhism, the Hinayana (Small Vehicle) found in Burma, Siam, and Ceylon; the Mahayana (Great Vehicle) found in China, Thibet, and Japan. The difference between these two forms of doctrine is very great. Hinayana Buddhism is practical, ethical, and traditional. The Mahayana is progressive, idealistic, mystical and metaphysical. The Buddha of the former section is an historical person who lived and died as a man: the Buddha of the latter is an ideal explained as having three bodies in one, resembling the triad of Brahmanism, or the Trinity in Christianity. He is the absolute being, resembling the Universal Brahma. In Hinayana doctrine, existence is real, but in a constant state of flux governed by the twelve-linked chain of Causation. This world system resembles that of Heraclitus, the "Weeping Philosopher of Greece." In Mahayana, things and changes are mere appearances, while reality resembles the idealism of Parmenides, Plato, or in its more modern form of persentation passes for Hegelian or Neo-Hegelian Idealism.

Dr Murakami points out in his great work on the *Unity of Buddhism* (佛教統一論, Vol. II), that Śakyamuni differed from the Sankhya recluse Arāda Kālāma in denying the reality and existence of both kinds of self, the Universal or God-self, and the personal, individual self of living beings, because to admit the self was to make possible attachment to existence which would increase and drag men into the net of trans-

¹ The writer presents this article merely as a study. He is well aware of the difficulty of reaching a conclusion on this subject on which differences of opinions are not unnatural. (There are some points in this "Study", including its general conclusions, which the Editor of *The Eastern Buddhist* wishes to discuss fully. He expects to write an independent article on the subject as soon as practicable. D. S. T.)

migration and illusion. On the other hand, Mahayana Buddhists have not only added two other faculties to the six sense faculties of Hinayana, one of which is the *Alaya Vijñāna*, a mental quality, which is practically a reassertion of the self, but they have gone so far as to assert a Universal Buddha-self with a decidedly theistic significance.

For Hinayana, the object of religious austerities is Nirvana, described as the state of "an extinguished flame." It is the quiet of Individual Annihilation. For Mahayana, Nirvana is identical with Absolute Reality, Enlightenment and Buddhahood and described as possessing "permanence, happiness, selfhood and purity." But between this suffering world and Nirvana lies Paradise, and the various Bodhisattvas like Amida, exert themselves in the interest of saving suffering men.

The question has very often been asked, how could Buddhist doctrine as taught by Śākyamuni account for these two opposing schools? That they teach opposite doctrines cannot well be questioned. They are so opposed that if it is admitted that Mahayana came from Śākyamuni, it becomes logically necessary to explain away the four fundamental truths, the three seals, and the twelve-linked chain of Causation of original Buddhism. If to the pessimistic world background of Southern Buddhism are added the easy, optimistic methods of the Pure Land sects, based on Amida's vow, the most logical way to escape from suffering existence is to enter the paradise of Amida at once by suicide. In the stormy days of the Genji and Heike wars, instances of this logical conclusion became historical fact.

This apparent opposition between the doctrines of Southern and Northern Buddhism is the chief reason for doubting their common origin in the teaching of Śākyamuni. The Japanese attitude is well expressed in the *Chūgai Nippo* of July, 1919, by Professor Bunzaburo Matsumoto when he said, "Although Mahayana Buddhists have acted contrary to the

real ideal of Buddha, the present existence of Buddhism in the world must be attributed totally to the merit of Mahayana Buddhists."

In the appendix to his *Historical Discussion of Mahayana Buddhism*,¹ Dr. Eun Maeda discusses the origin of Mahayana doctrine in a very fair, sincere manner, even expressing a willingness to admit that Mahayana is not the teaching of Śākyamuni. He points out that Chūki Tominaga in the Genroku age first denied the Buddhist origin, and that similar views were also held by Tenyu Hattori, Hirata Atsutane, and by Jesuit scholars in China.² He gives many arguments for and against such a position, but is conservative in his conclusion.

Early disciples gathered the master's teaching together, and they are preserved in Pali. The Mahayana doctrines were not presented until centuries later, and when they were, they were written in Sanskrit. It is consequently clear that none of the Arhats of the Southern school knew the Mahayana doctrine. Even the most distinguished disciples of Śākyamuni remained in the humble grade of hearers, while the supposed founders of Northern Buddhism, Āśvaghoṣa, Nāgārjuna, and others, were exalted to Bodhisattvas or Saints of the highest type. To say that men like Ānanda could not really appreciate the doctrine if presented by Śākyamuni, is to cast a reflection not only upon the disciple, but to suggest that the personal influence of the teacher which was exercised directly and personally upon his disciples for years, was lacking in either spiritual or intellectual power. It is significant that archæologists bear testimony to the fact that images found in India for five or six centuries after Śākyamuni's death are those of Hinayana Buddhism only, and that no images of the great Bodhisattvas of Mahayana Buddhism appear till much

¹ *Daijō Bukkyō Shiron* (大乘佛教史論) by Dr Eun Maeda, Meiji, 36th year.

² See also *Daijō Bussetsu Ron Hihan*, (大乘佛說論批判), Chapter III, Dr S. Murakami, Meiji, 36th year.

later. Some argue that it stands to reason that Mahayana doctrine is too broad and includes too many different ideas to be the work of one man. These facts point to a later origin for Mahayana doctrine.

Many arguments are given to show that Mahayana doctrine originated with Śākyamuni. Conservative scholars claim that Mahayana doctrine passed secretly from mind to mind as if by telepathy for all these centuries. Although not transmitted by word of mouth, it successfully passed several centuries until Aśvaghosha first brought it to light. In addition to the objection based on the hundreds of years which elapsed before the doctrine was known, it is almost impossible to imagine how a great teacher like Śākyamuni could oppose the ideas in Brahmanism which he was secretly transmitting to his disciples. Equally unattractive is the conservative argument that Śākyamuni taught the doctrine but that it died out in Southern India, but was fortunately preserved in Northern India. If so, how do we account for the fact that the Hinayana Sutras were collected and preserved while Mahayana Sutras are not known to have existed at least before the time of Aśvaghosha and possibly not for a much later period.

Another conservative argument is that Mahayana doctrine relies upon truth and teaches ideas which are true for all time, respecting truth even more than the facts of Śākyamuni's life and his relation to their doctrine. Consequently, the origin of Mahayana doctrine is of little vital importance. This compromise is rather against the Śākyamuni origin of Mahayana. From the standpoint of the religious influence and power of Buddhism, it is of vital importance whether Mahayana doctrines are the product of one great central personality or are to be regarded as mere abstractions, the origin of which is not Buddhist.

One of Dr Maeda's interesting arguments¹ used to combat

¹ Ibid., Appendix.

the idea that Mahayana did not originate with Śākyamuni is based on an analogy between the development of Buddhist doctrine and the growth of the fruit tree. The teachings of Śākyamuni are the seeds, those of Hinayana are the branches and leaves, those of Mahayana are the blossoms and fruit. Long after the seeds were hidden away, when the time was ripe, the fruit appeared. This analogy, though very attractive, proves nothing: it merely states his position very cleverly. Dr S. Murakami in his *Critical Discussion of the Buddha Origin of Mahayana* gives a brief outline of the arguments of various Japanese scholars. It is sufficient for our purpose to mention two of them, that of the late Dr Enryo Inouye and that of Dr M. Anezaki.

Dr Enryo Inouye first summed up the arguments for and against the Buddha origin and draws his conclusion in effect as follows. "From the standpoint of philosophy, it does not matter whether Śākyamuni was the founder of Mahayana Buddhism or not. It is not to be regarded as superior because Śākyamuni taught it. It is excellent because it is truth regardless of its origin. Religiously speaking, it does make a difference. Externally Hinayana and Mahayana appear to be different but in reality they are essentially one and the same. If Śākyamuni taught the former, it contains the possibility of the latter doctrine, no matter what may have been its origin, and both are to be regarded as Buddhism. For example, Tendai, Kegon, and Shingon may not have been taught in India, but they are nevertheless Buddhism." From the standpoint of fact, he thinks that both doctrines came from Śākyamuni, the Hinayana passing from mouth to mouth, the Mahayana from heart to heart. From the standpoint of time, Hinayana suited Śākyamuni's time, but in the days of Asvaghosha and Nāgārjuna, it could not compete with Brahmanism, so the Mahayana doctrine became prosperous. From the standpoint of place, the Hinayana was suited to the busy, hot Southern districts, and the Mahayana

soon died out, but was preserved in the Northern parts till discovered by Nāgārjuna.

He briefly reviews the ideas which Dr Anezaki has presented in his *Historical Discussion of Buddhist Sutras*. Dr Anezaki agrees with Chūki Tominaga that Mahayana cannot be historically related to Śākyamuni. He says that his discussion of this problem is modern and scientific, pointing out the unscientific and unhistorical nature of Indian thought and methods, including those of Buddhism.

Dr Murakami's discussions of Buddhist principles in the second volume of his great work on the *Unity of Buddhism* is a most interesting and helpful discussion. He makes it living and vital. In the *Critical Discussion of the Buddhist Origin of Mahayana Doctrine*, he says, "That Mahayana is the teaching of Śākyamuni is fixed by doctrine and not by history. Doctrine is not a time distinction. It cannot be fixed by history and some would go so far as to hold that even if it were proved historically, such a proof must be rejected. In the early days of Meiji, men feared that Buddhism would fall with the old 'Sumerian' explanation of the Universe, but it did not. So even if Mahayana Doctrine cannot be proved to be historically related to Śākyamuni, it is without doubt doctrinally related to him," and he proceeds to show how the problem arose in the controversy after the death of Śākyamuni.

Dr Murakami's conclusion is idealistic and metaphysical. Mahayana is above explanation. It was the teaching of Buddha, but with the exception of Zen, it is not to be traced historically to Śākyamuni. Nevertheless, it is doctrinally related to Buddha. The method of receiving Mahayana canon is not known. Even when men say it is handed down secretly, that is a guess. The teaching is Buddhistic, but not that of the historical Buddha.

Dr Bunyiu Nanjo is not critical.¹ He represents the

¹ *A Short History of the Twelve Japanese Buddhist Sects.*

life of Śākyamuni after the manner of the Tendai sect. Immediately after his enlightenment, the first teaching of the great teacher was the *Avatamsaka Sutra* (*Kegon sutra*). Then followed all the teaching of Hinayana, Quasi-Mahayana and Mahayana according to the Tendai idea of the five periods. Like Dr Maeda and Dr Murakami, he traces the historical changes after the death of Śākyamuni down to the days when, to use his own words, "The doctrine of Mahayana became flourishing owing to the influence of the two teachers, Nāgarjuna and Vasubandhu. Therefore every succeeding generation has looked up to them with deep reverence."

A striking presentation of the relation of Śākyamuni to Mahayana doctrine is given by Dr Teitaro Suzuki,¹ but it fails to convince because of the lack of historical criticism of the sutras. He argues that "the intensely human interest of Northern Buddhists centered in the personality of their master. Whatever his teachings, they were vital only so far as they were considered in connection with the master himself. —They wished to warm up the Buddhist teaching with the fire of his personality. This does not mean that they rejected the logic of the Fourfold-Noble-Truth, and the thought of the impermanence of all things, but that objective truth.... had to be interpreted according to subjective truth which now imperatively demanded recognition in the hearts of Buddhists They were simply impelled to go their way which was illumined by their inner spiritual light. The light.... told them that the Buddha and the Dharma (scripture) were one and the same thing, and could not be comprehended apart from the Buddha, and that the Dharma was in fact the Buddha himself.... The growth of Mahayana Buddhism was thus an inevitable event. If the Buddhism of the Hinayanists is the literal translation of Buddha's teaching in their logical and objective form, the Buddhism of the Mahayanists must

¹ *The Eastern Buddhist*, July 1921.

be said to be the spiritual interpretation of the same in vital relation to the Buddhahood of the master himself."

Dr Suzuki assumed that "it was not in their (Mahayanists) character to remain so impersonal, so logical, so scientific, and so calmly rational." But as a matter of fact, is there anything in religious literature more impersonal than a description of the Buddhist Absolute in the writings of Nāgārjuna? Dr Suzuki, however, finds a parallelism in Christianity; "There are two main currents of thought in Christianity; one is Johannine, and the other is Pauline, and we can say that most Christians are followers of the Pauline, for it was Paul who succeeded in deifying Christ, in religiously interpreting the crucifixion, and in promulgating the theory of salvation by faith. Paul concentrated his attention on Christ himself rather than on his teaching independently." This argument of Dr Suzuki makes a strong appeal. Without doubt the Law-Body was deified, but that was a natural reaction toward the three-body doctrine of later Hinduism, and does not require any deep spiritual meaning to explain it. The similarity to Pauline doctrine is perhaps not so close as to Johannine doctrine, which under its Greek form of expression bears a much more striking resemblance to that of Modern Buddhism.

Dr Murakami, Dr Maeda, Dr Nanjo, and others agree that after Śākyamuni's death, there was development in Buddhist doctrine. For one hundred years during the period of the five great patriarchs of whom Kāśyapa and Ānanda were first, the followers of Buddhism commanded great respect, and were at peace with themselves and apparently with Brahmanism. This is in harmony with a report of conditions in India in the fourth century received from Megasthenes, who, according to Monier Williams,¹ was the official representative of Slenkos Niketor, the successor of Alexander the Great, at the Indian Court at Magadha. He describes Bud-

¹ *Hinduism*, p. 4, 73.

dhism and Brahmanism existing side by side without any special controversy or opposition. This probably throws light on the Japanese account that when the Buddhist Elders met at Magadha to hear the teachings of Śākyamuni, a great assembly who were not recognised as Buddhists met outside and were disappointed not to be admitted. One hundred years later, at Vaisali, the great controversy which is so well described by Dr Rhys Davids,¹ took place between orthodox followers of Śākyamuni and the liberal group who seem to have represented a reaction toward Brahmanism were in the majority under an able leader, Mahā-Deva. The controversy, which at first favoured orthodoxy, was decided by King Aśoka in favour of the pure liberal Brahmanist interpretation of reality, and the orthodox priests returned to Kashmir defeated and the liberal school became the state religion of Magadha. These two groups known as the Great Council,² and the Elders³ were broken up into nine and eleven schools, respectively. According to Chinese and Thibetan records, there were only eighteen. The former emphasised the problem of reality as opposed to common sense, while the latter were orthodox followers of Śākyamuni, basing their doctrines on the four truths and the law of Causation. During the centuries which followed, the two types intermingled and no doubt prepared the way for Mahayana doctrine. This may be made clear by the following table (p. 36) which only partially represents the various influences at work.


These facts make it fairly clear that a reaction towards Brahmanism had set in and account for the idealistic and metaphysical elements which crept into Hinayana Sutras, which were first recited and later written. This method made it not only possible but natural that ideas from Brahmanism should be scattered through the recognised Hinayana scrip-

¹ *Buddhism*, Chap. IX.

² *Mahāsamghikas* in Sanskrit, *Daishubu* in Japanese.

³ *Sthāviras* in Sanskrit, *Jōzabu* in Japanese.

ŚĀKYAMUNI BUDDHA



tures, thus preparing the way for point of contact with Mahayana doctrine on the one hand, but destroying the value of Hinayana sutras as proof of the origin of Mahayana. This fact was recognised by Dr Murakami when he said "Agamas which are regarded as the texts of Hinayana were not compiled into a written form until some centuries passed after the death of Śākyamuni, and naturally there are in them some elements which cannot be considered primitive."¹

In attempting to gather together the results of this study, we will distinguish between conclusions and impressions. In the first place, there is little doubt that most Japanese Buddhists, though they may differ in their opinions as to the Śākyamuni origin of Mahayana, agree in general that the teaching came from the Iron Tower, the Dragon's Palace, the Tushita Heaven, or some other similar place in Northern India, and that the four great patriarchs of the teaching were Āśvaghosha, Nāgārjuna, Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu. We may also conclude that the historical connection between these men and Buddhism in China is not very clear until the seventh century, when famous Chinese travellers like Hsüan-Chuang (Genjo Daishi), became the life of Buddhism in China.

It is open to doubt whether Āśvaghosha or Nāgārjuna ever were directly connected with Mahayana Buddhism in India. True, Dr Nanjo says, "Six centuries after Buddha Āśvaghosha composed *The Awakening of Faith in Mahayana*."² If so, it was the first book of Mahayana doctrine, and Dr Maeda was justified in concluding on this assumption that Mahayana sutras existed before Āśvaghosha.³ But if it was the first, why was it one of the later books to be translated into Chinese? If it were translated into Chinese as late as the beginning of the eighth century, where is the original? There is a vague tradition that it existed in the

¹ See *The Eastern Buddhist*, July 1921.

² *Mahāyāna-Sraddhotpada-Sāstra*. Japanese, *Daizo Kishinron*.

³ See Appendix to *Daizo Bukkyo Shiron*.

ninth century, but as the book was produced in China in eighth and ascribed to Āśvaghosha in order to give it prestige, it is not an unnatural conclusion that it was not the work of Āśvaghosha. In the connection, Dr Murakami writes:¹—"I have strong grounds to believe that *The Awakening of Faith in Mahayana*, which is traditionally ascribed to Āśvaghosha; and which is the only book of his expounding his philosophical view of Mahayana Buddhism, is not his, but a Chinese product, presumably trying to systematise the two Mahayana schools of Nāgārjuna and Asaṃga. The work is most ingeniously executed, being one of the best Mahayana treatises ever written in China...and it profoundly influenced the course of historical development of Buddhism in the Far East."

The impression that Nāgārjuna's relation to Mahayana is posthumous is based upon two facts: first, his teaching belongs to the Yoga system and has not only no connection with Hinayana Buddhism, but his writings are rather antagonistic to it. In the second place, no historical reliability can be given to the loose records of transmission from India to China. For example, Dr Nanjo says,² Nāgārjuna saw Vajrasattva in the Iron Tower in South India, and received the secret doctrine from him...Nāgārjuna transmitted it to his disciple Nāgābodhi, who transmitted it to Vajrabodhi. In 720 A.D. Vajrabodhi, bringing his disciple Amoghavajra, arrived in the capital of China, etc. This illustrates the method of transmission from the second or third century at best to the eighth century. It is not much wonder that some modern scholars in Japan should think there must be two Nāgārjunas. Similar doubts are connected with Asaṃga.

He³ was probably a Buddhist of the Hinayana school at

¹ See *Eastern Buddhist*, 1921.

² See *A Short History of the Twelve Japanese Buddhist Sects*, p. 29.

³ See Eitel's *Handbook of Chinese Buddhism*, p. 18; Dr Nanjo's *History*, Chapter IV.

one time but later became a disciple of Nāgārjuna, and founded what is known as the Yogācāra School. His leading work, *Yogācāra-Bhūmī-Śāstra* (*Yugashijiron*), he claimed to have received from Maitreya in the Tushita Heaven. As founder of the Yogācāra sect, and a convert from original Buddhism, he regarded his new system as the Great Vehicle as compared with his former doctrine. The Great Vehicle for him was great because it was so all-inclusive. Dr Rhys Davids makes this clear when he says of him and his work,¹ "As in India before the rise of Buddhism, the degrading worship of Siva and his dusky bride had been incorporated into Brahmanism from the wild and savage devil-worship of the dark non-Aryan tribes; so as pure Buddhism died away in the north, the Tantra system, a mixture of magic and witchcraft and Siva-worship, was incorporated into the corrupted Buddhism. The founder of this system seems to have been Asaṅga, an influential monk.....who lived and wrote the first text-book of the creed, the *Yogācāra-Bhūmī-Śāstra*, during the fifth century of our era.....He managed with great dexterity to reconcile the two opposing systems by placing a number of Saivite gods or devils, both male and female, in the inferior heavens of the then prevalent Buddhism;....He thus made it possible for the half-converted and rude tribes to remain Buddhists while they brought offerings and even bloody offerings, to these more congenial shrines; and while their practical belief had no relation at all to the Truths or the Noble Eightfold Path, but busied itself almost wholly with obtaining magic powers (*Siddhi*), by means of magic phrases (*Dhāraṇi*) and magic circles (*Maṇḍala*). Asaṅga's happy idea bore but too ample fruit. In his own country and Nepal, the new wine, sweet and luscious to the taste of savages, completely disqualified them from enjoying any purer drink, and now in both countries

¹ *Buddhism* by Dr. T. H. Rhys Davids, 208.

ninth century, but as the book was produced in China in eighth and ascribed to Āśvaghosha in order to give it prestige, it is not an unnatural conclusion that it was not the work of Āśvaghosha. In the connection, Dr Murakami writes:¹—"I have strong grounds to believe that *The Awakening of Faith in Mahayana*, which is traditionally ascribed to Āśvaghosha; and which is the only book of his expounding his philosophical view of Mahayana Buddhism, is not his, but a Chinese product, presumably trying to systematise the two Mahayana schools of Nāgārjuna and Asaṅga. The work is most ingeniously executed, being one of the best Mahayana treatises ever written in China...and it profoundly influenced the course of historical development of Buddhism in the Far East."

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¹ *Buddhism* by Dr. T. H. Rhys Davids, 208.

Saivism is supreme, and Buddhism is even nominally extinct, except in some outlying districts of Nepal." Equally unpromising is the criticism of Burnouf who found the system of Asaṅga to be both absurd and immoral. He said:¹— "The pen refuses to transcribe doctrines as miserable in respect of form, as they are odious and degrading in respect of meaning." In the light of such authority, our amateur impressions begin to take on the form of conclusions.

The facts about Vasubandhu are not so clear. He was the younger brother of Asaṅga. Dr Maeda² represents him as an earnest Buddhist, at first opposed to the Great Vehicle, which he denied was Buddhism. It was probably at this time that he wrote the *Abhidharma-Kośa-Śāstra* (*Kusha Ron*), which is one of the most orthodox of Hinayana works introduced to Japan. Later he wrote many Mahayana books, among them a commentary on the *Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka*, thus indicating his conversion to the ideas of Asaṅga. These facts make it clear that the "Great Vehicle" for those men was the Yogācāra system. We are now in a position to suggest a reason why Nāgārjuna is made the centre of Mahayana Buddhism, although there is reason to doubt whether he was a Buddhist at all or not. He is so regarded because Asaṅga was his disciple.³ It becomes more and more evident that the dominant element in the "Great Vehicle" was thus derived through these men from the Yoga System. In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that in India it was the Yogācāra system.

Many reasons tend to strengthen this opinion. The *Avatamsaka-Sūtra* (*Kegonkyō*)⁴ was received by Nāgārjuna from the Dragon's Palace. It is described as having various

¹ Quoted by Dr. Rhys Davids. Ibid. 208.

² *Daijō Bukkyō Shiron*, p. 220.

³ Eitel's *Handbook of Chinese Buddhism*, p. 195.

⁴ *A Short History of the Twelve Japanese Buddhist Sects*, Chapt. VI.

texts of which the "Constant text" and the "Great Text" were "kept by the power of the Dharani or 'holding' of the Great Bodhisattvas and not written down upon palm leaves." Such mystical language belongs to the Yoga system. A close study of Kern's translation of the *Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka (Hokke)* gives much internal evidence of the influence of Yoga upon this central sutra.

That the "Great Vehicle" was preserved not only in the Dragon's Palace, but in the Iron Pagoda, or the Tushita Heaven, is the language of the ecstatic imagination of Yoga mysticism. They were probably not intended as a description of fact, and we are under the necessity of explaining such symbolism by the spiritual state of the writer's mind. Vajrasattva, from whom Nāgārjuna, another believer in Yoga, received the secret teachings of the Shingon sect in the Iron Tower, was a mystic saint of the Yogācāra school. One of them was ordered by the Chinese emperor to translate the "Law of Reading and Reciting the Yoga Doctrine." That Nāgārjuna is thus related to it is based upon the identity of this teaching of his disciples with the so-called Mahayana doctrine, and not because he himself was actually conscious of being a Buddhist.

Kobo Daishi, the founder of the Shingon sect in Japan, received these doctrines from a believer in the Yogācāra school named Keikwa, who said,¹ "The Blessed One gave the secret key of truth to Vajrasattva who transmitted it to Nāgārjuna, and so on down to myself. Now because you are a man worthy to receive the doctrine, I pass it on to you. Propagate it in your country." In China, the Shingon sect was known as a Yoga school, but when Kobo Daishi introduced it to Japan, he absorbed it in somewhat the same way as he tried to absorb Shinto.

The text-book of Asaṃga, known as the *Yogācāra-Bhūmi*

¹ Ibid., Chapter VIII.

was introduced by Hsüan-Chuang into China where it greatly influenced Buddhist circles. Fugen, Samanta-Bhadra,¹ another prominent Mahayana saint, was also one of the four great teachers of the Yogācāra school. All of this indicates that this school was one of the most dominant influences in the reconstruction of Northern Buddhism.

The Yoga practise of casting off the gross earthly body, and by will-power forcing the ethical body through the pores of the skin in order to free it for a time from its bondage to matter, would explain the mystical reference as to the origin of Mahayana doctrine. The Tushita Heaven and all other references to heaven can be very reasonably explained as ecstatic states in which, lost in mystic meditation, these men were transported in thought, and inspired by the mystical doctrine of the Yoga system. These are just so many ways of describing in allegorical language, mystical places of ecstatic contemplation in which these men built their "castles in the air." This is made clear by the close relation which exists between the four Brahman² heavens and the various states of mystical liberation which are largely liberations of thought. Eitel describes these heavens as moral freedom from vice, mental liberation through several intellectual acts in which man recognises knowledge to be unlimited, and absolute non-existence to be real; or a man enters a state of mind which is neither conscious nor unconscious, and realises the possibility of obtaining final extinction of both sensation and consciousness. These mental conditions correspond to several heavens or states of mystic being. It was even thought that mind, by mystic liberation, was able to dwell in different localities corresponding to various intellectual operations.

This identification of the Yoga heaven with an intellectual state describes the Yoga meditation by which the founders of Mahayana Buddhism who were saints in either Yoga or the

¹ Eitel, p. 141.

² See Eitel's *Handbook*, 201 174. Kern's *Saddharma-Pundarika*, p. 182, 31.

Yogācāra sect, were able to rise into a state of mind which they described as heaven, so that when Mahayana doctrine is described as coming from heaven, the Dragon Palace or the Iron Tower, as a result of an ecstatic condition of thought, it is just Yoga doctrine, and probably was at first so recognised.

Other resemblances between Yoga philosophy and Mahayana doctrine may be noted. Both alike aimed at assisting the human soul into direct union with the universal soul. The methods of meditation which aim at this union by clearing the mind of all obstacles and passions, and by adopting certain mechanical practices of breathing and sitting, are similar. For example, Eshin Sodzu, the Dante of Japan, was in the habit of entering a form of "water meditation" until the room seemed filled with clear water. This was a sort of transcendent, ecstatic condition, and seemed to imply an ethereal condition resembling the idea of the "Ka" in Egyptian mythology.

The mystical character of the sacred word "Om" used in the Shingon sect, is identical with the same character in the Yoga school of Hindu philosophy where it was quite customary to have "seed words," mystical words or letters which stand for some reality or person. The "Om" was originally an abbreviation of "A-U-M," which are three letters descriptive of Brahma, Vishnu, and Siva. In Yoga, as in Mahayana, the repetition of "Om" carries with it a peculiar merit for the believer. In Shingon it is also customary to speak of the unborn Sanskrit letter "A." In Hinduism, the letter "A" stands for the unborn Brahma. Japanese scholars explained it as the first sound. In Japan it is applied to Absolute Reality, the unborn Buddha; the reality described is the same for both Brahmanism and Mahayana doctrine. This is another evidence of the influence of Yoga mysticism on Mahayana doctrine. All of these facts point to the conclusion that in India the so-called "Great

Vehicle" was either identical with Yoga mysticism or dominated by the Yogācāra movement.

The facts brought out in *The Unity of Buddhism* by Dr Murakami cannot be overlooked. Dr Murakami has discussed this question on a very scholarly manner and from his facts it is evident that there is a golden thread of connection between Mahayana and the men of The Great Assembly. But before the birth of Mahayana doctrine proper, there seems to have been a very strong reaction toward Brahmanism and such an intermingling of liberal ideas that the purer teaching of Hinayana had difficulty in maintaining its identity. It was at such a period that Nāgārjuna became the "Buddha without his characteristic Marks" and influenced the whole future of Buddhist development. He appears to have been a wonderful critic, who, in two of the three Śāstras on which the San Ron Sect is based, spares neither the Mahayana nor the Hinayana. The Hosso Sect, which is called "The Sect, or School that studies the nature of Dharmas or things, i. e. the Yoga School"¹ was greatly influenced by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, two brothers who were also disciples of Nāgārjuna.

If these facts are true it is not strange that Buddhism as a separate force practically died out in India. No doubt many of the terms used by Buddhists such as "Buddha," the Enlightened, and "Nirvana" would persist especially in the mystical school of Yoga. Whatever the actual historical order may have been, the purer metaphysical ideas of Nāgārjuna, the Yoga mystic, influenced many other scholars and from time to time his writings were introduced into China. But from the beginning of the sixth century, China produced some great priests who are really responsible for assimilating these Yoga ideas and incorporating them into the Buddhism of China. This is especially true from the seventh century

¹ See Dr Nanjo's *Short History of the twelve Buddhist Sects*.

when Hsüan Chuang (Genjo Daishi) after several years in India (629-645) returned bringing many of their better writings which he immediately began to pour into the Buddhism of China. The result of his and other similar influences was to establish the Avatamsaka (Kegon) sect and the Dharma-Lakshana sect (Hosso); the Mantra (Shingon) teachings were introduced and Mahayana Buddhism had its Golden Age in both China and Japan during the three centuries which followed.

Unfortunately, for Buddhism in China, the so-called "Great Vehicle" was too great in the sense in which Asaṃga apparently thought of it. It was the broad way that introduced the whole "Tantra system" to China. In the ninth century this led to a reaction against it and an awakening of the more ethical way of Confucius which became the centre of the scholarship of the Sung and Ming eras. It was during the early years of this period that the *Awakening of Faith in Mahayana* was probably produced. In this work, the "Great Vehicle" is metaphysical not unlike Indian and Greek philosophy.

Buddhism has had a similar history in Japan. By the end of the tenth century its practices were such that it is difficult to say what might have occurred had not Honen Shonin, Shinran Shonin, and especially Nichiren, arisen. But these reformers were unable to work any permanent ethical reform. As in China, Buddhism was rejected in favour of the Sung and Ming scholarship, which Zen priests had first introduced to Japan. The vital power of the system gradually degenerated till the opening of the Meiji era.

If this historical review, including Dr Rhys Davids' accounts of Asaṃga and the Tantra system in Northern India be true, then Mahayana in the higher sense in which it is interpreted in Japan is of comparatively modern origin. Without doubt, it has received a modern stimulus and is attempting the laudable task of purifying Buddhism from

many of its most objectionable superstitions and practices.

The rather striking similarity between the Shingon sect of Japan and Gnosticism was pointed out by the late Professor Arthur Lloyd.¹ This resemblance is not unnatural in view of the striking similarity between Indian and Greek philosophy. Whether it is possible to trace any historical connection between them, many of their metaphysical ideas are essentially the same. It is possible that Greek philosophy and culture did influence India at one time. The fact that the Kushu Kings who overran Northern India during the first three centuries of the Christian era, used the Greek alphabet to express Indian royal titles, and Greek forms to represent Buddhist traditions in the Gandara sculpture suggests the possibility that the age when Mahayana doctrine was supposed to have been born was very greatly influenced by Greek culture. Tradition says that Āśvaghosha visited Persia, and if so, as a scholarly Indian missionary he would no doubt be interested in all the scholarship of his day, and would probably be greatly influenced by the ideals of Greek and Persian scholars. There is considerable similarity between the doctrine of Śākyamuni and Heraclitus, the doctrine of the Hosso sect and Parmenides, and between Mahayana philosophy and that of Plato. It presents an absolute as a supramundane ideal world of which the present world of nature is a shadow, a product of darkness. It is nevertheless created by the ideal world which cannot but be active. Matter is unreal and evil, and yet it is opposed to ideal reality. The emanations from the ideal Buddha intended to save the world, resemble the Gnostic heresies and Neo-Platonism. Allowing for the difference in language, the resemblance between Zen learning and Neo-Platonism is so great that it is no exaggeration to say they are essentially the same. This identity may be accounted for by tracing an earlier connection between

¹ Ibid., page 61.

Brahmanism and the pre-Socratics. But it is also true that when Mahayana Buddhism originated, Greek culture and philosophy were moving eastward, influencing the thought life of the whole world. This movement of thought from the west made it possible for Greek culture to make some contribution to the development of Indian thought. It also accounts for the striking similarities between Mediaeval Christian and Buddhist forms, and for the fact that Śākyamuni, the sage of India, was placed in the calendar of Christian saints at St. Josaphat (Rhys Davids, 196).

What then is the origin of the Pure-Land sects and the Bodhisattva of Buddhism! A comparative study of Yoga mysticism, Gnostic heresies, Greek philosophy, Persian dualism, reveals a remarkable identity of thought even though their historical connection cannot be directly traced. All of them took a dualistic attitude toward reality; the Absolute or God was set over against this evil world of gross matter from which all men strove for emancipation and obtained it by mystical enlightenment and direct mystical union with a mediator between the Absolute and gross existence. In India and Europe the idea was the same, even though their historical connection is unknown. The idea of the Bodhisattva Amida thus resembles the Gnostic Eons. This idea probably arose from the worship of the setting sun, because Amida, "the Buddha of Measureless Life and Light," is identified with the Being who dwells in the Western Pure Land. The same idea was held by the Greeks when they spoke of the Isles of the Blest, "far out in the glorious west." You remember Tennyson made Ulysses at the end of life say,

"For my purpose hold,
To sail beyond the sunset, and the baths
Of all the western stars, until I die.
It may be that the gulfs will wash us down:
It may be we shall touch the Happy Isles
And see the great Achilles, whom we knew."

ROBERT CORNELL ARMSTRONG

VIMALAKĪRTI'S DISCOURSE ON EMANCIPATION

(Continued)

Translated by HOKEI IDUMI

CHAPTER VIII

THE WAY OF BUDDHA

Then Mañjuśrī asked Vimalakīrti: "In what manner does the Bodhisattva practise the way of Buddha?"

Vimalakīrti replied: "When the Bodhisattva practises no-way he is said to practise the way of Buddha."

Again Mañjuśrī asked: "In what manner does he practise 'no-way'?"

Vimalakīrti replied: "The Bodhisattva is said to practise the way of Buddha, when he feels no anguish, no anger in the commission of the five grave sins; when he enters hell even without the defilement of sin; when he enters the animal world without errors of ignorance and arrogance, etc.; when he enters the world of hungry ghosts though himself endowed with merits; when he practices such acts as may lead him to heaven either with form or without form though he does not himself consider heaven an excellent abode; when he is free from defilements, while appearing as if practising covetousness; when he is free from impediments of anger, while appearing as if practising anger; when he controls his mind in wisdom, while appearing as if practising ignorance; when he abandons his possessions, both inner and outer, and does not spare even his body nor his life, while appearing as if practising avarice; when he abides in pure morality and trembles with great fear even for a minor misdemeanour, while appearing as if practising trespasses; when he is ever merciful and patient, while appearing as if practising anger; when he is diligent in virtue, while appearing to be slothful; when he is ever abiding in meditation, while appearing to be distracted in mind; when he is in possession of the wisdom both

of this world and that of the world beyond, while appearing to be ignorant; when he follows the teaching of the scripture in accordance with the necessary means, while appearing as if practising flattery and hypocrisy; when he is even like a bridge for all beings, while appearing to be arrogant; when he is pure in mind, while appearing to practise passions; when he is obedient to the wisdom of Buddha, never following the doctrines of the heretical teachers while appearing to be with the evil one; when he is preaching for the sake of all beings, the law which has never been heard before while appearing to be with Śrāvakas; when he is endowed with great compassion and teaches all beings, while appearing to be with Pratyeka-Buddhas; when his hands are jewelled and his virtues are inexhaustible, while appearing to be with poor people; when he is endowed with excellent forms with which he is adorned, while he looks as if defective in the body; when he is endowed with virtues and born in the race of Buddhas, while appearing to be of mean birth; when he is regarded by all beings with pleasure having obtained the body of the Nārāyana, while appearing to be weak and uncomely; when he eradicated the root of disease and is gone far beyond the fear of death, while appearing to be subject to old age and disease; when he is ever meditating on the transiency of things and is never covetous, though in possession of property; when he is far above the mire of the five senses, though he possesses wives and children: when he is endowed with eloquence and memory which never fails, while appearing to be slow in speech; when he saves beings and leads them in the right path, while appearing to be in the wrong path; when he has exterminated causes for the evil paths, while manifesting himself everywhere in all those paths; when he has exterminated birth and death, while manifesting Nirvāṇa. Mañjuśrī, when the Bodhisattva realises the no-way in these manners, he is said to comprehend the way of Buddha."

Then Vimalakīrti asked Mañjuśrī: "What are the seeds

of Tathāgatahood?"

Mañjuśrī replied: "To possess the body is the seed. Ignorance and thirst are the seeds. Covetousness, anger, and ignorance are the seeds. The fourfold false idea is the seed. The fivefold passion is the seed. The six Āyatanas are the seed. The sevenfold abode is the seed. The eight wicked paths are the seeds. The ninefold passion is the seed. The tenfold wickedness is the seed. To speak briefly, the sixty-two heresies and all passions are the seeds of Buddhahood."

Mañjuśrī asked: "What is the meaning of this?"

Vimalakīrti replied: "He who enters into the "state of fixedness" by seeing the uncreated, can never awaken the thought of supreme enlightenment. Just as a lotus flower can never grow on a high dry land but only in the filthy mire, even so he who enters the "state of fixedness" by seeing the uncreated can never bring forth the law of Buddha; it is only in the mire of passion that beings bring forth the law of Buddha. Again, seeds sown in the sky can never grow, but only in manured soil can they grow and bring forth fruit; even so he who enters the "state of fixedness" by [seeing] the uncreated, does not bring forth the law of Buddha; but it is in those beings who caress selfishness as high as Mount Sumeru that the law of Buddha grows, cherishing the thought of supreme enlightenment. Therefore, it should be known that all passions are the seeds of Tathāgatahood. Just as one can not obtain the inestimable treasure buried in the deep ocean unless one dives into it, even so no one can obtain the treasure of omniscience unless one enters the great ocean of passions."

Then Mahāśyapa praised him by saying: "Rightly said! rightly said! O Mañjuśrī, thou hast spoken excellently. What thou hast spoken is true. All passion is the seed of Tathāgatahood. While we Śrāvakas can never cherish the thought of supreme enlightenment, those beings who commit even the five unpardonable sins are able to cherish the thought

[of supreme enlightenment] and bring forth things relating to Buddhahood. But we are forever incapable of cherishing it. Just as a man who is defective in his sense-organs can never again enjoy the advantages of the five senses, even so Śrāvakas and those who have exterminated passions can never partake in the advantages accruing from things relating to Buddhahood and cherish forever no desire [for higher things]. Therefore, O Mañjuśrī, ordinary men know how to return what they have received, while the Śrāvakas do not. And why? Ordinary men hearing the law of Buddha and cherishing the thought of supreme enlightenment will never let the three treasures be discontinued, but the Śrāvakas, even when they have heard throughout their lives of the Buddha's [tenfold] power and [fourfold] fearlessness, can never cherish the thought of supreme enlightenment."

At that time there was in that assembly a Bodhisattva named Samantadarśanarūpakāya who asked Vimalakīrti: "O sir, who are thy father, mother, wife, children, relatives, kinsfolk, officers, and friends, and where are thy servants, maids, elephants, horses, and vehicles?"

Vimalakīrti replied in the following gāthās:

1. "Prajñāpāramitā is the mother of the Bodhisattva; Upāya is his father; all the leaders of men are born of such [parents].

2. "The joy of hearing the law is his wife: the mind of mercy and compassion is his daughter; and to possess good will and sincerity is his son; absolute emptiness is his house.

3. "Passions are his disciples; they are obedient to the intentions of his will; the [thirty-seven] branches of knowledge are his friends by whom he attains to supreme enlightenment.

4. "All the Pāramitās are his friends of righteousness; the four acceptances are his singing maidens who sing in concert the song of the law.

5. "There are the gardens of the Dhāraṇīs; the trees

of the law far above passion, the pure and excellent flowers of the mind of Bodhi, and the fruits of wisdom of emancipation.

6. "There in the bathing lake of the eightfold deliverance the water of meditation runs over, strewn with the flowers of the sevenfold purity.* Those who bathe [in that water] are men free from the filth of passion.

7. "Elephants and horses of the five supernatural powers yoked to the Mahāyāna vehicles, driven by intent mind, serve for the journey to the quarters of the eightfold righteousness.

8. "He is endowed with a form adorned with excellent things the best garment of penitence and the garlands of profound mind [are for him to wear].

9. "There is the wealth of the sevenfold treasure;** to teach beings is the interest brought forth therefrom; to make them practice according to the law and bring these merits to maturity are the great profit.

10. "The fourfold meditation is the seat born of pure living; much learning and increase in wisdom serve as the awakening music.***

11. "The food of the immortal law he takes; the savour of emancipation is the sauce; the purity of mind is the bath, the anointing is the chapters of the law of discipline.

12. "Destroying all the enemies of passion, there are none who surpass him in courage and strength; repressing the four evils he sets up the banner of victory in the Bodhimandala.

* The sevenfold purity is: (1) the purity of the body, speech, and mind; (2) the purity of being separated from passions; (3) the purity of seeing truth; (4) the purity of being without doubt; (5) the purity of discriminating the way of enlightenment; (6) the purity of comprehending the conduct leading to enlightenment; and (7) the purity of Nirvana.

** The sevenfold treasure: (1) faith, (2) discipline, (3) hearing, (4) indifference, (5) wisdom, (6) penitence, and (7) penance.

*** Kumārajīva commentating on this passage says that the nobles of India in his time had in their house a professional musician, whose duty it was to awaken them in the morning by soft music.

13. "Though he understands that there is neither birth nor death, yet he manifests himself in all lands as the sun is seen from every quarter.

14. "Honouring countless millions of Tathagatas in all the ten quarters, in him there is no idea of partiality because he distinguishes not between those Buddhas and himself.

15. "Though he comprehends the emptiness of the nature of those Buddha-lands and beings therein, yet he ever realises the land of purity for the sake of beings who ought to be taught.

16. "He is the Bodhisattva who possesses the power of fearlessness and manifests even in one moment all beings with their forms, voices, and behaviour.

17. "Though being conscious of evil yet he follows evil deeds of evil; and he manifests those evils according to his will, through his wisdom of the necessary means.

18. "He shows himself as subject to old age, disease, and death in order to teach all beings; though he knows that [things are] even as a phantom, yet he understands their real nature in a most thorough manner.

19. "He causes a world conflagration and reduces the universe into nothing; this is to make all beings realise transiency of things, as they are possessed by the idea of permanency.

20. "When countless millions of beings come to invite the Bodhisattva, he goes even simultaneously to all their houses and make them walk in the way of Buddha.

21. "All the books of spells and all kinds of arts he produces, making use of all these things in order to benefit all beings.

22. "He mixes himself among all the heretics of the world becoming himself one of the mendicants and helps others to be freed from errors, while he himself never falls into any of these heresies.

23. "He manifests himself as the sun or moon or Śakra

or Brahman who is the lord of this world, or sometimes even as earth or water, or again as fire or wind.

24. "When there is a plague in this kalpa, he shows himself as a medicinal herb; those who use it will be cured of disease and all poisonous [effects] will be nullified.

25. "When there is a famine in this kalpa, he shows himself as food; and delivering people from hunger and thirst, he preaches the law to them.

26. "If there be a war in this kalpa, he shows mercy and compassion to all beings, and teaches them to enter a state of non-resistance.

27. "If a great battle takes place, the Bodhisattva opposes the enemy with an equal force; manifesting a mighty power he subdues them and restores peace.

28. "To all the lands where there are infernal regions the Bodhisattva will go and be busily engaged in saving all the suffering beings.

29. "In all the lands where the beasts devour one another, he will manifest himself among them and benefit them.

30. "Though he appears as if enjoying the five senses, yet he practises meditation; thus causing confusion in the mind of the evil ones he gives them no chance to assert their power.

31. "To see a lotus flower blowing right in fire, this is indeed a rare thing; even so to practise meditation while leading a sensuous life, this is rare indeed.

32. "Manifesting himself as a harlot he attracts those sensuously minded; this is to catch them by the hook of sensuality, and induce them later into the wisdom of Buddha.

33. "He will sometimes be manifested as a burgomaster, or as a leader of traders, or as a national teacher, or as a minister of state, and benefits all beings.

34. "He manifests himself as an inexhaustible store of treasure for all who are in need, and by this means persuades

them to cherish the thought of enlightenment.

35. "He manifests himself as a hero in possession of mighty power and suppresses all the arrogant spirits cherished by those that are egotistic and conceited; and makes them abide in the supreme enlightenment.

36. "To those who are timorous he manifests himself before them and gives them comfort: he first bestows fearlessness on them and then lets them awaken the thought of supreme enlightenment

37. "Showing himself as a hermit, free from sensuality and in possession of the five supernatural powers, he leads all beings to realise discipline, patience, and mercy.

38. "If there is any who requires attendants, he will be manifested to him as a servant; first he satisfies him in his needs, and then persuades him to cherish the thought of supreme enlightenment.

39. "Whatever beings desire he bestows upon them; he induces them to the way of Buddha, and by the power of the good necessary means he provides them with everything they are need of.

40. "Thus infinite are the ways of Bodhisattvas and measureless his deeds; and innumerable are beings he thus delivers; limitless is his wisdom.

41. "Though all the Buddhas through countless millions of kalpas praise the virtues of the Bodhisattva, yet the limits will never be reached.

42. "Who but the foolish, ignorant, and unintelligent, hearing such excellent teachings as these, cherish not the thought of supreme enlightenment?"

NĀGĀRJUNA'S MAHĀYĀNAVIMŚAKA

Prefatory Notes

The Madhyamika philosophy of Buddhism goes in China under the name of the San-lun school (三論宗), which literally means the school of the three treatises, which are Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamika-sūtra*, *Dvadaśadvāra-sāstra*, and Āryadeva's *Śataka*. In Tibet there is a Buddhist school known as the Prasaṅgikā which claims to transmit the tradition of the Madhyamika philosophy as was expounded by such later followers of Nāgārjuna as Buddhapaṇita and Candrakīrti. The Prasaṅgikā school has five treatises by Nāgārjuna for its doctrinal authority. They are known as "rigs-paḥi tshogs sde" (Division of Norm-collection) and consist of (1) *Mūlamadhyamika*, (2) *Yuktishashtika* (3) *Śūnyatāsaptatī*, (4) *Vigrahavyāvartanī*, and (5) *Vaidalya*.

While it goes without saying that the fundamental ideas of the two schools, Chinese San-lun and the Tibetan Prasaṅgikā, are derived from Nāgārjuna's original treatise (*Kārikā*) on the Madhyamika, we can distinguish the three different undercurrents of thought in the text-books of the Madhyamika school. (1) Of the five Tibetan works, the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* and the *Vaidalya* may be regarded as forming the logical wing of the school, as its central subject is a critical study of the Nyāya; (2) The *Śūnyatāsaptatī* has for its content a subject-matter somewhat different from the other texts, but as it is on the whole a summary of the *Mūlamadhyamika*, it forms another branch of thought together with the *Mūlamadhyamika* and the *Dvadaśadvāra-sāstra*, which last is again a compendium of the *Śūnyatāsaptatī* and the *Mūlamadhyamika*; and lastly, (3) The *Yuktishashtika* differs not only in its subject-matter but in its tendency of thought from the rest of the Madhyamika works, and what we especially

notice in this book is that it betrays an idealistic way of thinking. This is shown in the following extracts:

|| ḥbyuñ-ba che la-sogs bśad-pa ||
 rnam-par śes-su yañ-dagṭdu ||
 de śes-pas-ni ḥbral ḥgyur-na ||
 log-par rnam-brtag ma-yin nam || (Verse 34)

“What are known as the elements, etc., are included in Vijñāna (consciousness): knowing this; would one think of the elements as separate from Vijñāna? The elements so regarded are the result of wrong discrimination.”

And again in Verses 36 and 77, we have this: “This world is said to be conditioned by ignorance; when ignorance vanishes, the world too vanishes. Being so, the world is no more than discrimination.”

In the *Mahāyānaviśāka* whose Tibetan texts along with the Chinese version are given below, this idealistic tendency is more pronounced than in the *Yuktishashtika*. There is no doubt that the philosophy of the *Prajñā-pāramitā Sūtra* and the theory of Śūnyatā as advocated by Nāgārjuna are derived from the phenomenalism of the Buddhist teaching that things (*bhāvāḥ*) have no reality of their own because of the law of conditionality. Thus naturally Nāgārjuna is ever intent everywhere in his philosophical treatises to dwell upon the ten similes in the *Prajñā-pāramitā Sūtra* illustrative of the theory of Śūnyatā (emptiness), saying that all things are like dreams, visions, the moon reflected in water, and images in the mirror. The reason, however, why we see all these actualities before us in spite of Nāgārjuna's phenomenalistic interpretation of existence, is according to him, due to our ignorance which stirs up our minds to create all these dream-like existences. This absolute idealism or subjectivism which denies the reality of an external world in itself, logically leads to the Vijñānavāda point of view as held by Aśaṅga and Vasubandhu. According to this teaching, Vijñāna alone exists

(*viññānaptimātra*), no reality is granted to external objects (*artha*), and even mind (*citta* or *viññāna*) as one of such objects cannot claim any reality: in brief, apart from the comprehended (*grāhya*) there is no comprehending subject (*grāhaka*) either.

While the philosophy of Nāgārjuna is based upon the theory of Śūnyatā as expounded in his encyclopedic commentary to the *Prajñā-pāramitā Sūtra*, it is also supported by the Avatamsaka doctrine, the final word of which is that "the triple world is mind only"; and indeed his treatise on the ten stages (*daśabhūmi*) of Bodhisattvahood is no more than the confirmation of this psychological dictum. In this respect the *Mahāyānavimśaka* is quite explicit as we see in verses 6, 8-12, 17-20, 22, etc., especially in verse 10 which corresponds to the utterance of Nyorairin (如來林) Bodhisattva at the Yamadeva's Palace as described in the *Avatamsaka*:

"Mind is like an artist

Variously producing the five skandhas."

The verse 17 begins with the following:

Mdo-las|kye rgyal-baḥi srar-dag ḥdi-lta ste|khams gsum-
pa ḥdi-ni sems-tsam-mo shes hbyañ-baḥi phyir-ro|

"As we read in the Sutra, O sons of the Buddha, in the triple world there exists mind only."

This is in full agreement with the idea of the *Vimśika-vṛitti*, where we have this:

Bya byed rmi-ram gnod-pa ḥdra. 如夢害作事. (It is as if in dream evil deeds are actually committed.)

And again the verse 16 reads:

mñon-sum blo-ni rmi-sogs bshin || de-yañ gañ-tshe deḥitshe
|| khyod-kyis don de mi snañ-na || de-ni mñon-sum ji-ltar ḥdod
證智如夢中. 是時如證智. 是時不見塵. 云何塵可證.

(Our knowledge of reality is like a dream in which things appear as if real, but there are no objective realities in dreams, and in like manner how can we prove the reality of an objective world?)

We may add that the various currents of thought to be discerned in Nāgārjuna's works above referred to including the *Mahāyānavimśaka* are traceable in his stupendous commentary on the *Mahāprajñā-pāramitā-sūtra*. In the fifteenth volume, Nāgārjuna comments, "If all existences (*bhāvāḥ*) are real, it is impossible for mind to know them. If they exist because of their being known by mind, this is not to be called as existing." In Volume Eight we have: "All existences are like a plantain-tree; all is created by mind. But when you know that things have no reality, the mind itself ceases to exist." Nāgārjuna's comments on the ten similarities explaining the theory of Śūnyatā also testify to the idealistic tendency of his philosophy.

While lately making comparative study of the philosophical verses of Nāgārjuna, which are preserved in the Tibetan and the Chinese Tripitaka, I came across two versions of his *Mahāyānavimśaka* in the mdo ḥgrel, of the bstan ḥgyur, which in Cordier's Catalogue correspond to No. 17 (*Tsa*), 156a, 4-157 a, 5; and No. 33 (*Gi*), 211 b, 8-213 a. In the Chinese Tripitaka there is just one version of this work (Nanjo, No. 1308). In the following pages all these three versions are given for comparison. The Chinese consists of three parts: the prefatory verse, the text proper, and the dedicatory: the Tibetan (*Tsa*) contains 23 verses as the Chinese, but each division retains the same gāthā form. Towards the end of the text the Tibetan version grows disorderly and does not conform to the Chinese order; in this latter respect however the Tibetan (*Gi*) version consisting of twenty verses is in better agreement with the Chinese. In the following edition of the *Mahāyānavimśaka*, the "Tsa" text has been used as the principal one for comparison. As I have so far no access to other Tibetan editions than the Red Peking edition brought over here by Professor Yenga Teramoto, there are some points in each of the three texts, Tibetan and Chinese, which re-

quire further elucidation. It is my earnest wish that scholars would help us to clear up all the difficulties I have left here unsettled. An English translation and notes giving reasons for various readings and corrections will appear in the next issue of *The Eastern Buddhist*.

SUSUMU YAMAGUCHI

༄༄ || ཁྱ་གར་སྒད་དུ། མ་དུ་ཡུ་ན་བེནྱ་ཀ
 བོད་སྒད་དུ། ཐེག་པ་ཆེན་པོ་ཉི་ཤུ་པ།
 大乘二十頌論

(ཙ) འཇམ་དཔལ་གཞིན་རྒྱར་གྱུར་པ་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ།

(ག) དཀོན་མཆོག་གསུམ་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ།

(ཙ¹) | ཆགས་མེད་ཐུགས་སུ་རྒྱུད་སངས་རྒྱལ།

| རྩོད་བྱེད་བརྩོད་པར་བྱ་བ་མེན།

| ཐུགས་རྩེས་རྒྱལ་བར་སྒྲུང་གྱུར་པ།

| མཐུ་བསམ་མི་བྱུང་ཕྱག་འཚལ་ལོ།

(ག¹) | གང་གིས་བརྩོད་པའི་ཆོས་ཀྱིས་ནི།

| བརྩོད་དུ་མེད་ཀྱང་བརྩེ་བས་བསྟན།

| ཆགས་མེད་སྟོ་ཅན་སྟོན་མེད་པའི།

| མཐུ་ཅན་སངས་རྒྱལ་ལ་ཕྱག་འཚལ།

(¹) 歸命不可思議性 諸佛無著眞實智
 諸法非言非無言 佛悲愍故善宣說

(ཙ²) | དམ་པའི་དོན་དུ་སྒྲུ་མེད་ཕྱིར།

| དེ་ཉིད་དུ་ནི་གྲོལ་བའང་མེད།

| མཁའ་བཞིན་སངས་རྒྱལ་དེ་བཞིན་ཏེ།

| ཐེགས་ཅན་དང་ནི་མཆོན་ཉིད་ཅིག

(ག) 2) |སྒྲིབ་དོན་དུ་ཡོད་མ་ཡིན།
 |འགག་པ་འདྲ་དེ་ཉིད་དུ་མེད་དེ།
 |མངས་ཀྱིས་ནམ་མཁའ་ཇི་བཞིན་ལ།
 |མཐམ་ཅན་ནམས་ཀྱང་མཚན་ཉིད་གཅིག།

(2) 第一義無生 隨轉而無性
 佛衆生一相 如虛空平等

(ཙ) 3) |ཕ་རྒྱལ་ཚུ་རྒྱལ་སྒྲིམ་པས།
 |རང་བཞིན་སྤངས་འདས་པ་འདྲ་མེད།
 |དེ་བཞིན་འདུས་བྱས་མཛོད་པར་སྟོང་།
 |ཀུན་མཐུན་ཡི་ཤེས་སྟོན་ཡུལ་ཡིན།

(ག) 3) |ཕ་རྒྱལ་ཚུ་ལ་བཞིན་སྒྲིམ་པ་ཡི།
 |འདུས་བྱས་རྟེན་སྒྲིམ་དེ་དག་ཀྱང་།
 |རང་གི་ངོ་བོ་སྟོང་པ་ཉིད།
 |ཀུན་མཐུན་ཡི་ཤེས་སྟོན་ཡུལ་ཅན།

(3) 此彼岸無生 自性緣所生
 彼諸行皆空 一切智智行

(ཙ) 4) |དངོས་པོ་ཀུན་གྱི་རང་བཞིན་ནི།
 |གཟུགས་བརྒྱན་དང་ནི་མཚུངས་པར་རྟོགས།
 |ནམ་དག་ཞི་བའི་ངོ་བོ་ཉིད།
 |གཉིས་མེད་དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་དུ་མཉམ།

(ག) 4) |དངོས་པོ་ཐམས་ཅད་རང་བཞིན་གྱིས།
 |གཟུགས་བརྟན་དང་ནི་མཚུངས་པར་འདོད།
 |དག་དང་ཞི་བའི་རང་བཞིན་ཏེ།
 |གཉིས་མེད་དེ་བཞིན་ཉིད་དང་མཚུངས།

(4) 無染眞如性 無二等寂靜
 諸法性自性 如影像無異

(ཙ) 5) |བདག་དང་བདག་མེད་བདེན་མེན་ཏེ།
 |སོ་སོའི་སྐྱེ་བོས་བརྟགས་པ་ཡིན།
 |བདེ་དང་སྤྱག་བསྐྱེད་བསྐྱེས་པ་སྟེ།
 |ཉོན་མོངས་རྣམས་དང་གྲོལ་དེ་བཞིན།

(ག) 5) |སོ་སོའི་སྐྱེ་བོ་དེ་ཉིད་དུ།
 |བདག་མེད་ན་ཡང་བདག་ཉིད་དུ།
 |བདེ་དང་སྤྱག་བསྐྱེད་བརྟེན་སྟེ་མས་དང་།
 |ཉོན་མོངས་ཀྱན་དུ་རྣམ་པར་བརྟག

(5) 凡夫分別心 無實我計我
 故起諸煩惱 及苦樂捨等

(ཙ) 6) |འགྲོ་བ་རིགས་སྤྱག་འཁོར་བ་དུ།
 |མཐོ་རིམ་མཚོག་དང་བདེ་བ་དང་།
 |དབྱུང་བར་སྤྱག་བསྐྱེད་ཆེན་པོ་སྟེ།
 |དེ་དག་ལྷུང་རྣམས་ཉམས་སྤོང་།

(ག) 6) |འཁོར་བར་འགོ་བ་རྣམ་ཏུག་དང་།
 |བདེ་འཁྱོ་བདེ་བ་མཆོག་ཉིད་དང་།
 |དཔྱལ་བར་སྤྱག་བསྐྱལ་ཆེན་པོ་དང་།
 |ཡུལ་དེ་ཉིད་མི་བསམས་པར་ ... །

(7) 天趣勝妙樂 地獄極大苦
 皆不實境界 六趣常輪轉

(ཙ་ 7) |མི་དགེས་མཆོག་ཏུ་སྤྱག་བསྐྱལ་ཞིང་།
 |དགའ་ན་མི་དྲག་གྱུང་པ་ཡིན།
 |དག་བའི་ལས་རྣམས་ཉིད་ཀྱིས་ཀྱང་།
 |བཟང་པོ་ཉིད་ཏུ་ངེས་པ་ཡིན།

(ག) 7) |གཞན་ཡང་མི་དག་སྤྱག་བསྐྱལ་དང་།
 |ཁ་དང་ནད་དང་མི་དྲག་ཉིད།
 |ལས་རྣམས་ཀྱི་ནི་རྣམ་པར་སྤྱིན།
 |བདེ་བ་དང་ནི་སྤྱག་བསྐྱལ་ཉིད།

(6) 世間老病死 爲苦不可愛
 隨諸業墜墮 此實無有樂

(ཙ་ 8) |སྤྱི་མེད་རྟོག་པས་བསྐྱུན་པ་ཡིས།
 |
 |དཔྱལ་པ་སོགས་པ་སྤྱང་བ་ནི།
 |ཉིས་པ་ནགས་ཀྱི་མེ་བཞིན་བསྐྱེག་

(8) 衆生妄分別 煩惱火燒燃
墮地獄等趣 如野火燒林

(ཙ་ 9) |སྒྱུ་མ་ཇི་རྩ་ཇི་རྩ་བར།
|དེ་བཞིན་སེམས་ཅན་ཡུལ་ལ་སྤོང།
|འགྲོ་བ་སྒྱུ་མའི་རང་བཞིན་ཡིན།
|དེ་བཞིན་དུ་ནི་བརྟེན་ནས་བྱང།

(9) 衆生本如幻 復取幻境界
履幻所成道 不了從緣生

(ཙ་ 10) |ཇི་ལྟར་རི་མོ་མཁན་གྱིས་གཟུགས།
|གནོད་སྦྱིན་འཇིགས་པ་བྲིས་པ་ཡིས།
|དེ་ཡིས་རང་ཉིད་སྒྲག་པ་ལྟར།
|མི་མཁས་འཁོར་བར་དེ་བཞིན་ནོ།

(ག་ 8) |ཡང་དག་རི་མོ་མཁན་གྱིས་ནི།
|ཤིན་ཏུ་འཇིགས་བྱེད་གཤིན་ཇི་དེ་གཟུགས།
|བྲིས་ཏེ་རང་ཡང་འཇིགས་པ་ལྟར།
|འཁོར་བར་ཆོང་བའང་དེ་བཞིན་ནོ།

(10) 如世間畫師 畫作夜叉相
自畫已自怖 此名無智者

(ཙ་ 11) |ཇི་ལྟར་རང་གིས་འདས་གཡོས་པས།
|བྲིས་པ་འགའ་ཞིག་བྱེད་བ་ལྟར།

། དེ་བཞིན་རྟོག་པའི་འདམ་བྱིང་བས།

། སེམས་ཅན་རྣམས་ནི་འབྱུང་མི་ལུས།

(ག 9) ། ཇི་ལྟར་རང་གིས་འདམ་བྱས་ནས།

། བྱིས་པ་དགའ་བ་འདྲིན་པ་ལྟར།

། དེ་བཞིན་གཤིན་ཏུ་དགའ་བ་ཡི།

། རྣམ་རྟོག་འདམ་ཏུ་སེམས་ཅན་བྱིང་།

(11) 衆生自起染 造彼輪廻因
造已怖墜墮 無智不解脫

(ཙ 12) ། དངོས་མེད་དངོས་པོར་ལྟ་བ་ཡིས།

། ལྷག་བསྐྱལ་ཚོར་བ་ཉམས་སུ་བྱིང་།

། ལུལ་དང་གེས་པ་དེ་དག་ཏུ།

། རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པའི་དུག་གིས་བཅིངས།

(ག 10) ། མེད་ལ་ཡོད་པར་མཐོང་བ་ཡིས།

། ལྷག་བསྐྱལ་ཚོར་བ་བྱིང་བར་བྱིང་།

། ཉམ་ང་ཕྱིན་ཆེ་ལོག་སྒོ་ཡིས།

། རྟོག་པའི་དུག་གིས་གནོད་པར་བྱིང་།

(12) 衆生虛妄心 起疑惑垢染
無性計有性 受苦中極苦

(ཙ 13) ། དེ་དག་སྒྲིང་པོ་མེད་མཐོང་བས།

། ཤེས་རབ་སྒྲིང་ཇི་ལྟར་ཡིད་ཀྱིས་ནི།

|སེམས་ཅན་རྣམས་ལ་ཕན་པའི་ཕྱིར།

|རྫོགས་སངས་ཀྱིས་ལ་སྦྱོར་བར་བྱ།

(གི་ 11) |སྐྱབས་མེད་དེ་དག་མཐོང་ནས་ནི།

|སྤྱིང་ཆེན་དབང་གྱུར་ཡིད་ཅན་གྱིས།

|སངས་ཀྱིས་ཕན་མཛད་སེམས་ཅན་རྣམས།

|རྫོགས་པའི་བྱང་ཆུབ་ལ་སྦྱོར་མཛད།

(13) 佛見彼無救 乃起悲愍意

故發菩提心 廣修菩提行

(ཙ་ 14) |དེས་ཀྱང་ཚྲགས་བསགས་ཀྱན་རྫོབ་དུ།

|སྤྱིང་མེད་པའི་བྱང་ཆུབ་ཐོབ།

|རྫོག་པའི་འཆིང་བ་རྣམས་ལས་གྲོལ།

|སངས་ཀྱིས་དེ་ནི་འཛིག་རྟེན་གཉིན།

(གི་ 12) |དེ་དག་བཟོད་ནས་ཚྲགས་བསགས་ནས།

|རྫོག་པའི་དྲ་བ་ལས་གྲོལ་རྟེ།

|ཡི་ཤེས་སྤྱིང་མེད་པ་འཐོབ།

|སངས་ཀྱིས་འཛིག་རྟེན་གཉིན་དུ་འགྱུར།

(14) 得無上智果 即觀察世間

分別所纏縛 故爲作利益

(ཙ་ 15) |ཇི་ལྟར་རྟེན་ཅིང་འབྲེལ་འབྱུང་བ།

|གང་གིས་ཡང་དག་དོན་དུ་གཞིགས།

།དེ་ཡིས་འགྲོ་བ་སྤོང་པར་མཐོག།

།ཐོག་མ་དབུས་དང་ཐ་མ་སྤངས།

(ཁ) 13) །ཡང་དག་དོན་ནི་མཐོང་བའི་ཕྱིར།

།ཇི་བཞིན་ཡི་ཤེས་སྒྲིམ་པ་ནམས།

།དེ་ནས་ཐོག་མཐའ་བར་སྤངས་པའི།

།འགྲོ་བ་སྤོང་པ་ཉིད་དུ་མཐོང་།

(15) 從生及生已 悉示正眞義
後觀世間空 離初中後際

(ཙ) 16) །དེ་ལྟར་མཐོང་བས་འཁོར་བ་དང་།

།མྱ་ངན་འདས་པའང་དེ་ཉིད་མིན།

།ཉོན་མོངས་པ་ཡི་རྣམ་པ་མེད།

།ཐོག་མ་དབུས་མཐའི་རང་བཞིན་བསལ།

(ཁ) 14) །དེ་དག་བདག་ཉིད་འཁོར་བ་དང་།

།མྱ་ངན་འདས་པའི་མི་མཐོང་ངོ་།

།མ་གོས་འགྱུར་བ་མེད་པ་དང་།

།གཞིན་ནས་ཞི་ཞིང་འོད་གསལ་བོད།

(16) 觀生死涅槃 是二俱無我
無染亦無壞 本清淨常寂

(ཙ) 17) །ཁྱི་ལམ་ཉམས་སུ་སྤྱོད་བ་བཞིན།

།སྤོང་དོན་གསུམ་སྤྱོད་བ་མིན།

ཁྱོང་ས་པའི་ཐུན་པ་བཞིན་སང་པ།
འཁོར་བ་ནམས་ནི་དཔེགས་པ་མེད།

(ཁི་ 15) ཁྱི་ལམ་ཉམས་སུ་སྤྱོད་བའི་ཡུལ།
མང་པར་བྱུང་ན་མི་མཐོང་ངོ།
ཁྱོང་ས་པའི་ཐུན་པ་སང་པ་ཡིས།
འཁོར་བ་མཐོང་བ་མ་ཡིན་ཉིད།

(17) 夢中諸境界 覺已悉無見
智者寤癡睡 亦不見生死

(ཙ་ 16) ཁྱྱ་མས་སྤྱལ་པ་སྤྱྱ་མར་མཐོང་།
གང་ཆོ་འདུས་པ་དེའི་ཆོ།
ཅུང་ཟད་ཡོད་པ་མ་ཡིན་ཏེ།
དེ་ནི་ཆོས་ནམས་ཆོས་ཉིད་ཡིན།

(23) 於彼諸法法性中 實求少法不可得
如世幻師作幻事 智者應當如是知

(ཙ་ 19) འདི་དག་ཐམས་ཅད་སེམས་ཅམ་ཏེ།
སྤྱྱ་མ་ལྟ་བུར་གནས་པ་ཡིན།
དག་དང་མི་དག་ལས་ནམས་ཀྱིས།
དེ་ཡིས་བཟང་ངན་སྤྱྱ་བ་ནམས།

(ཁི་ 18) འདི་དག་ཐམས་ཅད་སེམས་ཅམ་གྱི།
སྤྱྱ་མར་འབྱུང་བ་བཞིན་དུ་སྤྱྱ།

|དེ་ལས་དག་དང་མེ་དག་ལས།

|དེ་ལས་སྒྲིབ་བཟང་དང་ངན།

(20) 此一切唯心 安立幻化相
作善不善業 感善不善生

(ཙ་ 20) |སེམས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་ལོ་འགགས་པ་ཡིས།

|ཚེས་རྣམས་བསམ་ཅད་འགག་པ་ཉིད།

|དེ་ཕྱིར་ཚེས་ཉིད་བདག་མེད་ཅིང་།

|དེས་ན་ཚེས་ཉིད་རྣམ་པར་དག

(གི་ 19) |སེམས་ཀྱི་འཁོར་བ་འགགས་པ་ན།

|ཀླན་གྱི་ཚེས་ཉིད་འགག་པ་ཡིན།

|དེ་ཉིད་ཚེས་པ་བདག་མེད་དེ།

|དེ་ཉིད་ཚེས་ཀྱི་རྣམ་དག་སྒྲི།

(21) 若滅於心輪 卽滅一切法
是諸法無我 法諸悉清淨

(ཙ་ 21) |དངོས་པོ་འམ་ནི་རང་བཞིན་ལ།

|རྟག་དུ་བདེ་བར་འདུས་ཤིང་ཤིང་།

|སྤངས་པའི་ཐུན་པས་བསྐྱབས་པས་ན།

|བྱིས་པ་འཁོར་བའི་ཀྱ་མཆོར་འཁྱམ།

(གི་ 16) |རང་བཞིན་མེད་པའི་དངོས་རྣམས་ལ།

|རྟག་བདག་བདེ་བའི་འདུ་ཤིང་གིས།

|ཆགས་མྱོང་ས་ལུན་པས་བསྐྱབས་པ་ནི།

|སྲིད་པའི་རྒྱ་མཚོ་འདི་འབྱུང་ངོ།

(གི་ 17) |སྐྱེ་བ་རང་ཉིད་མ་སྐྱེ་ན་མས།

|འདིག་རྟེན་ན་མས་ཀྱིས་སྐྱེ་བར་བརྟགས།

|ན་མ་པར་རྟོག་དང་སེམས་ཅན་ན་མས།

|འདི་དག་གཉིས་ཀྱང་རིགས་མ་ཡིན།

(18) 愚癡闇蔽者 墜墮生死海

無生計有生 起世間分別

(19) 若分別有生 衆生不如理

於生死法中 起常樂我想

(ཙ་ 22) |རྟོག་པའི་ཚུ་བོས་གང་བ་ཡི།

|འཁོར་བའི་རྒྱ་མཚོ་ཆེན་པོ་ལ།

|ཐིག་ཆེན་གྱ་ལ་མི་ཞིན་པ།

|གང་གིས་པ་རྩོལ་བྱིན་པར་འབྱུང།

(གི་ 20) | |

|ཐིག་པ་ཆེ་ལ་མ་རྟེན་པར།

|འཁོར་བའི་རྒྱ་མཚོ་ཆེན་པོ་ཡི།

|པ་རྩོལ་བཀལ་བར་འབྱུང་བ་མིན།

(24) 生死輪迴大海中 衆生煩惱水充滿

若不運載以大乘 畢竟何能到彼岸

(ཙ་ 23) །མ་རིག་རྟེན་གྱིས་བྱང་བ་འདེ།
 །ཡང་དག་འཛིག་རྟེན་མཁྱེན་པའི་ཕྱིར།
 །རྣམ་པར་རྟོག་པ་འདི་དག་ནི།
 །ཅི་ཞིག་ལས་ནི་འབྱུང་བར་འགྱུར།

(22) 佛廣宣說世間法 當知卽是無明緣
 若能不起分別心 一切衆生何所生

(ཙ) །ཐིག་པ་ཆེན་པོ་ཉི་ཤུ་པ་སྟོབ་དཔོན་གྱ་སྟུབ་ཀྱི་ནལ་ལྷ་ནས་
 མཛད་པ་ཚོགས་སོ།

།ཀྱ་གར་གྱི་མཁན་པོ་ཅན་དྲ་གྱ་མ་ར་དང་དགེ་སྟོང་ཤུ་གྱ་
 འོད་གྱིས་བསྐྱར།

(ག) །ཐིག་པ་ཆེན་པོ་ཉི་ཤུ་པ་སྟོབ་དཔོན་འཕགས་པ་གྱ་སྟུབ་ཀྱིས་
 མཛད་པ་ཚོགས་སོ།

།ཁ་ཆེན་པོ་ཉི་ཤུ་པ་སྟོབ་དཔོན་ལོ་རྒྱ་བ་དགེ་སྟོང་གྲགས་
 འབྱུང་གིས་རབ་ཀྱིས་བསྐྱར་བོ།

大乘二十頌論 大龍樹造 宋天竺三藏施護譯
 (至元法寶勘同總錄 第九)

THE LATE PROFESSOR GESSHO SASAKI

To our greatest sorrow, we have to report the death of Professor Gessho Sasaki, who was one of the chief organisers of the Eastern Buddhist Society and President of Otani University. The lamentable event took place on March 6, this year, after a short illness, though in fact he had not been well at all ever since the last severe attack of the heart which he had about two years ago. So many important affairs required his personal and exacting attention, and he refused to shirk his duties in spite of the weak condition of his health and the strong advice of his friends. He was just a little over fifty years when he died. He was a profound scholar of the Avatamsaka school as well as of the Shin sect to which he belonged. In his later years he showed much interest in the Yogācāra and the Madhyamika school, and two of his last productions deal with Asanga and Vasubandhu and with Nāgārjuna. He had also practical and executive abilities and there were many things he had projected and left unfinished for the future of the young university over which he came to preside a short time before his last illness. He published many books on various branches of Buddhist study while alive, and yet at his death more than a trunkful of MSS was found awaiting his final elaboration. His friends remain unconsoled over the loss of such a devout and learned Buddhist scholar, and this number of *The Eastern Buddhist* with which he had such close connections, is dedicated to his spirit. Without his cooperation and constant encouragement, the Eastern Buddhist Society would perhaps have never seen the light.

Death is an everyday affair in this world, we see it in every direction and at every moment of life, there is nothing strange about it. But when a friend is taken away from among our own circles, the event assumes a thought-provoking aspect and makes us think of it as if it were a thing that

never happened before and would never happen again. There is something absolutely unique and final about death. It takes our thoughts and feelings away from things worldly and material and carries them out into another realm whose truth and reality appeals powerfully to our supersensibility. All worldly considerations melt away and we are awakened from a long dream. It is as if cold water had been poured over the fervid forehead, a new order of realities now confronts us. After all there is something of real value behind the fleeting individual existences, and it is this that is really real and eternally surviving. Our work however humble gains its meaning only when it is considered in connection with this reality.

A short biographical sketch of the late Professor Gessho Sasaki and a list of his principal works are as follows:

Born April 13, 1875, as fifth son of a Shinshu family in the prefecture of Aichi—Graduated from the Shinshu Daigaku (College of Shin Buddhism), 1901—Graduated from the post-graduate course of the same College, 1905, where the Subject of his research work was the "Doctrine of the One Vehicle (*ekayāna*)"—Appointed as professor at Shinshu Daigaku, 1905—Went abroad for the years 1921-22—Appointed as President of Otani Daigaku, 1924, which is the continuation of Shinshu Daigaku, but enlarged and recognised by the Department of Education as a fully qualified university (*daigaku*)—Died March 6, 1926.

Religion of Experience, 1903—*Life of Shinran*, 1910—*History of the Pure Land Doctrine in China*, 2 vols., 1913—*Outlines of Buddhism*, 1917—*Outlines of Shin Buddhism*, 1911—*Sacred Songs from the Avatamsaka Sutra*, 1921—*On Human Nature*, 1922—*The Twenty Verses Text of the Yogācāra School, Chinese and Tibetan Collated*, 1924—*Study of Shin Buddhism* (in English), 1925—*On Nāgārjuna's Madhyamika and its Philosophy*, 1926—*Asaṅga's Mahāyānasāṅgraha, Chinese and Tibetan Collated*, in press. Besides these about twenty minor works were left by the author.

TO GESSHO SASAKI

When I look out at my garden here among the mountains,
 And see the moon-flowers blooming every night,
 (They are so beautiful, like the flowers that grow in Gokuraku,
 But frail and short-lived as are the blossoms of this our world),
 I think of you and of the short night that you were with us.
 The dawn came too soon and you have left us,
 So many works unfinished, your splendid activity cut short;
 Surely in the Pure Land where you are dwelling,
 Your thoughts help us who are left here behind.
 This is our wish—to do those things you desired, to help
 those works for which you laboured;
 And while we mourn, the thought of you shall be our
 inspiration.
 O Moon-flower in my mountain garden
 Blooming tonight in heavenly radiance!
 Carry this message to that farther shore
 When you open your petals again in the garden of the
 Pure Land.

BEATRICE LANE SUZUKI

Karuizawa, August 5, 1926

NOTES

There is a growing tendency among the Christians as well as among the Western people to appreciate the spiritual value of Buddhism, especially of Mahayana Buddhism, and we are glad of that. For we know that the two great world religions, Christianity and Buddhism, cannot forever be kept apart with an antagonistic attitude towards each other, and also that if the Western people want to understand the East they cannot afford to ignore the study of Buddhism, not indeed with the idea of trying to find the weaknesses of an enemy, but really to appreciate the strong points of a friend. Mahayana Buddhism with its ideals of the Bodhisattva and his self-sacrificing love and all-penetrating wisdom has singularly conquered the hearts of the Far-eastern peoples. In spite of Confucianism, Taoism, and Shintoism, all of which are native-grown among them, Buddhism has wonderfully succeeded in penetrating into the deepest recesses of their souls. Even when those native religions cry aloud against the influence of Buddhism as not indigenous and therefore as something to be shunned, they forget that the very vitality of their doctrines is largely drawn from Buddhism itself. There is, besides, something infinitely grand and all-embracing in the ideas of Mahayana Buddhism, which compel those who study it to admit that they are truly such.

For instance, consider the idea of the Bodhisattva's postponing the attainment of enlightenment. He does this for the sake of his fellow-creatures, which include not only human beings but all living beings, sentient and non-sentient. Every possible means (*upāya*) is utilised for the purpose. He incarnates himself in every possible form and condition, and stands to his fellow-beings in every possible relationship. He goes to hell as readily as to heaven. Even when he acts as an enemy, he is using the opportunity for the latter's con-

version and final salvation. As long as there remains one single soul to be saved, he will keep up his activity. If he thinks it best to save a man as Christian, he will not have him to be a Buddhist. The means of salvation is not limited; as his resources are inexhaustible, he always knows what to do. He is not prejudiced, nor is he one-sided. If he cannot accomplish his objects in one life, he will be reborn as many times as necessary. And when everything is accomplished, he will quietly enter into his own Nirvana as if he achieved nothing, though no human intelligence can tell when such time will ever come on earth. And, last of all, the most wonderful thing is that this Bodhisattva is no other being than ourselves only if we know it.

In Christianity, each single individual stands to his creator as an independent solitary soul; but in Buddhism each soul is not only related as such to the highest reality but to one another in the most perfect network of infinite mutual relationship. The doctrine of anatta (non-ego), therefore, in Mahayana Buddhism grows to be quite a positive concept full of implications which have not been imagined in the teaching of the Hinayana. The doctrine of mutual interpenetration taught by Mahayanists goes beyond the limits of history, and does not countenance the idea that all the truth and power working for universal salvation centers in one single historical personage. As a Zen master claims, the Mahayanist turns a blade of grass into a golden body sixteen feet high (meaning the Buddha) and makes it function as such; not only that, he knows also how to turn the Buddha into a blade of grass and make it function as such.

The Shin sect of Buddhism is usually regarded as most closely related to Christianity in its scheme of salvation with Amitabha Buddha as saviour and all the suffering and sinful souls as his objects of mercy. But Amitabha is not a historical personage, but a metaphysical reality created by the demand of the religious consciousness. His reality thus stands

above historical contingencies. As long as the human heart is what it is, Amitabha will continue shedding his light, love, and life all over the universe. His Pure Land is not like a kingdom of God either to be realised in this world or to be sought after death. We are constantly coming back and forth from the Pure Land of Amitabha. We can say that the Pure Land is far away from us, speaking concretely, so many kotis of miles away from this world of endurance, but at the same time it is right among us in its full realisation. The Pure Land is not the place of rest and enjoyment where we go after death, it is here if we attain enlightenment; but if we feel that enlightenment is only possible to us in the land of Amitabha, this land stands as the object of eternal longing which sits deeply in the human heart. The longing, however, is not a dream never to be realised and only to aspire after, it is a longing we somehow feel already fulfilled even while longing for it. An element of irrationality always has its place in all religion.

When Mahayana Buddhism is thus studied in its multifarious aspects, we shall hear in it a still small voice whispering directly to the inmost ear of the soul. In China the Mahayana reached its height of development as the Avatamsaka philosophy of Genju (賢首) and the Tendai doctrine of Chisha (智者) while its mystical side bloomed as Zen Buddhism under the leadership of Yeno (慧能) and his satellites. In Japan the unfolding of Mahayanistic thought was consummated in the establishment of the Pure Land school as independent sects by such religious geniuses as Honen, Shinran, and Ippen. And then we have the religion of the *Saddharmapundarika Sutra*, which stirred up the soul of the fisherman's son to its very depths. Mahayana Buddhism has been specially fruitful in Japan. When the tide of agnosticism washed the shores of this side of the Pacific, the Japanese were thought, in fact they themselves thought, that they were agnostics, positivists, and altogether non-religious. But they

are now beginning to realise that they are after all the descendants of Nichiren, Shinran, Honen, Dogen, Kobo, and other Mahayanists. No students of the East can afford to neglect the study of Mahayana Buddhism with all its metaphysical subtleties and highly stimulating religious thoughts.

Recently the Editors of the *Eastern Buddhist* have received interesting literature from two widely different sources concerning the study of Mahayana Buddhism. The one comes from an American businessman who was once a Christian missionary in China, and the other from the German ambassador in Japan. Mr Dwight Goddard is a practical man full of religious feeling while Dr W. H. Solf is a diplomat with a deep intellectual mind. Naturally they see in Mahayana Buddhism what most appeals to their respective capacities and inclination. Mr Goddard's pamphlet (of sixteen pages and with the portraits of Christ and Buddha) is entitled "A Vision of Christian and Buddhist Fellowship in the Search for Light and Reality," and in it he proposes to establish "outwardly a Buddhist monastery but in reality a Christian Hospice." It is to be located somewhere in Hangchou or Nanking and somewhat apart from the busy city. It will be in the midst of a beautiful park whose very atmosphere is conducive to quiet meditation and the exchange of serious thought. There will be a large building that has convenience for library, lecture hall, and studies; there will be a chapel beautifully decorated and equipped for the liturgical worship so dear to the Buddhist brother, and smaller chapels for private meditation; further there will outlying buildings, a hospitality hall, and dwellings for the staff, consisting of a director, a chaplain, and two secretaries.

"The immediate objects to be secured by such a Hospice are as follows:

1. A place for fellowship and mutual exchange of thought;
2. A place to which missionaries may come for rest and

meditation; 3. A place for an annual retreat for both Buddhists and Christians; 4. A clearing house for the exchange of speakers at annual conferences; 5. A place for the accumulation and examination of Buddhist books and research material; 6. The publishing of a magazine designed to circulate among both Christians and Buddhists; 7. The publishing of books of mutual interest; 8. A place where British and American scholars may meet Buddhist scholars in a friendly atmosphere; 9. A place for the conservation of the results of research into the early contacts of Buddhism and Christianity.

"The foregoing are all immediate objects; there is the great purpose more distant but all important, which is: To provide a center from which may radiate that friendly and understanding sympathy that we believe, in the long run, will draw Christianity and Buddhism together into one native church."

Being a practical man and once a Christian missionary, Mr Goddard's appreciation of Buddhism is more practical than theoretical. The following passage quoted from his "Vision" is interesting showing what aspect of Mahayana Buddhism appeals to a certain type of Christians, when some of them refuse to see anything but idol-worship in the Buddhist temple. Mr Goddard writes:

"Buddhism is the real soul of China. If one measures it by the village temple with its one or two or three ignorant monks lounging about in their faded robes, the temple dust covered, the floor unswept from litter of orange-peel and chewed sugar cane, the idols in decay, incense ashes strewn about, hangings and decorations in dirty tatters, ignorant women kneeling and knocking their heads on the pavements in agonised prayers for some material benefit of health and comfort, he measures Buddhism in error. Even in the poorer of these crumbling, dirty village temples is a dignity and solemnity that is profoundly impressive. The surroundings of the temples and monasteries in their nature setting of park and lotus, with vistas, wherever possible, of mountain grandeur and solitude, all lift the human spirit into its own serenity and peace. The distant boom of pagoda bell, the fragrance of incense, the mystical chanting of sutras irrespective of worshippers, the rhythm of different-toned drums and gongs, the serene and

placid figure of Buddha, obscure in the half-light of the altar, all tends to intensify the spirit of worship and to allay the anxiety and distraction of earthy strife and impermanence, by thoughts of the real beauty and eternity and peace of the Pure Land, Nirvana. Multiply this by scores of thousands and you have China."

The German diplomat-scholar is far more philosophical than the American, and his interest in Mahayana Buddhism, like Professor Petzold whose articles on Tendai are well known to readers of this magazine, is speculative. He recently read an address before the Asiatic Society of Japan under the title, "Mahayana, the Spiritual Tie of the Far East." He proposes founding "a comprehensive Mahayana institute in Tokyo or Kyoto." He says, "The Buddhist Congress which recently sat in Tokyo has shown me that the foundation of such an institute is by no means a utopian idea. If then an exchange of ideas should take place between the teachers at this institute and the professors of Western universities, or if Eastern and Western scholars should be exchanged in the manner of the 'exchange professors,' I believe that knowledge of the Orient in the West and of the Occident in the East would be infinitely furthered."

According to him, it is

"A gap in our science and an anomaly in our academic education that we in the West, whether in Europe or in America, have not at any of our many universities a single chair for a religion or a religio-philosophical system which counts more adherents than Christianity. Should not this be a field for the cooperation of East and West? The knowledge of Far Eastern Buddhism is the key to the spiritual life of those races, the Chinese and Japanese, whom it is so hard for us to understand. If we in the West understand this Buddhism, we shall understand also the priests, philosophers, and poets who have worked and taught within its sphere. We shall also understand the products and the spirit of Far Eastern art. We shall no more be perplexed by the innumerable details in the religious images of Japan and China which to us are unintelligible: the deep symbolism which controls the whole thinking and feeling of these races will become clear to us; then shall we attain also to a practical understanding which will be unmeasurably useful to us in our intercourse and dealings with the men who have been endowed with the Buddhistic tradition for two and a half millenniums."

Below is Dr Solf's summary view of Mahayana Buddhism:

"Of all the systems of thought of the Far East, Buddhism alone can stand by the side of the great systems of Indian and European philosophy. This may be sufficiently demonstrated by a glance at its historical position. Buddhism, like Christianity, was in its origin not a *beginning*, but the *end* of a development of more than a thousand years. In it all the questionings and seekings of a highly civilised people, *every* problem of religion and philosophy, *every* craving for redemption and perfection find their satisfaction in a quite simple formula, or, better, in a retirement of the soul *back* to the ultimate and the simplest. And since this retirement of the soul was possible or at least comprehensible to all, this at once accounts for the immense spread of Buddhism far beyond the bounds of Indian nationality. For the *simplest* is always *that* which has also the widest *human* appeal. In this simplicity of its fundamental ideas, again, Buddhism possessed the ability to include the most diverse domains of human consciousness, and to grow in the course of its history into a system which in many-sidedness and comprehensiveness has no equal, into a structure in which practically everything can be accommodated, in which also the logical opposite appears to be equally related to one and the same fundamental thought."

All these propositions made by Dr Solf and Mr Goddard may appear somewhat visionary at the present stage of the mutual understanding spiritually between the East and the West, but they surely indicate where the wind blows among the most cultured minds of the world. The members of the Eastern Buddhist Society are in their humble way doing their best to propagate the knowledge of Mahayana Buddhism in the world so as to bring about these results desired by the missionary-businessman and the diplomat-scholar and many other like-minded who have not yet voiced their ideas but are in full sympathy with us.

Die Christliche Welt, nummer 44-45, issued in November, 1915, has quite a sympathetic review of *The Eastern Buddhist*, penned by Professor Rudolf Otto. We are thankful for his full appreciation of the work we are trying to further here in the Far East in our most unpretentious manner for the study and dissemination of Mahayana Buddhism. Unfortunately, while the fields are white already to harvest, there

are not enough hands to reap them. There are so many subjects in Mahayana Buddhism, one of the great religious-philosophical systems of the world, which we like to discuss and get reviewed by Western Christian scholars, but language stands in the way. In the many universities there are in Japan we have a number of able Buddhist scholars who are thoroughly equipped for the special fields of their study, but they are unable to express themselves in any other language than their own. On the other hand, professors at the Western universities find it difficult to thoroughly master the languages in which Mahayana Buddhism exists embedded. This is to a certain extent even the case with native scholars, for Buddhist philosophy is so highly technical, and to get well acquainted with its terminology is quite a task in itself, not to speak of the difficulty of translating Buddhist thought into other languages. There are more than a dozen scholarly magazines in Japan at present which publish learned articles on Mahayana Buddhism, but they are all sealed books to the outside world. We often think of epitomising such discussions in the *Eastern Buddhist* for the benefit of the learned world at large. But this again in itself constitutes a special field of work involving knowledge, labour, and time. We will do however our best to present in our magazine gradually what Japanese Buddhist scholars are thinking about such subjects as Professor Otto sets for them to answer in his kind and appreciative review of the *Eastern Buddhist*. We will for instance publish at an early date papers on the relation between Shin and Zen, on the doctrine of the Nichiren sect, on the unifying principles of the different Mahayana schools which generally look so confused and contradicting one another, on the Buddhist conception of sin and its redemption, etc., etc.

Something of Hinayana Buddhism is known to the West, but the real philosophical and religious foundations of Mahayana Buddhism are not yet properly understood by Chris-

tian scholars, who are inevitably more or less prepossessed though quite unconsciously against their rival religion. While the East has much to learn especially in science, economy, and organisation from the West, the latter too ought to be broad-minded enough to take in from whatever sources, whatever will broaden their intellectual outlook and help their spiritual development.

Dr Genchi Kato, associate professor at the Tokyo Imperial University, and Hikoshiro Hoshino, professor at the Hosei College, Tokyo, have published a second and revised edition of *Kogoshui* or *Gleanings from Ancient Stories* with introduction and critical notes. This is an English translation of an ancient book on the legendary history of Japan written early in the ninth century. Those who have studied *Kojiki* (Records of Ancient Matters) and *Nihongi* (Chronicles of Japan) will find in the present translation a useful supplementary reader in matters concerning the tradition of the divine ancestorship of the Imperial House of Japan. The Shinto rites in the beginning of history were equally entrusted to the Nakatomi family and to the Imbe, but later the Nakatomi grew in power and the tradition transmitted in this family came to be considered more orthodox than that of the Imbe. This was not liked by the latter. In order to have due regards paid to their history and the rôle they played in it, they compiled the *Gleanings from Ancient Stories*. According to the translators this book is also a protest against the overwhelming influence of Chinese culture that came at the time sweeping over the entire court of Japan. The translation is done well and faithfully. Dr Genchi Kato is an authority on Shintoism, and we congratulate him on giving such a valuable contribution to the students of ancient Japanese religion and history. The book is published by Meiji Japan Association, Tokyo, and its price is seven shillings. Pp. VI+124.

In England there seems to be a revival of interest in Buddhism. The Buddhist Lodge of the Theosophical Society was founded in 1924 with the object of forming a nucleus of such persons as wish to study, disseminate, and attempt to live the fundamental principles of Buddhism as viewed in the light of Theosophy. The Lodge has a furnished room at Bloomsbury Mansions, 26 Hart street, Bloomsbury, London. Meetings are held twice a month, there is a study class and discussion and all persons are welcomed, whether Buddhist or not and whether theosophist or not. A Bulletin was issued with news of activities and short articles until its size and circulation seemed to warrant the issuing of a magazine, and now since May the monthly magazine, *Buddhism in England*, twenty-four pages bound in yellow covers with lotus design has made its appearance. It contains many interesting news and notes of the Buddhist world and articles on Buddhist subjects. We wish the new enterprise a long and healthy life.

The Japanese Government is at present trying to prepare a law regulating all the religious organisations now existent in this country, Buddhist, Christian, and Shinto. A committee chosen for the preliminary discussion of the proposed law consists of some members of the Diet, Government officers, scholars and professors connected with the science of religion, specialists in different branches of jurisprudence, and representatives of the religions. The Government's plan is have the bill ready for the Diet that is to sit towards the end of the present fiscal year. Among the various difficulties that naturally arise from the Government's attempt to regulate in one act all the religious systems in Japan standing in most complicated historical relations not only to one another but to the life of the people, there is one problem that interests us most. This is the one concerning the status of the numerous Shinto shrines scattered all over Japan. The policy of the Government has been to regard them as non-religious

institutions, and all the Shinto priests in the chief shrines are Government officials with honorary court titles and paid from the Government exchequer. The idea is to associate the Shinto shrines with ancestor-worship or hero-worship and thereby to make them function towards the moral education of the nation. But the trouble is as the matter stands that the objects of worship at those shrines are not always august spirits belonging to the Imperial Family, they are frequently some unknown insignificant spirits, even evil spirits, and, what is worse, sometimes of phallic origin. The general public of course does not know anything about it, but this does not alter the fact. Besides, all the Shinto shrines including such as the Meiji shrine, Nogi shrine, etc., also issue charms and offer prayers for the devotees. In them we thus find popular superstition, moral tradition, and religious sentiment all mixed in utter confusion. Now what the Government wants to do is to exempt them from the proposed law of religions and to treat them separately as only concerned with the moral sentiment of the people, the source of which, according to the paternal way of thinking on the part of the Government, ought to be derived from the reverence for the Imperial Family; and the Imperial Family cannot have anything to do with religion in any form. A part of the Committee however strenuously opposes such exemption made for the Shinto shrines. This mix-up is deep-rooted and historical. Buddhists will be interested in the outcome of the controversy.

While going to the press we learn the loss of another fine spirit in the death of Mr Gijo Sakurai, who was the founder of *The Young East*, a new Buddhist monthly, published only since last year in Tokyo. He was a pious Buddhist and a practical worker for the dissemination of Buddhist knowledge. It is to be greatly regretted that he had not been allowed to see a fuller development of his last enterprise in which he poured much of his energy and from which he expected much good result to grow.

The last number of *The Eastern Buddhist*, Volume III, Number 4, was dated January-February-March, 1925, and issued in December 1925. Since then no number of *The Eastern Buddhist* has appeared until now. We are very sorry that the magazine had to be suspended again. It is too great a work for the Editors to make up so many numbers in arrears; therefore as we are just at the beginning of a new volume, we have decided to begin Volume IV with the summer number, July-August-September, 1926. This will be Number 1 of Volume IV, and Number 2 will follow towards the end of the year, the volumes after this beginning in July. All subscribers will receive the full number of magazines. We would ask our exchanges and reviewers to note this matter of our temporary suspension and of our beginning again with the fourth volume. From now on we hope to proceed without interruption and beg our readers to forgive the delay which has been due to difficult circumstances on the part of the Editors.

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THE EASTERN BUDDHIST

A quarterly unsectarian magazine devoted to the study of Mahayana Buddhism
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EDITORS

DAISETZ TEITARO SUZUKI

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- No. 5—The Life of Shinran Shōnin (*Godensho*)—The Religion of Shinran Shōnin—The Buddha and Shinran—In Buddhist Temples: Higashi Hongwanji.
- No. 6—Zen Buddhism as Chinese Interpretation of the Doctrine of Enlightenment—Dengyo Daishi and German Theology—Introduction to the Vimalakirti's Discourse on Emancipation—In Buddhist Temples: Chion-in.

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 - No. 4—Development of the Pure Land Doctrine in Buddhism—The Teaching of Sakyamuni—Vimalakirti's Discourse on Emancipation (continued)—A Comparative Index to the Samyutta-Nikaya and the Samyukta-Agama (concluded).
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THE EASTERN BUDDHIST

ZEN AND JODO, TWO TYPES OF BUDDHIST EXPERIENCE¹

Those who have studied Eastern or Mahayana Buddhism, even superficially, will at once notice that there are at least two distinct types of it, the devotional and the speculative; and that they are so sharply and almost so radically distinguished the one from the other that they may be regarded as not belonging to one and the same system known as Buddhism. Compare, for instance, the quotations from Hōnen (法然, 1133-1212) and Shinran² (親鸞, 1173-1262) with the one from Rinzai (臨濟, Lin-chi, died 867):

"The reason I founded the Pure Land sect," says Hōnen, "was that I might show the ordinary man how to be born into the Buddha's Real Land of Compensation. According to the Tendai (T'ien-tai, 天台) sect, the ordinary man may be born into the so-called Pure Land, but that land is conceived of as a very inferior place. Although the Hossō (Dharmalakṣha) sect conceives of it as indeed a very superior place, they do not admit that the common man can

¹ As this article presupposes some knowledge of the teachings of the Pure Land (Jodo) and the Zen school, the reader is referred to the author's previous essays on the subjects which have already appeared in this magazine.

² Hōnen was the founder of the Japanese Pure Land sect. While there were some devout Buddhists prior to him who advocated the nembutsu it was due to Hōnen's influence that the Pure Land or Nembutsu sect came to be recognised as an independent denomination in the body of Buddhism. Shinran following him advanced a step further and developed the deeper meaning implied in the teaching of Hōnen. The one constant refrain that runs through all those devotees of the nembutsu is their unmistakable detestation of this mundane life which is filled with the three poisonous passions and the five nauseating desires, and at the same time their utter inability to escape these fetters by their own efforts. Hence their faith in the saving power of Amida's Original Vow.

be born there at all. And all the sects, though differing in many other points, agree in not admitting that the common man can be born into the Buddha's Land of Real Compensation.....And so I inquired of a great many learned men and priests whether there is any other way of salvation than the Threefold Discipline (*śikṣa*), that is better suited to our poor abilities, but I found none who could either teach me the way or even suggest it to me. At last I went all by myself and with a heavy heart into the Library at Kurodani on Mount Hiye, where all the Scriptures were kept, and read them all through. While doing so, I hit upon a passage in Zendo's¹ *Commentary on the Meditation Sutra* (觀經疏) which runs as follows: 'Whether walking or standing, sitting or lying, only repeat the name of Amida with all your heart. Never cease the practise of it even for a moment. This is the very work which unfailingly issues in Salvation, for it is in accordance with the Original Vow of that Buddha.' On reading this I was impressed with the fact that even ignorant people like myself, by reverent meditation on this passage and an entire dependence on the truth in it, never forgetting the repetition of Amida's sacred name, may lay the foundation for that good karma, which will with absolute certainty eventuate in birth into the Blissful Land. And I was led not only to believe in this teaching bequeathed by Zendo, but also earnestly to follow the great Vow of Amida. And especially was that passage deeply inwrought into my very soul which says, 'For it is in accordance with the Original Vow of that Buddha.'"²

According to Shinran, we have this: "When the

¹ Zendo (善導 613-681) was a great advocate of the Pure Land doctrine in China, and always so strongly conscious of his sinful life in this world of defilements, he was ready at any moment to depart for Amida's country where everything was pure and perfect.

² *Hōnen, the Buddhist Saint*, pp. 186-188.

thought is awakened in us to recite the nembutsu,¹ believing that our rebirth in the Pure Land of Amida will surely take place by virtue of the miraculous power of his Vow, we then come to share in his all-embracing grace. The Original Vow makes no distinctions whatever as to age or moral merit; all that is needed is a believing heart. For the Vow is to save us—those sentient beings who are deeply immersed in sins and incessantly burning with passions. This being the case, when we believe in the Original Vow, no other merits are needed, for there are no merits that excel the nembutsu; nor are we to be afraid of evil deeds, for no evils are strong enough to stand in the way of Amida's Original Vow."²

These quotations are representative of the devotional type of Buddhist life, which is led by Donran (曇鸞, 476-542), Dōshaku (道綽, 562-645), Zendo, Jimin (慈愍, 679-748), and others in China, and by Genshin (源信, 942-1017), Hōnen, Shinran, and Ippen (一遍, 1239-1289) in Japan. The authority for this they find in the so-called Three Sutras of the Pure Land school: the *Daikyo* that is, (*Sukhāvativyūha*), *Kwangyo* (*Meditation Sutra*), and *Shōkyo* (*Smaller Sukhāvativyūha*). When we peruse their works such as Zendo's *Commentaries*, Hōnen's *Compilation* (選擇集), or another by Shinran (教行信證), we observe how firmly their thoughts are fixed on being born in a better world, because they describe themselves as hopelessly sinful mortals whose peace and happiness is entirely depending on being embraced in the love of Amida and born in his Land of Bliss and Purity. Now compare this deeply religious sentiment and devotional

¹ As to what is meant by "Nembutsu," literally "thinking of the Buddha," see below, and also my article on "The Development of the Pure Land Doctrine," which appeared in *The Eastern Buddhist*, Vol. III, No. 3.

² *Tannishō*, 歎異抄, a short collection of Shinran's sayings compiled by Yūinemo, one of his immediate disciples.

attitude with the following passage from Rinzai, one of the foremost Zen masters in the T'ang dynasty:

"Those who wish to study Buddhism these days must seek a true understanding of it. When they have it, they are not defiled by birth-and-death; to stay or to go, they are at liberty; while not seeking after anything superior and unusual, it comes to them by itself. O friends of the truth, the masters of old all had their specific ways of instructing their disciples, and as regards my way of illustrating [the truth of Zen], it simply consists in not letting you be confounded by others. If you wish to use it, use it¹, and have no hesitation whatever.

"Where is the trouble with students of Buddhism these days that they do not attain to it? The trouble lies in their not having faith enough in themselves. For when you have not faith enough in yourselves, you are always kept busy and annoyed, as you are controlled by your external conditions; and when you are thus turned round by all kinds of external circumstances, you will never be free, independent masters of yourselves. Only let your thoughts cease from pursuing things external, and you will not be any different from the Buddhas and Fathers.

"Do you wish to know the Buddhas and Fathers? They are right here with you listening to my discourse. As long as students not having faith enough run after things external, they will never attain to the living spirit of the Fathers, and all that they grasp will be the literary beauty of expression and nothing else.

"Don't be deceived, O venerable followers of Zen! If you fail to avail yourselves of this chance, you will have to

¹ Literally, "If you wish to use, use!" "It" is supplied by the translator, meaning the truth of Zen. The idea is that we are distracted too much by things external, including selfish desires and passions, and for that reason we fail to realise the sense of inner freedom which we all have and which constitutes the ultimate truth of all religion.

be going around through the triple world for ever so many kalpas and so many lives; and when you are thus swept off your feet by agreeable circumstances in this life, your next birth will be inside a cow or an ass.

"O friends of the truth, as far as I can see, in my understanding of the truth there is nothing different from that of Śakyamuni himself. Whatever activity shown by me today, is there anything not sufficient unto itself? All the mysterious light illumining the six forms of existence has not for a moment ceased to shine. When you gain this understanding, you will be leading a quiet, undisturbed life all the time.

"O venerable ones, there is no place for rest in this triple world which is like unto a house on fire. This is not a place for you to stay long; when a devil known as Impermanence comes around, all will be carried away in an instant, no respect will be paid to age, young or old, and to social rank, high or low. If you want to be like unto the Buddhas and Fathers, only pursue not things external."¹

The devotional type as represented by Zendo and other saints of the Nembutsu is technically known among Buddhist scholars as the "tariki" (other-power, 他力) branch of Buddhism, while the speculative or intellectual type as illustrated by Zen is called "jiriki" (自力) which literally means "self-power." For Zen relies on one's own efforts to reach the goal set up by its teachers, while Shin and Jodo ask Amida to help his devotees in their rebirth in the Pure Land where they expect to realise the Supreme Enlightenment. When practical difficulties involved in self-discipline are considered, the Jodo is said to be the path of Easy Practice in contradistinction to the path of Difficult Practice, which is trodden by the followers of Self-power. The Self-power school is also called the Holy Path as it is

¹ From the *Sayings of Rinzai* (臨濟錄) somewhat freely rendered.

meant only for those holy Bodhisattvas who are richly endowed due to their previous karma and are thus able to climb the rungs of perfection by their own moral effort (*vīrya*).

Overwhelmed with the wickedness of this world, the helplessness of sinful mortals, and the immensity of moral efforts one has to exercise for Enlightenment and freedom, the Jodo followers were placed in a situation of utmost despondency and untold agony. The drowning souls did not have even a fragment of straw to take hold of, when they caught sight of a shining one enveloped in infinite light. The Original Vow of Amida was the last refuge to which they could go. In spite of the Buddha's injunction, "Be ye your own lamp," they rushed towards the Infinite Light, immersed in which they felt strong, efficient, blessed, and enlightened. They felt and reasoned that whatever teaching left by the Buddha for his disciples was not meant for the weak-minded and heavily burdened with sins, who came to this world long after the master and could not come in personal touch with him. Their spiritual experience called for something else than the Nikayas or Agamas, they tried to find what they wanted among all the scriptures which claimed to come from the Buddha; if such documents were not in actual existence in the form of literature or oral transmission, they did not hesitate to compile one as based upon the inner spirit of the master whose love made him go through an infinite round of transmigration for the sake of sentient beings as told in the Jatakas and demonstrated in his last earthly life itself.

In this respect the speculative or intellectual type of Buddhism as exemplified by Zen is in better accord with the teaching of the Buddha, which is, as far as is observable in the earlier literature, highly characterised by its meditative and self-reflective mood of mind. In many respects the Bodhisattva is not an Arhat, perhaps the gap between the

two conceptions is just as wide as that between the Holy Path and the Easy Practice; but as long as the Bodhisattva is a self-reliant and self-disciplined follower of the Buddha, he is essentially an Arhat; both are striving after the realisation of the Supreme Enlightenment. They do not mind how long they have to transmigrate in their earthly lives, if they attain to self-realisation by constant striving and indefatigable energy. They are such believers in individualism and moral perfectibility that they never think of availing themselves of a stock of merit accumulated by others; their view of the moral law of causation is exclusive and self-containing and not at all so diffusive and all-embracing as that entertained by followers of the Nembutsu. The Holy Path is thorny and paved with the sense of moral responsibility, in which one side of human nature finds satisfaction. We are a strange combination of contraries; solitary aloofness appeals to us as much as social gregariousness.

It may not be out of place here to see how teachers of the Jodo doctrine survey the whole system of Buddhism from their particular angle of observation; for the reader will thus be enabled to understand by himself the history of relationship as existing between the Zen and the Jodo type of Buddhist experience, and such highly technical terms as "Self-power" and "Other-power," "Difficult Practice" and "Easy Practice," "Holy Path" and "Pure Land," will also become more intelligible.

According to Shinran,¹ the founder of the Shin branch of the Jodo doctrine, Buddhism is divided into two grand groups, Mahayana and Hinayana; and Mahayana into two further sections, the one to be known as Abrupt and the other as Gradual. In the Abrupt section of Mahayana Buddhism there are two Teachings and two kinds of

¹ *The Gutoku-shō* (愚秃抄).

Leaping: the two Teachings are the Difficult Practice which is the doctrine of the Holy Path, and the Easy Practice which is the doctrine of the Pure Land (Jōdo); two kinds of Leaping are Leaping Straight-ahead by which is meant enlightenment attained by the doctrine of identity, and Leaping Athwart by which is meant rebirth in the Pure Land through faith in the Original Vow of Amida. In the Gradual section of Mahayana Buddhism there are also two Teachings and two kinds of Outgoing. The two Teachings are the Difficult Practice which is the doctrine of the Holy Path as advocated by followers of the Hosso (Dharmalaksha sect), and the Easy Practice which is the doctrine of the Pure Land as explained in the *Sutra of Meditations*, for instance. The two kinds of Outgoing are Straight Outgoing by which is meant enlightenment attained after a laborious moral discipline for ages, and Athwart Outgoing by which is meant rebirth in the outskirts of the Pure Land.

This somewhat complicated classification may be rendered clearer when presented in a tabular schema as follows:

Buddhism	{	Hinayana	{	Holy Path—Straight Outgoing;
				Pure Land—Athwart Outgoing;
	{	Mahayana	Gradual Group	
			Abrupt Group	
				Holy Path—Leaping Straight-ahead, (Zen included here);
				Pure Land—Leaping Athwart, (meaning Shin).

It is evident as is seen here that Shinran considered Zen occupying the same position in the Holy Path system as Shin does in the Pure Land system, as both belong to the Abrupt Leaping group though the one is the "straight-ahead" kind while the other is the "athwart."

Shōkū who was the leader of the Seizan branch of the Jodo sect has also worked out his schema of the Buddhist schools, which is quite instructive and illuminating in regard to the relative position of Zen and Jodo. The following list of contrasts is compiled after Shōkū, which he considers existing between the Holy Path and the Pure Land doctrine:

	Holy Path:	Pure Land:
What is the objective?	To get rid of Ignorance while here and attain Buddhahood;	To be born in the Pure Land after death.
By what means?	Self-power—wisdom—meditation—ascetic discipline;	Other-power—love—faith in the Original Vow.
How related to morality?	Relies on the accumulation of merit;	No such accumulation needed.
Route described.	Winding, tortuous road, on land;	Straightforward course, by water.
Teacher:	Śākyamuni;	Amitābha.
Meant for whom?	Wise men;	Plain ordinary mortals.
General characterisations:	Easy to believe, Difficult to practise, Gradual progress, Not meant for the present age, Limited application,	Difficult to believe; Easy to practise; Abrupt leap; Just meant for the present age; Universally valid.

However widely these two types of Buddhist experience, the Jodo and the Zen, may thus differ in their method of achieving final deliverance, there is no doubt that they both start from the Buddhist view of life as suffering. They both want to get away from this suffering life in which they fail to find anything enjoyable. The Jodo finds a better and purer life in the Pure Land of Amida who welcomes all to his land. The followers of Zen, on the other hand, take their refuge in a transcendental realm beyond the reach of birth-and-death, which is found within one's self when looked into it deeply enough.

By suffering, however, the Buddhists do not mean that life is psychologically explained as pain, and that therefore it is to be shunned. Most of unreflective critics regard Buddhism as pessimistic and world-flying because of its view of life as suffering. But in fact this Buddhist idea of

suffering is the Buddhist way of judging life as it is lived by most of us who are finite, limited, relative, and conditioned; and therefore, this life is for Buddhists something to be transcended, or mastered, or expanded, or purified. The religious life with all its varieties starts from the consciousness of limitation and its consequent idea of bondage. This bondage is felt as pain. To escape from pain, therefore, is to be released from bondage, and when this assumes a positive sense, it is to get unified with the infinite, or to be embraced by an unconditioned being. Every religion ought to start pessimistic inasmuch as it feels the necessity of breaking through the limitations of this present life.

Though the Jodo and the Zen start from the same view of life as suffering, the Jodo has developed the emotional side of Buddhist experience more emphatically than its intellectual side. Suffering is thus conceived by Jodo followers as due to their moral imperfection, that is, due to their sinfulness, which is the outcome of their previous karma. They want to be perfect, to be freed from sin, but as they realise that in consequence of their heavy karma-burden, too heavy to be carried on by themselves, they seek some one who is thoroughly free from it and able to help them out of their difficulties. This they find in Amida.

Amida is not a historical personality in the sense that he once lived in human history as limited in time and space, but a living being in a transcendental realm of spiritual aspirations and longings. He may not be real in the same sense as the objective world is, but just because of this he is more real than anything existing in time-space relations. If it is an incontestable fact that we are more than merely physical or biological realities, it is an equally incontestable fact that Amida is more real than a merely historical personality. This Amida has his Pure Land, also not limited by space-time relations though the descriptions of it sometimes suggest its being a spatial existence. He

willed this Land of his for the sake of all sentient beings as a place or community where they could have all their deepest spiritual longings fulfilled, and it came to be realised as he attained his Supreme Enlightenment. This being the case, every suffering, pining, helpless mortal who wishes to be a member of this community can now be one and share in Amida's love and wisdom.

The Jodo is thus dualistic with Amida on the other shore of the ocean of transmigration and sinful mortals on this side. The distance between the two increases the more in one sense as the latter—sinful mortals—grow the more conscious of their sinfulness and defiled conditions; but in another sense this distance grows the shorter and there takes place the most intimate relationship between Amida and his devotees. Therefore, the greatest stress the Jodo places in its teaching is on the sinful life we all are leading here on earth. We are sinful, according to its teaching, because of our previous karma and not necessarily because we commit so many different kinds of evil deeds one after another. When this is realised, we are inevitably thrown back on the infinite love of Amida and will most fervently long for his merciful embrace.

The gap between Amida and his devotees is never to be closed up as long as the consciousness of sin is made the basis of the religious life. The devotees may feel the closest possible relationship to their object of appeal, but the dualistic sense will remain with them to the end of their earthly lives. They may recognise the fact of consubstantiality existing between Amida and themselves; for if there were not something in Amida that is of the same nature with the human, he could never understand the sufferings of his worshippers, he could never listen to their appeal and send to them whatever help they are in need of; and this ability on the part of Amida to read the thoughts of his followers shows that there is something

common to them and Amida. Indeed, Amida was once one of us, and it was through the perfect maturing of his Buddha-nature that he thoroughly got rid of his earthly passions and became the saviour of his former fellow-beings who are now his devotees. The fact that Amida suffered once as we suffer now brings him most intimately to our hearts, and perhaps the very possibility of salvation is due to the awakening of our consciousness to the presence of Amida himself in us. If this really be the case, the theory of consubstantiality will now turn into that of self-identity, and dualism will cease to exist in the minds of Jodo and Shin followers. But as long as "faith alone" is the key to salvation Amida will forever stand in contrast to the defiled condition of karma-ridden creatures.

Compared with this dualistic and devotional type of Buddhism, the Zen type is unquestionably intellectual and monistic. The view of life as suffering is taken up intellectually by Zen. The cause of suffering is referred to the fact that we are finite and living under various conditions of limitation. To reach a state of rest, freedom, and perfect bliss, therefore, Zen followers try to grasp the infinite. They know that deeply buried underneath their consciousness of finitude there lies something infinite; for otherwise they would not even be conscious of their being finite and under bondage. They also know, therefore, that when this infinite is brought out clearly in consciousness and the feeling of identity is firmly established, they are no more sufferers of the passions and desires classified under various headings by Buddhist philosophers.

Zen Buddhism is thus naturally speculative and mystical. Its gaze is fixed more on "the other shore" than "on this shore." It perceives infinity in a particle of dust and knows that this very moment is confluent with eternity. If its followers have Amida, he is at once identified with

themselves. He is not quietly sitting cross-legged on the lotus-flower in the Land of Purity, but he is right with them and in them and moves his hands as they move theirs and walks as they walk. His Pure Land is not so far away as $100,000 \times 100,000,000$ lands in the West, but right here on this earth. Thus instead of duality, unity is the keynote of Zen Buddhism.

Contentment is a sentiment common to Zen and Jodo; but the Zen remains cool as if there were nothing in life to disturb its serenity, while the Jodo is full of grateful feelings, even for the smallest things in life. If Zen is a towering solitary winter mountain covered with snow, Jodo is the spring ocean with its broad swelling waves. Zen contemplates, Jodo appreciates; Zen is intoxicated with the sense of identification, Jodo is constantly aware of its overflowing joys; the Zen master comes out into the world and is looked up to as almost a superior being who has already gone over to the other shore (*pāram*), the Jodo devotee is mixed up from the beginning with the world and takes everybody for a fellow-being suffering like himself; Zen rejects the worldly life as not conducive to the realisation of enlightenment, Jodo accepts the worldly life as a thing inevitable to a being living in bondage from which it expects to be freed only after death. The Zen follower disciplines himself to the utmost of his capacity in order to reach the highest stage of self-identification; the Jodo gives himself up to this life as he finds it making Amida shoulder all the burden inherent to it.

A Christian counterpart to the Zen form of Buddhist mysticism may be found in the sermons of Eckhart, while the Jodo, especially the Shin form of it, finds its Christian correspondent in the *sola fide* teaching of evangelicalism. Zen has a practical method of training the mind in order to bring it to a state of concentration, from which there ensues an intuition of the truth. This is lacking in Eckhart,

for all his sermons are concerned with the realisation itself and not with the way to it. Being in the direct line of Indian thought and culture, Zen differs from Christian mysticism especially in its practical training. So with the Jodo, it has its own formula which has no parallel in Christianity.

The Jodo formula of faith is "Namu-amida-butsu" (*namo amitābha-buddhāya*), technically known as "nembutsu" (thinking of the Buddha). It literally means "Adoration (or homage) to Amitābha-Buddha," but the formula as it is repeated these days has no special reference to its original meaning, for the name of the Buddha is invoked in the main as expression of one's devotion.

As to the way this formula, "namu-amida-butsu," is interpreted, we may distinguish different tendencies of thought existing side by side in the Pure Land school, that is, in the devotional type of Buddhist experience. The formula may be repeated by the devotee without his really being conscious of all its implications, but when his psychological attitude is analysed, we grow aware of the following three motives or ways of approaching the nembutsu, and these motives determine the different tendencies of thought in the understanding of its signification. The first is to think of the Buddha as a being fully enlightened and emancipated from fetters of various kinds; the second is to recite or invoke the name as itself containing innumerable merits in accordance with the scriptural authority; and the third is to call upon his name, as when a distressed child calls upon its mother, as the last refuge from all the worldly sufferings and spiritual tribulations.

Historically, the nembutsu (*buddhānusmṛti*) meant to think of the Buddha as possessor of all the virtues Buddhists could think of. When he was thus thought of, the corresponding virtues would gradually grow in the hearts of his followers. The nembutsu was thus the means of moral

training. We may understand the nembutsu in this way whenever reference is made to it in the early or Hinayana literature of Buddhism.

The second form of invocation developed perhaps when the mystery of name came to be recognised. In fact, the Indians had been from their early history great advocates of incantation, they had been cognisant of the mysterious powers concealed in names, and this is the reason why we find so many magical formulas quoted throughout the classical literature of India. Probably this also explains why we read in the Jodo sutras that Amida wished to have his name resounding all over the chiliocosm and that there are innumerable merits contained in the name of Amida or Amitabha. Thus there was a time when the question was most heatedly discussed by scholars of Shin philosophy whether its devotees were to believe in the mysterious power of Amida's Original Vow or of his name.

Most Jodo followers believe in the mysterious power of the name and consequently that the more frequently is the name repeated the more meritorious one's life will be and the more assured of one's birth in the Land of Purity. Hōnen is said to have repeated the nembutsu more than

¹ In *Hōnen the Buddhist Saint*, p. 187 f., we have this record: Following the examples of Zendo and Genshin, Hōnen repeated the nembutsu over sixty thousand times a day; and when he came nearer to the end of his life, he added ten thousand more making it altogether seventy thousand times a day. It is said that he then did nothing else but repeating the nembutsu day and night; even when he had visitors and inquirers about his religion, he seemed to be listening to their talk as he lowered his voice, but in fact he never ceased repeating the nembutsu. The followers of Hōnen have often a special week devoted to the nembutsu when they expect to say it one million times. As to the all-importance of the nembutsu, read the following extract from Hōnen's *Life* (p. 734): "Whether a man is rich and noble, or poor and mean, whether he is kind or unkind, avaricious or morose, indeed no matter, what he is, if he only repeats the nembutsu, in dependence upon the mysterious power of the Original Vow, his rebirth is certain."

fifty thousand times a day;¹ but according to Shukō (Chuhung, 祿宏), a Zen master of the Ming dynasty, who was experimentally inclined, the nembutsu cannot be repeated more than one hundred thousand times for every twenty-four hours. When, however, the formula is pronounced in full and when some time is given up to eating and other physical requirements, the number will considerably be reduced. It is readily seen that in this kind of invocation there is no thinking about the virtues of the Buddha, the repetition being altogether mechanical; and therefore this practise tends to produce a hypnosis in the consciousness of the devotee-invoker. Could we say that the final result of the nembutsu in this case is to clear up the field of consciousness ready for the awakening of a hidden truth?

The genuine devotional type of Buddhism is represented by the third form of the nembutsu, in which Amida is appealed to as the real rescuer of sinful mortals who look up to him as children do to their father or mother. The nembutsu for this class of devotees is the last cry they utter in their desperate efforts to be delivered from the miserable situation in which they are. It is a cry in which the last citadel of egoism is given up, that is, the old Adam dies and the new man is born, and the very moment the cry is uttered, the devotee is embraced in the light of Amida. In his consciousness, this cry is felt as if he were compelled to utter it by another, and at the moment a light comes to his passive mind. The nembutsu in this case is not thinking of the Buddha, nor is it for the inducement of an ecstatic condition of mind, but it is simply calling upon Amida as the last appeal from a spirit in indescribable anguish. It is just one call, and there is no room in such a soul for repetition or for deliberation. When a rope is at the last stage of tension, it snaps with a sound, which is, translated into Shin terminology, "Namu-amida-butsu!"

Besides these three ways of saying the nembutsu, we have another form in which the devotional type of Buddhist experience sometimes comes closely related to the speculative type, showing their common origin at least psychologically, in spite of their apparent polarisation. This form may be termed the Zen nembutsu, for it is the nembutsu practised by some of the later Zen masters in China. It is distinct, however, from the foregoing three forms in this respect that the Zen adept treats it intellectually and not devotionally or psychologically. He tells his followers to find out who is the one that invokes the name of the Buddha. Historically, this way of treating the nembutsu must have developed when the nembutsu as a repetitive formula was very much in vogue, and when on the part of Zen history what is technically known as "Koan" (公案) was resorted to as the means of opening the mind to the truth of Zen.

Instead of mechanically repeating the nembutsu, the Zen master wants to have an interview as it were with the inner man who does this repetition. Zen always insists to have an intellectual insight into the innermost recesses of consciousness. Its method is like peeling the onion; taking off every skin of logical complication, it wants to see face to face the last man if there is any. It is never satisfied with mere reasoning or mere metaphysical inference, it wants to lay its hand on the thing itself. This is where Zen is a personal experience and not a philosophy. It is thus ever pressing inward until it goes through the bottomless abyss of human consciousness. Therefore, when the Zen student repeats the nembutsu we know that he is knocking at the gate of the invoker himself. Which is to say, he is doing his utmost to look into the secrets of his own being. The Zen master sometimes regards this form as the true meaning of the nembutsu; but in this he is mistaken, for there are three other ways of invoking the Buddha's name, each representing a type of religious experience in Buddhism.

As to the relations between being born in the Pure Land and the reciting of the Buddha's name, the general idea entertained by scholars is that the nembutsu is the condition for such a rebirth, that the nembutsu is said with the sole purpose of assuring oneself of the rebirth. This is what is expressly taught in the Sutras and what the Jodo devotees confessedly aim at. As this is a hopeless world as far as the attainment of purity and perfection is concerned, they desire to have their ideal world realised in the dominion of Amida where everything is granted to them as it is desired. Life there unfolds itself on the basis of eternity and infinitude, of light and love, quite unlike this world of limitations and hence of imperfections and defilements. When, however, this idea of being born in the Land of Purity through the mysterious virtue in the name of Amida is closely studied, I doubt whether this is really the case with the actual psychology of the nembutsu devotee who claims to have been saved by the grace of Amida. The point awaits further investigation and I will not enter here into a discussion. This much I wish to say that in the Zen type of nembutsu there is no thought of being born in the country of Amida. The motive of the Zen follower is to penetrate into the secret of the nembutsu itself and has no ulterior aim to attain beyond that. When the realisation dawns upon him that he himself is the bearer of the Buddha-name and that infinite light shines out of his own inner man, he knows that there is no Pure Land to seek after. This is usually expressed in the following phrases: 己身彌陀, 唯心淨土, "The self-body is Amida, mind only is the Pure Land."

These four approaches to the nembutsu are distinct enough as they have been defined here, but in our practical lives they are more or less mixed up and difficult to separate one from another, except the Zen type which is quite apart from the rest, especially in this that it entertains no desire

for the Pure Land. While this is true of most Zen masters, there are a great deal of individual variations. Some of the masters express a desire for the Pure Land where they pray to be born after this life. But the peculiar feature we have to recognise about them is that they do not say the nembutsu conditionally for the attainment of their wish. The nembutsu is quite a separate thing with them, perhaps it is a re-collective type making them think of the attainment of perfect Buddhahood. Read the following prayer by Daiye (Ta-hui, 大慧, 1089-1163):

"This is my prayer: May I be firm in my desire for the truth, showing no retrogression in the long pursuit of it, while my physical body remain in health, free from all disease, with my mind strong and striving, neither scattered nor listless! May I be free from disaster and undisturbed by evil ones, and, not turning towards a wrong path, directly enter upon the right path! May my selfish desires be destroyed and my wisdom increase so that coming soon to the realisation of the great truth I may inherit the Buddha's spiritual life, and; by delivering all sentient beings from misery, requite the grace I have received from the Buddhas and Fathers!

"Next, may I not suffer much at the time of death! Knowing its arrival seven days previously, may I quietly rest in the right thought and enjoy spiritual freedom at the last moment! When this physical body is quitted, may I instantly be born in a [? the] Buddha-land where I come in the presence of all the Buddhas and, by them certified as to my realisation of enlightenment, I may reveal myself all over the world in various forms and save all sentient beings. [I pray to you], O all the Buddhas and Bodhisattva-Mahasattvas, of the past, present, and future in the ten quarters of the universe; O Mahāprajñāpāramitā!"

In a way it is strange that a Zen master should ever think of offering a prayer to the Buddha or Buddhas and

also to Prajñāpāramitā. Does he not find himself well with the whole world with its multifarious contents? Has he not gained a transcendental view of life, from which he surveys undisturbed all the vicissitudes of human experience? Does he think that his prayer-offering has a power to move the course of things in the universe, which are evidently regulated by the law of causation, moral as well as physical? At all events Zen masters frequently offer prayers for various reasons in spite of their claim to have grasped the ultimate truth which makes the sun rise in the morning and the stars shine at night and which when grasped makes one free from all bonds of human ailments and trivialities? Daiye however does not say whether he wishes to be born in the Land of Amida, for he simply wishes to be born in a Buddha-land; but in this respect the Chinese language leaves the reader in the lurch. *Fou-t'u* (佛土) is too indefinite, which may mean a Buddha-land or the Buddha-land. But the prayer of Yi-rin (Wei-lin, 爲霖), another Zen master of Ming dynasty, is quite explicit in this respect:¹

“Homage to the Buddhas of the past, present, and future in the ten quarters; to the Honoured One, Śākyamuni, who is my teacher and leader; to the Mysterious Gates of Truth which are of one vehicle but innumerable in number; to the Mahāsattvas such as Mañjuśrī and Samantabhadra; to such Great Śrāvakas as Mahākāśyapa and Ānanda and other Bhikshus of wisdom and holiness. I pray to hosts of the Triple Treasure and to the Nāgadevas that they would not forsake me from their mercy but embrace with pity this poor Bhikshu as well as all sentient beings in the universe. From beginningless time till this day they have all been drifting along in the triple world and transmigrating from one state to another in the five forms of existence. Not yet

¹ The whole text, more or less liberally translated, is given here in order to show where lies the principle of life that regulates the ideals of the Buddhist monk generally.

being able to realise the essential unity of things, they erroneously cling to the body made of the four elements. In the Dharma of identity, they make the mistake of cherishing the view of *meum et tuum*, and to the world of unreality they are so insanely attached. They have no restraint over their passions: avarice, anger, and infatuation, which they assert with the body, mouth, and mind. All kinds of karma are produced, and evils in every form are committed. Through kalpas as numberless as atoms and dusts they have wandered in a cycle of births and deaths.

"Fortunately, due to a seed of wisdom sown in my previous existence, I was now born as a human being in this Middle Kingdom. I am endowed with six complete sense-organs, and my body, mouth, and mind are in sound harmony. Borne by the right faith I am now a Buddhist monk; and under the guidance of a wise teacher have I entered the path. My effort is to master the Threefold Discipline, to comprehend most thoroughly the doctrine of One Vehicle, to penetrate into the real reality of all things, and to abide in the eternity of One Mind. What I fear, however, is that my steps are not steady enough to overcome my past evil karma and that my thoughts are not penetrating enough to reach the most subtle truth. If the dark storms are always disturbing the bottom of my mind and the four snakes are ready at any moment to devour this visionary husk of existence, when can I bring the fruit of truth to maturity and make the tree of enlightenment blossom out? I humbly wish by means of repentance to climb up the path of discipline and enlightenment.

"I only pray that the Triple Treasure would embrace me under their truly merciful protection and let not only myself but all sentient beings be released forever from the bondage of karma-hindrance, and deeply penetrate into the great Dharma, and, furnished with great blissful wisdom and exhibiting great activities, perform great spiritual

wonders. For thereby the Triple Treasure should flourish, the Mahayana be propagated, the Right Dharma prevail all over the world, the True Way be always conserved even to the last day, the Eightfold Path of Righteousness be brought out to view, the Fourfold Gate of Reception be kept open, and all sentient beings be brought under the Dharma so that they might universally be back at the home of Enlightenment.

“When the day comes to quit this body of karmic effect, may my understanding of the doctrine of Emptiness (*śūnyatā*) be not obscured, but the spirituality of the Buddha-mind be revealed, and, being born in the Western World of Bliss, come in the personal presence of Amitabha Buddha, Avalokiteśvara, Mahāsthāmaprāpta, and other holy beings. And by them may I personally be respected and be allowed to listen to their own sermons on the mystery of the Dharma, and then being admitted into the congregation of the firmly established in the faith, attain to the meaning of the Dharanis, be furnished with the Ten Supernatural Powers, and open up the Three Secret Treasures. May I then sit on a lotus of the first order and realise the fruit of enlightenment in one birth. When this is attained, may my being be in accord with the nature of the universe and work with the activity of the universe. While not going away from the Land of Bliss, may my body be revealed all over the ten quarters; while waiting upon Amitābha Buddha may I also come in personal contact with all the Buddhas. Every land has a place for a Buddha to abide, and may I come in his presence wherever he may be, and being regarded as his eldest son, ask him to revolve the fundamental wheel of the Law.

“There is not indeed a place in the universe which is not inhabited by sentient beings, and they are looking for a merciful one to come and help them, and may I in response to their call become a rescuing boat for them in order to

take them safely to the other shore which is Nirvana. May I also reveal myself in all forms and be a helpful friend to the four classes of being.

"May the Six Virtues of Perfection be fulfilled in every thought of mine and all kinds of Dharanis be attained by every function of my mind. When there is no Buddha, may I even become a Buddha and reveal myself like the moon which is uniformly reflected on one thousand lakes; where there is no Dharma may I preach it in such a way as an echo reverberates throughout ten thousand hollows. Whenever there is a call may I respond without fail, and whenever there is a wish may I fulfil it. May my pitying heart be equal to that of Avalokiteśvara, and my miraculous deeds be like unto those of Samantabhadra. Beginning today till the end of time, may my prayer be effective when there would be no more suffering beings anywhere in the universe. This alone is my earnest desire that the Triple Treasure have mercy on me and taking note of my sincerity fulfil all my wishes."

With the devotional type of the Jodo the being born in the Pure Land is manifestly the object of the nembutsu, though in my view there is some confusion in the minds of its adherents as to the real signification of what they call salvation, that is, rebirth in the Pure Land. For instance, when they say they are assured of the rebirth, what guarantee do they have of a fact which has not yet taken place? How can they be absolutely or at least to a very high degree of anticipation sure of the promise or vow made by Amida to materialise successfully after their death? According to the Jodo devotee, he is assured of his rebirth when his faith is firmly established, that is to say, when he is innerly convinced of the sincerity and genuineness as well as the efficaciousness of the Original Vow. He will then have not a shadow of doubt as to the wonderful power

of the Vow which comes out of the mysterious depths of the will of Amitabha Buddha. It is this faith and not necessarily the fact of rebirth in the Pure Land that seems to be of every importance in the life of the Jodo devotee. The rebirth is not yet a matured fact, for it is something to be realised after death; and who can be sure of a thing that is to happen after the dissolution of this relative existence when we have no absolute reason to expect even the sun to rise tomorrow as it did this morning? The faith thus naturally comes to be of more consequence than the rebirth itself, which is, however, confessedly the objective of the nembutsu. "When the faith is acquired, the rebirth is assured. When the rebirth is assured, one abides in the condition of no-retrogression. When one abides in the condition of no-retrogression, one is settled in the order of steadfastness (*samyaktvaniyatarāṣi*)."¹ And this "when" means simultaneity or instantaneousness and not succession in time.¹

It is then evident that what the followers of the nembutsu are seeking after as a thing of foremost significance in their religious life is the faith in the Original Vow of Amitabha Buddha. If this is once firmly established, they would leave everything to the wisdom and love of Amida, for he knows what is the best for them to have. They would not mind even if they were sent to hell instead of their coveted Land of Bliss. The wisdom of Amida who is the Buddha of Infinite Light, is altogether beyond the comprehensibility of finite mortals such as we are; it is the height of absurdity and presumptuousness on our part to try to guess at his wondrous ways of achieving our salvation. We must abandon all our finite thinking, all our individual reasoning, and give ourselves up absolutely to the mercy of the Buddha; for the faith is gained only thus. As to the

¹ From Shinran's *Notes on the Fuishinsho*, 唯信鈔文意, a little treatise on the doctrine of faith alone.

rebirth, it takes care of itself. It does not matter indeed what will become of it so long as the Vow remains effective through faith. Read the following from Kakunyo (覺如),¹ one of the most illustrious and learned followers of Shinran, who quotes his master thus:

"To be reborn in the Land of Purity, all that is needed is faith, and nothing else matters. Such a great event as the rebirth is altogether beyond the limits of finite knowledge. The only thing we can do is to leave everything in the hands of the Buddha. Not only we who are finite but even Bodhisattva Maitreya who is to be a Buddha after another birth (*ekajātīpratibaddha*), are unable to fathom the incomprehensibility of Buddha-wisdom. The limited intelligence of an ignorant being is of no avail. My repeated advice, therefore, is to trust ourselves entirely to the Original Vow of the Buddha. Such a trusting one is called one who has awakened faith in 'other-power.'

"Therefore, as far as we ourselves are concerned, let us not be troubled with the thought whether we should be reborn in the Pure Land or in Naraka. As I [meaning Shinran] was told by my late master just to follow him wherever he was destined, I am ready to go even to Naraka (hell) if he is to be there. In case I had no opportunity to meet my good master in this life, I as one of ignorant beings was sure to go to Naraka. But, instructed by the holy teacher, I have now learned of Amida's Original Vow, and his all-embracing love is cherished deeply in my heart; I have cut asunder the bonds of birth-and-death and know that my destiny is in the Pure Land where it is so difficult to obtain a rebirth. This surely cannot be the work of a limited being. It is possible that the taking refuge in the Buddha-wisdom of Amida and saying the nembutsu were really a deed destined for Naraka; misinterpreting which,

¹ From the *Shūjisho* (執持抄), in which are recorded some of the most important sayings of Shinran. Compiled 1326.

however, my late master might have deceived me, saying that it would be the cause of rebirth in the Pure Land. Even in this case I have no regret whatever, for I should most willingly go to Naraka. Why? Because if I did not meet him my destination after death would have been nowhere else but Naraka itself; but if I go there now deceived by my wise teacher, I should be there with him, I should not be alone; and so long as I were with him it did not matter where I went, either to the Pure Land or to one of the evil paths; I am decided to follow him. The faith I now cherish is not most assuredly the designing of any finite being."

This idea of not caring for one's destination after death if once faith is awakened in the Original Vow, is in most unmistakable manner expressed in the following passage taken from the *Tannisho*, in which are presented some of the most remarkable views held by Shinran, the founder of the Shin sect: "Whether the nembutsu is the seed from which a rebirth is obtained in the Land of Purity, or whether it is a deed meant for Naraka, I have no knowledge whatever. I only follow the teaching of my good master who told me to say the nembutsu and be saved by Amida. This is the whole content of my faith."

When the nembutsu goes beyond the idea of rebirth in the Pure Land, and gains a new signification in itself and for itself, the Jodo school has to turn towards mysticism. The nembutsu is now no more the means of taking one into the promised land of bliss and purity, it is in itself an end, in the realisation of which the dualism between the reciter of the nembutsu (i.e., the Jodo devotee) and its listener (i.e., Amida) is finally obliterated. And in this obliteration we notice the strong mystic colouring of the Jodo. In the beginning it was through the nembutsu that the Jodo devotee brought upon himself all the favours that

could issue from the Original Vow; but the moment he got assured of his rebirth, that is, the moment his faith was somehow established, the objective was forgotten, his consciousness dwelt only on the mysterious power of the Vow itself, and then the feeling of mystery developed and dwelt on an inexplicable state of identification now taking place between himself and the Buddha.

The Jodo writers as a rule do not dwell so much upon the description of the Happy Land where they long to go, as the mystery of the Original Vow whereby they are so singularly, so wonderfully, so inexplicably saved in spite of all their past and present sinful life. According to the ordinary law of moral causation, sin multiplies itself, but the Original Vow breaks completely this eternal chain of cause and effect, of curse and damnation; for if one only believes in its efficacy, one is at once released from it and received into the Infinite Light and Eternal Life known as Amida. This is absolutely beyond the grasp of finite knowledge bound up in the principle of relativity. Shinran is never weary of talking about the unfathomable depths of Amida's wisdom deprecating all the petty contrivances of a finite and sinful being. The following is an abstract made out of one of his sayings¹ with the heading "On Being True to Self-nature":

"By 'being true to self-nature' is meant that the mysterious power of the nembutsu is wholly due to the virtue of the Original Vow itself and that the devotee's will or contrivance has no share in it. As the Buddha willed it so, so it is; there are no other wills entering into it. It is, therefore, said that the nembutsu transcends all determination as to its meaning, which is the very meaning of it. In other words, the nembutsu is not a matter of thought, it demands faith and not the understanding.

¹ *Letters of Shinran* (御消息集).

Therefore, what the devotee has to do is simply to take in what Amida freely gives and not to put forward anything of himself, he need not think of what is good for himself or what is not, but just to abandon himself to the free natural working of the Original Vow. And as the Vow is to take every mortal being to Amida's own Land of Bliss and Purity where he can have a full realisation of Buddhahood, it is said that the nembutsu works out itself, that is, true to its self-nature, and that its meaninglessness is the very meaning of it. Indeed, even where this much is asserted, something of meaning gets attached to the nembutsu. How beyond the ordinary comprehension of mortal beings is the Buddha-wisdom!"

From this attitude the next step will be to grow more and more conscious of the mystery of the nembutsu itself. According to Ippen (一遍)¹: "When one casts away the thought of this body and gets absolutely unified with 'Namu-amida-butsu,' we have the so-called state of 'undisturbed single-mindedness.' Every nembutsu one would say at this moment of self-concentration is a repetition of itself by itself, for in it subject and object are identified. When the subject-ego is separated from the nembutsu and made a somewhat devising for the rebirth, this is asserting 'self-power' and is a form of ego-attachment. Such nembutsu reciter will not probably be born in the Pure Land. To be merged single-mindedly in the nembutsu itself, paying no attention whatever to the dualistic determinations of thought, is what is meant by 'saying the nembutsu with singleness of thought.'"

From the author of the *Anjinketsujō shō* (安心決定抄)²,

¹ *Sayings of Ippen* (一遍上人語錄).

² *The Anjin Ketsujō Shō* is one of the finest and deepest expositions of the "tariki" doctrine of salvation. The central idea is a mystic unification of the mortal sinful being called *ki* (機) and Amida designated as

a short treatise on the attainment of spiritual peace, we have this: "When your faith is established in a state

hō (法), and is technically known as the doctrine of *ki hō ittai* (機法一體), that is, the identity of *ki* and *hō*. *Ki* is a very difficult term to translate into any other language, it is generally understood to mean potentiality, affectibility, and the possibility of getting related to others. Sentient beings have within themselves a certain capacity to get related to the merciful heart or Original Vow of Amida and be recipients of the merit of his deeds performed for the realisation of enlightenment. There is something spiritual though potential even in every one of us who are mortal, sinful, and ignorant, and through this something Amida works in us in order to carry out his Original Vow. What is this something? If it does not partake somewhat of the nature of Amida himself, how can the latter come to stand in any manner of relationship to it? The wisdom of Amida may be beyond the calculation of human understanding, and his way of achieving salvation may be a miracle as far as it transcends the law of moral causation. But unless the subject, that is, *ki* itself has some possibility of being affected by the Original Vow, it will be like throwing pearls before swine, there is no unity of interest, no sympathetic response, no mutual relationship; hence absolutely no understanding between them. The *ki* therefore must be regarded as reflecting something of Amida, as holding in it a potentiality of Amidaship, and by virtue of this the *ki* is affected by the latter's loving heart and gets related to it. When the heart of the *ki* is finally occupied by Amida whose Original Vow is ever ready to function whenever the *ki* opens itself to its influence, the *ki* is said to have entered upon the order of steadfastness and attain to a peaceful state of mind called *anjin*. *Ki* and *hō* are thus said to be of one substance. Without this fact, the Shin scholar argues, Amida and his devotees would be two entirely independent terms with no connection whatever between them. The whole edifice of tariki salvation will then indeed topple down even with Amida under its ruins.

Hō which is ordinarily the Chinese equivalent for Dharma stands here for Amida as the embodiment of truth, or as ultimate reality itself, or, in the terminology of the Jōdo school, the author of the Original Vow. But sometimes, especially by scholars of the Shin, *hō* is understood to signify the virtue or power of Amida whereby the salvation of all beings is effected, and not Amida himself in whose personality lies this saving power. In this case *ki* means not mortal sinners as they are, but their believing heart directed towards Amida. When this heart gets united to the power or loving heart of Amida in the expression of "Namu-amida-butsu," they say there is the identification of *ki* and *hō*.

known as 'Nembutsu Sammai' your body as well as your mind turns into 'namu-amida-butsu,' leaving nothing behind but 'namu-amida-butsu.' The physical body is constituted of the four elements, earth, water, fire, and air; the Hinayanists consider it as made up of *anu* (infinitesimal particles). Let the body be crushed into infinitesimal dust and you will find every one of them coloured with the virtues of Amitabha Buddha (i.e., Buddha of Enjoyment or Sambhogakāya). This being so, the physical body in which *ki* and *hō* are united is no other than 'namu-amida-butsu' itself. The mind is filled with the passions, major and minor, and with other things as well; it is born every minute and dies every minute, it is in a state of constant becoming. Analyse the mind into its component thoughts as they succeed in time one after another, and you will find that every one of them is filled with the Vow and the Deeds of Amitabha Buddha; the mind in which *ki* and *hō* are thus found united, is no other than 'namu-amida-butsu' itself.

"As the great pitying heart of Amida is filled with thoughts about sentient beings who are ever sinking in the ocean of birth-and-death, in him you too will find the identity of *ki* and *hō*; and he is no other than 'namu-amida-butsu.' At the bottom of our hearts, however confused and distorted, we find them filled with the virtues of the Buddha whose body is the universe itself, and for this reason there is also in our hearts an identity of *ki* and *hō*, and they are no other than 'namu-amida-butsu.'

"The same can be said of the Land of Purity and of its Lord: For every leaf of the jewel-trees in the Land sways for the sake of mortal sinful beings such as ourselves,

¹ Originally, Buddhānusr̥ti-samādhi in Sanskrit. This is a mental state in which the nembutsu follower finds himself completely unified with the nembutsu itself, or a state of perfect identity in which self and not-self, or subject and object, are merged as one.

and for that reason in it too we find an identity of *ki* and *hō*; it is thus no other than 'namu-amida-butsu' itself. As to the Lord in the Land of Purity, every part of his body, from the white hair-tuft (*ārṇakeśa*) between his eyebrows to the wheel with one thousand spokes on his hands and feet, is the form of perfection attained by the fulfillment of his Vow and Deeds, which he had for the sake of all sentient beings for ever in transmigration; and for that reason in his form too there is an identity of *ki* and *hō*; and it is thus no other than 'namu-amida-butsu.'

"This being of ours composed of matter and mind and capable of acting in three ways¹ is pervaded throughout, whichever one you may assume of the four attitudes,² with the virtues of the Buddha in his state of enjoyment; and for that reason between us who turn towards the Buddha for salvation saying 'namu' and the Buddha, i. e., Amida-butsu himself, there has never been a gap from the first; every thought of ours is thus 'namu-amida-butsu' itself. Since every breath indeed, inhaling or exhaling, has never had even for a moment been separated from the virtues of the Buddha, it is the embodiment of 'namu-amida-butsu.'"

In these confessions of the great adherents of the *nembutsu* we notice that the devotional type is changing into the mystical type and closely approaching the Zen. While beginning intellectually, the Zen ends in transcending logic and philosophy, which is also the case with the Jodo. For the Jodo too ultimately casts off its dualistic attitude towards the object of its devotion as we have seen, and enters upon the phase of identification, growing thoroughly mystical. The difference between the two types is finally resolvable to this, that the one avowedly proclaims the identity of *Ki* and

¹ Physical movements, speech, and mentation in its wider sense.

² Walking, standing, sitting, and lying.

Hō, directing all its religious discipline towards the realisation of the theory, whereas the other starts off with facts of experience in which realism is frankly acknowledged. The latter therefore tends to be dualistic, and in so far as this is the case the Jodo stands in contradistinction to the Zen. But the essentially mystic tendency of Buddhism reappears in the Jodo as well as in the Zen when they both claim to have realised their goal, the one in *Satori* and the other in *Anjin*. Compare thus the following stanza by a Zen master with the last quotation from the author of the *Anjin-ketsujō-shō*, in which indeed this is also quoted:

“Every night, embraced by Buddha I sleep;
 Every morning when I wake I am with him;
 Whether standing or sitting, I am for ever accompanied by him,
 I am never away from him even for a second:
 It is like unto an object followed by its shadow.
 Wishest thou to know where the Buddha is this moment?
 Only this—hear thou this voice of mine!”

We are now enabled to understand how the two types of Buddhist experience which are so manifestly divers and apart from each other are merged in one, breathing the same original spirit of Mahayanism. The *jiriki* here becomes *tariki* and the *tariki jiriki*, that is to say, selfhood is revealed in otherness and otherness in selfhood, which means a complete interpenetration of subject and object, Amida and his devotees. And we can say that Buddhism is after all one and remains so in spite of its apparent diversity.

This is where Buddhism differs from Christianity. Christianity is essentially a devotional religion, and dualistic, holding fast to the irreconcilable gap as existing between the sinful mortal and the all-pardoning saviour. The devout orthodox Christians would never think of crossing this gap in order to get unified with their object of worship. Mysticism was something foreign to Christianity in the

beginning of its history, it was grafted into it later on when it came in contact with other forms of religious thought and experience. Buddhism on the other hand is truly Indian in its tenacious hold on the monistic view of life which is to be intuitively attained. While the bhakti type may not be said to be a foreign importation, it generally stands contrasted to the vidya type; and where it reaches its consummation it thoroughly merges into the latter, erasing almost all the individual traces of each type. So we observe that even the extremely devotional form of Buddhist life as revealed in the Jodo begins in its last stage of "spiritual rest" (*anjin*) to approach the Zen type. Indeed here lies the unity of Buddhist experience throughout its varied expressions.¹

DAISETZ TEITARO SUZUKI

¹ Buddhist theology has a fine comprehensive theory to explain the manifold types of experience in Buddhism, which look so contradicting to each other. In fact, the history of Chinese Buddhism is a series of attempts to reconcile its divers schools, all claiming to base their authority on the sacred writings of Buddhism. Various ways of classification and reconciliation were offered, and when they thought they succeeded in the attempt, their conclusion was this: Buddhism supplies us with so many gates to enter into the truth because of such a variety of human characters and temperaments and environments due to diversities of karma. This is plainly depicted and taught by the Buddha himself when he says that the same water drunk by the cow and the cobra turns in one case into nourishing milk and in the other into deadly poison, and that medicine is to be given according to disease. This is called the doctrine of means or device (*upāya*), and the broad-mindedness of Buddhists is explained on this ground. The doctrine of *upāya* has its background in the Buddhist conception of the highest being as the embodiment of wisdom (*prajñā*) and love (*karuṇā*).

THE UNITY OF BUDDHISM

The visitor to Buddhist lands finds few things so striking as the varied and contrasting forms which Buddhism presents as one passes from the south-west to the north-east. Particularly notable, of course, is the difference between the Hinayana and the Mahayana. One familiar with the Buddhism of Burma and Siam when suddenly set down in China feels himself in the midst of an utterly new and unknown religion. In the smoke of incense and paper money, before Fos and Pusas, among the artificial flowers and votive vegetables, he gropes around, at first in vain, for something familiar. And if he has the unusual good luck to find some monk or layman who can explain to him the Mahayana philosophy, he is the more mystified, and is tempted to exclaim: By what right is all this—or any of this—called Buddhism? How, indeed, can the religions of these various lands justly be subsumed under one heading, and be called by one name?

Most fundamental, perhaps, among the contrasts between South and North is the difference in the Scriptures used by the two great schools. In theory the Tripitaka (in a Chinese rather than a Pali version, to be sure) is recognised by the Buddhists of China and Japan. But it is practically never read, and the explicit teaching of the Mahayana is to the effect that these Southern scriptures form merely a provisional statement of the truth, and have been entirely transcended by the fuller truth of the Northern School. The Southern School, in its part, refuses to recognise the Northern Scriptures as having any authority whatever: in fact, it quite ignores them. Following from this divergence in canonical scripture, an almost equally fundamental contrast is to be found in the attitude of the two schools on metaphysical questions. The

Hinayana, in obedience to the warnings of the Founder, refrains almost entirely from metaphysical speculation; the Mahayana is interested in little else. Its emphasis upon morality is relatively slight, whereas the Hinayana teaching might almost be said to begin and end with moral matters. The moral ideals of the two schools have often been contrasted: Southern Buddhism holding up as the supreme norm for admiration and imitation the self-contained and enlightened Arhat while Northern Buddhism looks upon his attainment as but a little thing and points the learner instead to the unselfish example of the Bodhisattva. The moral teaching of the Southern School still makes a good deal of the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eight-fold Path. It is rare that one finds a Northern Buddhist who has so much as heard of these things. The Hinayana is emphatically realistic; the Mahayana as emphatically idealistic in its philosophy. In Hinayana lands while there is a recognition of a long series of Buddhas, Śākya Muni alone plays any vital part in either theoretical or practical religion. In China and Korea he is associated with two or more other Buddhas who stand quite on an equality with him, and he is compassed about by a host of Pusas, Taoist deities, and Chinese generals who often seem to form a thoroughly polytheistic pantheon, while some of them frequently take from the Buddhas four-fifths of the offerings and adoration of the worshipers. In Japan the Taoist and Chinese additions to the Buddhist cycle merely give way to the innumerable deities drawn from Shinto; and Śākyamuni, far from coming back to his own, is in three of the most important sects explicitly put on a level greatly inferior to that of some of the other Buddhas. The interest of the Southern School is fixed almost exclusively on the teachings of the Buddha; the Northern School is principally interested in the teachings of philosophy *about* the Buddha. On Southern principles there seems logically nothing for the fully enlightened Buddhist at death but annihilation, and the

Founder taught that the ultimate fate of the enlightened was one of the questions which ought not to be raised. The Northern School discusses the matter at length and usually teaches something very like a personal immortality for the enlightened soul. Southern and Northern teaching are usually alike in their insistence that salvation can be attained only through the individual's own efforts and his intellectual enlightenment; but many Chinese Buddhists and two of the largest and most forward-looking of the Japanese sects deny this, and in Christian fashion offer salvation purely through faith and grace, and by an act of will. Can religions having these enormous divergencies be still called, in any significant sense, one religion? That is our question.

Before attempting to answer this question directly it may be well to remind ourselves that at any rate Buddhism is not alone in possessing wide varieties of belief. Of the four great religions of the world, Mohammedanism is unique in being capable of formulation within the compass of relatively narrow and exact theological definition; and even here, if one contrasts Sunnis with Shiahs, or better still, orthodox with liberals, one will find very considerable divergencies. Hinduism contains within itself ever greater contrasts than Buddhism. And what shall we say of the use of a single name to designate the religion of the Spanish peasant and the German philosopher, of the South-American half-breed, the Russian ikon-worshiper, the English high-churchman, and the New England Unitarian? In fact, it would not be difficult to point out within Christianity rather interesting parallels to many of the Buddhist variations of beliefs and practice discussed in the last paragraph.

If Northern and Southern Buddhists do not agree on their authoritative books, Catholic and Protestant Christians agree no better on the question whether the source of authority lies in a book, in a man, in a Council, or in the whole body of believers; or in fact whether there is any such thing as

authority at all. There is, indeed, within Christianity no such diversion as to the propriety of metaphysical discussion and the importance of metaphysical doctrines, as we found in contrasting the Hinayana with Mahayana. All forms of Christianity are more or less interested in problems of this nature. But the answers which different Christian bodies give to these problems vary almost as greatly as those furnished by the various schools of Buddhist thought. Well nigh innumerable are the philosophical positions carefully expounded by distinguished Christian theologians, varying all the way from a simple realistic anthropomorphic scheme like that of the old Testament to the most abstruse systems of Absolute Idealism. Particularly noticeable is this divergence when the discussion ranges about the person of the Founder. If Buddhists can not agree on the nature and position of the Buddha, no more can Christians on the nature and position of the Christ. In Christianity as in Buddhism we find again the perennial disagreement whether the religion consists in the teachings of the Founder or in the teachings of the Church *about* the Founder. And as to his nature, there is an almost continuous gradation of beliefs, running all the way from the conception of him as God himself down to the picture of him as a deluded zealot and even to the denial of his existence altogether. To match the contrast between the Hinayana unitary worship and the popular polytheism of China and Japan, we have the contrast between Unitarianism and the saint worship of various Catholic and "Orthodox" countries. If the Goddess of Mercy has supplanted the Buddha in the shrines and worship of many Buddhists, have we not a striking parallel to this in the way in which the Madonna has taken the place of both God and Christ in the hearts of many a simple Christian? And if the Pure Land Sects differ from the rest of Buddhism on the method of salvation, is not this identical disagreement to be found again within the Christian fold?

The truth is that if we try to define any of the great religions (except perhaps Mohammedanism) by means of creeds and doctrines, we shall find it altogether impossible to discover any unity in them. We shall be forced to split each of them into at least four or five quite distinct and even antithetical religions. As a matter of credal agreement there is no such thing as Buddhism, Hinduism, or Christianity.

And yet learned writers and ignorant people, literature, history, and common speech alike, continue to speak of Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism, and everyone understands in a general way what they mean and (except in hypercritical moments) everyone knows perfectly well that this use of the words is justified. What, then, shall we make of these things, and how shall we come at any defensible definition of the world's great religions? What do we mean when we speak of Christianity, Hinduism, and Buddhism?

As I have already pointed out, one thing is plain: namely, that all credal definitions are hopeless. For the truth is, the great religions of the world are not primarily schools of philosophic thought. They are something very much bigger, very much more living than any creed can be. They are, in fact, living things, organic beings, in a sense, and they can no more be identified with some form of teaching than can you or I. If we take the historical rather than the theological point of view, and consider what as a matter of fact Christianity and Buddhism have been in history and actually are in the world today, we shall see that neither of them is or ever has been a creed, but that each of them is a stream of spiritual life, one of the spiritual life of the race, taking its source back thousands of years and flowing steadily and continuously down through the ages. Each of these religions is, as I have said, an organic thing, and as such it has the same kind of unity and of self-identity that other organic things possess; not the unity of unchanging creed but the unity of a constantly yet continuously changing life.

If now we ask what constitutes the unity and self-identity of living organisms, we shall get the clue to the problem of this paper. You are the same person that you were twenty years ago, not because your body has remained unchanged, not because your mind has remained unchanged: change, in fact, has been the very condition of your being alive at all. You are the same person that you were for two reasons. In the first place, your life has been a continuous and unbroken stream from then to now, your self of today has grown out of your self of yesterday, and that grew out of your self of the day before, and so back to the beginning of your conscious existence. And secondly, you are the same with your self of twenty years ago because, in spite of innumerable changes, small and great, there are certain fundamental characteristics which were yours then and which are yours still. These principles hold of every organism and give it what self-identity it possesses. A material thing may be identified by the identity of its constituent atoms; a creed may be identified by its unchanging propositions; but a living, and therefore changing, organic being is identical with its own past self because of the continuity of its life, and because of the persistence of some of its more fundamental characters. A complex organism, moreover, possesses various organs of varied functions, developed out of and necessitated by the demands of its life and the exigencies of its environment. The eye is not the hand; it is very different from the hand; yet the two are one in the sense that they belong to the same organism and serve the same life. Through the unbroken continuity of growth both trace back their origin to the same parent cells, and both are informed by the same spirit and characterised by one dominating purpose, or innate tendency.

We may, I think, properly compare the great religions to living organisms. I do not mean, of course, that they are organisms in the full and biological sense of the word.

It would be as appropriate, perhaps, to compare them to rivers. For rivers, too, have the self-identity of continuity and some of them the additional identity of persistent character. But the comparison of the religions to living things seems to me rather better; for religions struggle for existence and adapt themselves to new environments and to changing environments in almost biological fashion.

But whatever figure we use, it is, I trust, now clear that we have a right to speak of "Christianity" and of "Buddhism" and to attribute to each of them a certain unity and self-identity. For each of them is connected with its own past and its own origin by the unbroken transition of a continuous growth, and each of them can be shown to possess certain persistent characters in spite of an enormous amount of constant change. In short, it may be said that each of the great religions has its own controlling genius, which remains fairly constant underneath the almost endless branchings of its variations.

It is, of course, no part of our task here to deal further with the other great religions;¹ but if I am to sustain my thesis that in a real sense there is such a thing as Buddhism I must treat in somewhat greater detail those characteristics on which its unity and self-identity depend. The continuity of Buddhism must be patent to all readers of this paper. To me at any rate there are few phases of the spiritual life of man more interesting or more impressive than the growth and development and migration of Buddhism. Buddhism has been a pilgrim, beginning its career in a little town among the foot hills of the Himalayas, wandering down the river valleys and over the great plains and across the moun-

¹ I have made some suggestions toward this in the case of Hinduism in Chapter VI of *India and Its Faiths*; and more specifically on the question of Christianity in a paper entitled "Again What is Christianity?", published in the *Hibbert Journal* and in an address on "The Nature of Christianity" printed by the Peking Union Medical College in 1924.

tains; a pilgrim, and after many years an exile, driven from its mother land and making its way through many a hardship and many a danger into strange countries and among strange peoples. Much of its early possessions it has carried with it, much it has left aside, much it has found in the new lands which it valued and which it has made its own. But throughout its long course there has been no break. Each phase of its career can be traced to the preceding phase, or to the reception by it of some tributary stream. Its course has been like that of a great river which with its tributaries drains an entire continent and, with many a bend, pushes its irresistible, majestic way to the sea. It has had the continuity of an individual life, the continuity of an organic species, the continuity (from another point of view) of the Hegelian dialectic.

All this I trust, is plain enough. Not so obvious, perhaps, are those persistent characteristics which help to make it, in all its ramifications and in all its history, still one religion. I shall not, of course, maintain that all those who burn incense in Buddhist temples or employ Buddhist monks at funerals are Buddhists, any more than I should hold that every ikon-worshiper is necessarily a Christian. What I mean is that there are certain qualities of character and feeling, of point of view, conduct, and belief, which may properly be called Buddhist, and that these are not confined to any one school of Buddhism, whether Hinayana or Mahayana, but are to be found in all those who by common consent would be considered typically Buddhist, from southern Ceylon to northern Japan. These qualities, I hold, transcend not only nations but centuries, and unite the earnest follower of the most up-to-date Japanese sect with the earliest disciples of the Founder. Taken together they constitute what, in a rough and general way, might be called the Spirit of Buddhism.

As fundamental among these qualities I would point out first of all a certain attitude, a certain feeling, a certain way of looking at things, a certain point of view, which is

hardly to be described and for which I can think of no better word than the German *Innerlichkeit*. Our English *inwardness* perhaps suggests it, but not so well. Buddhism constantly lays its emphasis upon the subjective as having more importance than the objective. It is interested primarily in psychology and seeks in psychology for the solution to all important questions. Its glance is ever turned inward, and the events that go on within the soul it regards as immensely more significant than anything in the outer or material world can possibly be. Only in the inner life does it feel at grips with reality. This has been its point of view from the beginning; and with this fact in mind one sees that the development of the Mahayana idealistic metaphysics is not so out of keeping with the simple teaching of the Founder as at first it seems to be.

With such a view of relative values it is natural that Buddhism in all its forms should regard as of primary importance the cultivation of the inner life. Self-discipline and self-control are the first aims of its earnest adherents in every land. It is for this reason, I suppose, that whatever else of the teachings of the Founder it may have forgotten, Buddhism has never ceased to inculcate the Five Precepts—the five great rules of self-control. These are the primary requisites for reaching the supreme goal, which, whether it be that of the Arhat in this life or of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas in the spaceless worlds, or of the simple Shinshu believer sitting upon his lotus in the Western Paradise, consists in the attainment of a spiritual freedom and an inner Peace that the external world can neither give nor take away. Other religions have taught the value of an independent spiritual calm, but no others have given it such repeated and almost exclusive emphasis. Once this is gained, the Buddhist feels, nothing else counts. He who through strenuous culture of the inner life has attained to this spiritual freedom, who has won the Great Peace, may snap his fingers at whatever comes.

The inner nature of this supreme goal has determined inevitably the characteristic form which the Buddhist moral teaching and moral training have assumed. The destruction of desire, as the chief enemy of inner peace, was the burden of the Founder's most significant and original sermons, and for long years this aim, embodied in the Four Noble Truths, seems to have constituted a large part of Buddhist teaching. The Four Noble Truths, as I have pointed out, form no real part of Northern Buddhism today, and there is no general attack upon desire as such. But the essence of the matter has been retained in the persistent attack which Buddhism the world over constantly makes upon Lust and Worry. In the insatiable nature of sexual desire and in the steady sapping of our inner strength that comes from anxiety, Buddhism sees the two great dangers to our Freedom and our Peace, and against these it launches its attacks, in every Buddhist land, with something of the same vehemence and systematic earnestness that the early Brothers and Sisters put into the practice of the Noble Eight-fold Path. In all these things the Northern Buddhists are at one.

As a reinforcement to these two great attacks upon Lust and upon Worry, or rather, as the principal offensive of the entire campaign, Buddhism when in earnest, in every part of the world, brings all its forces to bear against self-centeredness and self-interest, against that common pre-occupation with one's own possessions and schemes and wishes and rights which is so notoriously incompatible with the calm life of the spirit. I do not mean that all "Buddhists" do this: but all these in every land who would be singled out as notably and characteristically Buddhist are distinguished for this effort. The attack launched by the Founder upon self-centeredness has never ceased to have its influence upon Buddhism in all the lands to which it has been carried. Sometimes, the Buddhist emphasis on the inner life has resulted in a sophisticated sort of spiritual selfishness, quite as

ugly as the more brutal and naive form which it has displaced; but there can be no doubt of the fact that the Buddhist point of view and the Buddhist training have resulted in great efforts, both North and South, to get rid of the more aggressive and obvious forms of selfishness. This has been reflected in the *anatta* or non-ego doctrine of both Hinayana and Mahayana, and in the readiness and eagerness of many Buddhists to merge the individual in the Absolute. It is seen more persistently in a trait which I think everyone must feel who has much to do with Buddhists who are steeped in the thought and training of their religion, namely, a kind of "negative-self feeling" (to use McDougall's term) a kind of humility, an unwillingness to put themselves forward, a dislike for the aggressive attitude which seeks to emphasise Number One. This lack of aggressiveness is one of the most marked of Buddhist traits. It stands out in strong contrast to the large-footed, self-advertising, red-blooded, self-gratulatory efficiency of the West. For that matter, it is, of course, a characteristic not only of Buddhism but of the East in general; but in the East itself it belongs peculiarly to Buddhism. It is at the heart of much of Buddhist pacifism. Your typical Buddhist would rather give up his rights than fight for them. "Positive self-feeling" and the instinct of pugnacity have been as nearly eradicated by the Buddhist training as perhaps they ever are or can be in human nature. There is little longing in the Buddhist for a fight as such, or for that positing of the self, that assertion of one's own will, which is at the bottom of so many an altercation. Moreover, nothing that one can fight for is worth so much as that inner peace which a fight is certain to destroy. There is a kind of gentleness in the Buddhist nature which I think everyone must feel.

But this is not the gentleness and non-aggressiveness of weakness. It is not fear that prompts it. Behind it there is a spiritual strength of a quiet sort, a power of passive

resistance that might well astonish a western prize-fighter, forever feeling of his biceps. The non-aggressiveness of the typical Buddhist is a kind of strength in reserve; it is the gentleness of the strong man who refuses to push his own way in a crowd, or of the reflective man who is convinced the game is not worth the candle. Partly as an outgrowth of this gentleness of spirit, partly in obedience to the never-forgotten exhortations of the Founder, partly out of contagion from the example and influence of his mesmeric personality, Buddhism in all the lands to which it has gone has never ceased to preach and to practise universal pity and sympathy for all sentient life. *Ahimsa*, harmlessness, is the first law. No other religion, except perhaps Jainism, carries so far this fellow-feeling for all living things, enfolding in its merciful arms even the lowest forms of animal life. As everyone knows, it influences even the details of the monks' diet, and is not infrequently seen in what seems to us phantastic forms, as in the refusal of conscientious Buddhists to kill snakes or mosquitoes. Not only so. This feeling of pity sometimes defeats its own end, as in the refusal of Buddhists to put a suffering animal out of its misery. For the roots of it are emotional rather than reasoned. The unwillingness of Buddhists to kill animals is often explained in the West as due to the belief in transmigration and the consequent fear of destroying in the animal some deceased friend or relative. There is no doubt that the transmigration theory has something to do with it, setting the whole animal kingdom, as it does, on something like an ultimate equality with man and thus inducing a respect for our brute relatives which in the West is difficult to grasp. But I am sure there is more in the attitude of the Buddhist than this. It is by no means purely as a matter of reasoned theory that he feels for the lower forms of life and dislikes to kill them. The feeling of pity is quite as fundamental and original as the theory.

Naturally, not all Buddhists obey the law of *Ahimsa*.

Buddhist laymen often eat meat and nearly all of them eat fish. But this exception to the law is recognised as an exception, and he who practises it knows that in so doing he is not acting wholly as a Buddhist should. The necessities of this present evil world make it very difficult for all save the monks to follow completely the councils of perfection. Nor would I assert that pity for all sentient things and harmlessness toward all human beings are displayed by every Buddhist, any more than efficient love for one's neighbour is seen in every Christian; but I believe it is true that whoever in the lands of the East is conspicuously devoid of these traits is by common consent regarded as a verypoor Buddhist, no matter how many candles he may burn to the Fos and Pusas, to the Butsus and Bosatsus. It is not without significance that the only members of the Buddhist cycle who are real rivals in popularity of the Buddhas are the Goddess of Mercy and Jizo. There are loved, I am very sure, not only because they may prove helpful to the worshiper, but because the Buddhist consciousness the world over holds in most reverend esteem and most enthusiastic admiration the qualities of sympathy and helpfulness which they embody. In China they will tell you that the Chinese learned reverence from Confucius and pity from the Buddha. Much the same thing seems to be true of Japan. Whatever be the sins of Buddhist monks, and they are frequently many and serious, they usually have the reputation, in all lands, for real feeling of sympathy; and if they teach anything to the layman it is likely to be the law of harmlessness. In the more earnest and consistent Buddhists, lay or cleric, South or North, this sympathy often blossoms into genuine love and a real desire for positive helpfulness.

Another outgrowth of the inwardness, gentleness, and lack of aggressiveness which are so basic in the Buddhist character, is an unusual degree of intellectual tolerance and liberality of thought. This tolerance for the opinions of others

has an intellectual or theoretical root as well. It is in part the natural result of the lack of any absolutely authoritative book, Church, or Pope. Buddhism has never had a theory of literal and plenary inspiration. The Founder seems regularly to have based his teachings upon his own experience or the common reason of the race. Hence, in Buddhism it is extremely rare to find any trace of that bigotry which has been all too common in religions which like Judaism, Christianity, and Mohammedanism, claim to possess a uniquely inspired and infallible book. In the case of the Mahayana, moreover, this natural tolerance has been reinforced by a theory of different grades or degrees of truth, and the possession of a world-view wide enough to make room for most scientific hypotheses and most non-Buddhist philosophies as approximate pictures of certain aspects of Reality. The universal Buddhist belief, moreover, that there is no absolute division between the sheep and the goats, but that most of us are both goats and sheep at the same time, the conception of many heavens and many hells and many conditions of rebirth in this world, with the refusal to shut the door of effort in the face of any sinner, however vile, or to believe that anywhere in the universe there is a gate bearing the inscription "Who enter here leave hope behind"—all these considerations make it natural for the Buddhist to recognise many ways of salvation besides just his own. In an oft-quoted parable in the *Lotus of the Good Law*, the Buddha shows not only that in the Eternal Heavens there are many mansions, but that there are many "vehicles" by which one may reach them. Over and over again have I asked monks in both Hinayana and Mahayana lands whether sincere Christians who lived according to their best light could be saved. In only one case, so far as I remember, have I received a negative answer; and frequently I have been assured not only that Christianity if followed out conscientiously leads to the same ultimate goal as Buddhism, but

that a good Christian is really a good Buddhist, without knowing it.

I have dealt thus far with the fruits of what I have called Buddhist *Innerlichkeit* on their positive side. There are also negative results which are quite as characteristic and which must not be passed over. Like other things, Buddhism possesses *les défauts de ses qualités*. The constant preoccupation with the inner and the great emphasis laid upon it naturally works a corresponding neglect of the outer. The typical Buddhist usually pays relatively slight attention to the external world. The consequence of this is seen in the lack of practical efficiency and of serious practical effort so often pointed out in the great majority of consistent Buddhists. A good Buddhist is likely to be "an ineffectual angel." Buddhists are not greatly interested in the regeneration of this evil world, and though they may wish for it in a mild way they are too busy cultivating their own inner lives to do much toward it. The morality which they preach and practice is mostly of a personal sort. It is in danger, in fact, of being largely of a negative sort. It is not insignificant that the Five Precepts—the one set of moral laws taught with emphasis over the entire Buddhist world—are all phrased in negative form. Earnest and efficient effort for social morality, for the reform of society, for cooperation with others in making this a better world, for positive and effectual helpfulness toward one's neighbour—these things are by no means incompatible with Buddhism, in a sense they may even be the natural outflow of Buddhist pity, but there is much in Buddhism that makes them difficult; and, as a fact, except among the modern sects that have been prodded into activity through Christian competition, they are rare. In all these ways of practical and efficient helpfulness and positive as well as loving service, Buddhism is far behind Christianity.

There are, of course, other causes for this contrast between Buddhism and Christianity besides the fundamental

contrast in the genius of the two religions which I have been discussing. Foremost among these are the racial and economic factors. No one will question the obvious fact that the western races, on the whole, are more practically efficient than the eastern races. The reason for this may be what you like, but the fact is undeniable. The western races are also more aggressive, they have a larger share of the sporting, combative spirit than have most orientals. Now it is quite thinkable—I should say quite probable—that if, by some chance of history, Buddhism had gone west and Christianity east, Buddhism would have been the aggressive, practically efficient religion and Christianity the inactive one. The economic situation has reinforced the contrast of tendency within the two religions so largely brought about by racial characteristics. The charitable institutions and the missionary activities of Christendom have been made possible by the surplus wealth of Christian lands. In the West the population has never caught up with the food-supply in the way it did ages ago in the East. It is perhaps more than a coincidence that Protestant missions date exactly from the period at which Protestant countries, as a result of the industrial revolution, began to have an excess of wealth. And it is, of course, perfectly plain that the possession of political and military power, as well as wealth, has done much to make possible the actual development of Christian missions. I do not think these racial and economic factors when combined are enough to explain the contrast in outer activity and efficient helpfulness exhibited by the two religions. I think the original teachings of the Founders, and the ideas developed by their successors must be taken as co-causes in developing the differences we find. All these factors have doubtless had their influence.

Whatever the causes may be, however, there is no doubt that most Buddhist morality and good will are tinged with a certain passivity that is unfortunately almost as characteristic of Buddhism as that morality and that good will themselves.

It did not, indeed, characterise the Founder; and innumerable cases of thoroughly consistent Buddhists probably might be cited who did not share it. It is perfectly thinkable and (as the Shinshu in Japan demonstrating) it is practically possible that Buddhism may come to possess the active virtues of positive efficient achievement in the external world. But thus far it has done so only in exceptional cases; and its passivity and disregard of social, political, economic, and material conditions is a natural if not a necessary corollary of Buddhist *Innerlichkeit* which is even more unfortunate than its passivity and which must be pointed out. The inner life is necessarily a private life. As William James expressed it: "the breaches between thoughts belonging to different personal minds... are the most absolute breaches in nature." It follows that one can do relatively little of a direct sort for the inner life of others. *One may, indeed, teach morality and give instructions in Zazen. But most of the work of self-cultivation must be done by one's self. By one's self and consequently for one's self. When the chief business of life is the culture of one's spirit, the constant preoccupation with one's own inner life and one's advance in virtue naturally tends to breed much of the self-centeredness which Buddhism is so deeply concerned to destroy. Only, as I have indicated above, it is a peculiar form of self-centeredness, a kind of sophisticated spiritual priggishness and selfishness, which is indeed far removed from the brutal aggressive self-love which Buddhism constantly attacks, but which is hardly more attractive though it may be much less harmful. The belief in Karma and in the acquisition of merit, with all that this means for future lives, also contributes to this most undesirable result. With the baser sort of Buddhist, the whole thing frequently boils down to a kind of spiritual materialism in which the merit to be acquired by each good deed is nicely calculated, and the cash value of virtue in this or another life is ever present to the mind's eye.

Fortunately, Buddhism possesses still a further characteristic which may in time, and possibly at no distant time, to a considerable extent counteract the unfortunate consequences of its inveterate inwardness. I refer to its remarkable elasticity and its ability to respond to new needs. Of this I shall have something more to say before the close of this paper. Already, in fact, in both Siam and Japan the needs of the times are bringing out in Buddhism qualities of practical and efficient activity in the external world which show that passivity and selfishness are by no means inevitable and unescapable consequences of its inward nature. And it is possible that these new movements within Buddhism may be only a foretaste of what is yet to develop.

In addition to the qualities I have discussed there are certain fundamental beliefs which all schools of Buddhism hold in common, the more important of which should be mentioned in this connection. Perhaps the most basic of these is the universal confidence of all Buddhist in the ultimate dominance of the universe by spiritual forces. Southern Buddhism is atheistic in a sense, and neither Southern nor Northern Buddhism has anything to say about creation or a creator. But both schools believe emphatically that the universe itself is supernaturally moral. The fundamental law of Reality, dominating all laws of the material world, is the law of Karma, that whatsoever a sentient being sows, that he shall reap: that virtue and vice have their never-failing recompense. This faith Buddhism of course shares with Hinduism, from which, in fact, it borrowed it. Following naturally from this basal doctrine is the correlative belief in the unimportance of physical death. The laws of matter being so subordinate to the laws of spirit, it is unthinkable on Buddhist presuppositions that the accident of bodily death should put an end to the life of the spirit. It is conceivable, think some members of the Southern school, that absolute enlightenment may bring so full completion that conscious-

ness as we know it will cease, at the expiration of bodily life; but mere bodily death by itself can not possibly have any such momentous influence upon a member of the spiritual world. What form the future life may take is a matter of detail upon which different schools and different individuals disagree, though all accept transmigration as a partial solution. This common acceptance of the doctrine of transmigration, indeed, deserves more emphasis than I have space here to give it, as one of the great credal bonds that hold the entire Buddhist world together. But more important still is the spiritual and moral conception of the universe which I have been discussing, the basal faith that nothing on the physical plane can destroy the life of the spirit, and that not only the spiritual but the material world is ultimately governed by moral laws. On these great doctrines all Buddhists are firmly agreed.

One other common belief, moreover, should be mentioned, namely, the recognition by all Buddhists that their religion in its present form owes its reintroduction upon this earth to the great Indian Teacher, Sakyamuni. Together with this historical belief and this recognition of indebtedness goes the sense of gratitude and loyalty to him which loses in intensity, to be sure, as one gets farther away from the scenes of his earthly life, yet which has still a certain strength even in distant Japan. Connected with this item of the common Buddhist creed there is the further belief, accepted by all, in a series of supernaturally enlightened beings, the Buddhas, of whom Sakyamuni was one, who out of pity for all sentient things from time to time appear upon the earth to reinstate a knowledge of the way to salvation.

Before concluding this paper I must say one further word about a final quality in Buddhism which I have already mentioned and which has been and must of necessity be of great importance in the life of the religion. I refer to its remarkable elasticity and adaptability. Wherever Buddhism has gone,

it has manifested this characteristic and manifested it in a superlative and unique degree. I do not think there is another religion that possesses so much of it. Buddhism has been emphatically a missionary religion. Its transplanting to new lands has been accomplished never through conquest or through migration but solely by the spread of ideas. Yet almost everywhere it has gone it has so completely adapted itself to the new people and the new land as to become practically a national religion. This has been partly due to the tolerance and liberality of its thought, to which I have already referred, a tolerance which it has exhibited both within and without. With the most extremely rare exceptions Buddhism has held no heresy trials and has carried on no persecutions. With daring catholicity that approaches foolhardiness it has recognised every form of rival as a possessor of some degree of truth. Its confidence in the inclusiveness of truth, and of its own truth, has been so great that it has taken up into itself all sorts of foreign cults and superstitions and seemingly incongruous and inconsistent beliefs. The doctrine or policy of "*hoben*" as the Japanese call it, or "accommodation", has been applied to an extent that astonishes every western student who reads of it for the first time. The conception that the beliefs and the gods of other religions may be true and real in their way, that they may be symbolic expressions of the truth which we possess in its fullness, hardly dawned upon the western world prior to our grandfathers' time, and before that was guessed only by an occasional Lessing or *Nathan der Weise*. But from the earliest introduction of Buddhism into Japan and even into China, when our Christian predecessors were anathematising each other over an iota subscript, the Buddhist missionaries and thinkers were accepting into their religion all sorts of native beliefs as dim and symbolic expressions of the Eternal Dharma.

That Buddhism has carried this tolerance and liberality too far for its own good is beyond question, and is recognised

today by all Buddhist leaders. The adoption of the innumerable deities of the Shinto pantheon as merely Bodhisattvas under new (and extremely long) names helped indeed to win over the Japanese people, but it brought into Buddhism a mass of primitive and superstitious cult which did much to put the religion into the degenerate condition from which it suffered for so many of the mediaeval centuries. Fortunately, its rival came to its rescue and through the effort of Shinto scholars who despised Buddhism a reform within Buddhism was initiated which has been carried on with increasing success to our own day. In China the situation has been and is much more serious. The welcoming of Taoist deities into Buddhist temples has been carried on with so liberal a hospitality that not infrequently the guests have deprived their host of all the best room and in some cases have turned him out of doors altogether. The deplorable condition of Buddhism in some of the more distant provinces of China is in part due to an excess of tolerance and an extreme extension of the doctrine of symbolic interpretation.

Yet when not carried too far this liberality, this elasticity and adaptability of which I speak, are undoubted elements of strength. Change is a necessity of life, a sign of life: in its readiness to change its outward forms and to adapt itself to all sorts of new conditions Buddhism has shown itself very much alive. When transplanted to a new land it has acted exactly as a virile biological species acts under similar circumstances. It has made the adaptations necessary to the new conditions, it has responded to the new stimuli with an inventiveness and a youthful energy that betoken an almost inexhaustible store of life and strength. Never troubled by an excessive love of consistency, that "vice of little minds", never bound to an absolutely authoritative Past, never committed to an unchangeable loyalty to that which has been believed *semper, ubique et ab omnibus*, it has been able to develop its philosophy and its cult according to the fresh and

changing needs of the peoples it has sought to feed. Prejudice and hostility have not stood in its way. Its rivals it has regularly sought to make into friends and allies; and when they refused this relationship and declared open war upon it, it has not been too proud to learn from them and adopt such of their methods as seemed adaptable to its needs. Christian missionaries frequently ridicule the Japanese Buddhists for their adoption of Christian hymn tunes and their imitation of the Y.M.C.A., the Sunday School, the Salvation Army, and other Christian methods and institutions. As a fact this action on the part of Buddhism is a token of its life and its wisdom. If it were the dead thing some missionaries depict, it could not thus adapt itself to the new needs of the new day. This unique ability to adapt itself to new conditions, to develop new organs and functions, is inherent in the fundamental nature of Buddhism. As I have more than once pointed out, the inclusiveness of its philosophy puts it in a better position to make room for new scientific discoveries and new philosophic hypotheses than can either Christianity or Islam. It can also deal with its own outgrown beliefs in a symbolic fashion which must be the envy of religions more explicitly bound to definite and authoritative creeds. The unity that it possesses, the spirit that holds it together, as I have tried to show, are not of the credal sort and not endangered by the new developments which a new age may demand of it.

The results arrived at in this Essay are, therefore, not without their bearing on the question of the prospects of Buddhism. In particular, the peculiar elasticity of Buddhism puts the whole matter in a different light from that in which it would appear were we considering only the actual conditions from what might be called a quantitative point of view. A religion with the kind of self-identity and unity I have described and with the power of adaptation to changing conditions which Buddhism possesses is far from moribund. Such

a religion has still a mission to perform in this world: and provided it has wise and awakened leadership it may face the future with head erect and with a growing confidence.

JAMES BISSETT PRATT

THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF VICARIOUS SUFFERING

I

By "Vicarious Suffering" is meant that the Bodhisattva wishes himself to suffer on behalf of sentient beings in order to save them. This idea of "vicarious suffering" is expressed in many canonical books, and the following quotation is from the *Avatamsaka-sūtra*, (Chinese translation by Śikshānanda, 實叉難陀, Chap. X, on *Pariṇāmana*):

"The Bodhisattva thinks thus: all sentient beings commit innumerable evil deeds, and on account of which they suffer innumerable sufferings, do not see the Tathāgata, do not hear of the Good Law, do not recognise the pure Sangha. As they are loaded with innumerable evil deeds and their Karma, they are bound to suffer infinite pains. Therefore, I will stay for them in the evil paths and suffer their sufferings so that they may enjoy emancipation. I will never abandon them because of my incapacity of bearing all these "vicarious sufferings" which may cause my retrogression or fear or negligence. Because it is my desire to bear all sentient beings on my shoulders and to save them from such ills as birth, old age, sickness, and death, and to release them all from false philosophy, ignorance, and evils....."

But in Buddhism the Bodhisattva seems to denote the historical Buddha Śākyamuni himself as he was intent on the attainment of Enlightenment. Bodhisattva literally means a being who aspires for Enlightenment, and the notion of Enlightenment is generally made to imply the salvation of sentient beings. Therefore, originally, Bodhisattva was the name given to Śākyamuni while he was still in his disciplinary stage before he became the Great Teacher of the

world. But the life of Śākyamuni while still in his disciplinary stage was not confined to this life only, but meant the many lives in the past which he spent practising all the virtues in order to save sentient beings. Hence the origination of the Jataka tales. In the Jataka tales we see many instances where he suffered for the sake of all sentient beings—not only human beings but all creatures endowed with life; thus he came to be saviour of the world as well as its teacher.

But in Mahayana Buddhism the name Bodhisattva is not confined to Śākyamuni in his disciplinary stage, but given to any one who is a true seeker of the Dharma, that is, who disciplines himself with the desire to benefit not only himself but others. Bodhisattvaship must then be considered consisting in the spirit of vicarious suffering. Now let us ask how we can take this vicarious suffering for the principle of Bodhisattvaship.

If pain is everywhere caused by an external cause, vicarious suffering may be to a certain extent possible, as we see in the story of Prince Zempuku, 善伏¹ who suffered the punishment in the place of the real culprit. The rich can taste the distress of the poor by giving up all their property. To give a part of one's skin or blood to others who need them for some medical purposes may be said to be a case of vicarious suffering.

But these things are practised in some extreme cases not commonly met with in our ordinary life, and it is naturally impossible to practise this kind of things for all our fellow-beings. Vicarious suffering will be altogether impossible (it seems to me) when pain is produced entirely by an interior cause: the pain of old age, the pain of an incurable disease,—who could suffer this for the actual sufferer? This

¹ Śikshānanda's translation, Chapter on "Entrance into the Dharma-dhatu."

impossibility will become all the graver when pain comes from the inmost recesses of conscience which grieves not over the consequence of evil deeds but over the fact of their at all being committed; that is to say, the more inner the seat of pain, the more impossible its vicarious suffering will be.

Even when this vicarious suffering is confined to the person of Śākyamuni who is said to have gone through a life of sacrifice, the problem remains unsolved as long as we are on the plane of common sense. One may say this is a matter of religious faith. If so, how can we have this justified in our religious experience?

II

To inquire into this problem I will take as the basis of my study Genju's (賢首) noted commentary on the *Kegon* (*Avatamsaka Sūtra*) and that by Chōkwan (澄觀), in which various opinions are enumerated concerning the doctrine of vicarious suffering. In these enumerations no particular interpretations of the doctrine are offered, but they are rich in suggestion.

According to Genju and Chōkwan, vicarious suffering is desired by the Bodhisattva. In Maitreya's treatise on Yogācāra philosophy we read: the Bodhisattva with his excellent wisdom and deeds accumulates the pabulum necessary for his Enlightenment and has no other thoughts but pity and sympathy with all suffering beings. He vows to be in the evil paths in order to save suffering beings therein: fixing his abode in these evil paths he stays there and attains Enlightenment. He vows again to bear on himself the outcome of all the evil deeds committed by them in order to save them from sufferings. He wishes to atone for their evil Karma. The idea is through this vow not to let all suffering beings be actual sufferers of their own evil Karma, but to let them enjoy only the result of their good Karma. The Bodhisattva has destroyed all the seeds of

passions and gone beyond all the evil paths. According to this, it is evident that to suffer pain for others is the vow of the Bodhisattva.

Genju and Chōkwan seem to regard the vow as a fact of experience actually gone through by the Bodhisattva himself, and they are inclined to understand Maitreya in a somewhat superficial manner. But as we know that the doctrine advanced in the treatise on Yogācāra is representative of the views held by the Indian Buddhist philosopher, due respect is to be paid to it, and I wish to elucidate first of all what is meant by the vow (*praṇidhāna*). We already know in the *Avatamsaka-sūtra* that vicarious suffering is vowed by the Bodhisattva: what is this vow, generally speaking? What does it mean to save all sentient beings through this vow? When this question is made clear, we may perhaps understand what is really meant by vicarious suffering.

The term Bodhisattva means the one who seeks for Enlightenment. Enlightenment is the ideal of Bodhisattvahood and original reason of his being. Therefore, the vow of the Bodhisattva is to realise the original reason of himself, that is, unfold the Buddha-nature in himself. But how does he realise it with the consciousness that it is for his own benefit? As long as we are conscious of the fact that anything is done for the sake of self, in whatever sense this may be understood, there is no way for us to escape the bondage of this self. In order to realise the Original Self it is necessary to deny the notion that it is for one's self. What takes place in our consciousness in the denial of self is no other than the notion that it is for all suffering beings. The realisation of the Original Self may thus be possible only when the narrower self is given up and replaced by the notion of all sentient beings. Accordingly, the vow to save all suffering beings means truly to attain Enlightenment.

The idea advanced in the treatise on this interpretation will grow clearer, when we know that the original reason of Selfhood is Enlightenment which is the awakening of the transcendental self, while what it actually experiences in this world of senses constitutes this world of suffering beings. Therefore, the salvation of all suffering beings must come from the eternal vow of the Bodhisattva, and this vow is expressed in his deep feeling towards all sentient beings for whom he desires to suffer vicariously. This is truly the vow of the Bodhisattva, and that it shows no retrogression in its intensity is the very condition of its fulfillment. Therefore, the Bodhisattva entertaining the vow destroys as the first thing all the seeds of passions in himself and goes beyond all the evil paths; it is not thus quite fair to consider his vow a merely idealistic vow which is fine in sentiment but in fact utterly ineffective because suffering beings actually suffer. For as long as the Bodhisattva, through his vow, personally expresses all the sufferings in this world of the senses, he is, in the most realistic sense of the word, vicariously suffering for all sentient beings.

This is evident from those passages in the *Avatamsaka-sūtra*, to which reference has already been made. In them the reasons are enumerated why the Bodhisattva desires to be the saviour of all beings, and from them we also learn that his heart of deep compassion never shows retrogression in the face of every possible harm and enmity. His large heart is there likened to the sun that does not refuse to shine because of the presence of the blind; the sutra then goes on to speak about the Bodhisattva's desire to suffer for others, and his irrevocable determination that "Even when I am all alone in this resolution I will not falter." According to these statements in the sutra, it appears that from the desire for Enlightenment there issues the vow to save all beings; while the latter are not actually and perceptibly benefitted by the ardent desire of the Bodhisattva to save

them, the Bodhisattva never ceases to wish eternally for the benefit of all sentient beings; this is due to the fact that Enlightenment is essentially and ultimately for all beings and not for oneself. Therefore, in spite of the fact that beings to be saved are immeasurable in number, the Bodhisattva, ever intent on saving his fellow-beings, perfects, innerly in himself, through his vow and virtue, his own being. In other words, while always suffering for others the Bodhisattva realises his Original Self.

Thus we are able to understand the meaning of the truth constantly reiterated in the sutra, that the Bodhisattva, while all the time desiring to save all beings infinite in number, fulfills his vow and attains his Buddhahood even before all suffering beings are actually saved. This appears to our common-sense view quite self-contradictory. When, however, the Bodhisattva realises the eternal nature of his vow, he realises at the same time that Enlightenment is the ultimate end of the vow as well as its own reason; hence the fulfillment of the vow means no other than penetratingly understanding the inmost meaning of the vow itself.

III

Even when vicarious suffering is regarded as the essential intent of the vow of the Bodhisattva, is it possible from the practical standpoint of view for him to say that he vicariously suffers for others if the latter are not thereby benefitted in any demonstrable manner? That is to say, the idea of vicarious suffering must have two factors: the consciousness of suffering in the one who vicariously suffers and the acknowledgment of the fact by the one whose suffering is vicariously suffered by the former. It goes without saying that the fact of vicarious suffering has nothing to do with its acknowledgment on the part of the vicariously suffered; but there must be some meaning in deeds of vicarious

suffering, which is to be acknowledged by the vicariously suffered in their inmost hearts.

As long as the vow of vicarious suffering leads to deeds, the latter are as a matter of fact to be recognised by those whose suffering is vicariously suffered. A deed, however great and far-reaching it may be in its influence on society, is not to be considered representative if the motive, that is, the vow is not real and sincere; on the contrary, a deed may not be one of great outward consequence, but if the motive is true and sincere it is the one that is to be thanked for by all people. Therefore, every true and sincere deed must be recognised as containing in itself something representative, and through this medium we find our way of salvation for ourselves. So we read in Chökwan's Commentary: "When the Bodhisattva disciplines himself in asceticism in order to seek the Dharma for the benefit of all beings, this we have called 'vicarious.' This practice later becomes an ever-excellent guidance for all beings, as they strive after Enlightenment, and in this sense also the Bodhisattva may be said to 'vicariously suffer' for others. When we read the lives of self-sacrificing Buddhists who perseveringly sought after the path in the face of every possible hardship, we unfailingly feel that their heroic deeds were meant for us, and that but for their efforts how little should we know now of the meaning of our own lives?"

Vicarious sufferers are not necessarily limited to such personalities as are known as saintly or worthy. When our spiritual eye opens we shall be able to discover those worthy sufferers everywhere; they are not to be limited to a few historical figures. The question will then turn on the presence of the spiritual eye which detects our vicarious sufferers. The detection is possible only when our spiritual eye partakes the same nature as that which constitutes the fundamental spirit of the vicarious sufferer himself. And as we can conceive this perceiving eye as a reflection of the

pure spirit of the vicarious sufferer we may conclude that to recognise the virtue of the vicarious sufferer is in itself due to the action of this virtue. Then what is the deed of vicarious suffering?

IV

As long as deeds issue from the vow, what is the most essential is naturally the vow itself and not deeds. But it is also important to investigate into the several forms the deeds assume. We see a sort of answer to the question in the Commentaries on the *Avatamsaka-sūtra* by Genju and Chōkwan.

One of the forms assumed by deeds of vicarious suffering is sympathetic cooperation. This means "living in the same way." Now to save others, one is naturally expected to surpass them in wisdom and virtue, for it is a good swimmer that can save the drowning. But the saver, in order to save the drowning, must throw himself into the rapids and fight with the waves. Therefore, an excellent saviour of mankind must have within himself a world which is not of this world though in his outward life living the life of a mortal being which does not differ from that which is lived by his fellow-creatures. By thus transcending the world the saviour has in himself something not bound by pleasure and pain, but by thus conforming himself to the world he is capable of suffering pleasure and pain. If this apparent contradiction is not permitted, it will be impossible for the vicarious sufferer to save others. Then, in what sense is this "transcending and conforming" possible?

To transcend the world means inwardly to abandon all passion, that is, to be delivered from all desires and thoughts, whereas to conform to the world means to have various passions and not to be delivered from desires and thoughts. Thus to conform while transcending means not to abandon passions unnaturally, and to transcend while conforming

means in no time to be controlled by passions. Hence the doctrine of "intentional retention of passions." It means that the Bodhisattva retains passions and not purposely annihilates them in order to conform to the ordinary life of the world. The vow of salvation which has the Bodhi as its basis is infinite, and as our actual life evolves with nothing to hinder its course, passions are stirred without a moment's stoppage. But from the Bodhi which is the foundation of humanity issues wisdom whereby all these passions and worldly turmoils are kept under control. Therefore, passions are absorbed in the Bodhi just as they are and digested therein making the latter ever richer. We read in Asanga's *Mahāyāna-Saṃgraha-Śāstra* (Chinese translation):

"All passions have already been subjugated:
 As poison by itself loses its own poisonous nature,
 So ignorance is exhausted by its very ignorance;
 And the Buddha attains his all-knowledge.
 All confused thoughts become factors of Enlightenment,
 And Birth-and-Death (*saṃsāra*) turns into Nirvana;
 The Buddha who accomplishes the great skillful means of
 salvation (*upāya*),
 He is indeed beyond comprehension."

This doctrine of "intentional retention of passions" may sound strange when we understand it as meaning that when one is left to oneself no passions arise but they are needed for the benefit of others; for this is a sort of self-justification. If the doctrine is understood in this way, that is, while morality based on utilitarian principles is not good, the total absence of practical consideration may cause the motive of doing anything good to wither away, and for this reason the Bodhisattva retains all his passions—if the doctrine is to be understood thus, it will greatly lose in its spiritual signification. The essence of the doctrine, as I take it, lies in the ultimate control of passions by means of wisdom.

Desires and passions are, so to speak, raw materials of life which are purified by wisdom. No one can exterminate his desires and passions. The wise will not be led astray by them, keeping them always under control. They will thereby enrich the content of their experiences. As long as they have desires and passion they will have to suffer sufferings inherent to life. When sufferings are purified by wisdom, they not only become their own spiritual possession but are offerings to all humankind. Those to whom we pay our homage as the spiritual representatives of all sentient beings were not exempt from bitter experiences of life, but in them all the sufferings and tribulations were purified through true wisdom.

Genju and Chōkwan recite the following cases as deeds of vicarious suffering, which are however quite problematical. The first one may be termed "intentional commitment of evils." The Bodhisattva purposely commits crimes in order to attain a certain object, and the consequence of it he is made to suffer; in other words, he commits an evil deed to fulfil his vow of salvation preparing himself for its bitter retribution. If this is morally permissible, it comes to this that evil deeds are morally justified for the realisation of a lofty enhanced ideal as long as one is ready to suffer penalty as the outcome of his evil deed.

Shuncho, a devotee of the *Puṇḍarīka*, is said to have been often in prison on the charge of slight crimes, the idea was to approach the jail-birds and save them from spiritual suffering. It is reported that an Indian Buddhist philosopher justified murder for the love of the murdered. And in this case the Bodhisattva would go to hell in a most exalted state of mind. He maintains that such deeds are to be recognised as those of the Bodhisattva inasmuch as a victim of his purposeful crime is thereby relieved of his own suffering due to his past Karma.

... If such substitution is possible and is acknowledged as

Bodhisattvaic morality here we have an adequate example of vicarious suffering. But we feel that the problem is highly pregnant of grave consequences. We can say that, strictly considered, the deliberate commitment of evil deeds is an impossibility. True morality is to be regulated according to ideas universally acceptable and cannot be specified by any definitely itemised clauses of morality. For this reason, unwritten laws of morality are variously applicable according to time and situation. Or the specified items of morality may be idealised so as to mean that the killing of the body is compatible with the saving of the soul. Therefore, if the Bodhisattva is really awakened to the true ideals of humanity, whatever deeds he commits cannot be designated as evil. Consequently, in whatever way the Bodhisattva may act, no retribution can ever be his lot just as a good physician never suffers pain on account of the operation he may perform on his patient.

But the question is more concrete and realistic. What should the Bodhisattva do if the view which he conceives true is unfortunately against common sense and the tradition of his time? In point of fact, such disagreements are rather a matter of common occurrence. In this case the Bodhisattva, as the representative of his time and society, must hold himself also responsible for evils of his own time. But this is the negative phase of his moral consciousness; though it is of more significance than is ordinarily imagined, requiring more serious considerations. Still he is required to make some positive assertion that may seem on the surface to contradict the so-called common-sense view of things as well as the tradition of his time. And in this case he is naturally expected to suffer all the bitter consequences of his deeds; for were they not crucified by their contemporaries,—they who rendered great real services to humanity?

As is seen here, what is considered an evil deed is not

necessarily evil in the moral consciousness of the Bodhisattva himself, being only so when judged by the moral standard of the time. To judge however the conduct of the Bodhisattva, we must resort to the absolute standard of morality and not in its accidental relations to the views cherished by his contemporaries. Behind his positive conduct thus we can see his self-sacrificing spirit with which he is willing to bear on himself all the ills of his time.

The last form of vicarious suffering we may mention, is the self-sacrificing deeds of the Bodhisattva, by which he is himself willing to offer his own life, for the execution of anything that is needful for humanity, regardless of personal hardships and dangers. The welfare and progress of society owes a great deal to the conduct of the masses whose merits are usually unrecorded in all history. If the farmer entirely gives up his profession what should become of us? All kinds of labourers form the foundation of society. However magnificent a mansion may be, it cannot retain its splendour if no drudges are available for keeping the establishment in good and clean and sanitary conditions. The smooth working and orderliness of social life will at once be put out of gear if every woman wants to be a lady and every man to be a gentleman of leisure. We know that the stage is not set up for the sake of a curtain-raiser and a utility-man, but without them we cannot have any sort of play. For that very reason, however, there are very few persons who are willing to be curtain-raisers or general utility-men. Therefore, those who perform such parts may be regarded as placed on the sacrificial altar when they are evaluated from the general economy of the stage. Fully recognising the importance of such parts and yet not unconscious of public frigidity, the Bodhisattva offers himself to perform all the ignominious functions in the orderly evolution of the great drama which is known as human life. The original vow of Kshitigarbha and the universal manifestation of Avalokiteś-

vara exemplify in the most familiar manner cases of vicarious suffering.

We all know that hidden conduct is the basis of any successful achievement. In all departments of human activity anything worth reputation is preceded by many hard experiences. Social morality is sustained by silent workers who go their own way not demanding wealth or fame as reward. There is no enterprise that does not require perseverance and silent suffering on the part of the workers. Therefore, generally speaking, no work can be accomplished without the spirit of self-sacrifice. Further, when one realises that the basis of any undertaking is laid in self-sacrificial conduct, the worker must be free from the consciousness that he is doing self-sacrificing work.

V

By the foregoing explanation we have come to understand what are some of the forms of vicarious suffering; showing that importance is to be attached more to the motive or vow (*praṇidhāna*) which is the basis of conduct, than to conduct itself. That is to say, men of vicarious suffering to whom we feel greatly indebted, realise the vow in their conduct. From this point of view, whatever conduct it may be, as far as it issues from a true sincere vow, it must be regarded as a form of vicarious suffering. While human conduct in general may be regarded in the light of vicarious suffering, it does not follow that the general mass of people are all Bodhisattvas of that order. Very few of them are worthy of our respect and reverence as self-sacrificing and vicariously suffering Bodhisattvas. Most people are just living under the stimulation of personal desires. That is, few in number are real Bodhisattvas and many indeed those who are to be saved by them. When the matter is critically examined vicarious sufferers grow less and less in number until we know two or three really such in the whole history of mankind.

If so, is the ideal Bodhisattva so rare as we have to consider him an impossible specimen of humanity? The thing is, however, to turn this critical way of judging human conduct and direct it on ourselves and not on a generality of people moving towards the gratification of their own egotistic passions. So when we criticise others we are really criticising ourselves. To declare that there is no spirit of vicarious suffering in the world is to confess that we have no such spirit within our own hearts. The criticism must be directed on ourselves. It must be self-reflection. Now let us ask whence this self-reflection comes. It is no other than the working of the Bodhi which makes the Bodhisattva vow to save all sentient beings. The subject of self-reflection is the Bodhisattva and its object is all beings. While in this concrete self itself we may naturally find the unity of subject and object, in our empirical consciousness the "I" as an objective existence is entirely individualistic. Some may think that even this "I" may not be lacking in the spirit of vicarious suffering; but here we find that the light of self-reflection has not yet penetrated deep enough into the recesses of consciousness where there lurks a trace of self-conceit which is really self-deception. The genuineness of the spirit is no longer there. However, if there is no Bodhisattva's vow lying perhaps still dormant deep in our hearts and not yet recognised by our self-reflecting consciousness, we shall have no occasion to lament our personal defects, nor may we be able to discover any vicarious sufferers however scarce they may come to us.

At the same time, the more this will become clear in our practical reason, the more will be the number of vicarious sufferers acknowledged as such until we come to recognise the meaning of vicarious suffering in the whole body of humanity. In other words, our self-criticism wonderfully makes it clear that all sentient beings are to be saved as well as ourselves, and also that the Bodhisattva of vicarious

suffering is the taproot of their existence. However few may be exemplars of vicarious suffering, that which makes up the essence of vicarious suffering is no other than the *apriori*-self of all sentient beings. It is for the maturest realisation of this *apriori*-self in the vicarious sufferers that we especially admire and respect; that is to say, that which we worship in all wise and holy beings is found reflected in our own souls while what constitutes our *apriori*-self is found realised in the Bodhisattva. This is the reason why in Buddhism the historical Buddha Śākyamuni is not recognised as the vicarious sufferer. All the innumerable Bodhisattvas referred to in the sutras are the ideal of all sentient beings that makes up their transcendental-ego. The names of the Bodhisattvas mean various desires and hopes of humanity. The name Samantabhadra in the *Avatamsaka-sūtra* represents the virtue of the Bodhisattva in general, and Dharmākara-Bhikshu in the *Sukhāvativyūha-sūtra* means the most fundamental unity of all Bodhisattvas. As to the number of Bodhisattvas, whether one or many, it is not to be predetermined. As far as each living individual is expression of a desire, or hope, or will, there must be so many corresponding Bodhisattvas, but when all those desires or hopes are regarded as unified in one fundamental will there is but one Bodhisattva. When we thus understand the meaning of Bodhisattvahood, we are also able to comprehend the meaning of vicarious suffering.

We have understood the term "vicarious" in the sense of "representative." Of course these two concepts are to be distinguished the one from the other. As we recognise a deep meaning in the various stories of vicarious suffering as told in the Jataka-tales, the former is not to be confused with the latter. If a man acts for others with the heart of a Bodhisattva, we can read here his desire to save all sentient beings. This is what we may call a "representative deed." So, the essential meaning of "vicarious suffering" must be

sought in the idea of its being representative for all beings so as to bear their evil Karma for them. And the real vicarious sufferer in this empirical life is no other than our transcendental ego itself, which constitutes the "not-I" in me.

Now we come to understand the explanation given by Genju and Chōkwan that "Samantabhadra makes the spiritual universe his own body, which is constituted by all sentient beings; thus Samantabhadra is always the sufferer for all sentient beings, and in this sense his suffering is called 'vicarious.'" What is the most direct sufferer in this vicarious suffering is not what we understand by "others," nor is it sentient beings themselves; it is Samantabhadra himself who suffers vicariously in sentient beings. In other words, when we are awakened to the sufferings we are actually experiencing and bear them, this is said to suffer spiritually aided by Samantabhadra, for we by ourselves have no power of enduring sufferings. Forgetting Samantabhadra, however, who wants to suffer vicariously for us to an infinite degree, we externally seek for the means of removing our sufferings.

But to seek for the vicarious sufferer too near ourselves may seem to disregard the true sense of "vicarious suffering"; for each individual is a complete being by himself. In this case, that there is something still not quite clear in the meaning of "vicarious suffering" is because one understands it in the sense of "substitution": when it is understood in the sense of "representative" the idea grows more intelligible, because the vicarious sufferer is near enough to us and in this again we are able to see such a vicarious sufferer in others. In those whom we esteem as vicarious sufferers there is no need to cherish the consciousness that they suffer for others. We see that the true vicarious sufferers have not such a self-conceit and move according to the vow and conduct of Samantabhadra. And

we may take part in the great and sacred movement by aspiring for the deed and the vow of Samantabhadra. Herein we must seek for Life and Light Eternal.

TAIYE KANEKO

THE QUEST OF HISTORIC SAKYA-MUNI IN WESTERN SCHOLARSHIP

After nearly a century of Western scholarship the quest of the historic Śākyamuni still goes on and controversy is still vigorous. Of no historic figure are so many divergent views held and defended. Nor is Eastern thought less at variance. Buddhists themselves hold many different views about their Master. "The diamond-throne of the original enlightenment" says Okakura Kakuzo "is now hard indeed to discover, surrounded as it is by the labyrinths of gigantic pillars and elaborate porticoes which successive architects have erected, as each added his portion to the edifice of faith."¹ That is true as well as beautiful. And it is not only because of the elaboration of Buddhism by later Sects that it is hard to find the Founder: it is because those who claim to be nearest to him are themselves widely divided in their attitude towards him. Not only is there the wide gulf between the "Mahāyāna" and "Hīnayāna": in the Pali Canon itself there are several stages of Buddhology which await critical evaluation, and until we have some clear evidence as to what was central in the Founder's person and mission the whole question remains in confusion. Was the house of Buddhism a "House of Faith"? To Mrs Rhys Davids and to many a modern Neo-Buddhist it was a house of scientific thought; and the Buddha is revealed sitting upon a diamond-throne of dialectic. "Surely a notable milestone in the history of human ideas," says Mrs Rhys Davids (in commenting upon the Buddhist formula of causation, "that being present this becomes; that being absent this does not become,") "that a man reckoned for ages by thousands as the Light not of Asia only but of the

¹ *The Ideals of the East*, p. 60.

World, and the Saviour from sin and misery should call this little formula his Norm or Gospel, or at least one aspect of that Gospel."¹ This view, which clearly is only one phase of Mrs Rhys Davids' interpretation, has been lately attacked by Dr Berriedale Keith, who maintains that "given the psychological conditions of the time, it would have been a miracle had the Buddha been capable of the rationalism imputed to him.....It was the age of the growth of the great gods, Śiva and Vishnu, in their various forms, and the Buddha's success was due to the fact that he either had claims to divinity or his followers attributed it to him, and won general acceptance for the view. It is conceivable that divinity was thrust upon him against his will, but every ground of probability supports the plain evidence of the texts that he himself had claims which necessarily conferred upon him a place as high as the greatest of gods."² These two positions may be said to express the extremes of Western scholarship in its attempt to discover the historic Śākyamuni. For one he is Rationalist, for the other Deity. The one emphasises faith as essential to his disciples, the other reason.

Their views are not new, but they are here more emphatically stated than has been usual, and the issue is definitely joined. It is long since Kern insisted that Buddhism "is professedly no rationalistic system but a super-human law founded upon the decree of an omniscient and infallible Master."³ And recently L. de la Vallée Poussin has argued that "Buddhism, which does appeal to reason and which will later reason freely, places intuition, Jñāna, above all. It is in ecstasy that one sees things truly."⁴

The confusion of thought in which Western scholarship

¹ *Buddhism*, p. 89.

² *Buddhist Philosophy*, p. 29.

³ *Indian Buddhism*, p. 50.

⁴ *Nirvana*, p. 15.

finds itself may be partially explained by the statement of Hermann Oldenberg, who said nearly fifty years ago: "The Indian mind was wanting in that simplicity, which can believe without knowing, as well as in that bold clearness which seeks to know without believing, and therefore the Indian had to frame a doctrine, a religion and a philosophy combined, and therefore, perhaps, if it must be said, neither the one nor the other, Buddhism."¹

Buddhism is, in fact, a Middle Path in this as in everything else. Not only is it a Middle Path between the way of the world and the way of the ascetic, it is also a Middle Path between the way of the rationalist and the way of the man of faith; and in placing the emphasis most truly we shall probably do well to follow the clue given us by S  nart—a view held by Ś  kara and familiar to Indian thought—that Ś  kyamuni was essentially an early Mystic, who because he himself realised the ineffable experience of the conquest of Ta  h   spoke with authority to the conscience and heart of man; and because he was also a thinker seeking to explain this great experience appeared as an ethical teacher, when he explained it as the cessation of Ta  h  , and as a religious and a philosophical teacher when he went on to the further interpretation that it means also Nirodha or escape from Sa  s  ra. Himself more interested in the experience of Nirv  na than in the explanation, he was yet an Indian teacher seeking to lead others to Moksha. If they were to share his great experience he had necessarily to use the categories of Indian thought and to set forth Nirv  na as freedom from Sa  s  ra.

Many Western writers have trembled on the verge of this interpretation. Most of them have fallen back upon the conclusion that here was an early Socrates, or an early Hume, or some more ethical Upanishadic thinker. There

¹ *Buddha*, E. T. p. 6.

is truth in these positions; what makes them false is that inveterate tendency of the "either, or." With one recent Indian statement, that of Dr B. Barua, that Buddha was essentially a philosopher, some may be found to agree, but Dr Barua himself¹ goes on to quote that very vital passage in which the Teacher says "There are things profound, hard to realise, hard to understand, yet tranquillising, sweet, not to be grasped by logical reason, subtle, intelligible only by the wise. It is for these things that the Buddha must be rightly praised. Here then is a key passage: it is not for his morality or moral teaching, not for his use of logical reason, not for his philosophical achievement that the Founder is to be praised, it is for that apprehension of mystical truth which is the Buddhist equivalent of the *Neti* of the *Upanishads*, an expression "from which words turn back"—and which idealists of the Mahāyāna—recognising it as the essence of Buddhism—call Śūnyatā—the Void, the Void, the Ineffable.

It is, in other words, as a Yogi who grasps things by intuition that Śākyamuni claims originality, and yet if we are to accept the passage in *Majjhima Nikāya* II. 19, he calls himself a Vibhajjavādin, that is an Analyst, rather than an Ekamsavādin or Synthetist. This also may be true. For the Mystic may also have in him something of the rationalist, and if he is to communicate his experience he must seek at any rate to make it intelligible to others. The age was not as Dr Keith allows himself to argue "a barbarous age"; it was one of mystical seers like those of the *Upanishads*, and of a vigorous dialectic like that of the sixty-two schools mentioned in Buddhist texts. Some, at any rate, of these were philosophers and some were rationalists. Dr Keith is the last scholar one would expect to ignore such rationalism as that of the Sāṅkhya. The

¹ *Prolegomena to a History of Buddhist Philosophy* quoting *Dialogues of the Buddha* II. 33, 36.

view that Śākyamuni was an early Yogi has been well stated by S  nart, who in 1889 said emphatically, "Buddhism is not a philosophic sect; it is a system of Yoga."¹ And who in 1900² worked out this view, and showed that we have in the four Dhy  nas of Buddhism (a central doctrine and practice common to Northern and Southern Buddhism and therefore very old) an even older Indian practice, which is of the essence of Yoga. The famous Buddhist practice of Brahma-Vih  ra carries in its very name the proof of its origin, and Patanjali in his *Yoga-S  tras* uses the very words of the Pali texts a proof that he looked upon these practices of Mettam-Benevolence, Karu  n  -Compassion, Mudit  -Sympathy, and Upek  h  -Balance or Detachment, as common property not distinctively Buddhist, but belonging to Yoga as such.

The four stages again by which the Buddha analyses the disease of the world and lays down the essential treatment known as the "Four Noble Truths" of Buddhism, are the old stages of medical diagnosis which we find coming up again in the *Yoga S  tras*, and as the technique of meditation leading to ecstasy is the same, so are the powers of Iddhi to which they lead.

More may be said on this subject, but here it may suffice to note that in the great works of art of the Andhra and Gupta periods exemplified in the solitary Buddha in the jungles of Anuradhapura and in the even more deserted Deer Park at Sarnath, the artists have left to us the clear proof that here is in fact a Yogi, seated with eyes closed regulating his breath, with head and trunk in one line, and with hands folded in meditation. Here in fact is Sam  dhi, which is the crown and goal of the Eightfold Noble Path. This Path, though it begins with right views, is in fact a Path for the Mystic, and ends in right ecstasy.

¹ *Revue des Deux Mondes*.

² See "Bouddhisme et Yoga." *Revue d'Histoire des Religions*, 1900, Volume II, p. 345.

And as these old masterpieces of Buddhist art may be looked upon as strong rocks amidst the shifting sands of the Texts and the surging waves of the Schools, so when we look at the modern practice of the Buddhist Monk, whether in Ceylon with its strange meditation upon skeletons, or in some Zen temple in Japan, or in the Ch'an schools of China and Korea, we find that the living heart of Buddhism, amidst much that is dead and corrupt, is this practice. It is this and this alone which keeps alive the old faith, which because it is essentially Yoga, is able to attach to itself to almost any outward observances. Yoga is in fact, as Pous-sin has said, a technique "in itself strange to all morals as to all religions and philosophic theory, but from this technique there can be separated out, and to it there can be added, morals, theology and devotion."¹

At the core then of early Buddhism was the Solitary, the great Seer, the Yogi Śākyamuni, surrounded by a small group of others who had caught his spirit, and entered into some of these difficult practices. At the circumference were all sorts of lay-people, to whom he could not communicate even an idea of such things. For them he had a different teaching, a different technique, and to them he offered a different goal. "Whatsoever householder desires to be reborn in a heaven let him attach himself to me with faith and devotion," says the *Majjhima Nikāya*, "but whatsoever Monk would realise Nirvāna let him tread the noble Eight-fold Path"; for the way of the Mystic is a difficult and elusive way, open only to those who have the original spiritual genius to tread it, and who are prepared to give their whole time and attention to its pursuit. The layman *may* attain Nirvāna; it is very unlikely that he will ever attempt it. That his interpretation of this profound experience of Nirvāna is what it is, due to the fact that Śākyamuni was an Indian of the Sixth Century before

¹ *Nirvana*, p. 12.

Christ, and could only explain it in terms of current thought; that he was a great original thinker is evidenced by the fact that he had the courage to interpret it ethically rather than metaphysically, and to urge upon men that what mattered was the moral emancipation rather than the monistic interpretation. And even to the laity like Sigālo, whom we find worshipping the gods of the four quarters, he insists that the true worship of the gods is righteous living; to honour Mother and Father, to treat one's household aright, that is to pay due respect to the gods. To the specialist to meditate upon the great virtues or graces of Kindness, Compassion and Sympathy, this is the true Mysticism; and it will lead on to that Upekhā, or Yoga, which is Balance, Harmony or Poise. The world is out of joint because men are following false views, and obsessed with false pursuits. This is the meaning of Dukkhā, and over against it Śākyamuni holds out the alluring vision of that Yoga-Calm, Śānti, Peace, which he has himself experienced. This and this alone is Sukham-Joy. From the ordinary Yogi this great one differs in that his experience was profound and ethical—and that he established the practice on a rational basis. From the texts of the *Upanishads* he differed in bringing into daily life some of the glamour of the Ineffable.

KENNETH SAUNDERS

NĀGĀRJUNA'S MAHĀYĀNA-VIMŚAKA

(An English Translation with Notes¹)

By SUSUMU YAMAGUCHI

THE TEXT

(Tsa) Adoration to Mañjśrī-kumāra-bhūta.

(Gi) Adoration to the Three Treasures.

(1) The Buddha who is undefiled and enlightened, elucidates well, being full of mercy, that which is not a word nor is to be expressed in words: therefore I adore the [Buddha's] power which is beyond thought.

(2) From the absolute point of view there is no birth, here again is there no annihilation; the Buddha is like sky, so are beings; they are of one nature.

(3) There is no birth on the other side, nor on this side; Nirvāṇa too in its self-nature exists not. Thus when surveyed by a knowledge which knows all things, empty are the created.

(4) The self-nature of all things is regarded as like shadow; they are in substance pure, serene, non-dualistic and same as suchness.

(5) [To think of] self or of no-self is not the truth; they are discriminated by the confused; pleasure and pain are relative; so are passions and emancipation from them.

(6) Transmigration in the six paths of existence, the excellence and enjoyability of the heavenly world, or the great painfulness of the purgatories,—all these come from apprehending the external world [as reality].

(7) One suffers very much when there is nothing pleasurable; even when there are things to enjoy, they pass

¹ The author wishes to acknowledge his deep indebtedness to Professor D. T. Suzuki, one of the editors of *The Eastern Buddhist*, in the preparation of this translation.

away because they are impermanent; but it is so settled that goods indeed come from good deeds.

(8) Things are produced by false discrimination where there is no origination, so, when the purgatories, etc., are manifested, the erroneous are burned like a forest fire.

(9) Like unto things magic-created, so are the deeds of sentient beings who take the external world [for reality]. The [six] paths of existence are in substance magic-creations, and they exist conditionally.

(10) As the painter painting a terrible monster is himself frightened thereby, so is the fool frightened with transmigration.

(11) As a stupid child making a muddy pool is himself drowned in it, so are sentient beings drowned in the mire of false discrimination and unable to get out of it.

(12) As they regard non-existence as existence they suffer the feeling of pain. In the external world as well as in thought they are bound by the poison of false discrimination.

(13) Seeing that beings are weak, one with a heart of love and wisdom is to discipline oneself for perfect enlightenment in order to benefit them.

(14) Again, if one with such [a heart] accumulates [spiritual] provisions, one attains, from the relative point of view, supreme enlightenment and is delivered from the bondage of false discrimination. Such an enlightened one is a friend of the world.

(15) When a man perceives the true meaning [of reality] as it becomes, he understands that the paths of existence are empty, and cuts asunder [the chain of] the first, middle and last.

(16) Thus regarded, saṃsāra and nirvāṇa have no real substance. Passions have not any substance. Such notions as the first, middle, and last are done away with when their self-nature is understood.

(17) As perception takes place in a dream which when awakened disappears; so it is with sleeping in the darkness of ignorance: when awakened, transmigrations no more obtain.

(18) When things created by magic are seen as such, they have no existence; such is the nature of all things.

(19) They are all nothing but mind, they are established as phantoms; therefore a blissful or an evil existence is matured according to deeds good or evil.

(20) When the mind-wheel ceases to exist all things indeed cease to exist; thus there is no ego in the nature of all things and therefore their nature is pure indeed.

(21) When the ignorant wrapped in the darkness of ignorance conceive eternity or bliss in objects as they appear or as they are in themselves, they drift in the ocean of transmigration.

(22) Where the great ocean of birth and death filled with waters of false discrimination, who could ever reach the other shore unless carried by the raft of the Mahāyāna?

(23) When it is rightly understood that the world arises conditioned by ignorance, where could false discrimination obtain?

NOTES

(1) This verse (Tsa) agrees generally with the Chinese translation. *Snan-gyur-pa* in the 3rd line is the passive form of *dris*, corresponding to the Chinese 宣說 as well as to *bstan* in Gi; should it not then be the causative of *dris*?

As *blon-me-pa*, the 3rd line, in Gi, corresponds to *bsam-mi-khyab*, the 4th line, in Tsa, *blon-med* does not seem to be correct.

Rgyul-bar, of the 3rd line, in Tsa, is my correction according to the Chinese translation 善, adverbially used here. The original reads *rgyal-ba*.

非無言 in the Chinese 3rd line does not appear in Gi. *Brjod-par bya-ba-min*, the 2nd line, Tsa, corresponds to *brjod-du med*, Gi, the original Sanskrit probably was *na vācāvācya*, and this was misread by the Chinese translator as *vācā avācya*.

(2) That *hgag-pa*, 2nd line, Gi, is changed into *grol-ba*, is justifiable according to the idea upheld in Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamika Śāstra*, chapter on Nirvāṇa, where the author refutes the view of nirvāṇa as non-existence (*abhāva*), destruction (*vīnaśa*), annihilation (*nirodha*), and so on.

隨轉, Chinese 2nd line, seems to be the wrong rendering of *nī vṛit*, which the translator read for *anu vṛit*.

De-ñid-du (Tsa and Gi) is read in my translation as *tasmin eva*, but as the Chinese has 無性, could this have been *de-(kho-na)-ñid-du (tat-tvena)*?

(3) The first line, Tsa, agrees with the Chinese, but how shall we reconcile this with *bshin-skhyes-pa-yi (yonīśa utpannah)*? *Rtenskyes* (Gi) agrees with the Chinese 緣所生 (*pratītya utpanna*): this evidently corresponds to *mya-nan hdas (nirvāṇam, nirvṛita)*; but in what relation do they stand to each other?

Evidently *hdus-byas (saṃskṛita)* in both Tibetan texts is read by the Chinese translator as *saṃskara* 諸行. *Tshurol* (first line, Tsa) is *tshul-rol* in the original text, the correction was made according to the Chinese reading.

(4) *Dag*, (3rd line, Gi) is *bdag* in the original, but as this corresponds to *rnam-par-dag* (Tsa), *bdag* is incorrect. *Rnam-dag (viśuddhi)* is translated in the Chinese as 無染.

(5) The first line, Tsa, is the assertion of the idea as is expounded in the second stanza in the *Śūnyatā-saptatī* (空七十論), where we have “*bdog-med bdog-med mīn*, there is neither self nor no-self.” To deny both egoism (*ahaṃkāra*) and non-egoism (*nirahaṃkāra*) is the fundamental idea of Nāgārjuna philosophy, which is elucidated in his *Madhyamika Śāstra*, Chapter on Ego (*ātma-pāṛikṣhā*).

The Chinese translation is in agreement with Gi but not with Tsa.

Bden-pa, (first line, Tsa) is rendered here as *satyah* according to the usual method of transcription, but as it is to be regarded as corresponding to *de-ñid-du* (first line, Gi), it may be meant for *tattva*. In this case the difference between the two Tibetan texts hangs on the particle, *na*, or the privative prefix, *a*.

(6) As the last syllable of the fourth line, Gi, is lost, the sense is not quite clear, but Tsa and Chinese (third line) suggest the following reading, "The objective world is not to be considered real."

(7) The first and the second line, Gi, have again, "pain, old age, disease, and impermanency, which are not enjoyable"; this corresponds to the Chinese. But as we have in the third and the fourth line, Gi, "pleasure and pain variably mature (*vipaka*) from all kinds of karma," the latter half of this stanza differ in all three texts.

Rga-dan-nad, second line, Gi, was originally *rga-dan-na*? the correction is due to the Chinese translation.

(8) The missing second line, Tsa, may have been something corresponding to the Chinese second line, which reads "the fire of passions burns."

Rtog-pas, first line, Tsa, was originally *rtogs-pas*, which is here corrected from the Chinese reading 妄分別.

(10) *Gśin-rje* in Gi evidently corresponds to *yaksha*, and its original probably was *yama*.

(11) Tsa generally agrees with the Chinese especially in the first and the second line; in Gi the agreement is confined to the first line while the rest reads quite differently: "As ignorant betake themselves to pleasures, even so are all beings drowned in the mire of discrimination which is pleasing."

(12) The last syllable in the first line, Gi, originally

read *min*, but judging from its relation to the succeeding line *min* should be *yis* as in Tsa.

Rtog beginning the fourth line, Gi, was originally *dogs*, but in accordance with Tsa and also with the Chinese 虛妄心, *rtog* has been adopted here.

Gnod-par-byed (*bādhayate*) must have come from *bad-nyate* in Tsa.

As regards the third line, Gi, inasmuch as *ñam-na* is derived from *samsāya*, we are led to the Chinese 疑惑 (uncertainty, doubt), but how shall we understand it in the light of the third line, Tsa? Further evidence is needed to clear this up.

(13) Gi reads "seeing them without shelter, the Buddha as he has a pitying heart applies himself to enlightenment for the benefit of all beings." 救 (salvation) in the Chinese text corresponds to *śaraṇa*, Gi, rather than to *sāra*, Tsa. 佛 (Buddha) is the subject in the Chinese as well as in Gi.

(14) *Kun-rdsob* (*samvṛiti*) stands in contrast to *paramārtha*; according to the latter view, there is no merit to accumulate, no provisions to store, they are all empty in essence, all is absolute quietness where we cannot speak of gain or loss. Therefore, to say that perfect enlightenment is, as in the present stanza, realisable through the accumulation of spiritual merit, is in accordance with the *samvṛitya* view of truth.

Chinese translation is evidently from a text considerably different in form from the Tibetan versions.

(15) "The beginning, middle, and ending are laid aside,"—the idea also appears in the latter half of the twenty-fifth stanza in *Yuktishashtika* (六十如理論): 從無明種生, 離初中後際, *ma-rig rgyu-las śin-tu byun, thog-ma dbus mthah rnam-par span*s: (it grows from the seed of ignorance; the beginning, middle, and ending are laid aside). According to Candrakīrti, "As all component things are produced from the seed of ignorance as cause, they have no existence

of their own. In order to explain that they have no self-nature in themselves, Nāgārjuna says that the beginning and middle and ending are laid aside; in other words, it means that there is no production, no abiding, and no destruction." *Ji-ltar no-bo-ñid-kyis grub-pa (med-pa de-ltar bstan-paḥi phyir, thog-ma dbus mthah rnam-par spans, shes-bya-ba) stone-te skye-ba dan gnas-pa dan hjig-pa dan bral-ba shes-bya--baḥi tha-tshig-go.* (Bstan-hgyur. B. 24. 21 b. 2-3.)

The same thought is expressed in "kālaparīkṣha prakaraṇam," of Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamika Śāstra: uttama—ādharma—madhyādin—ca lakṣhyet.*

從生, first line, Chinese, evidently corresponds to "pratītya samutpāda," of the first line, Tsa; against this, Gi has in the second line, *utpannajñānāḥ*: in what relation does this stand to the Chinese as well as to Tsa? Can we regard the Chinese 生已 as equivalent to *utpanna*?

(16) According to Gi, the present stanza reads; "They do not see the ego (reality) as belonging to saṃsāra and nirvāṇa. There is no defiling, no changing; there is serenity from the first, and lucidity." This corresponds to the Chinese.

How did the fourth line of the preceding stanza come to be repeated here in the Tsa text? There must have been some confusion.

(17) The second line, Tsa, originally stood *so-sor rtog-pa snañ-ba-yin*, but in accordance with the Chinese and Gi, *rtog* was changed into *rtogs* and *yin* into *min*.

(19) All three agree generally; especially the Chinese 安立 in the second line is the exact rendering of Tibetan *gnas-pa*. If we follow the Chinese, *rnam*s in the fourth line may be altered into *smi*n.

(21) This stanza (Tsa) seems to be the amalgamation of the two stanzas 16 and 17 (Gi) which correspond to the Chinese 18 and 19.

Gi, 16, reads: "When such thoughts as eternity, ego,

and bliss are entertained in objects which have no self-nature, the night of avarice and ignorance falls and there arises the ocean of beings."

This roughly corresponds to the Chinese, 18, line 2, and to 19, lines 3 and 4.

Gi, 17, has: "While there is no birth in its self-nature, worldly people discriminate that there is birth: discrimination as well as sentient beings.....have no existence."

This is equivalent to the Chinese, 18, lines 3 and 4, and 19, line 2.

Tsa is the translation by Paṇḍita (堪布) Candrakumāra and Bhikṣu Śākhayaprabhā; Gi is by Paṇḍita Ānanda of Kaśmir and Bhikṣu Kīrtibhūtiprajña of Lotsāba.

VIMALAKIRTI'S DISCOURSE ON EMANCIPATION

(Continued)

Translated By HOKEI IDUMI

CHAPTER IX

ON ENTERING THE DOCTRINE OF NON-DUALITY

Then Vimalakirti spoke to all the Bodhisattvas and said: "O sirs, how can a Bodhisattva enter the doctrine of non-duality? I beg of you to explain it according to your way of understanding."

There was in the assembly a Bodhisattva named Dharmesvara who spoke thus: "O sirs, birth and death make a duality: but things are essentially uncreated, and therefore now they are not to be annihilated. To attain to the acquiescence in the law of no-birth—this is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Śrīgupta Bodhisattva said: "I and Mine make a duality; because there is no I there is no Mine. This is said to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Animesha Bodhisattva said: "Perceiving and not perceiving make a duality; if there is no perceiving of things they are unobtainable; as they are unobtainable there is neither seizing nor abandoning; there is no working, nor is there any function. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Śrīśīras Bodhisattva said: "Purity and impurity make a duality; if one penetrates into the true nature of impurity, one sees that there is no purity and thus attains to the state of annihilation. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Sunakshatra Bodhisattva said: "Moving and remembering (1) make a duality; if there is no moving, there is no remembering, and if there be no remembering, then there

is no discrimination. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Sunetra Bodhisattva said: "Oneness and nothingness make a duality; if we know oneness that is nothingness, and if we do not get attached to nothingness, we enter into the state of sameness. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Subāhu Bodhisattva said; "The Bodhisattva-mind and the Śrāvaka-mind make a duality; if we understand that the nature of mind is empty like a phantom, there is neither the Bodhisattva-mind nor the Śrāvaka-mind. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Pushya Bodhisattva said: "Good and not-good make a duality; if we entertain no thought of good and not-good, then we attain the realm of unconditionality and have a thorough understanding of truth. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Simha Bodhisattva said: "Sin and morality make a duality; when one fully understands that the nature of sin is not different from that of morality and penetrates this characteristic (of the truth) by the diamond-wisdom, he realises that there is neither bondage nor deliverance. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Simhamati Bodhisattva said: "Passion and passionlessness make a duality; when one understands that all things are equal, then he cherishes not the ideas of passion and passionlessness, and neither does he attach himself to form nor does he abide in formlessness. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Śuddhamati Bodhisattva said: "The created and the uncreated make a duality; when one is separated from all ideas, then his mind becomes like the sky, and, being in possession of pure wisdom, it is not hindered by anything. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Narāyaṇa Bodhisattva said: "Worldliness and unworld-

liness make a duality; when one comprehends that the nature of this-worldliness is empty, then he attains unworldliness; there is neither coming nor going from one to the other, and there is also neither overflowing nor scattering. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Sādhumati Bodhisattva said: "Samsāra (transmigration) and Nirvāṇa make a duality; but when one understands the nature of Samsāra, then he understands that there is neither Samsāra nor bondage nor liberation nor burning nor extinction. To understand thus is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Pratyaksha Bodhisattva said: "The exhaustible and the inexhaustible make a duality. But whether things are ultimately exhausted or not exhausted, there is really nothing exhausted. As there is really nothing exhausted there is emptiness; and there is thus neither exhaustion nor non-exhaustion in emptiness. To understand thus is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Samantagupta said: "Self and selflessness make a duality. But as self is unobtainable how can selflessness be obtainable? When one understands the true nature of self he no longer cherishes [the idea of] duality. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Vidyuddeva Bodhisattva said: "Knowledge and ignorance make a duality. But the true nature of ignorance is knowledge; knowledge is not obtainable as it is beyond all ideas. In this to remain the same and be free from the thought of duality is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Priyadarśana Bodhisattva said; "Form and emptiness of form make a duality. But form itself is emptiness; and that emptiness is not form extinguished, but the nature of form is in itself emptiness. And the same may be said of the other Skandhas: mind, conception, conformation, and consciousness: for instance; consciousness and the emptiness of consciousness make a duality. But consciousness itself is emptiness; and emptiness is not consciousness extinguished but

the nature of consciousness is in itself emptiness. To understand this is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Aruna Bodhisattva said: "[Of the five elements] the transciency of the first four and that of the fifth element ether make a duality. The nature of the first four elements is in itself that of ether element. Because the present is as empty as the past and the future. When the nature of the elements is comprehended, thus then he is said to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Sumati Bodhisattva said: "Eye and form make a duality. When one comprehends the nature of the eye, then he no longer desires form, nor is he offended, or infatuated with it. This is called annihilation. The same may be said of the twelve Āyatanas: ear and sound, nose and odour, tongue and taste, body and touch, or mind and ideas; that is: mind and ideas make a duality. When one comprehends the nature of the mind, then he no longer desires ideas, nor is he offended or infatuated with it. This is called annihilation. To abide in this comprehension is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Akshayamati Bodhisattva said: "Charity and transference of its merits towards [the acquirement of] omniscience make a duality. Charity is in itself the transferring of merits towards omniscience. The same may be said of the other Pāramitās: discipline, patience, diligence, meditation, and wisdom. They and the transferring of their merits towards omniscience make a duality. They are in themselves the transferring of merit towards omniscience. To enter thus into the oneness of things is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Gambhīramati Bodhisattva said: "Emptiness, formlessness, and aimlessness make a set of dualities. Emptiness is formlessness, and formlessness is aimlessness. When emptiness, formlessness, and aimlessness are attained, thoughtlessness and mindlessness are realised. To have the three ways of emancipation in each one of them—this is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Śāntendriya Bodhisattva said: "Buddha, the Law, and the Brotherhood make a set of dualities. Buddha is the Law, and the Law is the Brotherhood; this tripple treasure is in nature uncreated like emptiness of space; even so are all things. To behave in accordance with this view is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Cittānāvaraṇa Bodhisattva said: "The body and its annihilation make a duality. The body is in itself its annihilation. And why? When one understands the true nature of the body, then he cherishes no longer the idea that there is the body and there is its annihilation. There is no duality or distinction between the body and its annihilation. Not to be astonished at this, nor to be afraid of it, is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Pradhānakuśāla Bodhisattva said: "Body, speech, and mind make a set of dualities. This tripple activity has no character of action in it. The non-activity of the body is the non-activity of speech, and the non-activity of speech is the non-activity of mind. This triple non-activity is the non-activity of all things. When one is in accordance with the wisdom of non-activity is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Puṇyakṣhetra Bodhisattva said: "Meritorious deeds, demeritorious deeds, and indifferent deeds—they make a set of dualities. This triplicity of deeds is in itself empty, as they are neither meritorious, nor demeritorious, nor indifferent. He whose mind is not disturbed by these deeds is said to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Pushpavyūha Bodhisattva said: "From the idea of self there arises the idea of self and not self, which makes a duality. He who understands the true nature of self does not cherish the idea of this duality. When he does not abide in either of this dualism he has no consciousness. When there is no such consciousness one is said to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Śrīgarbha Bodhisattva said: "When a man thinks that he has taken hold of something there is a duality in his mind; when he has no such consciousness he has no consciousness of attainment, nor of abandonment. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Candrottama Bodhisattva said: "Darkness and light make a duality. When there is neither darkness nor light, then this duality disappears. And why? When one enters the contemplation of the extinction of sense and thought he sees neither darkness nor light; even so are all things. He who comprehends equality therein he is said to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Ratnamudrāhastā Bodhisattva said: "To be attached to Nirvāṇa and not to be detached from the world—these make a duality. When he is not attached to Nirvāṇa and renounces not the world, there is no longer duality. And why? If there is bondage then there is deliverance. If there is nothing bound from the beginning, who will seek for deliverance? When there be neither bondage nor deliverance then there is neither attachment nor detachment. This is said to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Cūḍāmanirāja Bodhisattva said: "Righteousness and falsehood make a duality. He who abides in righteousness makes no distinction between righteousness and falsehood. When he is free from this duality he is said to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Tattvarata Bodhisattva said: "Reality and non-reality make a duality. He who sees a reality as it is, does not even see it as distinct from another reality. How much more so with non-reality? And why? Reality cannot be seen by the fleshly eye; it is only seen by the eye of wisdom. And in this eye of wisdom there is nothing seen nor unseen. This is to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

Thus all the Bodhisattva each having expressed his own view, Mañjuśrī was now asked: "What is meant by Bodhi-

sattva's entering into the doctrine of non-duality ? Mañjuśrī replied: "According to my view, with regard to all things there is nothing to be said nor to be expressed, nor to be thought about them; they transcend all questioning and answering. This is to enter into the doctrine of non-duality."

Then Mañjuśrī asked Vimalakīrti: "Now each of us has expressed his view; O sir, I wish thou wilt express thy view as to what is meant by Bodhisattva's entering into the doctrine of non-duality." Vimalakīrti remained silent and said not a word.

Then Mañjuśrī praised him saying: "Well done, well done, ultimately not to have any letters or words, this is indeed to enter the doctrine of non-duality."

When this lesson concerning the entering into the doctrine of nonduality was preached to the five thousand Bodhisattvas in the assembly all entered into the doctrine of non-duality and obtained the acquiescence in the uncreated law.

CHAPTER X

BUDDHA GANDHAKŪṬA.

At that time Śāriputra thought to himself: "The meal time draws nigh; where should those Bodhisattvas take their meal?" Then Vimalakīrti knowing his thought thus spoke to him: "The Eightfold Liberation is preached by Buddha and thou shouldst receive and practice it; why shouldst thou think of material food when thou desirest to hear the law? But if thou wouldst eat, wait for a space, when I shall be able to obtain such food as thou hast never tasted before."

Then Vimalakīrti having entered into a Samādhi, manifested to the great assembly a country called Sarvagandhasugandha, which is situated in the upper regions beyond the Buddha-countries exceeding in number even the sands of

forty-two Gaṅgā rivers; and there is in that land a Buddha living at present, known as Gandhakūṭa, and the perfume of that land is most excelling even the perfume of men and deities of the worlds of all the Buddhas in all the ten quarters.

There in that land neither the name of Śrāvaka nor of Pratyekabuddha is heard; there is only a great assembly of Bodhisattvas. The Buddha preaches the law to [those Bodhisattva]. Everything in that land is made of perfume. All over the land towers and terraces are built of perfume. People walk on a perfume-ground: All the gardens are of perfume. The savoury perfume of food fills the countless worlds in all the ten quarters. At that time the Buddha [Gandhakūṭa] was seated himself to partake of food with the Bodhisattvas. There were also present many deities each called Gandhavyūha; all of them having cherished the thought of supreme enlightenment, did homage to each one in this great assembly.

Then Vimalakīrti asked the Bodhisattvas: "O sirs, who is able to bring here the food of that Buddha?" All the assembly remained silent through the supernatural power of Mañjuśrī. Vimalakīrti said: "How pitiful, O ye Bodhisattvas! are ye not ashamed of yourselves?" Mañjuśrī said: "'Despise thou not these novices,' which is Buddha's command."

Then Vimalakīrti, without raising himself from his seat, manifested in the presence of the assembly an incarnate Bodhisattva, whose form, splendour, and dignity were magnificent, far surpassing any in the assembly. He then spoke to the Bodhisattva and said: "Go thou there in the quarters on high, beyond the Buddha-countries exceeding even in number the sands of forty-two Gaṅgā rivers, to the country named Sarvagandhasugandha, where a Buddha named Gandhakūṭa now dwells, seated at table to take refreshments together with the Bodhisattvas, and on thy arrival tell him these words of mine saying: 'Vimalakīrti touching thy feet with his bowed head greets thee with all reverence and wishes to inquire

whether thou art assailed with few ailments, few illnesses, and whether thy spirits are in good condition as ever. He prays that thou bestow upon him a portion of thy food if thou canst spare it, that he might perform a religious work in the Sahā world, enabling all those who find pleasure in the inferior law only, to open their eyes to the great religion, thus helping to spread the fame of Tathāgata throughout [the world].’ ”

Then at that time the incarnate Bodhisattva ascended on high in the presence of the assembly, and every one in the assembly could see him reach the country of Sarvagan-dhasugandha and greet that Buddha touching the feet with his bowed head and speak thus: “ Vimalakīrti touching thy feet with his bowed head greets thee with all reverence and wishes to inquire whether thou art assailed with few ailments, few illnesses, and whether thy spirits are in good condition as ever. He prays thee to bestow upon him some portion of thy food if thou canst spare it, that he might perform a religious work in the Sahā world, enabling all those who find pleasure in the inferior law only, to open their eyes to the great religion, thus helping to spread the fame of Tathāgata throughout [the world]. ”

The great men in that country having beheld this incarnate Bodhisattva praised him saying that they had never seen the like before, and asked the Buddha: “ Whence cometh this superior man ? Where is the Sahā world ? What does it mean to find pleasure only in the inferior law ? ”

The Buddha replied and said: “ In the lower region beyond the Buddha-countries even equal to the number of the sands of forty-two Gaṅgā rivers there is a world called Sahā; and there dwells a Buddha called Śākyamuni now in the wicked age of five corruptions; he teaches the doctrine for the sake of those who find pleasure in the inferior law only. There is a Bodhisattva called Vimalakīrti, who, abiding in the Inconceivable Emancipation, preaches the law for

the sake of the Bodhisattvas; now he specially sends this incarnate Bodhisattva to us, to praise my name and this land in order to help the Bodhisattvas there to increase virtue and merit. The Bodhisattva asked: "What wonderful virtue is possessed by him who is able to make an incarnate Bodhisattva fearless in virtue and endowed with such supernatural power?" Buddha said: "Great indeed [is his virtue]! He sends the incarnate Bodhisattva to all the ten quarters in order to perform religious work and benefit all beings.

Then Gandhakūṭa Tathāgata having filled up a perfume-bowl with perfume-food gave it to the incarnate Bodhisattva. Then those nine millions of Bodhisattvas shouted together saying: "We would go to the Sahā world in order to do homage to Buddha Śākyamuni, and see those Bodhisattvas led by Vimalakīrti." Buddha said: "Go ye [Bodhisattvas]. Keep back the fragrance of your bodies lest those beings feel attachment [towards you] in their minds. Again you should abandon your real forms lest those who seek to be Bodhisattvas in that land should cherish [the feeling of] self-abasement. Again, you should not be contemptuous of them and thus create a hindrance-thought; and why? All the lands in all the ten quarters are [equal] even as the sky, but only for those beings who find pleasure in the inferior law Buddhas do not manifest their lands of purity."

Then the incarnate Bodhisattva, having received that bowl of food accompanied by those nine millions of Bodhisattvas through the grace of the Buddha and Vimalakīrti, disappeared from that world and in an instant returned to the house of Vimalakīrti. Then forthwith nine millions of lion-thrones magnificent as before were manifested by Vimalakīrti, and all those Bodhisattvas seated themselves thereon.

Then the incarnate Bodhisattva handed Vimalakīrti that bowl filled with perfume-food; the fragrance of the food filled the entire city of Vaiśālī and all the three great Chilocosms. Then Brahmans and wealthy householders of Vaiśālī inha-

ling the fragrance were gratified both in body and in mind and praised saying that they had never inhaled the like before.

At that time Candracchatra, a leader of wealthy householders, followed by eighty-four thousand men, came into the house of Vimalakīrti. Beholding in that chamber the multitude of the Bodhisattvas and lion-thrones, so high and so broad and so magnificent, and being pleased in mind, he seated himself on one side and greeted that great multitude of the Bodhisattvas and great disciples. [Besides], all the gods of earth, the gods of the sky, and the gods of the worlds of Form [and Formlessness], all inhaling the fragrance, came into the house of Vimalakīrti.

Then Vimalakīrti spoke to those great Śrāvakas led by Śāriputra and said: "Sirs, eat of the food of Tathāgata which has the flavour of immortality (*amṛta*); it is born of the great compassion [of Tathāgata]. Eat not with a divided mind, or it shall not be digested." There were some Śrāvakas who thought to themselves: "The food is but little, and would it be possible for each one in this great assembly to share it?" The incarnate Bodhisattva said: "Measure not the infinite virtue and wisdom of Tathāgata by the finite virtue and wisdom of the Śrāvaka; though the four great oceans might become dry, yet this bowl of food would never be exhausted. All men [in all the worlds] may eat of it even as much as a quantity equal to Mount Sumeru, and for a period lasting a Kalpa, yet it could never be exhausted. And why? The food spared by one who is infinitely endowed with the virtues of discipline, meditation, wisdom, liberation, and knowledge of liberation, could never be exhausted."

Then that bowl of food satiated all the assembly, yet remained as before not in the least impaired in quantity. All those Bodhisattvas, Śrāvakas and deities who ate of this food were gratified in body and felt happy just as did those Bodhisattvas of the world called Sarvasukhamāṇḍita; and from

all the pores of their skin an excellent fragrance issued forth which was as that from the trees in the world known as Sarvagandhasugandha.

Then Vimalakīrti asked the Bodhisattvas from Sarvagandhasugandha: "How does the Tathāgata Gandhakūṭa preach the law?" They replied: "The Tathāgata in our country preaches without words; he enables all beings to attain the virtue of discipline only by means of perfume. The Bodhisattvas, each sitting under a lofty tree, inhale the excellent perfume and enter Samādhi called the mine of virtues. Those who enter this Samādhi are endowed with all the virtues of Bodhisattva."

Then the Bodhisattva asked Vimalakīrti: "In what manner does the world-honoured Śākyamuni preach the law here?" Vimalakīrti replied: "Beings of this world are very self-willed and difficult to teach. Therefore, Buddha preaches to them in severe words in order to subdue them: the unhappy regions such as hell, the animal world, and the world of hungry spirits are the regions for the ignorant; Evil deed is the result of evil deed; evil speech is the result of evil speech, evil thought is the result of evil thought; murder is the result of murder; robbery is the result of robbery; adultery is the result of adultery; lying is the result of lying; duplicity is the result of duplicity; abusing is the result of abusing; idle word is the result of idle word; covetousness is the result of covetousness; anger is the result of anger; misconception is the result of misconception; avarice is the result of avarice; the breach of precepts is the result of breach of precepts; quick temper is the result of quick temper; slothfulness is the result of slothfulness; distraction of mind is the result of distraction of mind; ignorance is the result of ignorance; so with initiation into disciplinary life, living disciplinary life, violation of disciplinary life, what ought to be done, what ought not to be done, the obstacles, absence of the obstacles, guiltiness, purity or impurity, passion or

passionlessness, right or wrong, the created or the uncreated, the world or Nirvāṇa.—with these divers doctrines he subdues the minds of all beings and conquers them; because they are as difficult to subdue as those of monkeys. Just as severe pain which penetrates even to the bone is to be inflicted upon an elephant or a horse in order to bring it to complete subjection as it is so obstinate and difficult to subdue, even so severe words must be spoken to discipline those beings who are obstinate and difficult to subdue.”

Those Bodhisattvas having heard these words praised him saying: “We have never heard the like before; Śākyamuni, the world-honoured one, concealing his infinite power of independence which is never restricted, and manifesting only those things desired by the poor delivers them [from suffering], and also these Bodhisattvas of this world who are never wearied and always ready to condescend to become poor, are born in this land of Buddha cherishing infinite great compassion.”

Vimalakīrti said; “It is even as you say that the Bodhisattvas of this world are firm in their great compassion towards all beings; and the happiness which is bestowed on all beings by them throughout their lives, is of greater worth than all the deeds wrought in your land during hundreds of thousands of Kalpas. And why? In the Sāhā world there are ten kinds of goodness which are never found in other lands of purity. What are they? (1) To treat the poor with charity, (2) to treat the trespassers with pure discipline, (3) to treat the angry with patience, (4) to treat the indolent with diligence, (5) to treat the distracted with meditation, (6) to treat the ignorant with wisdom, (7) to save those who are in the eight difficulties by the law which removes them, (8) to save those who find pleasure in the Hīnayāna by the law of the Mahāyāna, (9) to save those who are destitute of virtue by a stock of merit, and (10) ever to perfect all beings with the Fourfold Acceptance,—these are ten kinds of [goodnesses].”

Then those Bodhisattvas said: "How many laws ought to be practised by a Bodhisattva in this world in order to be perfect in deeds and to be reborn in the pure land?" Vimalakīrti said: "A Bodhisattva who would be perfect in deeds and be born in the pure land must practise the eightfold law in this world. What is the eightfold law? (1) To bestow happiness on all beings without expecting reward, to endure all suffering for the sake of all beings, and to bestow on them all the stock of merit one has achieved; (2) to bring his mind down to the minds of those beings ever in perfect humiliation; (3) to regard Bodhisattvas as if they were Buddhas themselves; (4) not to cherish doubt in his mind when listening to a scripture which he never heard before; (5) not to contradict Śrāvakas; (6) not to be jealous of the honour given to them, not to be arrogant over the benefit enjoyed by oneself and thereby subdue one's own mind; (7) ever to reflect upon his faults and never talk about others' shortcomings; and (8) ever to seek a stock of merit with intent mind,—this is called the eightfold law."

When Vimalakīrti and Mañjuśrī spoke these words, one hundred thousand deities in the great assembly all cherished the thought of supreme enlightenment, and ten thousand Bodhisattvas attained to acquiescence in the eternal law.

NOTES

Dr Otto Fischer, of the Stuttgart Museum, was a visitor to the Orient last year. He is an earnest student of Oriental arts, especially paintings or drawings done by masters of the Zen school of Buddhism. The express purpose of his trip to Japan was to see such paintings in the original. He visited many Zen monasteries, inspected several private collections, and interviewed some of the living artists. The frontispiece to the present number of *The Eastern Buddhist* is a specimen of Zen paintings so called and comes from the brush of the father of modern Rinzai Zen Buddhism in Japan, who lived about two hundred years ago in a comparatively insignificant village town near Numadzu in the province of Suruga. He is generally known by the name of Hakuin. While busily engaged in lecturing, writing, and receiving disciples, he found time enough to indulge in painting and calligraphy. These of course were not his vocation, he never claimed to be more than an amateur or dilettante. The frontispiece represents Śākyamuni as he came out of his Himalayan retreat where he obtained his enlightenment after several years of meditation and penance. Hakuin as artist tries here to give us a glimpse of the inner life of the Muni who views the world from the higher position of Buddhahood. Dr Fischer greatly admired Hakuin and Sengai as representative of the Zen masters' work in this line. The Reverend Kosan Kawakami's picture reproduced here depicts Yeno (Hui-nêng) interviewing one of his pursuers. The central figure sitting by the bridge is Yeno the sixth patriarch and the one approaching is Myō-jōza. According to tradition, Yeno quietly left his master Gunin (Hung-jên) when he was given by the latter a bowl and a robe as the token of his right to succeed the master as the sixth patriarch of Zen Buddhism in China. His fellow-disciples did not

like this, and a party was organised to pursue Yeno and if possible to take the religious insignia back in their own hands. Myō-jōza, the leader of the party, caught up to the fugitive at Taiyurei which divides southern China from the central. Yeno saw him approach, and realising what was wanted of him he threw out the bowl and robe before the pursuer. When the latter tried to take them up, they grew suddenly altogether too heavy even for the strong man that he was to lift. He was awe-struck. He confessed his evil intention and asked of him to be enlightened in the teaching of Zen Buddhism. The master then said, "Do not think of good, do not think of evil; when you are in this state of mind, find out what is the original face which you had even before you were born of your parents." This is said to have at once opened Myō's eye to the truth of Zen. With Yeno the sixth patriarch really begins the first chapter of Chinese Zen Buddhism. As to Dr Fischer's remark about Zen paintings and in particular about Mr Kosan Kawakami's work here reproduced, read the following communication from him.

AN IMPRESSION OF JAPANESE ZEN-PAINTINGS

After a devoted study of sixteen years of Eastern art, as far as this is possible for European scholars with originals and reproductions, I had at last the opportunity of visiting personally the Far-eastern countries such as Japan, China, and Korea, where I could study the culture and the plastic art of the East by directly coming in contact with them. The great war and its consequences delayed my departure for the East for about twelve years. I am most happy to say that throughout this trip in Japan I have been most kindly and hospitably received by the people wherever I went and given opportunities to pursue my study.

Among the subjects I especially wished to study here in Japan I may mention these: (1) the nature of Zen spirit and



“ROKUSO MONDO”



practise and its influence on the plastic art, and (2) the present situation of Japanese art, especially of painting. To my pleasant surprise I can state that Zen is not only a historical force but a fresh, vivifying force in the spiritual life of the country, and that the tradition of Zen painting which was rejuvenated by Hakuin in the eighteenth century is still making progress vigorously and successfully in a train of distinguished painters. As far as a stranger may judge, the works of those Zen painters, it seems to me, show the best and most interesting phenomena of modern Japanese painting. Also on these painters the impression of European art—the discussion of it seems today to be the great problem of the East—did not pass without any trace. They did not reject it, but they remained free from every slavish imitation. The high and pure spirituality which is the principle of their doctrine, gave them the liberty to transmit also these impressions into the great tradition of Eastern Japanese ink painting and to translate into the language of an art, which knows how to represent the most immediate and the inmost experience in the bold cast of a quick and concentrated expression. Not only in the centuries of Mokuami, Soami, and Sesshu, but once more again in the school of Hakuin and Sengai till today, it seems to me, the artistic experience (which is after all the religious experience) of the world through the Japanese soul has found its fresh and strongest expression in these Zen paintings.

Especially interesting was a visit which I made to Kosan Kawakami in his charming temple of Shunko-in in Myoshinji near Kyoto. Kawakami is a priest and a profound scholar of the Chinese Tripitaka which he has been laboriously studying for the past thirty years, he has also occupied himself as a self-taught person with painting. His works from the quickly drawn sketch to the perfectly worked-out picture are not only evidences of a quite extraordinary artistic talent but also of a very high degree of perfection and absorption.

A moment of concentration is enough for him, and under his quickly sliding brush, trees, water, and mountains are composed, which in the mists of mornings and evenings seem to live and breathe. The blossoms are full of life that hover around the graceful spring trees, the vaporous mist in the mountain ravines, the trembling uncertainty of the fir-trees and pines, cloud-like eyebrows or eyelashes covering the slopes, are depicted with a vividness of feeling, with a suggestive abbreviation of Japanese ink painting, that wholly transmits the experience of nature into art.

But the most admirable and moving to my mind was a picture of the largest size which Kawakami painted in the last few years (364×152 cm). It is called "Rokuso Mondo" and represents the dialogue between the sixth patriarch Yeno and his companion Myojoza about the true transmission of the doctrine of Bodhi-Dharma. But it is not the two figures of the priests that are the principal motif in the picture, they nearly disappear bedded in the depth of a very mighty mountain landscape, which with immensely high summits rise soaringly into the skies, and to which white brewing fogs ascend from the abysses. The declivities and ravines are covered with a huge confusion of forest trees, and in the midst of those summits ways and paths lead upward. Not entirely to be expressed are the charm and mystery that secretly seem to rule in this darkly heaped-up world of mountains and trees, and also the deepest calm pervading the powerful sweep of the brush suddenly opening to one's inner eye a view of the world which is at once a moment and eternity. And not less admirable is the genius of the artist who understood to fix this deep quietness and this all-over reigning sublime rhythm during the long work of weeks on a picture of such an unusual dimension and such an unheard-of perfection of all details.

It may be questioned if it is a Zen picture, if the designation is to be confined to those works only which are

composed in the first stroke through the inspiration of the moment. As it seems to me it is a much higher performance to keep the inspiration during such a long laborious work, yes, even to raise it to higher strength and depth. As to my knowledge and feeling there are not many works which are as pure and sublime products of the true Zen as the "Rokuso Mondo" of Kawakami. I am sorry that no photographic reproduction does justice to the original. OTTO FISCHER

The following communication has reached us recently from China, and as we think it interesting from various points of view to see a kind of Christian-Buddhist brotherhood actually at work in the Far-east, it is printed here as received, at the same time expressing our hearty sympathy for the enterprise and our sincere hopes for an early recovery from its temporary suspension.

"A Christian Brotherhood was established in Nanking five years ago by the Reverend K. L. Reichelt, a Norwegian missionary, who has been engaged in various kinds of missionary work in different parts of China for the last twenty-five years, including a professorship in theology. Reverend K. L. Reichelt has always had a painful feeling of the lack of deeper understanding and sympathy towards Buddhism and Buddhists on the part of the Christian missionaries just as he felt that it was very difficult for the Buddhists to come to the state where they could really understand and appreciate the deepest meaning of Christianity. So he started this remarkable home in Nanking, the famous old city, through which so many thousand pilgrims pass on their way to the holy mountains and the illustrious monasteries; and the work has proved a success, for not less than five thousand Buddhists and Taoists have visited the place and stayed there for days, weeks, or months, studying Christianity, taking part in the common worship centred around Jesus Christ, of whom

a very beautiful statue of white precious limestone is placed on the purely Chinese altar in the main temple hall

"What is the secret of this success? The external arrangements so fittingly laid up to the common structure of Chinese temple life and mode of worship does of course partly account for this. The vegetarian food, the temple bell, the fine hangings and scrolls with deep and powerful sayings from the Mahayana sutras and the New Testament—all serve to fill the whole place with a refined, religious atmosphere indigenous to the religious soul of China. But the main reason is another. The main reason for this success is the fact that all sincere religious people who come there are met with as Tao-yu (道友), that is, as friends in religion. At Ching-feng Shan (景風山), the Illuminating Wind Mountain, the significant and beautiful name taken from the Nestorian monument, the Christians acknowledge the fact that in spite of all differences there exists a strong and precious common platform, on which all enlightened and sincere religious people can meet and communicate in holy communion for mutual help and blessing and that common platform, that wonderful sanctuary in the religious realm, is the Tao (道), the Logos, the all-embracing, wonderful Dharma.

"As we all know, the name given to Jesus Christ in the Gospel of St John is Logos, i.e., Tao. Very fittingly the word over the altar in the temple hall of the Ching-feng Shan is the famous passage from the first verse of the first chapter of St John's Gospel: "In the beginning was the word." The symbol carried by all who have joined the Brotherhood is also very significant. It is a silver cross on the lotus. The cross and the lotus must come together again, because they both originate in the Tao.

"During the awful riot and upheaval in Nanking on the twenty-fourth of March this year the Brotherhood as well as the other mission stations were looted and partly destroyed. So of course for the time being the work had to be suspended.

The Reverend K. L. Reichelt has used these months for a visit to Japan staying most of the time in Kyoto. He has delivered lectures at Otani University, Koyasan College, and Middle School, etc. There is a deep appreciation of the work and the aim, which Mr Reichelt is advocating, also in Japan, and it is hoped that it is possible in the future when the work is resumed to get it linked with some similar work in Japan—a great common, 'Tao Yu Hui' (道友會)."

Again, we have to offer our apology to subscribers and exchanges of *The Eastern Buddhist*. Since the last issue, Volume IV, Number 1, dated July-August-September, 1926, no number has appeared until now. We regret very much that owing to certain circumstances in the lives of the Editors the magazine had to be temporarily suspended again. As it is impossible to make up arrears, Volume IV, Number 2, dated July-August-September, 1927, is following the number issued a year ago. Subscribers and exchanges please take notice of this. Subscribers will receive the full number for which they have paid. The aim and ideal of the Editors is to issue the magazine regularly as a quarterly, but as *The Eastern Buddhist* is of a monographic character rather than a periodical of current interest we think that it is not so important if it does not come out always on time. *The Eastern Buddhist* will not be suspended except temporarily, and when the time comes that it will not be issued any more, subscribers and exchanges will be notified. We should appreciate reviews by our exchanges and a further continuance of exchange magazines. We would ask our exchanges to address the Editors personally at 39 Ono-machi, Koyama, Kyoto.

The following books have been received and will be

reviewed in an early number: *Doctrine of the Buddha, the Religion of Reason*, by George Grimm: Publisher, W. Drugulin, Leipzig.—*Polynesian Religion*, by E. S. Craighill Handy, published by the Bishop Museum, Honolulu.—*La Morale Bouddhique*, by Louis de la Vallée Poussin, published by Nouvelle Librairie Nationale, Paris.—*Dasabhumikasutra*, by Johannes Rahder, published by J.-B. Istas, Leuven.—*A Study of Shinto, the Religion of the Japanese Nation*, by Genchi Kato, published by Meiji Japan Society, Tokyo.

Our exchanges: We acknowledge with thanks the following magazines: *Extreme Asie*, Saigon; *Die Katholischen Missionen*, Aachen, Germany; *Buddhism in England*, London; *The Young East*, Tokyo; *La Revue Spirite*, Paris; *Rays from the Rose Cross*, Oceanside, California; *The Maha-Bodhi and United Buddhist World*, Calcutta; *Prabuddha Bharata*, Mayavati, India; *Journal of Religion*; *Occult Review*, London; *The Quest*, London; *Shrine of wisdom*, London; *Re-incarnation*, Chicago; *The Epoch and the Life of Reason*, Ilfracombe, England; *Annals of the Bhandarkar Institute*, Poona City, India; *Vedanta Kesari*, Madras, India; *The Vedic Magazine*, Lahore, India; *Kalpaka*, Tinnevely, India; *Quarterly Journal of Mythic Society*, Bangalore City, India; *The Theosophical Review*, London; *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Calcutta; *Revista Teosofica*, Habana, Cuba; *Le Lotus Bleu*, Paris; *The Messenger*, Chicago; *The Message of the East*, Boston; *Samakrita Bharati*, Bengal; *Logos*, Tübingen; *The Herald of the Star*, London; *The Theosophical Path*, Point Loma, California; *Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies*, London; *The Liberal Catholic*, Sydney; *Zeitschrift für Buddhismus*, München; *Christliche Welt*, Gotha; *Journal Asiatique*, Paris; *Shama'A*, Madras; *Il Progresso Religioso*, Genova; *New Orient*, New York; *Bhrātri*, Journal of League of Y. M. B. A. of North America San Francisco; *Buddhist India*, Calcutta.

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VOLUME FOUR.

- No. 1—The Secret Message of Bodhi-Dharma, or the Content of Zen Experience—A Discussion of the Origin of Mahayan Buddhism—Vimalakirti's Discourse on Emancipation, an English Translation—Nagarjuna's Mahayana-Vimsaka, the Tibetan Text.
- No. 2—Zen and Jodo, Two Types of Buddhist Experience—The Unity of Buddhism—The Buddhist Doctrine of Vicarious Suffering—The Quest of Historic Sakyamuni in Western Scholarship—Nagarjuna's Mahayana-Vimsaka, an English Translation—Vimalakirti's Discourse on Emancipation (in English).

THE EASTERN BUDDHIST

THE LANKAVATARA SUTRA, AS A MAHAYANA TEXT IN ESPECIAL RELATION TO THE TEACHING OF ZEN BUDDHISM

The *Lankāvatāra Sūtra*¹ is one of the nine principal Mahayana sutras in Nepalese Buddhism; in China and Japan it also occupies an important position in the philosophy of Mahayana Buddhism as containing the doctrine of Tathāgata-garbha or Ālaya-vijñāna,² and also in the literature of Zen Buddhism. The study of the sutra, however, owing to various reasons,³ has not been so vigorously prosecuted as that of other sutras such as the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka*, *Vimalakīrti*, or *Avataṃsaka*. This neglect has especially been the case on the part of the followers of Zen, whose traditional indifference to philosophy and the cognate subjects is notorious. One of the reasons is that its Chinese translations are somewhat difficult to understand, which is no doubt partly due to the same quality in the original.

There are three Chinese translations now extant; the earliest one which is recorded to have been made in 412 A.D. was lost so early as 700 when the fourth and last one was produced by Śikshānanda and others. Of these three, the most difficult is that of Guṇabhadra which in all likelihood represents an earlier text, and it has been this too that has been studied most by Zen scholars and commented upon also chiefly by them. Since the publication of the Sanskrit text in 1923 by the late Dr Bunyu Nanjo, scholarly interest in the sutra has been revived to a certain extent in this country. It may not therefore be inopportune to discuss the significance of the *Lankāvatāra Sūtra* generally as a Mahayana text, but especially as relating to the teaching of Zen Buddhism.

¹ To be linguistically exact, this is to be romanised *Lankāvatāra*, but for practical reasons ñ is throughout printed n in this article.

² These two terms are explained below.

³ Cf. the author's *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, p. 74 et seq.

PART I

Breadth of Mahayana Buddhism

Buddhism, especially Mahayana Buddhism so called, is like a vast ocean where all kinds of living beings are allowed to thrive in a most generous manner, almost verging on a chaos. Students who lightly step into it generally find it too complicated and overwhelming for their logical comprehension. But the fact is that Mahayanism is the outcome of long years of development of a religious system among a people furnished with the most fertile imagination. The student has to be patient. The best method of study may probably be found by taking up one principal Mahayana sutra at a time, and by examining its contents historically, philosophically, and psychologically. The Chinese scholars of Buddhism encountered the same difficulties centuries ago, and as in those days there was no higher or lower criticism of the sacred texts, every tradition was respected on its face value. The scholars exhausted their ingenuity to make a logical, humanly plausible arrangement among the literature brought over from India and claimed to have been delivered by the Buddha himself. Now this untenable position is abandoned, and each sutra has come to be studied historically, critically, and analytically. Each principal sutra may now be regarded as marking a certain stage or phase of development in the history of Mahayana Buddhism, which is indeed too huge and unwieldy to be handled as one solid piece of work completed within a few decades.

What does then the *Lankāvatāra* signify in the composite system of Mahayanism? What phase does it represent in the history of Buddhism? What in short is the message of the *Lankāvatāra* as we have it now? What function does it or did it perform in the conservation of Buddhist thought and experience?

Each principal sutra has had its special work to accomplish in the unfoldment of the religious consciousness. For instance, the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka* marks the epoch in the history of

Buddhism when Śākyamuni ceased to be conceived of as historical personage subject to the fates of all transient beings; for he is no more a human Buddha but one who lives through eternity for the benefit of all creatures. The *Suvarṇaprabhāsa*, at least in part, also belongs to the same period. The *Sukhāvativyūha* represents a stage in the history of Buddhist experience which ceased to be wholly satisfied with the intellectual presentation of the doctrine of enlightenment, when Buddhists began to be oppressed with the idea of sin hanging on them too heavily and too acutely. The *Prajñāpāramitā*, on the other hand, dwelling on the conception of relativity seeks deliverance from the bondage of existence, or rather interprets the Buddhist realisation purely from the metaphysical point of view. The doctrine of Śūnyatā constituting the keynote of the *Prajñāpāramitā* is really the foundation of all the Mahayana schools of Buddhism including even the Yogācāra. What is known as primitive Buddhism denied the existence of a substantial ego (*ātman*), but its conception of the external world was that of the naïve realist. The *Prajñāpāramitā* philosopher insists on the non-existence of a particular body as such, that is, as an entity whose identity is absolute. Every being or every object, as he sees it, is relative, impermanent, and not worth getting attached to. This *Prajñāpāramitā* idea of relativity, or emptiness as the literal sense of the term *śūnyatā* is, is the foundation of the Buddhist theory of nature. As to the *Avatamsaka Sūtra*, it is really the consummation of Buddhist thought, Buddhist sentiment, and Buddhist experience. To my mind, no religious literature in the world can ever approach the grandeur of conception, the depths of feeling, and the gigantic scale of composition as attained by this sutra. It is the eternal foundation of life from which no religious minds can turn back athirst or only partially satisfied. It is a great pity that this magnificent literature still remains concealed in a language not so universally accessible. Not only deeply speculative minds find satisfaction here but humble spirits and heavily-oppressed hearts too will have their burdens lightened. Abstract truths are so concretely, so symbolically represented here, and one will finally come to the

realisation of the truth that even in a particle of dust the whole universe is seen reflected—not this visible universe only but a vast system of universes, conceivable by the highest mind only.

The Teaching of the Lankavatāra

Where does the *Lankāvatāra* stand then?

The *Lankāvatāra* may be classed in a way with the *Avatamsaka* inasmuch as it teaches the absolute idealism of the latter and is the disclosure of the inner mind of the Buddha, but it has a special message to give to the Buddhist world in a manner characteristic of the sutra. It is devoid of all symbolism—quite different in this respect from the *Avatamsaka*. It is instead straightforward in expression and notes down in a somewhat sketchy style almost all the important ideas belonging to the schools of Mahayana Buddhism. It is partly for this reason that the sutra requires a great deal of learning as well as insight to understand all the details thoroughly. The principal thesis of the *Lankāvatāra* may however be regarded as summarised in the following passage¹:

“Again, O Mahāmati, there may be other Śrāmanas and Brahmans who hold the following views: that all things have no self-substance (*nihsvabhāva*),² they are like a cloud, like a circle traced out by a revolving fire-brand, or like the air-castle of the Gandharvas; that they are unborn (*anutpāda*), they are like māyā, or mirage, or the moon in water, or a dream; that external objects are manifestations of the mind erroneously perceived due to false discrimination (*vikalpa*)² since time immemorial; that by thus viewing the world one ceases from being conditioned by the false discrimination worked out in one’s own mind, one does away with the terminology belonging to such false discrimination and with the signification of words

¹ This is done mainly from the T’ang version, the Kōkyōshoin edition of the Buddhist Tripitaka, 黃 VI, 87b f. Cf. the Sanskrit text (p. 42 ff.). Throughout this paper, wherever pages are mentioned, unless no specification is given, they refer to the Sanskrit text edited by B. Nanjo.

² As to the meaning of these terms, see below.

such as predicating and predicated; that when one understands that the body, property, and abiding place are the particularisations of the Ālaya-vijñāna (or *citta*=mind), one is freed from [ideas such as] perceived and perceiving, attains to a state of no-image, and has no thought of birth, abiding, and disappearance; and that all things start from the evolution of one's own mind (*svacitta*). O Mahāmati, such Bodhisattva-mahāsattvas will before long realise the sameness of Samsāra and Nirvāṇa.

“O Mahāmati, by deeds of great love, skilful means (*upāya*), and effortlessness (*anābhogacārya*), a Bodhisattva reviews all beings and knows that they are like *māyā*, they resemble shadows, they are not produced by causes; and further knowing that the world exists not outside the mind, he would lead a life of formlessness (*nirābhāsa*). As he gradually goes up the higher stages, he will realise a state of Samadhi where he comes to the understanding that the triple world is mind-only (*citta-mātra*). The Samadhi he has attained is called *Māyā-like* (*māyopama*). He will further free himself from all images, perfect his knowledge, and realise that things are unborn, and, entering upon the Samadhi called Vajravimbopama, will obtain the Buddha-body. He will, always abiding in the suchness of things, manifest himself in transformed bodies, he will be endowed with the ten powers, the six psychic faculties, and the tenfold self-mastery. O Mahāmati, adorned with *Upāya* (means), he will visit all the Buddha-lands; and disengaged from the philosophical doctrines as well as from the *Citta*, *Manas*, and *Vijñāna*, he will experience a turning within himself and by degrees attain the Tathagata-body.

“Therefore, O Mahāmati, if a Bodhisattva wishes to attain the Tathagata-body, he should keep himself away from the Skandhas, Dhātus, Āyatanas, Cittam, causation, works, discipline, birth, staying, and passing, and cease from discriminating, philosophising, and only abide in the thought of ‘mind-only’ (*citta-mātra*).

“When the triple world is surveyed [by the Bodhisattva], he perceives that this existence is due to memory (*vāsanā*)

accumulated since the beginningless past, but wrongly interpreted. He recognises that Buddhahood is a state imageless, unborn, and to be inwardly experienced by oneself, when the mind gets fully controlled and purposeless deeds are accomplished. Like the cintamani (wish-gem), he will now manifest himself in a variety of forms according to the needs of sentient beings and lead them to the view that the mind-only is, and gradually have them go up the stages. Therefore, O Mahāmāti, let the Bodhisattva discipline himself well in the work of self-realisation (*svasiddhānta*).¹

The All-importance of an Inner Realisation

The ideas that things are devoid of self-substance (*svabhāva*), that is, they are empty in nature (*śūnya*), that the world is nothing but mind, that in order to reach the ultimate end of Buddhahood one must transcend all the limitations of particularity, and finally that the perfect state of enlightenment must be realised within oneself,—these are the common property of Mahayana Buddhism; but in the *Lankāvatāra* these ideas are developed in a way peculiar to this sutra, as it lays its emphasis especially on the importance of self-realisation, without which the Buddhist life remains a mere philosophical exercise. The reason why Bodhi-Dharma handed this sutra over to Hui-k'ê (慧可) as containing the essence of Zen Buddhism must be sought in this that the constant refrain of the *Lankāvatāra* is the all-importance of an inner perception (*pratyātmagati*) or self-realisation (*svasiddhānta*). Therefore, the purpose of the sutra is highly practical in spite of its abstract speculations.

In the first chapter which is added to in the two later translations of the *Lankāvatāra*, we have this from the Buddha, who gently smiled looking at the palace of Lankā at Mount Malaya: "All the Buddhas of the past have discoursed on the truth of an inner realisation which can be attained only by the

¹ Being full of technical terms, the reader will find it difficult to understand, but as we go on the import of the passage here quoted will I hope grow fully intelligible.

superior wisdom of the Buddha and never by the speculation of the philosopher¹ or by the discipline of the Śrāvaka and the Pratyekabuddha. This truth I will now disclose for the benefit of Rāvana, king of Lanka."²

And when the Bodhisattva Mahāmāti finished praising the virtues of the Buddha in the beginning of Chapter II, (which is Chapter I of the Sung translation), the Buddha surveying the assembly made this remark: "O ye, sons of the victor, and O thou, Mahāmāti, ask and I will talk to you concerning the attainment of the inmost realisation."

These statements are conclusive to show that the *Lankāvatāra*'s special importance in the literature of Mahayana Buddhism lies in its perpetual reference to this intuitive element in all religion. While the sutra has been made use of to support the claims of a particular school such as the Yogācāra or the Avatamsaka, in its connection with the doctrine of the Ālaya-vijñāna or Tathāgata-garbha, this connection is accidental; the thesis of the sutra must be regarded as centered on the idea of an inner perception of the deepest truth, which goes beyond language and reasoning. The Buddhist discipline or exercise (*yoga*) as is told by the Buddha³ consists of two parts, philosophical and practical. The philosophical discipline is to train the mind in absolute idealism and see that the world is mind, that there is in reality no becoming such as birth and death, and that no external things really exist; while the practical side is to attain an inner perception by means of superior knowledge (*svapratyātmāryajñānādhigama*). Putting the practical side of the Buddhist discipline first, we can say that when it is accomplished, the philosophical side follows by itself; that is to say, the world as seen in the light of self-realisation is to be interpreted in terms of absolute idealism. Whatever this be, the *Lankāvatāra* is decidedly rich in deep mystical speculations.

One thing I wish to notice in the *Lankāvatāra* before I

¹ *Tīrtha*, or *tīrthakara* in Sanskrit, and 外道 in Chinese.

² P. 2.

³ P. 79 f.

proceed to describe the nature of the inner self-realisation, is that this sutra does not make one reference to the awakening of the thought of enlightenment (*bodhi-cittotpāda*) made so much of, especially in the sutras of the Prajñāpāramitā group. The awakening of the thought of enlightenment means to take interest in the teaching of Mahayana Buddhism and to wish sincerely for the realisation of its truth. This is really the first step in the career of a Bodhisattva, for without this awakening no further progress in spiritual discipline will be possible. Therefore, in almost all the Mahayana sutras one is told to direct one's thought first towards enlightenment. When this is accomplished, one can come some day to the final attainment, however remote the day may be. In the *Lankāvatāra* no word is said about the awakening, but it goes directly to the heart of the matter, that is, it asks the Bodhisattva to come to the realisation at once, instead of making gradual advance towards the goal. In this respect, this sutra may be said to be an appeal to those Bodhisattvas who are already deeply steeped in the Mahayana teaching of the supreme enlightenment.

Another thing the student of the *Lankāvatāra* notices is that the Buddha here tells to attain to a state of inner realisation (*pratyātmagocara*) and not of enlightenment (*sambodhi*). These two are psychologically the same process; when one has Pratyātmajñāna one is enlightened. But in the *Lankāvatāra* the ultimate goal of the Buddhist life is generally stated in terms of experience (*gocara*) and not intellectually as illumining. I am inclined to think that the *Lankāvatāra* is unique in this respect explaining perhaps the reason why Bodhi-Dharma, the father of Zen Buddhism in China, recommended it to his mystic followers

The Inner Experience and Language

This inner perception or self-realisation is made possible by the presence of the Tathāgata-garbha within the heart of every sentient being.¹ The Garbha, literally meaning "womb," or,

¹ P. 77, p. 222.

better, "something interiorly hidden," is the seed of Tathagatahood from which a fully enlightened being grows up. This is however generally found covered up with the defiled wrappings of false judgment (*parikalpa* or *vikalpa*) and irrational attachment (*abhiniveśa*). False judgment comes from not perceiving things as they are, *yathābhūtam*, that is, as not subject to the principle of individuation, which is imposed by the mind upon things considered external; as to the irrational attachment which causes in us all kinds of vexation, it is the inevitable result of false judgment. The Garbha, therefore, originally pure and immaculate, must be restored to its natural state free from attachments. It is thus generally likened to a priceless gem concealed under a soiled garment. Take the garment off and the shining stone will begin to shed its natural light over things as they are. The illumination thus obtained is a state of self-realisation, and one can then see the Garbha as if held in one's own hand, even as plainly as the āmalaka fruit.¹ As the Garbha thus cleansed off its defilement is beyond speculations of the philosopher and the attainment of the Hinayanists, the author of the *Daśabhūmika*² as well as the *Lankāvatāra* calls it *avikalpa*, or *nīrvikalpa* (*-jñāna*),³ meaning knowledge of non-judgment or non-discrimination, a kind of direct perception, or again knowledge of thatness or suchness (*tathatājñāna*).⁴

In spite of the practical end it has in view the *Lankāvatāra* is filled with abstract nomenclature, which sometimes turns away those unfamiliar with Buddhist literature from further pursuing their study of it. But this is unavoidable seeing that the experience on which the *Lankāvatāra* discourses is not within the reach of a consciousness ordinarily suffocated with contrary notions. The sutra is quite explicit in this respect as it declares that those who are tied (*saṁsakti*) to words do not understand

¹ P. 222.

² Edited by J. Rahder. P. 64.

³ P. 158, etc.

⁴ See also Sthiramati's commentary on the *Trimśikā* by Vasubandhu, edited by Sylvain Lévi, pp. 40-41.

the truth (*tattvam*),¹ or that "the superior state of self-realisation is beyond speech and analysis."² In fact, the Buddha is never tired in this sutra of repeatedly reminding us of the fact that language falls far too short of adequately representing the true state of self-realisation. This is in the nature of language. Language is always discriminative; when we make any reference to anything, this is to be distinguished from other things, thus limiting it to that extent and to that degree. But the supreme moment of self-realisation is not subject to any form of limitation and discrimination; perhaps the only way of describing it will be to say "that," or, abstractly, "thatness" (*tathatā*), but even this is discriminating, *parikalpita*, and distorts the perception. As long as we are what we are, tied up to the exigencies of material existence, language is inevitable, and if we do not use words we have to resort to gestures or movements of some parts of the body in one way or another. The *Lankāvatāra* remarks:³ Words are not necessarily used all over the world for the communication of ideas or feelings; for in some other Buddha-lands the Buddha-teaching is carried out by mere gazing, or by the contraction of the facial muscles, or by the raising of the eye-brows, by frowning or smiling, by clearing the throat, by the twinkling of an eye, by merely thinking, or by motion of some kind. Articulated speech is not an absolute necessity for human intercourse. Mere gazing is said to be sufficient in the world of Samantabhadra to make one realise the highest state of enlightenment known as "Anutpattikadharma-kṣānti."⁴ Even in this world, says the sutra, the ordinary business of life is carried on most successfully among the bees or ants that never use words. If so, we need not wonder at those Zen masters who merely raise a finger or utters an unintelligible cry in order to demonstrate the profoundest experience ever attainable by human consciousness. When there is

¹ P. 224.

² P. 148.

³ P. 105.

⁴ This is explained below.

nothing in my mind which can readily respond to or which is already awakened to take in what is flashed out from another mind, the latter may use the finest expression possible in our language, and yet my mind may remain perfectly blind to its truth. If on the other hand there is a chord of harmony between the two, a touch on either side will create a reverberation in the other. There is no power in a language as such, though we cannot dispense with it by any means.

The *Lankāvatāra* here makes a distinction between words (*rutam*) and meaning (*artha*),¹ and advise us not to understand meaning by merely depending upon words, to do which is quite ruinous to the comprehension of reality. *Ruta* (word) is the combination of sound and syllable, subject to our logical or intellectual understanding. (*Vāg-akshara-samyoga-vikalpa*.) It issues from the cavity of the mouth between the teeth, jaws, palates, tongue, and lips, when one is engaged in conversation; inflections, conjugations, and other grammatical and rhetorical modifications are effected according to the ideas (*vikalpa*) and innate desires (*vāsanā*)² of the speaker. As to *artha* (meaning), it is an inner perception itself gained in self-realisation when one entering upon the path of Nirvana causes a turning (*parāvṛtti*)³ in the deepest recesses of consciousness known as *Ālaya-vijñāna*. To gain this inner perception, a man retires into a

¹ P. 154, p. 193 ff.

² *Vikalpa*, literally means "to distinguish," "to determine," or "to discriminate," and is rendered in Chinese by 分別 *fen-pieh*, which is the characteristic function of thinking. *Vāsanā* is a more difficult term implying the whole philosophy or psychology of Mahayana idealism. No English equivalent is found. In this article, "memory," "habit-energy," or "impression" is rather loosely used for it. For fuller explanation however see below.

³ According to the T'ang translation, "They [the Hinayanists] do not understand that great Nirvana is obtained when through an inner perception there takes place a turning in the *Ālaya* upon which depends the existence of an external world." Vasubandhu's *Trisūkāvijñāptikārikā*, XXIX, also makes reference to this turning. The *Lankāvatāra*, pp. 62, 108, 238, etc. More about this "turning" later.

solitary spot all by himself, and, by applying himself assiduously to abstract meditations and deep reflections, his inner sense (*prajñā*) or self-knowledge (*svabuddhi*) begins to shine out from underneath the residual accumulation (*vāsanā*) of the past thoughts, affections, and deeds since time immemorial. The meaning, *artha*, thus realised in one's inmost consciousness is something no combination of the physical organs is capable of expressing in any way adequate to the experience. But as when searching for an object in the dark one is to rely on a lantern, meaning is after all to be gathered by means of words, at least it is to be thus oriented. The understanding of the relation thus existing between *rūpa* (words) and *artha* (meaning) will be necessary when we wish to know the nature of the inner perception (*svapratyātma-jñāna*).

This relation between words and meaning, or between syllables (*akshara*) and reality (*tattvam* or *tathātva*),¹ or between teaching (*deśanā*) and truth (*siddhānta*)² is like that between the finger and the moon.³ The finger is needed to point out the moon, but it ought not to be taken for the latter. The same disastrous result follows from regarding *akshara*, or *rūpa*, or *deśanā* as the reality itself. Those who are not able to take their eyes away from the finger-tip will never realise the ultimate truth (*paramārtha*) of things. It is again like feeding the baby with uncooked food,⁴ it will be too late to resuscitate it when it has succumbed to the mother's unwise treatment. Those trained in the Buddhist doctrine ought to be quite discriminating in this respect. Naturally, we do not know what the teaching of the Buddha is if we have no communication in words, words are very much needed, but when there is no correspondence between words and meaning the teaching itself will lose its sense. The *Lankāvatāra* thus reiterates throughout the text that the Tathagata never teaches the Dharma fallen into mere talk (*akshara-patita*), and it was for this reason that it was preached by the

¹ P. 48, p. 196.

² P. 172.

³ P. 223, p. 196.

⁴ P. 196.

Buddha and other teachers of the Dharma that "the Tathagata had not uttered a word in answer or in discourse" during his life-time between the Enlightenment and the Nirvana.¹ The idea is, "Do not cling to words!" (*Na deśanā-ruta-pāṭhe 'bhini-viśatām.*)²

Words are to be treated like the lunar reflection in water as far as they are related to meaning. The reflection is there, though the moon itself has not entered (*apравishṭham*) into the water; nor is it to be considered standing in no relation (*nir-gatam*) to the water, because the latter has something in it to reflect the moon.³ Only let us not fall into the habit of superficially taking mere words for real meaning. This is the warning of the *Lankāvatāra*: *Yathā-ruta-artha-abhiniveśa-saṁdhan na prapateyuh.*⁴

Disastrous Complications Arising from Discrimination

This habit of regarding words as completely and adequately expressing all that is to be found there comes from another habit of ours, which is, in the terminology of the *Lankāvatāra*, our wrong discrimination or interpretation (*vikalpa*) of the aspect of existence, which may be designated as individuation (*prabhedanaya-lakṣhaṇa*,⁵ or *vishaya-pariccheda-lakṣhaṇa*⁶). When this aspect is well understood so that we shall no more be misled by wrong interpretation, we are able to get into a state of self-realisation. Individuation means to separate one object from another, and taking these separated, particular objects for final substances (*svabhāva*, or *dharma-ātmya-lakṣhaṇa*), to cling to this notion, and to keep up one's evil desires and passions burning all the time. According to the sutra, this wrong interpreta-

¹ P. 144, p. 194, p. 240. The same idea is expressed in the *Tathāgata-guhyā-sūtra*, which is quoted in Candrakīrti's Commentary on the *Madhyamika*, B. T. Society edition, p. 201.

² P. 193.

³ P. 158, p. 193.

⁴ P. 160.

⁵ P. 127.

⁶ P. 44.

tion takes place in regard to several categories of thought and being such as (1) sounds, (2) describable objects of thought, (3) appearances, (3) material wealth, (5) substance, (6) causal relations, (7) definite philosophical views, (8) reasoning as to the existence of the ego, (9) coming into existence, (10) not coming into existence, (11) dependence, and (12) bondage and release.¹ Logically considered, this kind of classification is baffling; but when we survey the Indian background which stimulated the Buddhist philosopher to speculate on such conglomerate subjects, we can readily enter into his spirit. For Buddhists, in fact all Indian philosophers, there are no abstract problems of philosophy to be solved from the purely intellectual point of view. They are always tinged with religious sentiment, they have always some bearings on the most important practical question of life, which is how to get spiritual freedom. All the thinking carried on in this sutra, therefore, has always this question in view, and naturally those statements above referred to are to be explained according to the general trend of Buddhist thought.

The wrong consideration about sounds (1) creates an attachment to musical or literary productions which are not always spiritually enhancing, and this is to be avoided. Objects of thought are describable and therefore determinable (2), but the content of the inner perception forming the central theme of the *Lankāvatāra* is not subject to this limitation, and if one gets a wrong idea here, there will be no salvation for him, as he takes a thing indescribable and inexpressible for a thing altogether contrary. Things describable have no permanency and consequently no spiritual value, but we are liable to judge them wrongly and get firmly attached to them. (3) We are in this respect like those who fancy mere watery appearance in the desert for real one. This faulty judgment may extend indefinitely over all appearances, and that the result is ruinous goes without saying. Hence this warning. Attachment to material wealth or property (*artha*) is another case of false judgment as to appearance (4).

¹ P. 128 et seq.

Substance (*svabhāva*) means in the *Lankāvatāra* a concrete individual object, a residue after the last analysis; and the adherents of the substance-theory maintain that there are really such things outside the mind (5). Owing to this misjudgment, the way to self-realisation is blocked. Errors of causal relation refer to the ideas of *sat* (to be) and *asat* (not to be), which are considered real as they make it possible to establish causal relationship between things about us (6). But this idea of causality ought not to lead us to a first cause or primary being from which all things derive their reality. As we know, Buddhist philosophy denies the first cause as really existing as such. The ideas of *sat* and *asat* are only relative and have no substantial existence besides being so named.

We next come to such philosophical views as entertained by different schools of thought at the time of the *Lankāvatāra* (9); according to which such categories as "to be" (*asti*) and "not to be" (*nāsti*), as oneness (*ekatva*) and otherness (*anyatva*), or as bothness (*ubhaya*) and not-bothness (*anubhaya*), are actualities and for that reason adhered to. This is, however, wrong and sure to lead one away from the inner realisation of the truth. (8) Reasoning (*yukti*) is concerned with the notion of the ego; when this is thought to be reality, one's spiritual development stops short. The *Lankāvatāra*, loyal to the traditional view of Buddhist philosophy, refuses to countenance the theory of ego-substance, which may be regarded as a corollary to general substance-theory. (9) The notion of *utpāda* (coming into existence) is related to that of causality. When such and such causes and conditions are matured, people think something comes into actual existence and continues to exist until the causes and conditions cease to operate; for coming into existence and vanishing from it are both real facts as much as is the law of causation. (10) The *anutpāda* view of things, on the other hand, argues that nothing has ever been brought into existence through causal relations, but that things are what they are even prior to the operation of the law of causation.

Dependence (*sambandha*) and bondage (*bandha*) are similar ideas. The relation between metal and wire is dependence, while

a man tied with a chord is in bondage, from which he can later be released when the chord is broken. All such relations when adhered to as real and permanent become dangerous to the spiritual growth of a true Buddhist, that is, of a Bodhisattva, (11) and (12).

Words (*ruta*) and meaning (*artha*), therefore, are to be separated, as the former generally fail to give us an exact idea of the object described with them. They are of course indicative suggesting where to look for the meaning. Numerous indeed are close attachments (*abhiniveśasaṃdhi*) one makes to things and relations on account of a wrong understanding of their true nature and value, and, due to these close attachments, one wraps oneself up in a cocoon like the silkworm, binding tight not only oneself but others.¹ Imaging things where they are not, or not perceiving them where they are, men are addicted to evil desires and passions. Let them only know how truthfully (*yathābhūtam*) to look into the reality of things whereby to break through the nets of wrong judgments and false imaginations, and they would have an inward perception leading to emancipation.

The Meaning of Yathābhūtam, Māyā, Śūnya

To understand the world or oneself, *yathābhūtam*, as it is in itself, is one of the great watchwords ringing through both Hinayana and Mahayana literature. But to know exactly what *yathābhūtam* means is the problem, for it does not allow any definite description. The problem is to be settled only by appealing to direct perception when one knows what it is, as when one sees a flower or a stone. In this respect, Buddhist terminology is often graphic and full of power; think of such terms as *tathatā* (如如, or 真如, suchness), *tattvam* (如實, thatness), or *satya* (真諦, being-so), which is used to designate the content of inner perception (*pratyātmañāna*). This seeing *yathābhūtam* constitutes the mystical element in all religion, and if one is affectively inclined, *tat* (that) will have to be taken in faith; but when the intellectual claim predominates, "that" will have to be perceived with "a noble eye of wisdom" (*āryapra-*

¹ P. 161.

jñācakshus) and not by a divine (*divya*) or human (*māṃsa*) eye.¹

The world seen through the divine or human eye is a world of *māyā*, but one disclosed to the *Prajñā* is the real one. Therefore, logically speaking, *māyā* is not a quality objectively attached to the world, it is not inherent in it, it rather belongs to the subject. As indeed the idealistic Mahayana does not admit the existence of an external world, whatever qualities we ordinarily think as belonging to the latter are creations or constructions of our own mind. But if we allow ourselves to be guided by the discriminating imagination (*parikalpa*), the world must be said to have in itself something of *māyā* nature; for its impermanency is patent to us all, it appears and disappears like lightning, having no self-substance in it. To say that this is an evanescent world is to say that it is always becoming, never in a state of being, that is, in constant flux as an ancient philosopher aptly describes it. We must, however, be most careful not to be carried away by the ordinary method of interpreting the world and designate its transiency or constant becoming in the Mahayanistic terminology. This is highly coloured with idealistic tinge, and to apply it in an objective realistic sense will be quite misleading. When the world is said to be like *māyā*, it is to be understood subjectively, and not objectively. Such objective terms as transiency or a flux of becoming presuppose realism, and are not, strictly speaking, in harmony with the absolutely idealistic standpoint adopted by Mahayanists.

So with the conception of *Śūnyatā* (emptiness), we must bear in mind the fact that the term is not to be found in a logician's dictionary, nor in one containing realistic terms only. For it is the word coined by the possessor of the *Prajñācakshus* (wisdom-eye) when he has reviewed the world as I look at a sheet of paper before me this very moment. By him the world is perceived *yathābhūtam* stripped off all its logical predicates and also its so-called objective trappings; the world thus appearing in its nakedness has been designated *Śūnya*, empty, by the

¹ P. 164.

Mahayanists. It is in this sense, therefore, when they say that there is nothing substantial in the world, which is endowed with an ego (*ātman*), and, therefore, which can be taken hold of; or that it slips off one's hands so readily, one predicate falling off after another, as it cannot be designated as being (*sat*), nor by its opposite, not-being (*asat*). No term or notion that admits an antithesis can be applied to the world, as it is beyond the logic of opposites. To mention some of such terms used in the *Lankāvatāra*, they are: *asti* and *nāsti*, or *sat* and *asat*, *svalakṣhaṇa* and *sāmānyalakṣhaṇa*, *lakṣhya* and *lakṣhaṇa*, *grāhya* and *grāhāṇa*, *samsāra* and *nirvāṇa*, *bāhya* and *adhyātma*, *anya* and *ananya*, *anekatā* and *ekatā*, *ubhaya* and *nobhaya*, *nitya* and *anitya*, etc. Before one term definitely fixes its quality, it runs over to the other alternative.

The *Lankāvatāra*, therefore, declares that the world as it is does not fall within the four propositions or points (*catuskoṭika*)¹, and in the first chapter even one hundred and eight negations are enumerated. The most truthful description of the state of things as we experience in this world of particulars, will be, from the Buddhist way of thinking, to compare it to *māyā* as created by the magician.² Making use of whatever objects he may take hold of, he would make out a variety of phantom creatures which appear to the spectators real. But in this neither the magician nor the objects fancifully created are at fault; the fault lies with the spectators who make erroneous judgments permitting things where they are not. The sutra gives further analogical proofs³ to impress upon us the truth of *māyā*-conception or that of *Śūnyatā*. That a picture is seen as really having the three dimensions, that a bedimmed eye imagines a hair-net (*keśonḍukam*), that a circle traced out by a fire-brand in quick motion is considered real, that a bubble is taken for a crystal-ball, and, further, that the reflection of a tree in the lake, an image in the mirror, an echo reverberating

¹ They are: affirmation, negation, double affirmation, and double negation.

² P. 56, p. 109, pp. 129-130, p. 199, etc.

³ P. 90, ff, etc.

through the valley, a mirage in the spring-field, and the wooden man operated by a piśāca—that each of these phenomena is regarded as an actuality, is due to the error of judgment on the part of an unenlightened mind, which, being placed under the permeating influence (*vāsanā*) of the past thoughts and desires, is incapacitated to look *yathābhūtam* into the truth of the matter. However, we must not take them for absolute illusions, for they are there and yet they are not there, so that the category of existence fails to be applied here. From the dualistic point of view, we feel inclined to interpret these terms objectively as denoting the idea of mere transiency or unreality, but when the whole trend of Buddhist thought is understood, we know that these similes are meant to describe a state of things, to which such logical conceptions as *sat* and *asat*, etc., are inapplicable, but which must be directly experienced *yathābhūtam* in one's inmost consciousness.

The *Lankāvatāra* says (p. 105):

“The sky [or space], the hare's horns, and a barren woman's child—

They are not, only talked of; so are things discriminated.

In the totality of causes and conditions, the ignorant discriminate birth;

Not knowing this reason, they go astray in the triple world.”

This may seem to mean: All things are mere names, their existence is not more than a matter of subjective discrimination; to think that things are really born, stay, and disappear in the system of causes and effects, is an illusion; all these realities so called have no objective validity; and, therefore, the world is altogether empty, void, unreal, and a mass of nothingness. To think this way, however, is not the position of the Mahayanist. What he wants us to do is that we should have a turning-over of the whole system of mentality and get a new point of view where we may survey the world *yathābhūtam*. The sutra, therefore, states a little further down (p. 106 ff.) that the difference between the wise and the ignorant is that the former are free from Viparyāsa while the latter are not. *Vipar-*

yāsa means imagining things where they are not, taking error for truth. The wise not hampered by this imagination see that the world is like *māyā* and has no reality, but at the same time they know that it is there, it is not pure nothingness. Why? Because they have gone beyond the relativism of being and non-being. The waters of the Ganga are not visible to the Preta, but they cannot be said to be non-existent, because other beings see them. In a similar way, the wise have a correct view of things as they are free from errors in their perception of an objective world, which exists only in relation to one's own mind. An objective world is really an error (*bhrānta*) in so far as it is discriminated as existing externally and individually. Or we may say that an external particularised world is an illusion as long as the ignorant are unable to break through the fetters of *Vikalpa*, wrong discrimination; whereas the same world is to the wise true, such as it is (*tathatā*). What is, therefore, an error to the one is truth to the other, because the latter is entirely free from all forms of discrimination (*sarvakalpināvirahitam*).

All these statements are designed to adjust our thought *yathābhūtam* to the actuality of existence, to which no logical predicates are applicable. To say "it is," is eternalism (*śāśvata*), to say "it is not," is nihilism (*uccheda*); and the object of Buddhist reasoning is to avoid these dualistic views, though not necessarily going to monism but to the way of experiencing it in its inwardness as well as in its totality.

"O Lord of Lankā," reads the sutra, "to see thus is called 'rightly seeing'; if seen otherwise it is called 'carrying on discrimination' (*vikalpa*), because here is discrimination which leads to dualism. It is like seeing one's own face in water, or like seeing one's own shadow in the moonlight or by the lantern, or listening to an echo of one's own voice in the valley, wherein discrimination takes place leading to attachment. In like manner, to separate *dharma* from *adharma* [or *a* from not-*a*] is only due to discrimination, and on account of this one finds it impossible to do away with the distinction, thereby creating all forms of falsehood. One is thus unable to realise tranquillity (*śānti*). By tranquillity is meant oneness of objects, and oneness of

objects is the highest Samadhi, from which grows an inner perception by the Noble Understanding. The Tathagata-garbha is its objective."¹

As we see here, any thought that permits of opposition or antithesis such as *sat* and *asat*, *dharma* and *adharma*, is considered the outcome of Vikalpa; and as long as Vikalpa is cherished, one can never realise the standpoint of pure idealism (*cittamātra*) and the *yathābhūtam* understanding of absolute oneness will never take place.

What is Meant by Being Unborn?

When *māyā* is understood in the sense elucidated above, we shall find light shed over the statement that all things are uncreated, or, more literally, unborn (*anutpannaḥ sarvabhāvah*). This is one of the phrases quite frequently met with in all Mahayana literature, and those who are not familiar with it will certainly find the phrase devoid of sense, regarding as having no connection with the self-realisation. But this again is a part of viewing things *yathābhūtam*. For if existence is not to be annotated by any one of the four propositions (*catuḥkoṭika*) and is above the alternation of *sat* and *asat*, and not controlled by the law of causation (*hetupratyaya*), it cannot be described in no other way than calling it unborn, *anutpanna*,—unborn not in the sense of eternity, nor in that of uncreatedness. Things are unborn simply because no categories admitting contradiction or alternation or antithesis are applicable here. Eternity contrasts with non-eternity or impermanence; uncreatedness if it has any relative meaning stands in opposition to creation; and if being unborn is taken in a similar way it limits itself and our perception of things will be no more *yathābhūtam* but affected by Parikalpa. For this reason, the Buddha in the *Lankāvatāra* repeatedly warns us not to get confused here, but to understand *anutpāda sarvadharmāṇām* in its absolute, unconditioned sense.

“Why is existence regarded as unborn or unoriginated? Because there is neither creating nor created, and therefore no

¹ From the T'ang version. The end of the first chapter.

causer, (i.e., creator)."¹ Again,² things are unborn because they are to be regarded as *māyā*, and because the Buddha wishes to have the philosophers take their eyes away from logic and its necessary limitations. As long as the antithesis of *sat* and *asat* is considered objectively real, as held by some philosophers, there will be the real coming into existence and the real passing away from it. Those who are taken to the passing-away aspect of existence are nihilists, while those who look for the eternal aspect are eternalists; and neither of them has the right view of it. They are attached to one thing or another, they are far from attaining the point where all things are perceived in their true bearings, that is, as manifestations of mind-only (*cittamātradrīṣya*). The *Lankāvatāra* calls this view-point "*Yathābhūta-avasthāna-darśana*."³ The *gāthā* reads:

"Because there is no causing, there is no birth;
Where existence is admitted, there is the holding of birth
and death.

When it is seen as being like *māyā*, etc.,
No Vikalpa takes place as regards appearances."

This Buddhist idea of being unborn is liable to be confused with eternalism as is suggested by Mahāmātī.⁴ But when we know that *anutpāda* (to be unborn) is not an idea contrasted

¹ P. 115.

² P. 111.

³ P. 112.

⁴ P. 111, p. 166, etc. Eternalism may not be an appropriate term for that school of philosophy which holds that all things have been what they are and remain for ever as such. This is the *śāśvata* (eternal or persistent) view of existence and stands opposed to the other view known as the *uccheda* (destruction or extirpation). According to the latter, there is nothing in the world that is real, eternally abiding, and will retain its identity for ever. The doctrine of *Śūnyatā* is sometimes taken for this. Buddhism goes the middle way between the two extremes; for, according to it, existence is neither temporal and forever vanishing, nor eternal and forever abiding. Objectively stated, it is in a state of constant becoming, which in terms of Mahayana philosophy is called like *māyā*, or it is *śūnya* (empty, another difficult word to translate properly), it is unborn, it is not dualistic, it has no self-substance. This is the Buddhist teaching known as "*śūnyatā, anutpāda, advaya, niḥsvabhāva-lakṣaṇaṁ sarvadharmaṇāṁ*." p. 73.

to *utpāda* (to be born) or subject to the principle of causation, but an idea absolutely going beyond opposites, we come nearer to the truth. We need an inner perception to see into the true nature of existence; otherwise, like the ignorant and confused we see things where there is really nothing, and imagine them to be actualities though they are like the hare's horns or the tortoise's hair.¹ Vikalpa takes place here, and all looks distorted. So we read in the sutra:

“According to my doctrine, there is neither being nor non-being, for existence is not to be characterised as being born, nor as disappearing. Why is there no non-being? For it is like seeking various objects created by the magician or in a dream. [As long as there are things actually seen they cannot be said non-existent.] Why is there no being? For the self-nature of all things that appear to be here, is really non-existent, they are seen and yet not seen, they are taken hold of and yet not taken hold of. Therefore, I say that things are neither existent nor non-existent. If one, realising that there is nothing but what is seen of mind, abides in the suchness of things where no individuation [or discrimination, *vikalpa*] takes place, one will see that all doings in the world cease. To discriminate is the business of the ignorant, and not of the wise. O Mahāmati, it is due to the mind that discriminates that there appears a world destitute of reality, such as the palace of the Gandharvas or phantom creations of the magician. To distinguish between the born and the not-born, between the created and the un-created, is like talking about the works of the magician, that have never been in existence and therefore that will never disappear. The ignorant fail to see the self-nature of existence (*bhāvasvabhāva*) because their views are perverted. When they are thus perverted, they are unable to realise a state of aloofness, and as they are unable to do so, they cannot disengage themselves from false discrimination. As long as one sees things particularised in forms, there is a perception of the born and the unborn, and as the result discrimination goes on. Nirvana

¹ P. 62.

is where there is no birth, no extinction; it is seeing into a state of suchness [or thatness] which transcends all the categories constructed by mind; for it is the Tathagata's own inner consciousness."¹

In connection with this *anutpāda* (not being born) idea, it may not be out of place to say a few words about the Mahayana conception of what is known as "Anutpattikadharmakshānti." One meets with this phrase quite frequently in all the Mahayana sutras though not so much in the *Lankāvatāra*. Literally rendered, it is "not-born-object-patience" and 無生法忍 in Chinese. This evidently baffled some of the European translators of the Mahayana texts. But we shall be able to understand it much better now than they as we have already explained what the Mahayanists mean by all things not being born (*sarvadharmāṇām anutpāda*). The idea is simply this that the reality or substance of things is beyond all predicate which always implies its opposite, and, therefore, the phrase, "Anutpattikadharma," is a statement concerning the nature of *dharma* which may abstractly be translated here as existence.

But the last term of the compound, *kshānti*, may be somewhat puzzling. What has patience to do with this existence to be designated unborn? *Kshānti*, of course, means "patience" here as when it is one of the six Pāramitās, or resignation, or acquiescence, but not in its ordinary sense. For *kshānti* here does not mean "to endure" or "suffer patiently"; endurance or suffering implies unwillingness and resistance to a certain extent. The sense of Buddhist *kshānti*, however, is a willing

¹ Abridged, pp. 199-200.

² M. E. Burnouf has in his French translation of the *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka* (p. 85), "Une patience miraculeuse dans la loi"; Max Müller in his *Sukhāvatīvyūha* (S.B.E. XLIX, pp. 39-40, and p. 51), "Resignation to consequences which have not yet arisen"; Cecil Bendall and W. H. D. Rouse in their English translation of Śāntideva's *Śikṣā-samuccaya* (p. 297), "Resignation to the idea of not being reborn"; and H. Kern in his English *Saddharma-puṇḍarīka* (S.B.E. XXI, p. 134), "Acquiescence in the eternal law." These show how these great Sanskrit scholars struggled to get at the exact meaning of *anutpattikādharmakshānti*.

compliance or acceptance. When the *anutpanna* view of existence is truthfully recognised and accepted, it becomes the principle of one's conduct, determining the whole attitude of the mind. The Chinese scholars generally take 忍 (patience) for 認 (recognition) as they are both pronounced *jen*; but, strictly speaking, the term is not an intellectual one, it belongs to the will, it is a whole-hearted acceptance of the ultimate fact (*tattvam*) as perceived by a mind free from errors or wrong judgments (*vikalpa*).

In the *Avatamsaka Sutra*, a chapter (Śikshānanda, Chapter XXIX, On Kshānti) is devoted to the explanation of ten kinds of Kshānti.¹ (1) Kshānti in sounds means to listen to the oral teaching of the Buddha, to accept it without fear or hesitation, and to abide in it whole-heartedly. (2) Kshānti of obedience is to reflect upon the nature of things, and truthfully penetrating into it, to keep the mind pure and serene. (3) Kshānti in the unborn nature of existence has already been explained. The rest of the ten are realised when one attains to the knowledge of things as like māyā(4), mirage(5), dream(6), echo(7), shadow(8), phenomenal(9), and empty(10). That this way of looking at existence is generally Mahayanistic and that it is not the same as regarding existence as altogether unsubstantial from the relative point of view, has been already made clear as I hope in the preceding section.²

How is Nirvana Explained?

Nirvana has been the central object of Buddhist life ever since the Buddha's own time, though in the Mahayana we do not come across the term perhaps so much as in the Hinayana. The idea has been replaced to a certain extent by the conceptions of Prajñā, Sambodhi, Dharmakāya, Tathatā, Pratyātmajñāna, etc., when Buddhist thought drifted towards intellectual intuitionism. The *Lankāvatāra*, however, has not forgotten to make reference to Nirvana and to interpret it in its own characteristic

¹ Cf. *Sukhāvatīvyūha*, (S.B.E. XLIX), p. 51.

² For further definition of "Anutpattikadharmakshānti," see below.

manner. According to its author whoever he may be, Nirvana is realised when one can see into the abode of suchness (*yathā-bhūtārtha-sthāna-darśanam*).¹ Here is the point the intellect (*vikalpa*) cannot enter; for it dissects and establishes somewhat to take hold of (*grahaṇa*), and it will then see that something coming into existence (*utpāda*) and disappearing (*nirodha* or *apavṛtti*). But Nirvana has no tangible form (*nimitta*), and it neither comes into existence nor ceases from working. To attain Nirvana, therefore, is to see into the truth of things *yathābhūtam*, that is, as unborn, as not affected by categories of intellectual construction.

To attain Nirvana which is a state of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) inherent in the nature of things and which is again a state of self-realisation obtained by means of a higher wisdom (*ārya-jñāna*), there must be a turning over (*parāvṛtti*) at the deepest seat of consciousness known as the Ālaya-vijñāna.² The latter is a kind of mental receptacle where all the memory of one's past deeds and psychical activities is deposited and preserved in a form of energy called Vāsanā (習氣 *hsi-chi*, in Chinese, habit-energy). But as this energy is so contaminated with ignorance and wrong judgment and all sorts of attachment (*abhiniveśata*), it reacts upon an external world in a way detrimental to the realisation of Nirvana, and, therefore, to the perception, *yathābhūtam*, of the truth. The old conditions must now be overhauled in order to create a new situation in our consciousness. To do this, we must free ourselves from the views nihilistic (*uccheda*) and eternalistic (*śāśvata*) and also from the notions of being (*bhāva*) and non-being (*abhāva*).

When this turning is effected, Nirvana is found to be devoid of all predicates. In it nothing is gained, nothing is cast aside, no extermination, no eternity, no unity, no diversity, one finds here. Nirvana is the mind of all holy ones and the goal of Buddhist discipline.³

¹ P. 200.

² Pp. 62, 98, etc.

³ P. 99.

The Hinayanists do not know this; when they realise that Nirvana is something above particular conditions and tranquil in nature, they feel they have it in its completeness in their Nirvana so called. But in fact they distinguish it from birth-and-death (*samsāra*), and seek it for the fear of being caught up in the net of transmigration. They cherish dualism, and so long as they do so, there is no true Nirvana for them. Nirvana, according to the *Lankāvatāra*, is not to be found in contradiction to birth-and-death, or Samsāra; for to thus distinguish one from the other is the result of wrong judgment (*vikalpa*), which imagines a future when the world of the senses is altogether annihilated, which is their Nirvana. The Mahayanistic Nirvana goes, however, beyond the dualism of Nirvana and Samsāra. It is to be found where there is the identity of Nirvana and Samsāra.

So long as dualism is adhered to, there is no Nirvana, no self-realisation. Light and shadow, long and short, black and white—they are mutually related; when they stand alone each by itself, they have no meaning. So with Nirvana. When it is sought after in relation to Samsāra, we may have a sort of Nirvana. But this kind vanishes when separated from the condition of mutuality in which it exists. True Nirvana is that which is realised in the oneness of Nirvana and Samsāra, absolute or *śūnya* in its nature, and above the relativity of eternalism and nihilism. Mahayana followers strive to realise this kind of Nirvana.¹

The following passages² from the *Lankāvatāra* will give us some ideas of Nirvana prevalent at the time when this sutra was compiled:

“The Buddha said, O Mahāmati, what is regarded as Nirvana by the philosophers is not in accordance with the true features of Nirvana. Listen, O Mahāmati, I will tell you what it is.

“Some philosophers, seeing how impermanent things are, do not cling to the individual conditions; to them no external

¹ P. 76, 126.

² P. 182 ff.

world exists, nor does the subjective mind; they do not think of the past, present, and future. Like the light that shines no more, like the seed that has no life, like the fire that no more burns, all attachments are gone with them, no individualising reflections take place, and this they consider to be Nirvana. But inasmuch as they see something destroyed, their Nirvana is not a true one, O Mahāmati.

“Again, there are some who think the departing to another realm is Nirvana; there is no external world of particulars for them; it is like wind ceasing to blow.¹

“Again some think, not to see the distinction between the knowing subject and the known object is Nirvana.

“Again, there are some who holding to the view that all individual appearances are real, cherish the feeling of pain; for they are ignorant of the truth that all is the manifestation of mind-only. And just because of this ignorance they are frightened with appearances and seek for a state where there are no-appearances. An intense longing for this is regarded by them to be Nirvana.

“Again, there are some who, reviewing things inner as well as external in their individual and universal aspects and as existing in time, think that they have self-substance, which is not subject to destruction, and in this they find Nirvana.

“Again, there are some who believe in the indestructibility of all things such as ego, being, life, growth, and personality, and think this to be Nirvana.

“Again, some philosophers, not being intelligent enough, imagine the reality of Prakṛiti and Puruṣa and think that the Guṇas in various transformations constitute all objects; and in this they see Nirvana.

“Again, some philosophers see Nirvana in the extinction of both merit and demerit, others in the extinction of evil passions by means of knowledge, and still others in the thought that *Īśvara* is really the creator.

“Again, there are some who think beings come into ex-

¹ This last sentence does not properly belong here. There must have been some transposition in the text.

istence mutually conditioning and not through any other cause. As they are without wisdom, they are unable to understand rightly, and because of their not understanding rightly, they imagine Nirvana in their own way.

“Again, there are some who, wrongly imagining what they have perceived to be the true path, find Nirvana here.

“Again, some philosophers, holding to the view that quality and substance are one and yet two, and mutually related and yet not related, think Nirvana to be in this relationship.

“Again, there are some naturalists who believe in spontaneous creation, saying that the peacock’s variegated beauty, the thorn’s pointedness, and the production of various kinds of precious stones from the mine,—who is the maker of all these things? Nobody but nature, and this is Nirvana.

“Again, some find Nirvana in the understanding of the twenty-five principles.

“Again, some cherish the opinion that the looking after the welfare of the subjects by the observance of the six virtues is Nirvana.

“Again, some think time is Nirvana, from which issues the world.

“Again, there are some who see Nirvana in that the world (*bhāva*) exists, or that the world (*bhāva*) exists not, or that the world exists and exists not, or that the world and Nirvana are not two different things.

“Again, there are some¹ who, differing from all these philosophers, and in possession of all knowledge, declare like a roaring lion to the following effect that to understand thoroughly what is meant by the manifestation of mind-only, not to get attached to the external world, to be disengaged from the four propositions, to abide in the *yathābhūtam* view of things, not to fall into the errors of dualism, to be free from the ideas of subject and object, to stand above all forms of knowledge, not to get attached to any one form of truth, to abide in the realisation

¹ This is evidently the Mahayanist view of Nirvana, though it is treated as if it were one held by the philosophers also not belonging to Buddhism.

of the truth revealed in the noble understanding, to perceive the twofold truth of egolessness, to be devoid of the two kinds of evil passions, to be cleansed of the two kinds of hindrance, to discipline oneself in all the stages [of Bodhisattvahood] one after another, whereby, entering upon the state of Buddhahood, to realise all the great Samadhis such as Māyā and for ever to go beyond the Citta, Manas, and Manovijñāna:—this is to attain Nirvana.

“O Mahāmati, all these philosophers’ views [except the last mentioned] are based on imagination and not in accordance with the truth; they are forsaken by the wise, for they are dualistic and Nirvana is imagined where it is not. There is really no such Nirvana where one may enter or come out. The philosophers, each adhering to his own thesis, fall into erroneous views contrary to reason, thereby achieving nothing but the wanderings and tribulations of the mind and will. O Mahāmati, therefore, you and other Bodhisattvas should avoid them.”

The Essence of Buddhahood

The self-realisation to be attained by the Bodhisattva is none other than the Buddha’s own inner consciousness, self-illuminating as well as world-illuminating. Therefore, when we know what is the nature of this enlightenment attained by the Buddha (*svabuddhabuddhatā*), we shall also have some glimpse of the content of the Pratyātmāryajñānagocara, the subject-matter of the *Lankāvatāra*. According to the sutra,¹ what constitutes the essence of Buddhahood (*buddhatā*) is neither a thing made nor a thing not-made, it is neither cause nor effect, it is neither predicable nor unpredicable, it is neither describable nor indescribable, neither subject to perception nor beyond perception. Why? Because by applying any one of these terminological explanations (*nirukta*) to this case, we commit a logical offence. If *Buddhatā*, the essence of Tathagatahood, is something made, it is impermanent; and if it is impermanent, all things made will be Tathagatas—which is impossible. If, on

¹ P. 187 ff.

the other hand, it is a thing not-made, it will be without a substance (*ātmakatva*), and all efforts to realise it will be to no purpose, as it is like the hare's horns or a barren woman's child. For are they not all not-made, unreal, merely imagined?

"Again, if the essence of Tathagatahood is neither cause nor effect, it is then neither being (*sat*) nor not-being' (*asat*). And this being the case it lies outside the four propositions (*catuskoṭika*). The latter belong to the worldly way of talk and what lies outside them is no more than a talk, it is like speaking of a barren woman's child. This exists only in talk and does not come under the four propositions. As it does not come under them, it is to the wise beyond their logical survey (*pramāṇa*). The meaning of all the Tathagatas' words is to be thus understood by the wise." (P. 188.)

This passage is taken from the Sanskrit text, which coincides with one of the Chinese versions, the T'ang; but when we weigh the meaning of the passage, we grow somewhat confused about it because it is in apparent contradiction to the general drift of thought that has been explained above as characteristic of the *Lankāvatāra* teaching. For if the essence of Buddhahood is something like the barren woman's child existing only in name and placed beyond the survey of the wise in the sense that it has no truth in it, the object of all Buddhist discipline will be set at naught. If, however, it could be understood in the sense that the truth is beyond the logical survey even of the wise, and, therefore, that it is an object of direct intuition, altogether beyond the reach of popular parlance which is made up with the four propositions, the quoted passage would be consistent with the rest of the text. The sentence referring to the barren woman's child as mere talk and beyond the four propositions will have to be altered. In fact, the Wei translation reads quite differently: "The four propositions belong to the worldly way of talk. O Mahāmati, if the truth does not go beyond the four propositions, it is no more than a word like when speaking of a barren woman's child. O Mahāmati, this belongs to mere speech, coming under the four propositions, and if the truth thus should come under them, the wise would

not take it up." Evidently, there is some discrepancy in the text. The earliest Chinese version extant, that is, the Sung, reads simply and is quite intelligible, showing perhaps that this is a more original text not mixed with gloss and other addenda. "O Mahāmati, if it is neither an object (*vastu*?) nor a cause, then it is neither being nor non-being; and if it is neither being nor non-being, it lies outside the four propositions. The latter belong to worldly talk. When it [or the essence of Buddhahood] lies outside the four propositions it does not come under them, and as it does not come under them, the wise take to it. The meaning of all the Tathagata's propositions is to be understood by the wise thus [that is, as beyond the four propositions]."

When Buddhism speaks of the egolessness (*nirātmana*) of all things (*sarvadharma*), this must be understood in the same way as suggested above, that is, in the sense that while all things have their characteristic marks (*svalakṣaṇa*), they are without self-substance (*ātman*). Inasmuch as the cow is not a horse and the horse is not a cow, they are quite distinct one from the other. Their individuality is to be reckoned with, but as to each having its self-substance or something that remains eternally so besides its appearances (*lakṣaṇa*), there is no substance in it. Therefore, things are in one sense as they are, but in another sense they are not. This is what is meant by Buddhist phenomenalism, but we are not to be carried away by its doctrine of emptiness as was explained before, as Buddhism has after all something to affirm. Its superficially paradoxical way of presenting the truth is often baffling to logicians. The *Lankāvatāra* proceeds to say that the ignorant and confused use their own way of discrimination (*vikalpa*) to grasp the theory of non-ego, but as existence is really beyond any system of categories, the Tathagata's wisdom alone is capable of penetrating into reality. It is, therefore, declared by him that he is not distinct from the Skandhas, nor is he identical with them.¹

The two horns of the cow are distinguished one from the

¹ P. 188.

other, for the one is longer or shorter than the other, and in colour too they may differ. But they are of one nature as they are both horns. In a similar way, the Tathagata is different from what constitutes matter, and yet he is not different. Again, he is designated as one who is emancipated (*moksha*), but he is not one with the emancipation, nor is he different from it. Therefore, the essence of Buddhahood is neither eternal nor transcient, neither made nor not-made, neither composite nor uncomposite, neither knowledge nor the known, neither predicable nor unpredicable, neither of the Skandhas nor not of them, neither describable nor indescribable. It is beyond all measurement, it is not to be brought under any form of category. We may talk of it as talk we must, but we can never reach it through words. For it is unborn, and consequently not subject to destruction. It is like unto the sky beyond logical constructions, and no amount of intellectual tricks (*prapañca*) will bring it within one's grasp. The essence, *buddhatā*, transcends measurement (*pramāṇa*) and the senses (*indriya*).¹

The *Lankāvatāra* is quite anxious to let us realise that the theory of non-ego does not conflict with that of the Tathagata's Womb (*tathāgata-garbha*), of which mention was made elsewhere.² When the Tathāgata-garbha is spoken of as a kind of storage where all the seeds (*bīja*) of the past deeds and psychical activities are preserved, philosophers are apt to take it for an ego-soul. But, says the *Lankāvatāra*, the Tathāgata-garbha is empty in its nature yet real, it is Nirvana itself, unborn, without predicates, without affections (*apraṇihita*), and, further, it is attained where no false discrimination (*nirvikalpa*) takes place, where no shadow (*nirābhāsa*) of particularisation falls. There is nothing here for the Buddhas or Bodhisattvas to take hold of as an ego-soul. They have gone beyond the sphere of false discrimination and wrongful judgment, and it is due to their wisdom and skilful device (*upāya*) that they set up all kinds of names and phrases in order to save their followers from mis-

¹ P. 189 f.

² See pp. 206, 207, 259, 260, etc., of the present magazine.

taken views of reality. Pudgala (soul), Samtati (continuity), Skandha (aggregate), Pratyaya (causation), Anu (atom), Pradhāna (supreme soul), Īśvara (god), Karṭri (creator):—some such ideas are entertained by the philosophers, but they are mere constructions of mind.¹

The World-transcending Knowledge.

The inner consciousness of the Buddha, which constitutes the essence of Buddhahood (*svabuddhabuddhatā*), is the highest form of knowledge (*jñāna*). Of knowledge the *Lankāvatāra* distinguishes three forms: (1) worldly knowledge (*jñānam laukikam*), (2) supra-worldly knowledge (*lokottaram*), and (3) supreme supra-worldly knowledge (*lokottaratamam*). The first is relative as cherished by ordinary minds whose thinking is determined by ideas of being and non-being; the second is one possessed by the Hinayanists who cannot go beyond the categories of particularity and universality (*svasāmānyalakṣaṇa*); while the third and the highest is the knowledge attained by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas who view the world from an absolute standpoint, for they know that the world is above all characteristics, that is, has never been brought into existence and will never be annihilated, that it is designable neither as being nor as non-being. It is by means of this highest knowledge that the Bodhisattvas finally come to the realisation of the egolessness (*nairātmya*) of all things, thus entering upon the path of Tathagatahood.²

This supreme supra-worldly knowledge is no other than the Noble Knowledge (*āryajñāna*) of the Bodhisattva, which enables him to enter into the innermost nature (*svapratyātma*) of all the Buddhas, and which constitutes the central theme of the *Lankāvatāra sūtra*. Its three aspects are now distinguished.³ The first is its not being mere appearance (*nirābhāsa*), that it is reality, as distinguished from the way it is regarded generally

¹ Pp. 78-79.

² P. 156 f.

³ P. 49.

by the Hinayanists and the philosophers. Secondly, it is awakened by the will (*prapīdhāna*) and power (*adhishṭhāna*) of all the Buddhas. That is to say, the Noble Knowledge is made possible to rise in the mind of the Bodhisattva by the virtue of the Buddhas' earnest desire for universal enlightenment and salvation; their earnest desire or will sends out strong waves of vibration throughout the universe, and all sentient beings there feel its effect according to their capacities. Thirdly, sustained by this and going beyond the relative knowledge of the Hinayanists, the Bodhisattva's mind is freed from all predicable forms and ready for realising in himself a psychic state termed *Māyopama-samādhikāya*. He is now fairly on the way to the final stage of Buddhahood.

In Buddhism no distinction is made between knowledge and knower. The Noble Knowledge (*āryajñāna*) is at once the inner perception and the mental power that brings about this perception. This is quite in accordance with the general mode of thinking in Buddhism; for if there is something at the back of the knowledge, or if this is the function of a certain higher faculty in the mind, there will be a dualism which is so strongly combated by the Mahayanists. The knowledge after all must be absolute; so *Prajñā*, which is the same thing as *Ārya-jñāna*, is described as one of the six *Pāramitās* (virtues of perfection) in the following manner.¹ As the Hinayanists cling to the idea of Nirvana for their own spiritual enjoyment (*ātmasukha*), they are unable to think of the welfare of their fellow-beings. With the Mahayanists it is different, they are ever bent upon practising all the six *Pāramitās* in their highest possible form; and, therefore, in *Prajñā*, their minds are free from false discrimination (*vikalpa*); they do not fall into either of any opposing predicates as they are awake to the suchness of reality; they are thus able to cause a turning (*parāvṛtti*) in the whole field of their consciousness, though this does not mean that they destroy the work of their own past karma. *Prajñā* thus leads them finally to the realisation of the inmost truth deeply con-

¹ P. 238.

cealed under the wrappings of attachment and intellectualism.

Doctrine of the Triple Body

When the *Lankāvatāra* was compiled, the doctrine of the Triple Body (*trikāya*) was not apparently yet formulated in the shape we have it today. We have thus terms corresponding to the Three Bodies and the indications of the underlying idea, but no specified relationship is established between them. Only the absolute state of self-realisation is considered belonging to the Dharmatā-Buddha,¹ who is evidently the Dharmakāya of the later periods.

There are other forms of Buddhahood known as Nishyanda-Buddha and Nirmāṇa-Buddha. *Nishyanda* literally means "flowing down", or "flowing into", and the Nishyanda-Buddha is a Buddha into whom Dharmatā flows and who shines in splendour. The two later Chinese translators have rendered it by 報佛 *pao-fo*, and 報 means "to requite", "to compensate"; while the Sung by Gunabhadra has 依佛 *i-fo*, 依 meaning "to depend", or "to rely upon." The latter is nearer to the sense of the Sanskrit *nishyanda*, and it is hard to know how the later translators came to have 報 for it instead of 依. Did they try to read their own thought into it? For they were doubtless acquainted in their own day with the doctrine of Trikāya, one of which is generally known as Sambhogakāya, and to which the *Lankāvatāra* has the corresponding Vipākāja² 報生佛 or Vipākasthā³ 報住(?)佛.

The other form of Buddhahood mentioned in the *Lankāvatāra* is Nirmāṇaika or Nairmāṇika or Nirmāṇa.⁴ This is generally done into Chinese by 化佛 or 變化佛, i.e., Transformation-Buddha, corresponding to the Nirmāṇa-kāya of the Triple Body. As to what is this Transformation-Buddha, the sutra does not offer any explanation. But when the distinction is made between the Nirmāṇa-Buddha and the Dharmatā-Buddha as to

¹ P. 56.

² P. 28.

³ P. 34.

⁴ Pp. 28, 34, 56, 93, etc.

their method and material of preaching, we can have a glimpse into the specific features of the Nirmāṇa-Buddha. The *Lankāvatāra*² makes the latter the teacher of the ordinary people generally known as “bāla and prithagjana” in Buddhist literature, while the Dharmatā-Buddha discusses about an inner perception penetrating into the suchness of truth, or about the self-absorbing contemplation by Noble Knowledge (*āryajñāna*) on the ultimate condition of things which cannot be reached by logical categories. The class of beings designated as “bāla and prithagjana”, which includes almost all of us as drifting over the ocean of contrary ideas, is not able to see behind the veil of ignorance and wrong judgment (*vikalpa*), and to lead this unfortunate group of sentient beings to salvation or enlightenment, the Nirmāṇa-Buddha would discuss about the aspects of particularity (*svalakṣhaṇa*) and universality (*sāmānyalakṣhaṇa*) as objects of the intellect. His preaching is thus concerned with the individualising side of existence (*prabheda-pracāra*), which is dealt with in Buddhist philosophy under such categories as the six Pāramitās, five Skandhas, twelve Āyatanas, eighteen Dhātus, methods of emancipation (*vimokṣa*), modes of consciousness, and other subjects.² The object of these discourses is naturally to go beyond the teachings of the various philosophical schools of the day. The Dharmatā-Buddha, on the other hand, is meant for the Bodhisattvas whose aim is to come to the highest realisation of truth, which is, Pratyātmāryajñāna-gatigocara.

The distinction, however, between the Nirmāṇa-Buddha and the Nishyanda-Buddha is not clear as far as the *Lankāvatāra* is concerned. For it describes the latter as performing almost the same function as the Nirmāṇa-Buddha.³ His teaching is said to consist of such topics as particularity, universality, Habit-energy (*vāsanā*) conserved in the deep recesses of consciousness, wrong judgments about it, and their interrelations causing multitudinousness of objects to appear, and then our inordinate

¹ P. 93.

² P. 57.

³ P. 56 f.

attachment to them, but in reality the non-existence of all these phenomena. Of these topics, the Dharmatā-nishyanda Buddha will speak thus: the conception of an individual ego-substance arises from our wrong judgment concerning the nature of existence and the law of causation, both of which fail to apply beyond the world of relativity which is *śūnya* (empty); it is like the creations of the magician, he knows how to produce variety of unrealities depending upon some objects of the senses such as plants, bricks, etc.; the spectators are induced to take them for real objects, though in fact there are none such. To the ordinary mind, the law of causation is made to extend beyond the world of relativity, which is also the world of wrong judgments and attachments; whereas the world which supplies a subject-matter for the Dharmatā-Buddha is altogether unsupported (*nirālamba*), disengaged from dependence (*ālambavigata*), that is to say, it is not to be subsumed under such notions as creation, sense-perception, inference, and others, as it is not to be found among the contents of thought cherished by the ordinary ego-bound minds, in which the Hinayanists and philosophers are included. The Dharmatā-Buddha points directly to the truth of immediate perception in which the Bodhisattva stands all by himself detached from the hypothetical creations of the mind.

From this we can see what the Dharmatā-Buddha teaches in contradistinction to the other two Buddhas, the Nirmāṇa and the Nishyanda; but as to the distinguishing marks between the latter two we fail to get any definite and specific ideas. When the universe is divided into two aspects, absolute and relative, the absolute one belongs to the Dharmatā while the relative one is the common province of the Nirmāṇa and Nishyanda. One may ask, Why this distinction then? As far as the *Lankāvatāra* goes, this question is unanswered. We can say only this, that the doctrine of Trikāya must have already been in progress at the time of the *Lankāvatāra* and the compiler of the sutra took it for granted that his readers were acquainted with the idea. It was evidently sometime later that the doctrine came to be dogmatised. The term "Dharmakāya" occurs at several

places¹ in this sutra, but no "Sambhogakāya", nor "Nirmāṇakāya," perhaps except once in p. 241.² However, that the Buddha is able as he wills to manifest himself as a Nirmāṇakāya in response to the earnest desires of his followers or in order to execute his own purposes, is foreshadowed in the conception of Manomayakāya, "mind-made-body," or "will-body."³ This is a kind of Nirmāṇakāya assumed by the Bodhisattva as well as by the Tathagata.

One thing I wished to emphasise in this statement concerning the three forms of Buddhahood was that the story of the inmost perception to be gained by the Bodhisattvas, forming the central theme of the *Lankāvatāra*, is told only by the Mūla-tathāgata,⁴ or true Tathagata (眞實如來) as in the T'ang version, because he is above all senses, all logical measurements (*sarvaprāmāṇa*), and cannot be perceived by the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas as well as by the philosophers; because he abides absorbed in the bliss of realisation and in the perfection of the highest knowledge.⁵

¹ Pp. 51, 70, 192, 212, etc.; as Tathāgatakāya, pp. 42, 43, 51.

² One difference between the Transformation-Buddha and the Dharmatā-Buddha is described to be as follows:

"The Tathagata of transformation (*nirmīta-nairmāṇika*) is attended by Vajrapāṇi, but not the original Tathagata (*maula-tathāgata*). The original Tathagata is beyond all senses and reasonings, cannot be known by the simple-minded, Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and philosophers. He abides in a state of bliss which follows from the perception of the truth as he has perfected himself in the doctrine of wisdom and patience. He requires no attendance of Vajrapāṇi. No Buddhas of transformation (*nirmītabuddha*) are born of karma (*na karma-prabhava*), yet they are neither the same nor different with the Tathagata. Like the potter who produces articles by bringing various conditions together, the transformation-Buddhas preach the Dharma when circumstances are provided for them, but they are incapable of discoursing on the state of consciousness realised by the noble understanding which leads to an inner perception of truth." (P. 242).

³ Pp. 81, 136, 192.

⁴ P. 242.

⁵ This sketchy and incidental reference to the doctrine of the Triple Body as foreshadowed in the *Lankāvatāra*, is far from being satisfactory. When an article exclusively devoted to the treatment of the Tathagata is written, a fuller exposition of the subject will be presented.

The Highest Knowledge and a First Cause

We know now that the Noble Knowledge realised in one's inmost depths of consciousness (*pratyātmajñāna*) is something absolutely defying all description and altogether unpredicable, and that it is thus the topic to be properly dealt with by Dharmatā-Buddha himself and not by any other beings subject somehow to the principle of relativity. This knowledge is thus eternal, unconditioned, beyond the reach of all thinkability, and belongs to the highest principle of cognition from which all relative knowledge is derivable. Now the question is, In what respect does this differ from the first cause (*kāraṇa*) considered by the philosophers to be also eternal (*nitya*) and beyond thought (*acintya*)? This is answered by the author of the *Lankāvatāra* in the following manner:¹

What is claimed to be the first cause by the philosophers cannot really be so, because a cause always presupposes something beyond and cannot be its own cause. The idea of causation belongs to a world of relativity, and what is relative cannot be eternal and is always within the sphere of thought. If we take a thing belonging to the relative world and therefore to a realm of action, as a first cause from which everything else has its beginning, this will be a wrong form of inference; for we jump from relativity to transcendentality, from impermanence to eternity, from a thing that is to a thing that is on the other side of being and non-being. Therefore, what is regarded by the philosophers as the first cause eternal and beyond thinkability is not to be identified with the Noble Knowledge attainable by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas.

That the Noble Knowledge is eternal and cannot be made a subject of thought, comes from its intrinsic nature. For it is a state of mind realised personally by the Buddhas when they deeply delve into the ultimate principle itself which is not conditioned by any category of thought. It is not to be designated as a cause which is bound up with its antecedents and con-

¹ P. 59 ff.

sequents, it stands all by itself as absolute knowledge flashed through one's consciousness, it is a fact of experience which does not allow of any arguments. It is Tathatā (suchness), Tattva (thatness), perceived in the inmost consciousness of the Tathagata. As it is not an object external to him, it is a self-sufficient cause not depending on anything. We may say that this is a state of pure perception (*pratyātmagati*).

And it is for this reason that the *Lankāvatāra* is ever persistent in making this pure perception not an object of discursive understanding for the ordinary minds, for the philosophers, for the Hinayanists. It is not only too exalted a subject for them to comprehend, but quite beyond logic and liable to be wrongly and disastrously interpreted by them. It is meant for those only who are not at all surprised, or alarmed, or frightened at hearing that there is a thing beyond one's power of thinking, for such belong to the family of Tathāgatayāna.¹ The Mahayanist does not deny the reality of the objective world as regards its relativity, where all conditions obtain, it only refuses to extend these to a realm where they do not apply, and as to the existence and reality of such a realm he is firmly convinced because his inner perception testifies to it. What stronger and more intimate and more convincing proof could one ever expect to offer for a truth? Therefore, *Lankāvatāra* boldly declares:²

“Śrotapatti-phala (預流果), Skṛīdagami-phala (一來果), Anāgāmi-phala (不還果), and Arhattva (羅漢果)³—they are all perturbed states of mind. Sometimes I speak of the Triple Vehicle, sometimes of the One Vehicle, and sometimes of No-vehicle; all these distinctions are meant for the ignorant, for men of inferior wisdom, and even for the noble-minded. As to the entering into the ultimate truth (*paramārtha*), it goes beyond dualism. When one is abiding where there are no images (*nirābhāsa*), how could the Triple Vehicle be established? All

¹ P. 64.

² P. 65.

³ These are the spiritual attainments of the Hinayanists, arhatship being the highest of the four.

kinds of Dhyāna, Apramāṇa, Ārūpa, Samādhi, and the Extinction of Thoughts¹—they do not exist except as purely psychical (*cittamātra*).’’²

The Parable of the Sands of the Ganga

From the absolute point of view, no use is apparently to be found for anything in the world; no talk is needed, no sermonising avails, and, therefore, let the world go as it pleases and work out its own solution if it ever wants; for what are the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas after all? This is then the question awaiting the absolutist’s solution. The following passages concerning the parable of the sands of the Ganga will be edifying in this respect:³

“At that time Mahāmati asked the Blessed One, Thou teachest in the scriptural text (*deśanūpāṭṭa*) that the Tathagatas of the past, future, and present are like the sands of the Ganga; is this to be understood literally? Or is there another meaning to it? Explain it to me, O Blessed one!

“To this the Blessed One answered: O Mahāmati, do not understand it literally. The Buddhas of the past, future, and present are not to be measured according to the measure of the sands of the Ganga. Why? Because the comparison goes beyond this world, it is no fair comparison, there is something resembling in it but not quite exact. And, O Mahāmati, the Tathagatas do not hold up a comparison, going beyond this world and not of complete resemblance. What has been told by myself and the Tathagatas is no more than a small portion of real resemblance. When I say that there are Tathagatas equal to the sands of the Ganga, it is meant to make those stupid and vulgar people tremble, who, following the modes of feeling and the erroneous views which are cherished by some philosophers, get attached to them, thinking that there is an eternal being or that there is not, go on revolving around the

¹ Summarily stated, these are all different forms of meditation.

² P. 65.

³ P. 229 ff.

wheel of existence, of birth and death. How are they to be kept away from the strait pass of the wheel of existence so that they come to long for a superior object and lay hold of a superior object? Thus it is shown that Buddhahood is easy to attain. If it is told that the appearance of a Tathagata is like the blooming of the udumbara, they may not exert themselves. [Therefore, I preach that the Tathagatas are like the sands of the Ganga. But again,] considering what people are to be led, I hold out in the scriptural text that the appearance of the Tathagata is a matter of utmost rarity as the blooming of the udumbara plant. O Mahāmati, the udumbara flower has never been seen by anybody, while the Tathagatas have already appeared in the world and are here even now. To say that the appearance of the Tathagata is as rare an event as the blooming of udumbara plant is not a statement put forward in accordance with my inner knowledge. When a statement is shown in accordance with my inner knowledge, it goes beyond, it oversteps any comparison that may be made in the world, because of its unbelievableness, and it will not be believed by stupid and vulgar people. No comparisons hold good in the realm of the Noble Understanding which is attained by an inner realisation, because the truth (*tattvam*) goes beyond those marks visible to the Cittam, Manas, and Manovijñāna. The truth is the Tathagata, therefore no comparisons are adequate here.

“Nevertheless, O Mahāmati, just a little of comparison is given, that is, Tathagatas are said to be equal to the sands of the Ganga, they are equal, they are not different, yet the comparison is not proper, nor erroneous. O Mahāmati, for instance, the sands of the river Ganga are violently trampled on by fishes, tortoises, porpoises, crocodiles, buffaloes, lions, elephants, etc., but the sands are not troubled, have no ill feelings, nor are they unconscious of being trampled on; they are without imagination, beautifully clear and devoid of impurities. Even so with the Tathagatas, O Mahāmati, their Noble Understanding attained by an inner perception is the great river of Ganga, and their powers, psychic faculties, self-mastery are the sands; and they are trampled by the philosophers, stupid people, and

antagonists, who are the fishes, but they are not troubled, they have no ill feelings. The Tathagatas, because of their original vows, fulfilling all the bliss that accrues from perfect mental concordance (*samāpatti*) for the sake of all beings, are not troubled, have no ill feelings. Therefore, the Tathagatas, like the sands of the river of Ganga, do not particularise, as they are above likes and dislikes.

“O Mahāmati, the sands of the river of Ganga do not lose their earthly quality even when fire breaks out on earth at the end of the kalpa, because the sands are of the nature of the earth itself. And, O Mahāmati, as the earth is bound up with the fiery element, it will never burn up, only it is imagined by stupid and vulgar people who are fallen into the way of untruthfulness that the earth will burn up because of continuity. But it will not burn up because it is the element on which fire subsists. Even so, O Mahāmati, the Tathagata’s Dharma-body, like the sands of the Ganga, is not destructible.

“O Mahāmati, as the sands of the river Ganga are immeasurable, even so, O Mahāmati, the Tathagata’s rays of light are immeasurable, which are shed by the Tathagatas over the assemblies and circles of all the Buddhas in order to effect the ripening and inspiring of all beings.

“O Mahāmati, as the sands of the river Ganga, retaining their quality of being themselves, do not change into anything else, even so, O Mahāmati, the Tathagatas, because of their severance from the cause of conditional existence, have gone beyond the realm of birth-and-death.¹

“O Mahāmati, as the sands of the river Ganga are unconcerned whether some of them are taken away or whether more are thrown in, even so, O Mahāmati, the Tathagatas’ wisdom (*jñāna*) which is engaged in the ripening of all beings knows neither decrease nor increase, for the Dharma is without corporeality. Beings endowed with the body, O Mahāmati, are destructible, not so with beings without the body; and the Dharma is without the body.

¹ Literally, “are neither produced nor vanishing in Samsāra.”

“O Mahāmati, as a man cannot obtain ghee or oil or things like that from the sands of the river Ganga, however hard he may squeeze them to get it, even so, O Mahāmati, the Tathagatas, however painfully hard they may be oppressed for the sake of all beings, never neglect the fulfilling of their original vows which they cherish in the depths of their hearts in the Dharma-dhātu [i.e., realm of the Dharma], so long as all beings are not led into Nirvana by the Tathagatas, and this is due to the latter's being endowed with great compassion.

“O Mahāmati, as the sands of the river Ganga flow along the banks of its water and not where there is no water, even so, O Mahāmati, all the discourses by the Tathagatas on the Buddha-dharma take place in accordance with the stream of Nirvana. For this reason the Tathagatas are said to be like the sands of the river Ganga. O Mahāmati, the sense of transmigration here does not apply to the Tathagatas. O Mahāmati, decay is the sense of transmigration. And, O Mahāmati, the ultimate end of birth-and-death is not to be known. Not being known, how am I to disclose the Dharma in the sense of transmigration? Annihilation is the sense of transmigration. O Mahāmati, this is not known to stupid and vulgar people.

“Mahāmati asked, If, O the Blessed One, the ultimate end is not knowable, how is it possible for all sentient beings to obtain deliverance as they are living in the midst of birth-and-death?

“Said the Blessed One, O Mahāmati, when the cause is removed which is the memory [i.e., habit-energy or *vāsanā*] of erroneous reasoning and faulty discrimination since beginningless time, and when there takes place a turning at the seat of discrimination by realising that external objects are appearances or manifestations of one's own mind, then there is deliverance, which is not annihilation. Therefore, O Mahāmati, there is no occasion for speaking of endlessness. An endless end is a synonym of discrimination, O Mahāmati; and apart from discrimination, there is no other being whatever here. When the inner world or the outer one is surveyed by wisdom (*buddhi*), we find indeed, O Mahāmati, all objects transcending the dualism

of knowing and being known. Only because of not knowing one's own discriminating mind, discrimination takes place; when this is realised, it disappears.

"On this occasion this was uttered:

"Those who see the Buddhas as not related to destruction, nor to transmigration, like the sands of Ganga, see the Tathagatas:

"Like the sands of Ganga which are free from all defects always flowing along the current, so is the substance of Buddhahood."

PART II

The Intellectual Content of the Buddhist Experience

Having elucidated to a certain extent though not so exhaustively as a thorough survey of the *Lankāvatāra* may require, as regards the nature of the inmost consciousness of the Tathagata known as Pratyātmāryajñāgocara, let us now proceed to see what intellectual equipment is needed for a Bodhisattva before he can attain to this inner realisation so emphatically acclaimed in the sutra. This intellectual equipment consisting of two parts, logical and psychological, is in a way the philosophical content of the intuitive experience attained by the Bodhisattva. It may be regarded either as the intellectual attitude to be acquired by him before he enters upon the path of Buddhist discipline, or as the philosophy of what he has realised, which as a rational being he is to elaborate later on. In either case, the *Lankāvatāra* offers us a thorough going idealism along with the message of self-realisation, and this has been the point of discussion as referred to before among the Buddhist exegetists who wished to decide which was the more important topic of the sutra. Whatever this may be, we are now prepared to see what is the philosophical background of the Buddhist experience.

Historically, the *Lankāvatāra* has been considered as exposition of the following subjects: the five Dharmas, three

Svabhāvas, eight Vijñānas and two Nairātmyas. Buddhist scholars, Indian, Chinese, and Japanese, were always quite partial to what may be termed a numerical method of analysis. The whole text was first analysed into so many parts, and each part again into so many sections, and so on; and then the important ideas developed in them were picked up, and gathered up numerically in order one, two, three and so on. They thus often failed to see one central thought running through the text, like the mountaineer whose attention is constantly arrested by details in his way and fails to take in the mountain as a whole. Now, the *Lankāvatāra*'s philosophy is absolute idealism, and all these numerical headings are details used to establish the main theme. But I will here first discuss each subject separately and then arrange it so as to bring out the whole system in a more centralised shape.

The Five Dharmas

The five categories (*dharma*) are Name (*nāma*), Appearance (*nimitta*), Discrimination (*vikalpa*), Right Knowledge (*samyagjñāna*), and Suchness (*tathatā*).¹ Those who are desirous of attaining to the spirituality of the Tathagata are requested to know what these five categories are; for they are unknown to the ordinary-minded, and, as they are unknown, the latter judge wrongly and get attached to appearances. Now Names are not real things, they are merely symbolical (*samketa*), they are not worth getting attached to as realities. The ignorant minds flow along the stream of unreal constructions, thinking all the time that there are really such things as "me" and "mine." They get a tenacious hold on these imaginary objects, over which they learn to cherish greed, anger, and infatuation, altogether veiling the light of wisdom. These passions lead to actions, which, being repeated, go on to weave a cocoon for the agent. He is now securely imprisoned in it and unable to see himself free from the encumbering threads of wrong judgments. He now drifts along in the ocean of transmigra-

¹ P. 224 ff, p. 228.

tion, and, like the wheel turning around the same axle, he never gets out of the rut. He never grows or develops, he is the same old sin-committing, blindly-groping fellow. Due to this infatuation, he is unable to see that all things are like *māyā*, mirage, or a lunar reflection in water; he is unable to disengage himself from the false idea of self-substance (*svabhāva*), of "me and mine," of subject and object, of birth, staying, and death, he does not realise that all these are creations of mind and wrongly interpreted. For this reason they finally come to cherish such notions as *Īśvara*, Time, Atom, and *Pradhāna*, and so inextricably involved in appearances they forever turn on the wheel of ignorance.

By Appearances (*nimitta*) are meant qualities belonging to sense-objects such as visual, olfactory, etc.; and by discrimination (*vikalpa*) is meant the naming of all these objects and qualities, distinguishing one from another.¹

Right Knowledge (*samyagjñāna*) consists in rightly comprehending the nature of Names and Appearances as predicating or determining each other. It consists in seeing mind as not agitated by external objects, in not being carried away by dualism such as nihilism and eternalism, and in not falling into the state of *Śrāvakahood* and *Pratyekabuddhahood* as well as into the position of the philosopher.

When one surveys by the aid of this Right Knowledge over a world of Names and Appearances, one realises that they are to be known as neither non-existent nor existent, that they are in themselves above the dualism of assertion (*samāropa*) and refutation (*apavāda*), and that the mind abides in a state of absolute tranquillity not disturbed by Names and Appearances. When this is attained one gets into a state of Suchness (*tathatā*), and as it is where no images are reflected the Bodhisattva will experience joy.

¹ More literally: "Then, again, O Mahāmāti, discrimination is that by which names are set up. Expressions are given to appearances, saying 'This is such, and not otherwise'; and we have names such as elephant, horse, wheel, footman, woman, or man, wherein discrimination takes place."

The Three Forms of Knowledge

The three forms of knowledge known as three Svabhāvalakṣhaṇa¹ are more or less a recapitulation or re-classification of the five Dharmas. *Svabhāva* literally means "self-nature," and *lakṣhaṇa* "a characteristic mark"; and, therefore, the combination may apply to the nature of knowledge itself and also to its object. But the motive underlying the classification is to see what knowledge is required for the attainment of the truth that will release one from the pain and bondage of existence, and the three characteristic marks so called will more properly apply to knowledge than to its object. In this case the term "svabhāvalakṣhaṇatraya" may be understood as meaning three characteristic signs by which the nature of a knowledge may be distinguished.

The first is known as Parikalpita, wrong discrimination or judgment, and comes from not rightly comprehending the nature of objects, internal as well as external, and also the relationship existing between objects as independent individuals or as belonging to a genus. The second is Paratantra, literally, "depending on another," is a knowledge based on some fact, which is not however in correspondence with the real nature of the object. The characteristic of this knowledge is that it is not altogether a subjective creation produced out of pure nothingness, but it is a construction of some objective reality on which it depends for material. Therefore, its definition is "that which arises depending upon a support or basis (*āśraya*)."² And it is due to this knowledge that all kinds of objects, external and internal, are recognised, and in these, individuality and universality are distinguished.² Paratantra is thus equivalent to what we nowadays call relative knowledge, while Parikalpita is the fabrication of one's own imagination or mind. In the dark a man steps on something, and imagining it to be a snake he is frightened. This is Parikalpita, his wrong judgment attended with unwarranted excitement. He now bends down and examines

¹ Pp. 67, 227.

² P. 67.

it closely when he finds it to be a piece of rope. This is Paratantra, his relative knowledge. He does not yet know what really the rope is and thinks it to be a reality, individual and ultimate.¹

While it may be difficult to distinguish sharply Parikalpita from Paratantra from these brief statements or definitions, the latter seems to have at least a certain degree of truth as regards objects themselves, but the former implies not only an intellectual mistake but some affective functions set in motion along with the wrong judgment. When an object is perceived as an object existing externally or internally and determinable under the categories of particularity and universality, the Paratantra form of cognition takes place. Accepting this as real, the mind elaborates on it further both intellectually and affectively, and this is the Parikalpita form of knowledge. It may be after all more confusing to apply our modern ways of thinking to the older ones especially when these were actuated purely by religious requirements and not at all by any disinterested philosophical ones.

The third form of knowledge is Parinishpanna, perfected one, and corresponds to the Right Knowledge (*samyagjñāna*) and Suchness (*tathatā*) of the five Dharmas. It is the knowledge available when we reach the state of self-realisation by going beyond names and appearances and all forms of discrimination or judgment (*vikalpa*). It is Suchness itself, it is the Tathāgata-garbha-hṛdaya, it is something indestructible (*avināśak*).² The rope is now perceived in its true perspective. It is not an object constructed out of causes and conditions and now lying before us as something external. From the absolutist's point of view which is assumed by the *Lankāvatāra*, the rope is a reflection of our own mind, it has no objectivity apart from the latter, it is in this respect non-existent. But the mind out of which the whole world evolves is the object of Parishpanna, perfectly-attained-knowledge.

¹ See also p. 130 ff. The gāthā, however, is very difficult to understand.

² Pp. 67, 227.

The relation between the five Dharmas and the three Svabhāvas may be tabulated as follows:

Five Dharmas	{	Nāma,	}	Parikalpita,	{	Three Svabhāvas.
		Nimitta,					
		Vikalpa,					
		Samyagjñāna,					
		Tathatā.			..Parinishpanna.		

In going over this tabulation as in the study of other parts of Buddhist philosophy, we must have one thing always before our minds, as I stated elsewhere, which is that Buddhist thought is the outcome of Buddhist life, that its logic or psychology or metaphysics cannot be understood adequately unless we realise that facts of Buddhist experience are at its basis and therefore that pure logic is not the key to the understanding of Buddhist philosophy.

The Two Kinds of Knowledge

The division of knowledge or truth (*satya*) into two forms, Samvṛitti and Paramārtha, is also known to the author of the *Lankāvatāra*, but it was due to the Madhyamika school of Nāgārjuna that the distinction was thoroughly formulated into a system and made most of it to account for the dual aspect of experience in their treatises on the doctrine of the Middle Path. In the *Lankāvatārā* we may say that the idea is foreshadowed when it makes reference to Vyavahāra,¹ according to which the Buddha concedes to the possibility of such concepts as being and non-being, birth and death, caused and causing, etc. Vyavahāra belongs to our ordinary life where rules the principle of individuation, and as long as the relative and provisional existence of māyā is permitted, common parlance too has to be given authority for practical purposes. When the sutra, however, goes on further down explaining the characteristic features of the Paratantra form of knowledge, the terms, Samvṛitti and Paramārtha, occur—the former as leading to particularity and the latter as a psychical state when this is transcended. The

¹ Meaning "usage," or "worldly way." P. 85.

gāthā on page 130 ff. seems to throw some light on what is meant by the Parikalpita and the Paratantra form of knowledge and also on their relationship to the Madhyamika conception of Samvṛitti-satya. But the stanzas¹ are very complicated in meaning and difficult to get at, exactly and in full. But the main idea seems to be this: Mind is set in motion when it allows itself to be conditioned by the principle of individuation. Parikalpita and Paratantra follow from this stirring up of mentation. Paratantra is intellectual, for it operates depending upon something outside itself. It is a kind of representation. It may not be always correct, but it does not create anything out of itself. Parikalpita, on the other hand, weaves out its own imaginative world regardless of its objective value. It is always in the wrong not only in the logical sense but psychologically. The main point about it is that it discriminates "me and mine" from what is not "me and mine," and holding this distinction to be real and final, gets itself attached to it, which culminates in moral egotism. When this is once asserted, all the evils follow that are to be found in connection with life. Paratantra which may be innocent in itself becomes the most efficient hand-maid to Parikalpita, and what is created by it is also intellectually confirmed with all its practical consequences. Paratantra and Parikalpita are mutually dependent. Parinishpanna is to go beyond both these forms of knowledge. This is Paramārtha, the highest transcendental wisdom, while the Samvṛitti form of truth prevails in the world of Parikalpita and Paratantra.

The two kinds of Buddhi (knowledge)² which are elsewhere distinguished in the sutra may be considered to correspond to Samvṛitti and Paramārtha. Buddhi is a higher power of reasoning, but it also denotes any form of intelligence. The first is called Pravicaya-buddhi, which is a kind of absolute knowledge corresponding to the Parinishpanna. *Pravicaya* means "to search through," "to examine thoroughly," and the Buddhi so

¹ P. 130 ff.

² P. 122.

qualified penetrates into the fundamental nature of all things which is above logical analysis and cannot be described with any of the four propositions (*catushkoṭika*). The second Buddhi is called Pratishṭhāpika, that is, intelligence that sets up all kinds of distinction over a world of appearances, making one's mind attached to them as real. Thus it may establish rules of reasoning whereby to give judgments to a world of particulars. It is logical knowledge, it is what regulates our ordinary life. But as soon as something is established (*pratishṭhāpita*) in order to prove it, that is, as soon as a proposition is made, it sets up something else at the same time and goes on to prove itself against that something else. There is nothing absolute in this.

This setting-up or establishing is elsewhere designated as Samāropa.¹ The *Lankāvatāra* distinguishes four of such establishments: (1) to establish characteristic marks (*lakṣhaṇa*) where there are none, (2) to establish definite views (*dṛishṭa*) where there are none, (3) to establish a cause (*hetu*) where there is none, and (4) to establish a substance (*bhāva*) where there is none. Owing to these propositions definitely held up as true, opposite ones will surely rise and there will take place a wrangling or controversy (*apavāda*) between the opposing parties. The sutra thus advises the Bodhisattva to avoid these one-sided views in order to come to a state of enlightenment which is beyond the positive as well as the negative way of viewing the world.

The Twofold Non-ātman Theory

We now come to a third distinctive feature of the philosophy of the *Lankāvatāra*, which is known as the twofold non-Atman theory, i.e., Nairātmyadvaya.² The non-Atman or non-ego theory is known among all Buddhist students as the most differentiating mark of Buddhism, but the denial of an Atman or self-substance in external objects is the specific property of the Mahayana and may require some explanation. To translate

¹ P. 70.

² P. 68.

ātman always by "ego," or "self," or "soul" may not be right; especially when its denial is applied to an objective world, egolessness has no meaning, it is merely the source of misapprehension. An Atman means something substantial in possession of a number of qualities, and a free agent not bound by the principle of relativity. When its existence, therefore, is denied in us, it means that we have no such free agent within ourselves, enjoying a substantial existence even above the concatenation of cause and effect. When we deny its reality in the world external to us, it means that there is no self-substance (*svabhāva*) in individual objects which come into existence, abide for a while, and finally disappear according to certain laws. In this case, *nairātmya* is *niḥsvabhāva*, and when it is understood in this way, the idea falls in harmoniously with the other views maintained by Mahayanists. Though not yet formulated numerically by Buddhist scholars, there are four distinguishing marks in Mahayana ontology which constitute its very kernel. They are: (1) that all things are empty (*śūnyatā*), (2) unborn (*anutpāda*), (3) not dual (*advaita*), and (4) without self-substance (*niḥsvabhāva*).¹ This sums up the metaphysical aspect of Mahayanism, and the dual non-Atman theory is merely a partial recapitulation of it.

The *Lankāvatāra* explains the theory in the following manner:² The Skandhas, Dhātus, and Āyatanas have nothing personal in them, there is no "me and mine" in them, they are created by the ignorant affirmation of the desire to have, and attachment takes place when they are comprehended by the senses. The material world as well as the physical body are manifestations of the mind known as Ālaya-vijñāna, and when they are discriminated as particular existences, we are discriminating our own mind-made. They are in constant transmigration, they never remain even for a moment as they are, they flow like a stream, they change like a seed, they flicker like a candle-light, they move like a wind or a cloud. And when affections are stirred up, they are pursued by us, we behave like the monkey

¹ Pp. 73, 188, etc.

² P. 68 ff.

or the fly that runs after filthy food, not knowing when to get satiated, and evidently to no good purpose, we burn like fire. Due to the habit-energy (*vāsanā*) accumulated since time immemorial through wrong reasoning and attachment, we now transmigrate from one state to another revolving like a wheel, like a machine, like a phantom creation, or like a walking ghost. When we realise this, we are said to have the knowledge of the non-existence of an individual ego-soul (*pudgalanairātmya-jñānam*).

Dharmanairātmya-jñānam, as I said before, is gained by extending the knowledge of the non-existence of an individual ego-soul to the external world. The two ideas are inter-related, and when the one is asserted the other follows inevitably. To say that all objects are devoid of self-substance is to recognise a most complicated system of relationship running through existence. This was noticed by the Buddha himself when he discoursed on the Chain of Origination, but as his immediate interest was to free his disciples from ignorance and attachment, his statement stopped short at the psychology of non-ego. With the growth of Buddhist experience and thought, the psychology developed into metaphysics, and the doctrine of Śūnyatā (emptiness) came to occupy the minds of the Mahāyanists. And this doctrine is another way of saying that all objects are without self-substance. When the theory of relativity is once established, all these stock ideas of Manayana Buddhism are necessary inferences: Śūnyatā, Dharmanātmaya, Niḥsvabhāva, Anutpāda, Anābhāsa, Nirvāṇa, Māyopama, etc.

The denial of self-substance means that just as the Skandhas, Dhātus, Āyatanas are devoid of ego-soul and have no other creator than the desire to have which expresses itself in deeds, thereby subjecting itself to an endless concatenation of cause and effect, so all things that are in nature above such categories as particularity and universality are distinguished as concrete individuals only through the wrong discrimination which is so intensely cherished by the ordinary mind. The wise are not confused, however, they are free from unwarranted inferences and attachments, as they know, by rightly reviewing the world

of particulars (*sarvadharmā*), that the latter is devoid of mind (*citta*), will (*manas*), intelligence (*manovijñāna*), the five Dharmas, and Self-substance (*svabhāva*).¹ When this is attained, the knowledge concerning the absence of Atman in all things is attained. "To be devoid of mind, etc.," means that the real nature of existence cannot be designated by any category of thought, for to be predicated means to be determined, to be limited. The truth, if it is really something that gives complete satisfaction to the yearnings of our religious consciousness, must be absolute, and to be absolute and thoroughly convincing such truth must be innerly experienced. When an appeal is made to logic, a statement or proposition is to be proved according to rules of thought, and these rules are sure to be conditional, and, therefore, more or less one-sided and prejudicial. Yet when the Mahayanists have to say somewhat either to assert or to deny, they run the risk of being judged by rules of thought, and perhaps all that they can establish in the circumstances is to say that all things are "devoid of mind, will, etc." as above referred to. This is where Mahayana philosophers are always in a quandary.

To apply the term, "Atman," ego or soul, not only to a person (*pudgala*) but to all inanimate objects may sound strange at first sight as was stated above, but when it is realised that Buddhist philosophy has no special intellectual interest in the discussion itself except from the most pragmatical point of view, i.e., as concerned with life, with this person, with its salvation and enlightenment, the extension of the term "self" or "soul" over to all existence seems justified and appropriate. At any rate the dual non-ego theory is one of the features of the Mahayana as differentiated from the Hinayana.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE BUDDHIST EXPERIENCE

The Doctrine of Mind-only

Having finished that phase of equipment which may be called logical, for the upward career of the Bodhisattva, let

¹ P. 69.

us now pass on to the psychological phase, that is, the doctrine of consciousness, technically known as the theory of the Eight Vijñānas. As I wish to repeat, Buddhism being a religion has no abstract interest in logic, or psychology, or metaphysics *per se*, and especially in the case of the *Lankāvatāra* the chief problem is to reach a state of self-realisation which is the *sine qua non* of Buddhahood, and of Bodhisattvahood as well. All efforts are to be directed towards this goal, and it would be against the spirit of the sutra to be discussing about the psychology of the *Lankāvatāra*. I am doing this simply for the benefit of the modern reader who wants to get a better perspective of the text than in its original confusion.

Psychology is, however, the most difficult part of the *Lankāvatāra*, and it is not an easy matter to get a clear insight into the meaning of it. What I have done here may not be quite correct as far as the reading of the text is concerned, and I am open to conviction from the hand of a more competent interpreter.

Most Buddhist scholars are often too ready to make a too sharp distinction between the Madhyamika and the Yogācāra school, taking the one as exclusively advocating the theory of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) while the other is bent single-mindedly on an idealistic interpretation of the universe. They thus further assume that the idea of emptiness is not at all traceable in the Yogācāra and that idealism is absent in the Madhyamika. This is not exact as a matter of historical fact. Though it is impossible just at present to fix the date of the *Lankāvatāra* definitely, we find in it the tendencies that might have developed into the Yogācāra as well as into the Madhyamika; and these tendencies must be regarded as prior to the development of these two schools each distinctly claiming its special province of interest. The differentiation must have taken place after the sutra and not before; for it is natural to infer that composite tendencies appear first and their decomposition into separate ideas and further development each along its specified line.

Whatever this may be, the main point we must never forget in the study of the *Lankāvatāra* is that it is not written as a

philosophical treatise to establish a definite system of thought, but to discourse on a certain religious experience. What philosophy or speculation it offers is only incidental as an introduction or as an intellectual interpretation necessitated by the rational nature of humanity. This latter phase of religious experience may be more predominant in Buddhism than in some other religions, but it is not for us to miss the essence of the matter for the sake of its more or less unimportant accessories, however inevitable they may be.

As was definitely stated, the principal theme of the *Lankāvatāra* is Pratyātma-āryajñāna-gocara, a state of consciousness in which the inmost truth is directly presented to one's mind. This being an immediate perception of the truth cannot be imparted to others by means of logic, but without it the perception itself ceases to be operative, which is the same thing as not existing at all or being unreal. The experience in itself is without content, and must be given to it by the intellect to make it workable in our social living. The psychology of the *Lankāvatāra* is also to be treated thus, that is to say, its doctrine of mind-only (*cittamātra*) with all its accompaniments is meant to explain the mental experience of the Bodhisattva. We have always to bear this subordinate position of psychology, or logic, or metaphysics in the teaching of the *Lankāvatāra*.

The doctrine of mind-only is explained in this wise.¹

"As the waves of the ocean depending on the wind are stirred up and roll on dancing without interruption;

"So the Ālaya-flood constantly stirred up by the wind of Vishaya [principle of individuation] rolls on dancing with the waves of various Vijñānas.

"Dark blue and red, and salt, conch-shell, milk, and honey; fragrance, fruits, and flowers; rays of light and the sun—they are neither different nor not-different one from another; so the seven Vijñānas which are the waves of the ocean rise in conjunction with mind (*citta*).

¹ P. 46 ff. These gāthās are not sometimes quite clear as to their meaning. Perhaps the text is to be more thoroughly re-arranged, which to a certain extent the author hopes to do later.

"Manifold are the waves evolved in the ocean; likewise indeed the Ālaya sets in motion a variety of Vijñānas.

"Citta, Manas, and [Mano-] vijñāna are spoken of [as different] because of appearances; in fact the eight [Vijñānas] have no specifically qualifying marks: there is neither that which qualifies nor that which is qualified.

"As there is no differentiation in the waves of the ocean, so no modification obtains in Citta as regards the Vijñānas.

"Citta gathers up karma, Manas inspects, the Vijñāna distinguishes, and the five Vijñānas discriminate the visible [world].

"Dark blue, and red, and such-like are known to be due to the Vijñāna of mankind, and tell me, O Mahāmuni, how a likeness obtains between waves and mind (*citta*).

"Dark blue and red and such-like are indeed not in the waves, and it is for the sake of the ignorant that mind is described as evolving due to appearances.

"There is no evolving in mind, mind in itself is free from that which is perceived; where there is that which is perceived there is that which perceives; the case is the same with the waves.

"The body, property, and abode are known to be due to the Vijñāna of mankind, in which an evolution is observed; the analogy holds good with the waves.

"The ocean with the dancing waves is discernible, and likewise why is not the evolution of the Ālaya perceived by intelligence?

"In accordance with the intelligence and discrimination of the ignorant, the Ālaya is compared to the ocean, and the likeness of waves and the evolution [of mind] are pointed out by a simile.

"Thou who illuminest the world like the sun that shines equally above and below, announce the truth for the sake of the ignorant!

"Thyself the master of all kinds of teaching, why dost thou not announce the truth? If thou dost not announce the truth, the truth may disappear from the mind.

"As the waves are stirred on the ocean, as images are seen

in the mirror, in a dream, simultaneously, so is the mind in its own field.

"To discriminate objects, an evolution takes place in succession: the Vijñāna distinguishes, and Manas reflects upon.

"The visible world manifests itself to the five Vijñānas; there is no successive evolution when mind is in a state of collectedness.

"As a painter or his disciple arrays his colours in order to produce a painting, so do I preach: the picture is not in the colour, nor in the canvas, nor in the vessel.

"In order to attract all beings, the picture is produced in colours; preaching may err, and the truth is indeed beyond words.

"Being the master of all kinds of teaching, I preach the truth to my followers, and the truth is to be attained by an inner perception, as it goes beyond both the distinguished [object] and the distinguishing [subject].

"I preach for the sake of sons of the Buddha, this preaching is not for the ignorant; the manifoldness of things is seen as like Māyā, and exists not.

"Preaching is thus done in various ways, subject to errors; when the preaching is not in good accord [with the mentality of the hearer], it is then for him no preaching.

"A good physician administers medicine according to his patients; so indeed do Buddhas discourse in accordance with the mentality of beings.

"The masters thus preach the state of consciousness attained by their inner perception, which does not belong to the realm of philosophers and Śrāvakas."

According to the *Lankāvatāra*, the mind, inclusive of Citta, Manas, and other six Vijñānas, is in its original nature (*svabhāva*) quiet, pure, and above the dualism of subject and object. But here appears the principle of particularisation known as Vishaya, which comes from *vish*, meaning "to act," "to work"; and, stirred by this wind of action, the waves are seen over the tranquil surface of the mind. It is now differentiated or evolves (*viritti*) into eight Vijñānas: Ālaya, Manas, Manovijñāna, and

the five senses; and simultaneously with this evolution the whole universe comes into existence with its multitudinous forms and with its endless entanglements. The following is indeed the constant echo reverberating in the sutra:

“The visible [world] which is mind does not exist [as such]; mind is set in motion by being seen [i.e., objectified]; the body, property and the abode are the manifestations of the *Ālaya* which belongs to mankind.

“Citta, Manas, and Manovijñāna, Self-nature, the five Dharmas, the two forms of Nairātmya (egolessness), purity—these are elucidated by the Buddhas.

“Long and short and such-like come to exist mutually conditioned; not-to-be grows effective by to-be and to-be by not-to-be.

“When things are analysed into atoms, there remains nothing to be discriminated as objects. Those who hold wrong views do not believe in the ever-abiding ground where the mind-only [doctrine is established].

“The masters point out the state of consciousness attainable by their inner perception, which goes indeed beyond the mental calibre of the philosophers and Śrāvakas.”¹

The Important Terms Explained

Before going further, it may be desirable to explain the more important technical terms constantly used in Buddhist psychology.

As is seen here, the conception of the *Ālaya-vijñāna* plays a chief, though silent, rôle in the evolution of the idealistic philosophy of the *Lankāvatāra*. It is often called simply “Citta,” or “Tathāgata-garbha.” *Ālaya* means a storage-house (*tsang*, 藏識, in Chinese) where all kinds of goods are kept in storage, and it is the *Ālaya-vijñāna*’s function to store up all the memory (*vāsanā*) of one’s thoughts, affections, desires, and deeds. *Citta* which is used as a synonym of the *Ālaya* may be translated “mind” as distinguished from Manas, that is, in its more specific sense. *Citta* comes from *ci*, which has two senses,

¹ P. 54.

(1) "to gather," "to pile," "to acquire," and (2) "to perceive," "to look for." *Citta*, therefore, may mean either "collection" or "thought," and in the present case, that is, when it is identified with the *Ālaya*, Buddhist scholars take it in the sense of accumulation. So we read in the *Lankāvatāra*, "*Citta* gathers up karma."¹ Ordinarily, it may correctly be rendered "thought," or "mind." The great source of confusion, however, comes from *Citta* being used frequently for the whole system of *Vijñānas* as well as for the *Ālaya*.

Vijñāna is one of the significant terms in Buddhism, and it is difficult to have one English word for it. *Jñā* means "to know," "to perceive," but *Vijñāna* in Buddhism has a technical sense; it is not mere understanding, it is a sort of principle of conscious life as distinguished from the body, and it is also the power or faculty of discrimination. It has however essentially an intellectual connotation, faithfully retaining its original sense. In the case of *Ālaya-vijñāna*, there is no discrimination in it, no intellection; for it simply accumulates all the impressions, all the memory-seeds (*bīja*) that are produced and left behind by the activities of the other *Vijñānas*.

Tathāgata-garbha, which is another name for the *Ālaya*, is also a sort of store-room or receptacle where the seeds of Tathagatahood are retained and matured. It has a religious shade of meaning in contradistinction to *Ālaya-vijñāna* which is a more philosophical term. *Garbha* is generally done into *tsang* in Chinese, same as *ālaya*, but literally it means "womb" (*tai* 胎). It is strange that the Chinese translators never, as far as I know, rendered *tathāgata-garbha* by 如來胎, but always 如來藏, except when in the Shingon sect the *Garbha-kosa-dhātu* (胎藏界) is spoken of as contrasting to the *Vajradhātu* (金剛界). But the meaning is clear because the *Tathāgata-garbha* is the womb where Tathagatas are conceived and matured, and as we are all possible Tathagatas except that we sit generally so tightly wrapped up under the heavy intellectual and affective coverings known as *Jñeyāvaraṇa*, and *Kleśāvaraṇa*, the intellectual and the affective obstruction.

¹Pp. 47, 158.

Manas (from *man*), meaning "to think," "to imagine," "to intend," is that seat of intellection and conation, corresponding to the Western conception of mind. It is the one term in Buddhist psychology that has no *viññāna* attached at its end. It is often confused, and justifiably with Manovijñāna which is one of the six Vijñānas recognised by all the schools of Buddhism. In the *Lankāvatāra* *Manas* occupies a definite position and performs a specific function in the hierarchy of psychological activities, which will be described later. Manovijñāna like the other five Vijñānas has a field of its own as the perceiving of the rationality of things internal as well as external. The Cakshur-vijñāna is meant for the visibility of things, the Śrotra-vijñāna for their audibility, and so on. The Manovijñāna functions sometimes independently of the five Vijñānas and sometimes simultaneously and conjointly with them. To a certain extent, it may be considered equivalent to the intellect, while *Manas* is conative and affective besides being intellectual. Therefore, it is sometimes called *Klišṭamanas*, meaning "Manas in defilement." The spiritual defilement starts nowhere else but in this *Manas*, the root of intellection and conation.

When the sutra says that all things are mind-only, *citta-mātram*, what is meant by it? Does *Citta* refer to the *Ālaya*, or to the whole system of Vijñānas, or to the interaction of the *Ālaya* and the *Manas*?

When it is said that *Citta* is under the bondage of *Vishaya*, *cittam vishaya-sambandham*,¹ or that bondage is mind-made, *bandhanam citta-sambhavam*,¹ what is meant by this *Citta*?

What does the phrase, *svacittadṛśyamātra*, (the-seen-only-by-one's-own-mind), or *cittavikalpalakṣhaṇa* (appearances-discriminated-by-mind), really refer to, which occurs so frequently throughout the *Lankāvatāra*?

When mention is made of "purifying the outflow of the visible world from one's own mind" (*svacittadṛśyadhārāvīśudhi*),² what is this mind?

¹ For instance, p. 130.

² P. 55

In my view, Citta or mind refers in some cases to the Ālaya alone, in other cases to Manas, or even to the whole system of Vijñānas. When the sutra says that if there is no turning (*parāvṛtti*) of the Ālaya-vijñāna called by the name of Tathāgata-garbha, there will be no extinction of the seven functioning Vijñānas,¹ or that the Tathāgata-garbha is united with the seven Vijñānas, from attachment arises a dualism, and when thoroughly perceived this is removed,² we realise that the Ālaya is the most important conception on which the whole mechanism of the psychic life hangs. Mind-only (*cittamātram*) must then mean *ālayavijñānamātram*. In fact the Ālaya is a depository of all kinds of karma-seeds, good as well as bad,³ and so long as it is not stirred up by Vishaya, the principle of individuation, it will stay quiet, retaining its original purity⁴ or neutrality, inefficiency, aloofness, and the primary quality of not being contaminated by defilements. However, the Ālaya is always found in company with the seventh Vijñāna, or Manas,⁵ and when it is found at all working, all the other Vijñānas are found in action.⁶ This being the case, "mind-only" may also involve the whole mental apparatus, especially with the Ālaya strongly in alliance with Manas.

It may be more appropriate to consider Citta designating the whole system of Vijñānas as a unit, instead of looking at each Vijñāna as an independent yet interrelating element. The whole mind is then conceived as operating or functioning in eight different modes, while each mode also shares in the general activity of the mind either as Citta or Vijñāna. Unless Citta is especially referred to as distinguished from Manas and the Vijñānas, we can safely state that Citta, when mentioned independently in such phrases as *cittamātram*, *svacittadṛśyam*, or

¹ P. 221.

² P. 223.

³ Tathāgata-garbha mahāmata kuśala-akuśala-hetukah. P. 220; see also p. 242.

⁴ Anyanta-prakṛiti-pariśuddhi. P. 222.

⁵ P. 220.

⁶ P. 221.

cittamātravinirmuktaṁ nopalabhyate, means the whole system of conscious life which is generally designated as mind by Western philosophers. For instance, we have in the T'ang version the following verse corresponding to the gāthā in the Sanskrit text, p. 70:

“The body, property, and the abode—
These are no other than the shadow of the mind;
The ignorant, unable to understand it,
Are engaged in theory-making and in controversy.
But what they establish is merely mind-made,
And outside mind nothing is obtainable.”

In this quotation Citta (mind) no doubt stands for the totality of the Vijñāna system. Indeed when the Ālaya is separated from its company, it ceases to work, that is, to exist, and we have nothing left here except the name.

The doctrine expounded in the *Lankāvatāra* and also in the *Avatamsaka Sūtra* is known as “Citta-mātra” and never as “Vijñānamātra” or “Vijñāptimātra” as in the Yogācāra school of Asanga and Vasubandhu. As far as the idealistic way of looking at the world is concerned, both systems have something in common; especially the *Lankāvatāra* may be interpreted more or less consistently by means of the Yogācāra psychology, and indeed this has been frequently attempted by scholars. But as is the case with Āśvaghosha's *Awakening of Faith* the *Lankāvatāra* differs from the Yogācāra in one important point, that is, while the latter maintains that the Ālaya is absolutely pure and has nothing to do with defilements and evil passions, the *Lankāvatāra* and Āśvaghosha maintain the view that the Tathāgata-garbha or the Ālaya is the storage of the impure as well as the pure, that it is both immanent and transcendental, both relative and absolute.

The Evolution of the Vijñāna System

The whole Vijñāna system is explained in the *Lankāvatāra* from various points of view which are very difficult to present adequately in another language in which there is no tradition of thought corresponding to the Indian or Buddhist way of think-

ing. I hope the following interpretation of mine has not altogether misrepresented the original conceptions of the *Lankavatāra*.

The Vijñāna system is describable from three points of reference: its evolution, its modes of being, and its function.

By evolution is meant the rise (*utpāda*), abiding (*sthiti*), and disappearance (*nirodha*) of the Vijñāna.¹ Of this there are two forms, Prabandha and Lakshana. Prabandha, meaning incessant continuation, is concerned with an uninterrupted activity of the Vijñāna, while Lakshana (or external mark) means its manifested aspect. When the habit-energy (*vāsanā*) stored up in the Ālaya by the imprints left behind by thinking, feeling, willing, and acting, either good or bad, is destroyed, there will be no visible signs of them left. This is called the destruction or disappearance of the Vijñāna as to their Lakshana. When not only the cause of the subject (*āśraya*) in dependence of which the Vijñānas can function, but that which supports them (*ālam-bana*), or that which provides them with material, are removed, there will be no more continuation of activity in the Vijñānas. This is the case of disappearance both with the Prabandha and with the Lakshana of the Vijñānas, and the same conditions will also hold good with their rise and abiding-on. But as the sutra does not give any further explanation concerning the difference between, for instance, the disappearance of the Prabandha and that of the Lakshana, the above statement is not enough to show why this distinction between the two is necessary, not only logically but psychologically; for the difference specified above does not seem to be sufficiently warranted. All that we can gather from this is that there is Vāsanā amassed in the Ālaya, which acts as cause to the other Vijñānas, and that there is another thing which serves as object to the latter, and, finally, that by the interaction that goes on between subject and object all the Vijñānas grow either active or dormant according to the case.

The one most important conception in the system of Vij-

¹ P. 37 ff.

ñānas is Vāsanā. What is this? Psychologically, Vāsanā is memory, for it is something left after a deed is done, mental or physical, and it is retained and stored up in the Ālaya as a sort of latent energy ready to get in motion. This memory or habit-energy (習氣), or habitual perfuming (薰習) is not necessarily individual; the Ālaya being super-individual holds in it not only individual memory but all that has been experienced by sentient beings. When the sutra says that in the Ālaya is found all that has been going on since beginningless time systematically stored up as a kind of seed, this does not refer to individual experiences, but to something general, beyond the individual, making up in a way the background on which all individual psychic activities are reflected. Therefore, the Ālaya is originally pure, it is the abode of Tathagatahood, where no defilements of the particularising intellect and affection can reach; purity in terms of logic means universality and defilement or sin means individuation, from which attachments of various forms are derived. In short, that the world starts from memory, that memory in itself as retained in the Ālaya universal is no evil, and that when we are removed from the influence of false discrimination the whole Vijñāna system woven around the Ālaya as centre experiences a turning (*parāvṛtti*),—this is the gist of the teaching of the *Lankāvatāra*.

This turning marks the culmination of the practical psychology of the *Lankāvatāra*, for it is through this fact that the realisation of Pratyātma-āryajñāna-gocara is possible, and this realisation is the central theme of the discourse. As this event takes place in the Ālaya, or what is the same thing, in the Tathāgata-garbha, which is the basis of all things, it is known as *āśraya-parāvṛtti*, a turning at the basis. *Āśraya* means that on which anything is dependent, and in this case the Ālaya is the *āśraya* on which hangs the working of the Vijñānas and consequently the birth (*utpāda*) of the whole universe. The turning takes place when the ego-centric and evil-creating discrimination based upon the dualism of subject and object ceases by realising that there is no external world besides what is perceived within oneself, and this realisation is effected by the cultivation

of the intellect known as non-discriminative and transcendental (*nirvikalpa-lokottara-jñānam*). As long as our ordinary understanding which works dualistically conditioned prevails, we cannot go beyond the realm controlled by the seven Vijñānas, and if we cannot go beyond this, we have no chance to penetrate into the reality of things (*dharmatā*), which means an everlasting transmigration in the world of birth and death. We must look now in the opposite direction, towards the quarter where no Vikalpa takes place, and where no evolution (*vr̥tti*) of the Vijñānas has set in. An opening must be made to the non-discriminative and transcendental intellect. The opening is the turning. The eye that used to open to the external world thinking it was reality and egotistically attached to it, now turns within to see what lies here. It is in this inner world that so many things we have been looking after are accessible now: the Inner Perception (p. 62), Nirvana (pp. 62, 98, 238, etc.), Tathatā (p. 108), Emancipation (*moksha*, p. 233), Prajñāpāramitā (p. 238), the cessation of the seven Vijñānas (p. 221), etc.

This turning is in a sense re-turning as the Ālaya or Tathāgata-garbha returns by this to its original purity (*śuddha*), happiness (*sukha*), and eternal nature which is above *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti* (rise and disappearance).¹ The Ālaya gets contaminated by external impurities (*āgantukleśa*) amassed by all kinds of philosophising (*vitarkadarśana*) which is based on the discrimination of subject and object. When the discrimination is in the right direction, it is all right, for it points towards the returning; but when it goes astray as is the case with every one of us, the unenlightened, it stirs up all sorts of trouble, not only intellectually but affectively, the latter being the worst of all trouble-makers. As Buddhism like other Indian systems of thought puts the first emphasis on intellectual integrity, the right seeing into the situation performs the most important office in the whole programme of Buddhist experience. When the intellectual outlook gets distorted, the affective and conative disturbances follow, which in turn react upon the essential purity

¹ P. 222.

of the Ālaya and contaminates it thoroughly. Incorrectness in every form is described by Buddhists in terms of chromatics. Hence the Ālaya is dyed (*upakliṣṭa*) by external impurities. *Kleśa* is generally translated in Buddhism 煩惱, "tormenting and afflicting," "causing vexations of spirit," but here in the *Lankāvatāra* it is done by 塵, "dust" or "impurity" as it spoils the immaculate Ālaya. And since this dust is not native to the Ālaya, it is called *āgata*, the "guest" who is uninvited.¹

The Three Modes of the Vijñāna

The Vijñānas may be described from their modes of being, that is, from the *lakṣhaṇa* point of view: there are three signs from which their being may be approached. The first is the Vijñāna as evolving (*pravṛitti*), the second the Vijñāna as producing definite effects (*karma*), and the third the Vijñāna as remaining in its original nature (*jāti*).¹ The Pravṛitti-vijñāna is a collective name for all the particular Vijñānas that evolve out of the Ālaya, when they are considered from the point of view of evolution, while the Ālaya is the Vijñāna or Citta that remains undisturbed in its native abode. The Karma-vijñāna describes the Vijñāna in its functioning capacity. The Vijñāna in itself does not show any signs of becoming; but these three aspects belong to one Citta; thus they are, as the sūtra says, "neither different nor not-different."

The following extracts may give us some ideas as to what is meant by the Pravṛitti-vijñāna and its relations to the other aspects of the Vijñāna.

"As atoms of clay and a lump of clay are neither different nor not-different from each other, so are gold and ornament made of it. If, O Mahāmati, a lump of clay is different from its atoms, nothing will be produced out of them, but as something is produced out of them, they are not different. But if they are identical, not different, no distinction is possible between atoms of clay and the lump. Likewise, O Mahāmati, if the

¹ P. 222.

² P. 37 ff.

evolved Vijñānas are different from the Ālaya each in its original nature, the Ālaya will not be their primary cause. If they are identical, the disappearance of the Vijñānas will be the disappearance of the Ālaya, but there is no disappearance of their own original nature. Thus, O Mahāmati, there is no disappearance of the original nature of the Vijñānas, but only the disappearance of the karma-aspect of the Vijñānas. If, however, their own original nature should disappear, the Ālaya itself would disappear. With the disappearance of the Ālaya, the distinction will cease to exist between the Buddhist doctrine and the nihilism of some philosophers. According to the latter, when the comprehension of an external world ceases, the Vijñānas cease to continue, their uninterrupted activity since beginningless time will be broken. O Mahāmati, the philosophers may explain an uninterrupted evolution [of the Vijñānas] by a cause, and do not say that the evolution is produced by the united action of the eye-sense with form and light. They assume another cause; the cause is Pradhāna (unevolved nature), Purusha (supreme spirit), Ísvara (supreme lord), time, or atom.”¹

“O Mahāmati, the eye-sense (*vijñāna*) is awakened by four causes (*kāraṇa*). What are the four? Getting attached to the visible world not knowing that it is mind-made(1); tenaciously clinging to form due to the habit-energy of unwarranted speculations and erroneous views since beginningless time(2); the self-nature of the Vijñāna itself(3); and eagerness for the multitudinosity of forms and appearances(4). O Mahāmati, owing to these four causes, the waves of the evolving Vijñānas are set in motion in the Ālaya which flows like the waters in the midst of the ocean. O Mahāmati, as the eye-sense, so [with the other senses, the perception of] the objective world takes place simultaneously and regularly [i.e., constantly] in all the sense-organs, atoms, and pores; it is like the mirror’s reflecting images, and, O Mahāmati, like the wind-tossed ocean, the ocean of mind is blown over by the wind of objectivity (*vishaya*)

¹ Pp. 38-39.

and the [*vijñāna*-] waves are raging without interruption. The cause and the manifestations of its action are not separated the one from the other; and on account of the karma-aspect of the *Vijñāna* being tightly united with the original-aspect, the self-nature of form [or objective world, *rūpasvabhāva*] is not accurately ascertained, and, O Mahāmati, thus evolves the system of the five *Vijñānas*. When together, O Mahāmati, with these five *Vijñānas*, the objective world is regarded as the reason of differentiation (*pariccheda*) and its appearances are defined, we have Manovijñāna. Caused by this, there takes place the birth of the body. They do not, however, think within themselves that 'we, mutually dependent, come to get attached to the visible world which grows out of one's own mind and is discriminated by it.'"¹

The Functions of the Eight Vijñānas

From the functional point of view, there are eight *Vijñānas*: Ālaya, Manas, Manovijñāna, and the five; but they may be grouped under two headings: Khyāti-vijñāna and Vastu-prativikalpa-vijñāna. *Khyāti*, from *khya*, means "to perceive," "to manifest," and this function of the *Vijñāna* is to perceive or to reflect things that appear in front of it just as the mirror reflects all forms before it.² This is the office of the Ālaya. It looks into itself where all the memory (*vāsanā*) of the beginningless part is preserved in a way beyond thought (*acintya*) and ready for further evolution (*pariṇāma*); but it has no active energy in itself, it never acts, it simply perceives, it is in this respect exactly like a mirror; it is again like the ocean perfectly smooth with no waves disturbing its tranquillity; and it is pure and undefiled, which means that it is free from the dualism of subject and object. For it is the pure act of perceiving, with no differentiation yet of the knowing one and the known. The waves, however, will be seen ruffling the surface of the ocean of Ālaya-vijñāna when the principle of individuation known as

¹ P. 44.

² P. 37.

Vishaya (境界) blows over it like the wind. The waves thus started are this world of particulars where the intellect discriminates, the affection clings, and passions and desires struggle for existence and supremacy.

This particularising agency sits within the system of Vijñānas and is known as Manas; in fact it is when Manas begins to operate that a system of the Vijñānas manifests itself. They are thus called "object-discriminating-vijñāna" (*vastu-prativikalpa-vijñāna*). Manas' function is essentially to reflect upon the Ālaya and to create and to discriminate subject and object from the pure oneness of the Ālaya. The memory accumulated (*cīyate*) in the latter is now divided (*vicīyate*) into dualities of all forms and all kinds. This is compared to the manifoldness of waves that are now stirring up the ocean. Manas is an evil spirit in one sense and a good one in another, for discrimination in itself is not evil, is not necessarily always false judgment (*abhūta-parikalpa*) or wrong reasoning (*prapañca-daushṭhalya*). It grows to be the source of great calamity when it creates desires based upon its wrong judgments, such as when it believes in the reality of an ego-substance and gets attached to it as the ultimate truth. For Manas is not only discriminating intelligence, but willing agency, and consequently actor.

In these activities Manas is always found in company with the Manovijñāna. In fact, it may be more proper to say that Manas and Manovijñāna conjointly working produce the world of particulars, and when reference is made to Vastuprativikalpa-vijñāna it includes both Manas and Manovijñāna. The function of Manovijñāna is by hypothesis to reflect on Manas, as the eye-vijñāna reflects on the world of forms and the ear-vijñāna on that of sounds; but in fact as soon as Manas evolves the dualism of subject and object out of the absolute unity of the Ālaya, Manovijñāna and indeed all the other Vijñānas as well, begin to operate.¹ It is like a complicated machine now, the whole system of the Vijñānas, each singly and also conjointly with others, is set in motion. When the system is thus

¹ P. 44.

in full swing, we cannot distinguish one Vijñāna from another, they so intimately interact, and the mirroring Ālaya is not distinguishable from the discriminating Manas and from the other Vijñānas, reflecting, reasoning, desiring, and acting. The Khyāti and the Vastuprativikalpa have now no differentiating marks (*abhinnalakṣaṇa*),¹ they re-act upon each other, the one acting in turn as the cause to the other (*anyonyahetuka*).

In the beginning there was the memory amassed in the Ālaya since the beginningless past as a latent cause, in which the whole universe of individual objects lies with its eyes closed; here comes in Manas with its discriminating intelligence, and subject is distinguished from object; Manovijñāna reflects on the duality, and from it issues a whole train of judgments with their consequent prejudices and attachments, while the five other Vijñānas help them to grow more and more complicated not only intellectually but affectively and conatively.² All the results of these activities in turn perfume the Ālaya stimulating the old memory to wake up while the new one finds its affinities among the old. In the meantime, however, the Ālaya itself remains unmoved retaining its identity.

The following extracts from the *Lankāvatāra* elucidate for us the relation between the Ālaya and the other Vijñānas and also that between Manovijñāna, including Manas, and the remaining part of the Vijñāna system.

When the Buddha said that Buddhist Nirvana consisted in one's turning away from the wrongfully discriminating Manovijñāna, Mahāmāti asked, "O Blessed One, dost thou not establish eight Vijñānas?" Being assured of this, Mahāmāti proceeded, "If this be the case, why dost thou not speak of one's turning away from the seven Vijñānas instead of Manovijñāna?" The Buddha answered as follows: "Depending upon Manovijñāna as the cause, there takes place the evolution of seven Vijñānas. Further, O Mahāmāti, when Manovijñāna clings to an external world of particulars, habit-energy (*vāsanā*)

¹ P. 37.

² P. 235.

is generated therefrom and by this the Ālaya is nurtured. Together with the thought of 'me and mine,' taking hold of it and clinging to it, and reflecting upon it, Manas thereby takes shape and is evolved. The nature of the substance [however] shows no change. Depending upon the Ālaya as the cause, an external world is tenaciously held as real while it is the manifestation of one's own mind, and thereby the mentation-system, mutually related, is evolved in its totality. Just like the ocean-waves, O Mahāmati, [the vijñānas], set in motion by the wind of an external world which is the manifestation of one's own mind, rise and cease. Therefore, O Mahāmati, the seven Vijñānas cease with the cessation of Manovijñāna. Thus it is said:

"My Nirvana has nothing to do with Substance (*bhāva*), nor with Action (*kriyā*), nor with Appearance (*lakṣaṇa*):

"With the cessation of the Vijñāna which is caused by discrimination, there is my cessation [i.e., Nirvana].

"Depending upon it as the cause, the whole system of mentation finds its refuge here.

"The Vijñāna gives the cause to the mind (*citta*) and is its dependant:

"As when the great flood runs its course there are no more waves,

"So with the extinction [of Manovijñāna] all the Vijñānas cease to rise."¹

The above shows the importance of Manovijñāna in the body of Vijñānas including the Ālaya; let us now proceed to see what rôle the Ālaya, besides supplying material to the activity of Manovijñāna, plays, or rather how it stands by itself especially in connection with the idea of Tathāgata-garbha. The following will be of great help to our understanding the significance of the Ālaya, which is needed in the bringing about of all inner experience known as Pratyātmagati:

"O Mahāmati, the Tathāgata-garbha contains in itself causes both good and not-good, and from which are generated all paths

¹ Pp. 126-127.

of existence. It is like an actor playing different characters without harbouring any thought of 'me and mine.' From not comprehending this, there arises the union and interaction of three causes producing results. The philosophers not understanding this get attached to the fixed idea of a creator. Infused with the habit-energy of various kinds of speculations and errors which have been carried on since beginningless time, the name of *Ālaya-vijñāna* obtains, [as *ālaya* means all-conserving]. It is in company with the seven *Vijñānas* which are generated in the dwelling abode of ignorance. The body [of the *Vijñānas*] is stirred uninterruptedly and all the time like the waves of the great ocean, but [the *Ālaya* itself] is free from the fault of impermanence and devoid of the thought of ego, it is in its ultimate substance perfectly immaculate. As to the other seven *Vijñānas* beginning with *Manas* and *Manovijñāna*, they originate and come to an end and are characterised with momentariness; this birth is due to our erroneously discriminating things that are not; they are intimately related to and dependent upon an external world of forms and images; tenaciously attached to names and appearances, they fail to comprehend that forms and appearances are manifestations of one's own mind; they do not realise what is pain and what pleasure, they are no producer of emancipation; firmly standing on names and appearances [as realities], they are begotten of the desire to have (*rāga*) and further beget the same desire; [the desire and the *Vijñānas* are thus mutually conditioning]. When what are known as the perceiving senses are destroyed and disappear, others [*Vijñānas*], immediately following this, cease to function. There is [still] a self-discriminating knowledge; and seeing that no pain, no pleasure is felt, that there is the extinction of thought and sensation, and the attainment of mental tranquillity and the four *Dhyānas*, and a skilfulness in [the understanding of] truth and emancipation, the devotees (*yogin*) think that they have [really] attained emancipation. But as long as the *Ālayavijñāna* known by the name of *Tathāgata-garbha* is not set in motion and turned round, the cessation of the seven evolving *Vijñānas* will never take

place. Why? Because, depending on the Ālaya as the cause, the Vijñānas are evolved; because this is not within the reach of all Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, philosophers, and Yoga-devotees; because [while] they understand that there is no ego-substance in a person, they are [still] attached to ideas of singleness and generality as really existing in the Skandhas, Dhātus, and Āyatanas; the Tathāgata-garbha is awakened and grows quiescent as one sees into what is meant by the five Dharmas, the [three] Natures, and the non-existence of the ego-substance in particular objects; and when there takes place the turning [in the Ālaya] by gradually going up along the scales [of perfection, i.e., Daśabhūmika], one will never be led astray by the methods and views held by the philosophers.....

“The Tathāgata-garbha is found united with the seven Vijñānas:

“From attachment a duality sets in, from knowledge it disappears:

“The Mind is to be regarded as mirror-like, perfumed by speculation [-habit] since beginningless [past]:

“When things are truly observed, they are not as they appear.

“As the ignorant see the finger-tip and not the moon,

“So those who are addicted to letters understand not the thatness of things I teach.

“The Mind dances like the dancer, Manas resembles the jester [or companion actor],

“The Vijñāna, in company with the five, imagines the visible [world] as the stage.”¹

The Function of Manas

The question may rise now, What is the significance of Manas? Cannot the other Vijñānas do without this one acting, as it were, between the Ālaya and the other particularising six Vijñānas? This seems to be quite a natural question, seeing that the Manovijñāna can directly deal with the Ālaya without

¹ P. 220 ff.

the interference of Manas. According to my way of interpreting the *Lankāvatāra*, which may not be correct, the Ālaya is a sort of universal consciousness, and Manas individual, empirical consciousness. In the Ālaya everything is stored, good and bad, in a state of quiescence and potentiality, but no discrimination, which latter, however, appears with the initiation of Manas. Manas is the active source of all the mental activities we ordinarily experience in this world of particulars. The possibility of consciousness lies in its dualistic nature, for without that which grasps (*grāhaka*) and that which is grasped (*grāhya*), there will be no conscious life. The duality of subject and object is fundamental, but this dualism is impossible without assuming behind it something which is not dual. Therefore, at the back of the six Vijñānas there must be Manas, the principle of individuation, and also the Ālaya, which goes even beyond the foundation of consciousness. When we admit that the six Vijñānas are fundamentally conditioned by the principle of individuation, we admit the existence of Manas. And when Manas is admitted, we inevitably go on to the Ālaya which allows itself to be reflected by Manas as its condition and yet at the same time transcends it because the Ālaya is not an individual object of experience but universal in its nature. And it is due to this universal nature of the Ālaya that all the individual Manas are capable of reflecting one and the same universe and of engaging in discussion. The Ālaya is thus most appropriately compared to the ocean.

This ocean of the Ālaya is disturbed by the wind of the particularising principle, psychologically known as Manas and epistemologically as Vishaya. While Manas is conceptually separable from the other six Vijñānas, it is practically involved in them. In our psychological life itself the whole Vijñāna system is engaged and we cannot very well talk individually of its components. So the *Lankāvatāra* is always careful to guard us from getting confused about this point: the Ālaya and the Vijñānas are different and yet not-different, i.e., one; without the Ālaya, the cause is lost and the whole mental apparatus collapses; and when that which makes the cause operative

ceases to get stirred up, the cause itself grows quiet though this does not mean its disappearance or destruction.

The Manas is the discriminating agency, but as this is possible only in the Ālaya, on which Manas with all its retinue of Vijñānas is dependent, the Manas and the Ālaya are in the closest possible relationship. For this reason, the Ālaya is dependent upon Manas to grow conscious of itself and of its unity. On the other hand, the six Vijñānas cannot function in harmony with one another unless Manas comes in between them and the Ālaya. Manas is the connecting link. The position occupied by Manas in the system of Vijñānas is thus peculiarly complicated and apt to get confused sometimes with the Ālaya and sometimes with Manovijñāna. In the *Lankāvatāra*, the Ālaya is the reservoir of things good and bad, but it is perfectly neutral and not conscious of itself as there is yet no differentiation in it. This differentiation is caused by Manas, the defiling Vijñāna as it is sometimes called. The differentiation or defilement itself is neither good nor bad, but when this is adhered to as final, irreducible reality, there ensues the idea of an ego-substance internally and externally, and from this all evils are generated. As the result the mind loses its native tranquillity. What is now most needed is to cause a revolution (*parāvṛtti*) in the whole system of Vijñānas, especially in the Ālaya itself, which, contaminated by Manas and Manovijñāna, has had its neutrality, purity, and innocence all departed from itself. To look into the matter squarely and clearly is called to see *yathābhūtam*, which leads to emancipation and serenity.

The Awakening of Prajñā.

How do we get now Prajñā awakened in order to see into the true state of things, *yathābhūtam*? Where does this Prajñā come, and how do we attain self-realisation by directly experiencing the truth? And what is the truth? The sutra refers all the time to Prapañca (戲論), Parikalpa (妄計), Vikalpita (分別), Abhiniveśa (執着), Bhrānti (迷惑), Daushṭhulya (過惡), Vāsanā (習氣), etc., which are tossing up the roaring waves over the Ālaya-ocean; but when does Pratyātmāryajñāna get

its start so that the stormy sea will grow pacified and the world perceived without discrimination or disturbance of any kind? Says the sutra: "The Bodhisattva who aims to be great in his spiritual discipline is required to be perfect in the following four things: (1) He must have a penetrating comprehension (*vibhāvana*) as regards the nature of the manifestation of mind; (2) He must be free (*vivarjana*) from such notions as birth, abiding, and destruction; (3) He must observe (*upalakṣhaṇa*) that external objects do not exist; and (4) He must get into (*abhilakṣhaṇa*) a state of realisation by directly seeing into the inmost self."¹ How could this be achieved?

If it were due to the coming in of the principle of particularisation or discrimination (*vikalpa*) that the Ālaya ceases to be the seat of Tathagatahood, and if without this principle no sentient beings could ever come to the perception of the Ālaya even in its disturbed, distorted, and altogether false reflections, it must be again this principle that will set us aright in the position in order to have a correct view of Ālaya. In other words, if it were the work of Manas and Manovijñāna that an external world came to be recognised as external, it must be their work again, properly executed this time, that we come to look at the world as having evolved out of our own being. Formerly, the Vijñāna got wrongly attached to the principle of particularisation and thus to the undesirable part of the Vāsanā, memory, in the Ālaya. There must be a turning of the waves, the course of Manas and Manovijñāna must be altered towards the other direction than that which has been pursued hitherto. If they thought of the Ālaya as external and subject to changes, they must now retrace their steps and look within themselves and see if there is anything that transcends the principle of particularisation. To transcend this principle, that is, for Manas and Manovijñāna to transcend themselves, means the obliteration of themselves, their disappearance from the field of operation, the going beyond the dualism of *grāhya* and *grāhaka*, of *sat* and *asat*, one and many, particularity and

¹ Pp. 79-80.

universality. When this is accomplished, where do we find ourselves? Where is the ultimate abiding place for us? This is the abode of Tathagatahood, and belongs to the realm of Ālaya-vijñāna to be known as Tathāgata-garbha, and realisable only through immediate knowledge (*pratyakṣa*).¹ For this no more belongs to the sphere of logic and analysis, but an experience immediately attained within oneself (*pratyātma-gatigocara*). A knowledge that is not of particularisation and discrimination, must be one of direct experience in which the Ālaya reveals itself in its original purity and not in its distorted forms as it ordinarily does to the Vijñānas.

When we thus come to have an immediate knowledge of transcendental nature, the Vijñāna system ceases to be treated psychologically. We have now to go back to the chapter preceding this, where the so-called logical aspect of the inner experience is treated. The awakening of Prajñā which is non-discriminative knowledge (*nirvikalpajñā*) beyond the realm of mentation (*acintya* or *acitta*), is a practical question in the *Lankāvatāra*, and this will be treated in what follows.

PART III

Discipline in Dhyāna

The logical and psychological equipment must be followed up by practical discipline without which the Bodhisattva could not be more than an idealistic philosopher. "As all the sacred doctrines leave no room from option and doubt, let the Bodhisattva retire into a solitude and reflect within himself by means of intelligence (*buddhi*) which lies in his inmost mind, and not be led by anybody else, when he will free himself from views based upon discrimination and by degrees advance towards the state of Tathagatahood."² This not depending on another is emphasised not only in Mahayana literature but in the Āgamas

¹ P. 222.

² P. 133; see also p. 155.

Nikāyas; for Buddhism is emphatically the doctrine of enlightenment which is to be realised within oneself. So, it is urged for the Bodhisattva who wishes to penetrate behind the screen of contrasts and dialectics that he should rid himself of all the hindrances (*nivāraṇa*) that may arise from noisy confusion, from heaviness of mind, and from sleepiness, and also that he should assiduously engage in disciplining himself throughout the night, not at all mindful of the philosophies of other schools,¹ including the Hinayanist.

Can the Bodhisattva, however, reach his goal by his own effort and without any outside assistance? Is there no "other power" that will come to his help? Here we come to one of the features of Mahayana Buddhism distinguishing itself from the Hinayana. The *Lankāvatāra* calls it the "Adhishṭhāna of all the Buddhas which issues from their Prāṇidhāna."² Without this Adhishṭhāna on the part of the Buddha, the Bodhisattva with all his assiduity and penetrating insight may be incapable of realising the highest truth in himself and may not finally be taken up among the community of the Buddhas of the past, present, and future. *Adhishṭhāna* (*adhi+sthā*) means "basis," "position," "power," etc., translated into Chinese by 加持力 "the power that is added to and sustaining." It is the power emanating from the will of the Buddha whose loving heart embraces the whole universe, and is added to that of a Bodhisattva to sustain him, to encourage him, and finally to carry him over to a state of self-realisation. Not only in the present sutra but in other Mahayana sutras we frequently come across the sentence, "Through the Anubhāva or Prabhāva (that is, power) of the Buddha, a Bodhisattva rose from his seat and asked thus of the Buddha, or preached thus." This is a form of authorisation, but in the case of Adhishṭhāna, it is more than that, for here the Buddha's power sustains the Bodhisattva throughout his long laborious career of discipleship. Read the following:³

1 Pp. 49, 99.

2 P. 49 f.

3 P. 100 ff.

universality. When this is accomplished, where do we find ourselves? Where is the ultimate abiding place for us? This is the abode of Tathagatahood, and belongs to the realm of Ālaya-vijñāna to be known as Tathāgata-garbha, and realisable only through immediate knowledge (*pratyakṣa*).¹ For this no more belongs to the sphere of logic and analysis, but an experience immediately attained within oneself (*pratyātma-gatigocara*). A knowledge that is not of particularisation and discrimination, must be one of direct experience in which the Ālaya reveals itself in its original purity and not in its distorted forms as it ordinarily does to the Vijñānas.

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¹ Pp. 49, 99.

² P. 49 f.

³ P. 100 ff.

"And again, O Mahāmati, sustained in two ways by the power (*adhiṣṭtāna*) of the Buddhas, the Bodhisattva falls down at their feet and asks them to settle controversial points for him. What are the two ways? The one is the power by which the Bodhisattva is made to attain states of mental tranquillisation, and the other is that by which the Buddha personally appears before the Bodhisattva and anoints him with his own hands.

"It is thus due to the power of the Buddha that the Bodhisattva at the first stage attains the Samadhi known as the Light of the Mahāyāna, and that having attained this Samadhi the Bodhisattva finds himself now blessed by the personal presence of all the Buddhas from the ten quarters who will with their own body and speech add their power upon him. It is like the case with the Bodhisattva Vajragarbha and others who are furnished with all these meritorious attributes.

"O Mahāmati, in this wise the Bodhisattva at the first stage gets sustained by the power of the Buddhas in his attainment of the states of tranquillisation. In virtue of a stock of merit accumulated for hundreds of thousands of kalpas, he will in succession go up the stages, and qualifying himself with the virtues of perfect control, reach the stage of Bodhisattvahood called Dharmamegha (Cloud of the Law). Seating himself on a throne in the Palace of the Great Lotus, he is surrounded by Bodhisattvas like himself and wears a tiara adorned and embellished with all kinds of jewels. The Buddhas will now come from all the ten quarters of the universe, who are shining like the brilliant full-moon with yellowish, golden, champaka-like rays, and with their lotus-like hands anoint the forehead of the Bodhisattva seated on the throne in the lotus palace. He is like the crown-prince of a great sovereign, who, being thus anointed by the Buddhas personally with their own hands, assume full power. This Bodhisattva and such others are said to be sustained, thus hand-anointed, by the power of the Buddhas. These are the two ways in which the Bodhisattva is sustained by the power of the Buddha; and when he is thus sustained he will see all the Buddhas face to face. In no other way, the Tathagatas, Arhats, the Fully-Enlightened Ones are to be seen.

“And again, O Mahāmati, whatever the Bodhisattva accomplishes in the way of Samadhi, psychic attainments, or preaching, is thus done by being sustained in two ways by the power of the Buddhas. If the Bodhisattva could at all preach intelligently without being sustained by the power of the Buddhas, the ignorant would also preach intelligently. Why? The question hangs on whether or not one is sustained by the Buddhas’ power. Being sustained by the entrance of the Tathagata into them, [the whole universe with its] grasses, shrubs, trees, and even mountains, and also [with its] musical instruments of all kinds, utensils, towns, dwellings, palaces, and seats,—all will play music. How much more so with conscious beings! The deaf, blind, and mute will be emancipated from their defects. Suchwise is the power of the Tathagata, so distinctive, and so full of great virtues.

“Mahāmati asked, Why do the Tathagatas sustain the Bodhisattva by their power when he abides in his states of tranquillisation as well as when he is at the superior stage? Said the Blessed One: It is to keep him away from the evil one and from evil passions, it is to let him not fall into the Dhyana and stage of the Śrāvakas, but to make him attain to the self-realisation of the Tathagata-stage and grow in the virtues already acquired by him. For this reason, the Bodhisattva is sustained by the power of all the Tathagatas. O Mahāmati, if he is not thus sustained he may fall into the way of thinking as cherished by bad philosophers, Śrāvakas, and the evil one, and will not be enlightened in the Supreme Enlightenment. For this reason, the Bodhisattva is favoured by the Tathagatas who are Arhats and Fully-Enlightened Ones.”¹

The conception of *Pranidhāna* which is usually translated 誓願 or simply 願, “vow,” is again peculiar to the Mahayana. A Bodhisattva generally makes a number of vows before he begins his career as a world-teacher; for his desire to realise the final stage of Buddhahood is not for his own benefit but for the whole world. The forty-eight vows of *Dharmākara* are one

¹ Pp. 100-103, abstract.

of such cases, who became Amitābha Buddha the world-saviour when his vows were all fulfilled. But, generally speaking, the Bodhisattva's universal vow or prayer is that all his fellow-beings, inclusive even of non-sentient beings, sooner or later, attain to the supreme enlightenment of the Buddha, and his work towards this end never ceases. The *Lankāvatāra* does not tell us so much about awakening the thought of enlightenment, (*bodhi-citta-utpāda*),—in fact I think there is not one reference to this idea; when Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi is mentioned, it refers to its attainment and not to the awakening of thought towards it. But in the *Prajñā-pāramitā Sūtras* and others this awakening is constantly spoken of as the first step towards gaining access to the final truth of Tathagatahood. The *Lankāvatāra*, however, describes the Buddha's part in the purification of the hearts or minds of all beings by raising a question as to the time needed for the work. Mahāmati asks, "Is the cleansing effected by the Buddha instantaneous or gradual—the cleansing of all beings from the out-flowings (or disturbances) of the Mind (*svacitta-dṛśya-dhārā*)?" To this the Buddha gives the following answer, according to which his cleansing takes effect sometimes instantaneously, sometimes gradually.¹ The word "sometimes" is missing in the passage quoted, but we have I think to supply it in order to make the sense not too glaringly contradictory. In fact, the reading of the *Lankāvatāra* is no easy task as I remarked in the beginning of this paper, and in many cases varied interpretations are possible.²

Mahāmati asked, "When the mind is cleaned of its own flow of external manifestations, is it done all at once or by degrees?" Said the Buddha: "The cleansing is done by degrees, not all at once. It is like the ripening of the amra fruit which takes place gradually and not at once. It is again like the potter's making pots, it is done gradually and not at once. The Tathagata's cleansing of all beings of their minds from which external manifestations flow, is carried out by

¹ Mainly after the T'ang version. Cf. pp. 55–56, Nanjio edition.

² There is no doubt that the sutra makes no pretensions to a system.

degrees and not all at once. It is again like the shooting of grass, shrub, herb, or a thicket on earth, it is gradual and not at once; so does the Tathagata cleanse all beings of their mental outflows. It is again like one's learning the arts of dancing, singing, writing, playing the lute, etc.; it is mastered by degrees and not all at once: so does the Tathagata his cleansing work.

“[But sometimes the cleansing is done at once and not by degrees] as in the case of the mirror's reflecting all forms simultaneously and without discrimination. In a similar way, the Tathagata cleanses the minds of all beings from their outflowing manifestations, making them at once pure and free from discrimination and leading them to a state of no-images. Again, as the sun or the moon illumines all forms and appearances at once with its beams of light, so does the Tathagata reveal at once the spiritual state of Buddhahood which is the object of intuitive knowledge (*acīntyajñāna*) by befriending all beings of their self-imagined manifestations, errors, and habit-energy (*vāsanā*). Again, as the Ālaya-vijñāna reveals simultaneously an external world of individual objects as manifestations of one's own mind, so the Nishyanda-Buddha,¹ at once maturing all beings, enables them to discipline themselves as religious devotees at their abodes in the celestial palace of Akanishṭha. Again, as the Dharmatā-Buddha shines instantly with the light of the Nishyanda-Buddha and the Nirmāṇa-Buddha, so does the inner realisation of the ultimate truth shine forth all at once going beyond the wrong views based upon ideas of being and not-being.”

The Will-body (manomayakāya)

No definite statement of the Triple Body dogma is found in the *Lankāvatāra*, but all the component ideas seem to be present as is recognisable here: Dharmatā-Buddha, Nishyanda-Buddha, and Nirmāṇa-Buddha, which apparently correspond to the later trinity of Dharma-kāya, Sambhoga-kāya, and Nirmāṇa-kāya. It may be interesting to discuss here the development

¹ For the explanation of this see *supra*.

of the dogma if the author was not going to restrict himself to such topics in the *Lankāvatāra* as are more or less directly connected with the absolute idealism developed in the sutra and with the intuitive knowledge of the truth which is its principal theme—these being the foundation of Zen Buddhism. He wishes, however, to touch upon the idea of Nirmāṇa-Buddha as it is closely related to that of Prāṇidhāna, the Bodhisattva's vow. Being thoroughly idealistic, whatever is most vehemently desired by the Buddha or Bodhisattva whose interest extends over the whole field of beings, must take effect in one way or another in this world even of our ordinary life. To have, however, a wish carried out successfully, one may have frequently to step over the limitations of this physical body, which is tied to space-time relations. A body not so limited will be needed in this case,—a body that can be manifested anywhere and at any time as is wished. The Buddha or Bodhisattva has this body known as Manomayakāya, which means "mind-made-body," or simply "will-body."

The definition of Manomayakāya (意生身 or 意成身), according to the *Lankāvatāra*, is this: "By *manomaya* ['as willed'] it is meant to move about so speedily and unobstructedly as one wills. Like the mind that moves unobstructedly over mountains, walls, rivers, trees, and other objects, even beyond many hundreds of thousands of yojanas, by merely thinking of objects seen and perceived previously, with its own thought continuously and uninterruptedly working regardless of the limitations of the body; so when the Manomayakāya is obtained in the realisation of the Samādhi known as Māyopama [Māyā-like], he acquires the ten powers (*bala*) the tenfold self-mastery (*vaśita*), and the six psychic faculties (*abhijñāna*), is adorned with the distinguishing marks, and born among the family of Holy Path, and, thinking of the objects of his original vow which is to bring all beings to full maturity, moves about as unobstructedly as the mind moves on."¹

The three kinds of Manomayakāya ("will-body") is dis-

¹ Cf. p. 81.

tinguished in the *Lankāvatāra* somewhat foreshadowing the later systematisation of the Triple Body dogma: The three are (1) the will-body attainable in the bliss of Samadhi, (2) the will-body that has the knowledge of the self-nature of the Dharma, and (3) the will-body whose deeds are not calculative, being born among the order of holy ones. The first kind is the product of a perfect mental control which takes place as the Bodhisattva goes up through the third, the fourth, and the fifth stage of spiritual discipline, and realises that the mind in its true nature is above its evolved Vijñānas and seeing into the phenomenality of objects is tranquil like the ocean undisturbed by the waves. The second form comes from a deep penetration into the truth of all things, which is enjoyed by the Bodhisattva above the eighth stage; for as he perceives that all things being mere appearances are like māyā and non-entities, there takes place a turning in the recesses of his consciousness, and he enters into the Samadhi called Māyopama and then into other Samadhis; he is now adorned with flowers, with various attributes such as the tenfold self-mastery and the six psychic faculties, moves as quickly as thought itself, and the body attained now is like lunar reflection in water or an image in the mirror or a vision in a dream, it is not made of the four elements and yet resembles one so made, it is furnished with all the parts of the material body; he will now enter into all the Buddha-lands, their circles and assemblies. As he has thus perfectly penetrated into the nature of the Dharma, he has the second form of the will-body. The third will-body comes from deeply experiencing the bliss and character of the inner realisation enjoyed by all Buddhas."¹

The inner realisation (*pratyātmadharma*) here referred to is a common property of all the Buddhas, and when a Bodhisattva obtains this insight into his inmost being, he has thereby obtained the passport into the spiritual community of all the Buddhas, past, present and future. If a critic insists that this subjectivism ought to be verified objectively, i.e., must have some

¹ Pp. 136-137, abstract.

objective ground on which the experience is to be set up, the *Lankāvatāra* says that there is what is to be called Paurāṇasthiti-dharmatā, something that has been in existence from the timeless past, or thingness that abides eternally in things, or an absolute reality that exists regardless of the appearance or non-appearance of the Buddhas. This reality exists in the world as gold exists concealed in the ore, for it is this that makes things abide, makes them arrange themselves in order and establish a realm among themselves, and constitutes their essence. It is eternally there. It is the suchness of things.¹

Therefore, when the Bodhisattvas or Buddhas attain to the realisation, the experience is not something altogether new to them. It is an old story, as it were. It is like walking in an old city which one happens to discover in the midst of the desert. The streets are smoothly paved as ever. One enters into it, and quietly enjoys a peaceful life. The Buddha did not create these things, they have been there from the beginning. The Dharma he has an insight into is something enduring (*dharmasthītā*), a regulative principle (*dharmaniyāmā*), and suchness of things (*tathatā*), reality (*bhūtātā*), truth (*satyatā*). And it was for this reason that the Buddha declared that ever since his enlightenment night he had not uttered a word.² This is indeed, according to the *Lankāvatāra*, the esoteric teaching (*samdhāya*) or Buddhism.³

The conception of Paurāṇasthiti-dharmatā, or Pūrvadharmasthiti⁴ is the doctrine of universal Ālaya-vijñāna, ontologically stated. The Pratyātmagati consists in realising this originally-abiding Dharma, which is variously described as Tathāgata-garbha, the Ālaya, suchness of things, which is beyond the signs of speech, analysis, and description, and in which all the Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, and sentient beings get united, have an ever-enduring community—Nirvana. But the function of the Bodhisattva is not to stay forever in this happy society but to come

¹ P. 143.

² See also above.

³ P. 144.

⁴ P. 241.

into a world of particulars. His vows are to be fulfilled, and in this he is said truly to be a Bodhisattva.

The Bodhisattva and Social Life.

The central theme of the *Lankāvatāra* has been explained as being the attainment of an insight into one's inmost consciousness, and to do this we have seen that the sutra approaches the subject in two ways, logical and psychological. But as Buddhism is a religion and as every religion has its practical and social side, without which it will lose its reason of existence, the *Lankāvatāra* also prepares the Bodhisattva for his mission as one of the members of a cooperative life. In fact, this is what distinguishes the Mahayana from the Hīnayana, for the latter's object of spiritual discipline does not extend beyond his own interest, however exalted it may be in itself,—the object being the attainment of Arhatship, a solitary saintly life. This is all well as far as it goes, but as we are all living within a most complicately organised communal body, not excepting even a Buddha or a Bodhisattva, we have to think of this side of life. The conception of a Bodhisattva was thus inevitable. If he attained to a state of self-realisation which he finds so full of peace, bliss, and strength, his natural desire is to impart them to his fellow-beings. Technically, when he has finished benefitting himself (*ātmahitam*), his next step is to go out into the world and benefit others (*parahitam*). In reality, he cannot do good to himself without letting others share in it. The sutra, therefore, now proceeds to tell the reader what is the practical, i.e., social life of the Bodhisattva. It may be said that the object of gaining an insight into the inner truth of things is really to qualify oneself for social work.

Before proceeding, a question may be raised as to the value of doing anything for others inasmuch as, according to the doctrine of *Svacittamātram* (self-mind-only), or to that of *Sarvadharmānām śūnyatā-anutpāda-advaya-niḥsvabhāva-lakṣaṇa*,¹ there is nothing or nobody in the world that will be the object

¹ P. 73.

of salvation, or upon whom any kind of benefit may be bestowed. From the absolutely idealistic point of view, we may even ask if life is at all worth living. Is it not really much ado for nothing that the Bodhisattva should try to save the world when the latter is no more than mere illusion of his own mind? This is what is called by the Mahayanists *uccheda-darśanam* (nihilism) and does not understand *yathābhūtam* the truth of things. That the world is like a mirage, thus that it is empty, does not mean that it is unreal in the sense that it has no reality in whatever way. But it means that its real nature cannot be understood by a mind that cannot rise above the dualism of "to be" and "not to be." Therefore, the Sung translation of the *Lankāvatāra* opens with this stanza recited by Mahāmati:

"The world transcends [the dualism of] birth and death, it is like the flower in air; the wise are free from [the ideas of] being and non-being, yet a great compassionate heart is awakened [in them].

"All things are like mirage, they are beyond the reach of mind and understanding; the wise are free from [ideas of] being and non-being, yet a great compassionate heart is awakened [in them].

"The world is beyond nihilism as well as eternalism, and it is always like a dream; the wise are free from [ideas of] being and non-being, yet a great compassionate heart is awakened [in them].

"The wise know that there is no self-substance in a person, nor in an object, and that both passions and their objectives are always pure [in their nature] and have no individual marks; and yet a great compassionate heart is awakened [in them].

"There is no Nirvana anywhere, there is no Buddha abiding in Nirvana, there is no Nirvana abiding in the Buddha; both the enlightened and the enlightening are transcended; 'to be' and 'not to be,' these two are altogether put aside.

"Those who look up to the Buddha thus tranquil and detachment-attained, are known as 'not-seizing,' they are pure now and after."

The Bodhisattva Never Enters into Nirvana

According to the *Lankāvatāra* there are five orders of beings from the religious point of view: (1) Those who belong to the Śrāvaka order, (2) Those of the Pratyekabuddha order, (3) Those of the Tathagata order, (4) Those who belong to no definite order, and (5) Those who are altogether outside these orders.¹ Those belong to the Śrāvaka order who are delighted at listening to such doctrines as concern the Skandhas, Dhātus, or Āyatanas, but take no special interest in the theory of causation, who have cut themselves loose from the bondage of evil passions but have not yet destroyed their habit-energy. They have attained to the realisation of Nirvana, abiding in which state they would declare that they have put an end to existence, their life of morality is now attained, all that is to be done is done, they would not be reborn. These have gained an insight into the non-existence of an ego-substance in a person but not yet into that in objects. Those philosophical leaders who believe in a creator or in the ego-soul may also be classed under this order.

The Pratyekabuddha order comprises those who are intensely interested in anything that leads them to the realisation of Pratyekabuddhahood. They would retire into solitude and have no attachment to things worldly. When they hear that the Buddha manifests himself in a variety of forms, sometimes in group, sometimes singly, exhibiting miraculous powers, they think these are meant for their own order, and immensely delighted in them they would follow and accept them.

The Tathagata order may be again divided into three: those who gain an insight into the truth that there is no individual reality behind what one perceives, those who know that there is an immediate perception of the truth in one's inmost consciousness, and those who perceive that besides this world there are a great number of Buddha-lands wide and far-extending. They may listen to discourses on such subjects as manifestations of mind, or transcendental realm of the Ālaya, from which

¹ P. 63 et seq.

starts this world of particulars, and yet they may not at all feel astonished or frightened. These belong to the order of Tathagatas.

The fourth one is of indeterminate nature, for those who belong to it may take to either one of the above three orders according to their opportunities.

There is still another class of beings which cannot be comprised under any of the four already mentioned; for they do not have any desire for emancipation, and without this desire no religious teaching can enter into any heart. Two sub-classes, however, may be distinguished here, those who have forsaken all roots of merit, and those who have vowed at the beginning to save all beings. They both belong to the *Icchantika*¹ order so called. Into the former fall all those who vilify the doctrines meant for the Bodhisattvas, saying that they are not in accordance with the sacred texts, rules of morality, and the doctrine of emancipation. Because of this vilification they forsake

¹ This is generally understood to have been derived from *icchā* "desire." According to Dr. Unrai Wogiwara, however, it comes originally from *itthamtvika* or *aitthamtvika*, meaning "being worldly" or "belonging to this world." (The *Mahavyutpatti*, ed. by himself, notes, p. 23.) Linguistically, he may be all right, but psychologically there is no harm in deriving *icchantika* from *icchā*, wish or desire; for the *Icchantika* are those devoted followers of hedonism either in its bad or good sense. The Bodhisattva is a hedonist in the good sense, his not entering into Nirvana is his own desire or pleasure, he simply desires to remain in this world in order to save his fellow-beings from misery, and he does this not from any sense of duty or moral desirability; he does this merely from his altruistic impulse as it were, that is, he is following the bent of his own mind, which is pleasure to him. But in the case of a sensuous hedonist "he does not believe in the law of causality, he has no feeling of shame, he has no faith in the working of karma, he is unconcerned with the present, with the future, he never befriends good people, he does not follow the teaching of the Buddha." (Quoted by Dr. Wogiwara as the definition of the *Icchantika* given in the *Nirvana sutra* (the Kyōbunkwan edition of the Chinese Tripitaka, 羣 VII, 96a, 1.9.) As far as the pursuit of pleasure is concerned, the hedonist-Bodhisattva and the worldly sensuous hedonist belong to the same order as are classified in the *Lankāvatāra*.

all the roots of merit and do not enter into Nirvana. The second group is that of the Bodhisattva, who wishing to lead all beings to Nirvana denies himself this bliss. He vowed in the beginning of his religious career that until every one of his fellow-beings is led to enjoy the eternal happiness of Nirvana he himself would not leave this world of pain and suffering, but must strenuously and with every possible means (*upāya*) work towards the completion of his mission. But as there will be no termination of life as long as the universe continues to exist, the Bodhisattva may have no chance for ever to rest himself quietly with his work finished in the serenity of Nirvana. The time will come even to those evil speakers of the Bodhisattvayāna when through the power (*adhishṭhāna*) of the Buddhas they finally embrace the Mahayana and by amassing stock of merit enter into Nirvana, for the Buddhas are always working for the benefit of all beings no matter what they are. But as for the Bodhisattva he never enters into Nirvana as he has a deep insight into the nature of things which are already in Nirvana even as they are. (*Bodhisattvecchantiko 'tra mahāmate ādiparinirvṛitān-sarva-dharmān-viditva-atyantato na parinirvāti*).¹

Thus we know where the Bodhisattva stands in his never-ending task of leading all beings into the final abode of rest. So, says the sutra: "He will through his ten never-ending vows bring all beings to maturity, and, manifesting himself in various forms in response to the needs of all beings, will never know where to rest from his task; and yet his mind is always abiding in the state of self-realisation and in the enjoyment of perfect meditation."²

The Bodhisattva's Vows and His Effortless Works

According to his transcendental insight into the truth of things, the Bodhisattva knows that it is beyond all predicates and altogether not subject to any form of description, but his heart full of *Karuṇā* (love) for all beings who are unable to

¹ P. 66.

² P. 123: see also p. 214.

step out of the dualistic whirlpools of *sat* and *asat*, he directs his intense vows towards their salvation and emancipation. His own heart is free from such attachments as are ordinarily cherished by the unemancipated, but that which feels is here after all, his insight has not destroyed this, and hence his Pūrvapranidhāna, his Upāyakaushalya, his Nirmāṇa-kāya. Yet all that he does for the maturity (*paripācana*) of all beings in response to their needs, is like the lunar reflection in water (*jalacandravat*),¹ showing himself in all forms and appearances he preaches to them on the Dharma. His activity is what is in Mahayana phraseology called Anabhogacarya, deeds that are effortless, effectless, and purposeless, which correspond to the Christian love of God.

When the Bodhisattva enters upon the first stage called Joy, Pramuditā, in the career of his spiritual discipline, he makes the following solemn vows, Pranidhāna, ten in number, which, flowing out of his most earnest determined will, are as all-inclusive as the whole universe, extending to the extremity of space itself, reaching the end of time, exhausting all the number of kalpas (ages), and functioning uninterruptedly as long as there is the appearance of a Buddha. The first is to honour and serve all the Buddhas, one and all, without a single exception; the second is to work for the preservation and perpetuation of the teaching of all the Buddhas; the third is to be present at the appearance of each Buddha, wherever and whenever it may be; the fourth is to practise the proper conduct of Bodhisattvahood which is wide and measureless, imperishable and free from impurities, and to extend the virtues of perfection towards all beings; the fifth is to induce all beings in the most comprehensive sense of the term to the teaching of the Buddhas so that they will find their final abode of peace in the wisdom of the all-wise ones; the sixth is to have an inner perception of the universe, wide and inexhaustible, in all its possible multitudinousness; the seventh is to realise the most closely interpenetrating relationship of each and all, of all and each, and to make

¹ P. 227, p. 193, etc.

every land of beings as immaculate as a Buddha-land; the eighth is to be united with all the Bodhisattvas in oneness of intention, to get intimately acquainted with the dignity, understanding, and psychic condition of the Tathagatas, so that he can enter any society of beings and accomplish the Mahāyāna which is beyond thought; the ninth is to evolve the never-receding wheel whereby to carry out his work of universal salvation, by making himself like unto the great lord of medicine or the wish-fulfilling gem; and lastly, the tenth is to realise the great supreme enlightenment in all the worlds, by going through the stages of Buddhahood, and to gratify the wishes of all beings with one voice, and while showing himself to be in Nirvana, not to cease from practising objects of Bodhisattvahood.¹

These ten vows or prayers made by the Bodhisattva at the beginning of his spiritual career, that is, when he has entered upon the first stage of Bodhisattvahood or rather Buddhist life, called Pramuditā, do not quite describe the inner consciousness of the Bodhisattva in its deepest signification; for he has not yet entered a stage of Anabhoga-carya where all his conscious efforts are dropped and he moves about as the sun shines on the unjust as well as on the just, or as the moon in water. While a great compassionate heart (*mahākaruṇā*) is always the most powerful driving force throughout his spiritual progress, he may not attain to a higher stage unless his heart transcends dualism and his behaviour leaves no taint of discrimination (*vikalpa*). Up to the seventh stage (called *Dūramgama*) of Buddhist life, the Bodhisattva has not been free from the sense of making effort for the attainment of a certain definite object, he has so far always been conscious of strain and strenuousness, he has been making a definite attempt at accomplishing something, at bringing forth some tangible result as the outcome of

¹ This is a mere abstract. For details see the *Daśabhūmika-sūtra*, edited by J. Rahder, pp. 14-16. Also cf. the *Śikṣā-samuccaya*, translated into English by E. Bendall and H. W. D. Rouse, pp. 265-268. Quite interesting it is to compare the English version with the various Chinese translations of the *Daśabhūmika sūtra* as an independent text and also as one of the chapters in the *Avatamsaka sūtra*.

his labour. But he has now completed this part of his work, he has now graduated, so to speak, from an effortful life (*prayogicarya*), he is now on the way to a life of Anabhogacarya, where no efforts are made, no consciousness of strain is left though he is far from being a sleepy lithargic good-for-nothing fellow now.¹

So we read in the *Avatamsaka sūtra*, or in the *Daśabhūmika sūtra*,¹ that up to the seventh stage the Bodhisattva has been trying not to be affected or contaminated by a life of evil passions (*kleśa*), but has not yet been able to go beyond it (*samatikram*). He is like a great king who goes around riding on a fine elephant. He knows thus that there are many poverty-stricken people in his country, but he himself has no fear of getting mixed among these unhappy creatures. He is quite free indeed from such contamination, but he cannot be said to be a super-man who has passed beyond the frailty of a mortal being. He can attain to this transcendental state only by abandoning his kingly position and being born in the Brahman world, where, enveloped in the celestial light, he looks down at thousands of worlds and freely walks through them. The Bodhisattva, up to the seventh stage, has gone through the world riding in the carriage of the Pāramitās, virtues of perfection, and due to these virtues he has been kept away from the contamination of this world though he knows well that there are defiled lives enough here. But he cannot be called yet to be one who has gone altogether beyond evil passions and deeds following them. If, however, he abandons all his conscious strivings or purposeful efforts, that is, if he finally passes from the seventh to the eighth stage, and, riding in the Bodhisattva's carriage of immaculacy, walks through the world, free from contaminations, he is really the one who has altogether gone beyond.

When thus the Bodhisattva, discarding all effortful works (*sarvabhogavigata*), attains to the effortless state of consciousness, he enters upon the eighth stage known as Acala, the

¹ Cf. Rahder, p. 57.

² Cf. Rahder, p. 58.

Immovable. But we must remember that effortlessness is the outcome of intense efforts, and that when the former is not preceded by the latter, it will never be realised. Says the *Daśabhūmika*:¹ It is like a man who in a dream finds himself drowning in a river; he musters all his courage and is determined at all costs to get out of it. And because of these very efforts and desperate contrivances he is awakened from the dream, and when thus awakened he at once perceives that no further doings are needed now. So with the Bodhisattva: just because of the great determination and the great strivings that he has put forward in order to save all beings from getting drowned in the river of ignorance and confusion, he has at last reached the eighth stage, and once here all his conscious efforts are set aside, his perception is not obstructed by dualistic considerations, nor by appearances.

This effortlessness is again compared in the *Daśabhūmika*² to a great seafaring boat. When the boat is not yet at sea, much labour is needed to make it move forward. But as soon as it gets out in the ocean, no human power is required; just let alone and the wind will take care of it. One day's navigation thus left to itself at high sea will surely be more than equal to one hundred years' human belabouring while still on the shallows. When the Bodhisattva accumulating the great stock of good deeds sails out in the great ocean of Bodhisattvahood, one moment of his effortless activity infinitely surpasses deeds of conscious striving.

By these analogies, the reader will be able to form some idea as to the significance in Buddhism of a life of effortlessness. When the Bodhisattva reaches this stage of Buddhist life he is said to be standing on the stage of immovability (*acala*), for he has now realised Anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti. This is defined in the following terms in the *Daśabhūmika*³ showing where is the spiritual background of Anabhoga-carya, which is really the quintessence of Bodhisattvahood:

¹ Rahder, p. 64.

² Rahder, p. 67.

³ Rahder, p. 63 f.

“The Bodhisattva Vajragarbha said, O venerable sir, son of the Buddha, when the Bodhisattva, while at the seventh stage, has thoroughly finished examining what is meant by the knowledge of the means (*upāyañāna*), has well cleansed the paths, has accumulated all the preparatory material, has well equipped himself with the vows, and is sustained by the power of the Tathagatas, procuring in himself the power produced from the stock of merit, attentively thinking of and in conformity with the powers, convictions, and unique characteristics of the Tathagata, thoroughly purified, sincere in heart, and thoughtful, elevated in virtue, knowledge, and power, great in pity and compassion which leaves no sentient beings unnoticed, and in pursuit of the path of wisdom that is beyond measurement; and, further, when he enters, truly, as it is, upon the knowledge that all things are, in their nature, from the first, unborn (*anutpanna*), unproduced (*ajāta*), devoid of individualising marks (*alakṣaṇa*), have never been combined (*asambhūta*), are never dissolved (*avināśita*), nor extinguished (*anishṭhita*), nor changing (*apravṛtti*), nor ceasing (*anabhinivṛtti*), and are lacking in self-substance (*abhāvasvabhāva*); the knowledge that they remain the same in the beginning, in the middle, and in the end, are of suchness, non-discriminative, and entering into the knowledge of the all-knowing one, [and finally] when he thus enters upon the knowledge of all things as they really are, he gets himself completely free from such individualising ideas as are created by the mind (*citta*) and its agent (*manovijñāna*); he is as detached as the sky, and descends upon all objects as if upon an empty space; he is then said to have attained to the acceptance of all things as unborn (*anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti*).”

This may seem from the point of view of ordinary terminology almost too abstract, too metaphysical, but to those who are well acquainted with the Mahayanistic way of thinking and feeling, the definition of Anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti here quoted from the *Daśabhūmika* is exact and adequately describes the highest object of Buddhist life as far as this kind of phraseology allows. In the *Lankāvatāra*, the same ideas are more concretely expressed from another angle by means of an analogy.

though the sutra says that such analogies do not do justice to the true state of affairs. The truth as intuitively seen by the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas surpasses all symbolism and beyond the understanding of the ordinary mind, but when some indications are not given, the truth may forever be kept away from us, perhaps worse than that, will be vilified and denounced to our own spiritual ruination. The analogy has already¹ been quoted when Tathagatahood was compared to the sands of the Ganga.

There are some other important points in the *Lankāvatāra* to which I wish to refer if this paper were intended to exhaust the sutra even as one of the principal Mahayana texts, but my object has been from the start to treat it as most intimately connected with Zen Buddhism, and, therefore, as containing some of the most salient ideas of Zen. Therefore, I opened this article with an account of Pratyātmagatigocara which forms the central thesis of the *Lankāvatāra* and also the object of Zen discipline. No doubt, all the schools of Mahayana Buddhism (and for that matter the Hinayana too) aim at gaining an immediate personal insight into the essence of Buddhahood, but this aspect of Buddhist life I find more clearly and emphatically and straightforwardly brought out in the *Lankāvatāra* than any other sutras. But as all religion requires a philosophical background without which it limps, I have tried to show how the *Lankāvatāra* gives a logical and a psychological account of the inmost experience called throughout the sutra Pratyātmāryaj-ñānagocara. With this the theoretical side of Zen Buddhism finishes while its active side is to be developed if it has to bear fruit in this practical life. Hence towards the end of this paper I have tried to describe the disciplinary life of the Buddhist as presented in the sutra.

Buddhist nomenclature is frequently too intellectual and the Indians have their own peculiar way of presenting their ideas; and for this reason one is apt to regard the Mahayana as

¹ See page 241 et seq. of this magazine.

a philosophy too abstract and too high-flying and not at all religious; but the fact is that the Mahāyāna stands on two legs, Prajñā and Karuṇā, transcendental idealism and all-embracing affection for all kinds of beings, animate as well as inanimate. The former sees into the unity of things, and the latter the diversity. The Bodhisattva weeps with suffering beings and at the same time realises that there is one that never weeps, being above sufferings, tribulations, and contaminations. Buddhist life finds its perfect realisation in a harmonious blending of the two terms: philosophically, the one and the many, *sat* and *asat*; religiously the pure and the defiled. And this balancing is found in the Bodhisattva's Praṇidhāna or vow. "There are two worlds, the defiled and the immaculate, and between the two there is no way to cross from the one to the other, except by means of the Bodhisattva's great vow, knowledge of means (*upāya-prajñā*), and the power of psychic penetration."¹

DIASETZ TEITARO SUZUKI

¹ *The Daśabhūmika Sūtra*. Cf. Rahder, p. 58.

THE CHINESE TENDAI TEACHING.¹

INTRODUCTORY.

History and Literature.

When we discuss Tendai Buddhism, we must strictly distinguish between the Chinese Tendai school as founded by Chisha Daishi (智者大師) in the sixth century, and the Japanese Tendai school as founded by Dengyo Daishi (傳教大師) at the beginning of the ninth century. My present lecture concerns *Chinese Tendai teaching* or Tendai teaching proper.

To deal with Chinese and Japanese Tendai in one and the same short lecture, would be impracticable, the subject being too vast. But for your orientation I must tell you that the Chinese Tendai teaching is identical with the Tendai element in Japanese Tendai. Therefore, when we know Chinese Tendai we know at the same time the most important element in Japanese Tendai,—the element which has given its name to Dengyo's school. The other elements forming Japanese Tendai, namely the Shingon, Zen, Kai Ritsu, Nembutsu, Shōmyō, and Shinto elements do not prejudice the Tendai element proper in Japanese Tendai.

Now I begin the description of the Chinese Tendai school by giving you first a few data on its history and its literature.

The great Mahayana teacher, Nāgārjuna, who is believed to have lived in Southern India in the second or third century and is placed at the head of various Mahayana schools, is also regarded as the ancestor of the Tendai school. But the real originator and first patriarch was the Chinese priest Emon (慧文), in Chinese pronunciation Hwei-Wen or Hwui-Wen. We know very little about him, as he has not left any record behind. Still, so much is clear, that he lived in the early part of the sixth

¹ A lecture delivered at the German Embassy in Tokyo before the Asiatic Society under the presidency of the German Ambassador, Dr Solf.

century, his death year being 550(?), that he was a native of Northern China (Pe Tsi, the Northern Tsi Kingdom) and that he first discerned the great fundamental truth of Tendai teaching. He was like a Moses who could see the new country, but was not allowed to enter it.

The second ancestor of the Chinese Tendai school is Emon's disciple, Nangaku Eshi (慧思), in Chinese pronunciation, Hwui-Sz or Hwei-Si, of Nan-ngo or Nân-yo, of whom we know much more, as we still possess four works attributed to him. Namely: 1. The Text of Nangaku Eshi's Prayer; 2. The Samadhi-Teaching of Non-Discord (i.e., of the Perfect Amalgamation of All Dharmas); 3. The Dharma Gate (i.e. Teaching) of Mahayana Shi Kwan (i.e., of Tendai meditation); 4. The Meaning of the Anraku Practice, as stated in the Hokke Kyo (namely in its Anraku Chapter);¹ of which works the two first can be regarded as authentic.

Nangaku was a great master of meditation, and his outlook on Buddhism was so new and provoked such antagonism, that twice he was in danger of being assassinated by fanatical fellow-monks. He died in 577. His greatest disciple was Chi-ki (智顗) or Chisha Daishi (智者大師), by the Chinese called Chiche-ta-shi, or ChiK'ai or Ch'en Chi-k'ai or K'i,² the Great Sage of the Thien-thai mountains in Chekiang, also commonly called Tendai Daishi—The Great Teacher of Tendai.

He is the real founder of the Tendai school and of Tendai teaching which was systematised by him, Emon and Nangaku being only its predecessors. Chisha Daishi was born in 531 A.D. in the reign of Emperor Wu Ti, a few years after the death of Theodoric the Great and the execution of Boetius. He himself died a peaceful death in 597 when Pope Gregory the Great

¹ 1 立誓願文 (The Ryu Se Gwan Mon), in 1 fas., Nanjio, 1576; 2 無諍行門 (The Mu Jo Gyo Mon), in 2 fas., Nanjio, 1543; 3 大乘止觀法門 (The Dai Jo Shi Kwan Bo Mon), in 4 fas., Nanjio, 1542; 4 法華經安樂行義 (The Hokke Kyo An Raku Gyo Gi), in 1 fas., Nanjio, 1547.

² Chi-Kai or Chi Gai is the "Go" pronunciation (吳音), i.e. the pronunciation used by the Buddhist priests: Chi-Ki or Chi-Gi is the Han pronunciation (漢音), i.e. the pronunciation used by the Confucian literati.

was sending Christian evangelists to the Anglo-Saxons in England and when the archbishopric of Canterbury was being established. The century to which Chisha Daishi, the patriarch of Chinese Buddhism, belongs, is the same century which witnessed the activity of Saint Benedict, the patriarch of occidental monasticism, and the birth of Mohammed, which occurred 27 years before Chisha Daishi's death.

China at that time as to-day was full of anarchy and civil war, divided between a Northern and a Southern Dynasty. Chisha Daishi who was born in Southern China in the province of Ke (荊州), in the village of Kwa Yo (華容縣), saw as a boy the downfall of the Ryo Dynasty, that is, of the Southern Empire, and his mind became early impressed with the futility of earthly greatness and with the vanity of the pomp and splendour of kings. He migrated with his family to the city of Cho Sa (長沙), the capital of Honan.

At the age of eighteen years he became a Buddhist novice and at the age of twenty full priest. His genius soon became noticed by the leaders of Buddhism of that time and attracted the attention of the Imperial Court of Nanking. He was invited there and became the religious teacher of the crown prince. Two emperors were his protectors and intimate friends. But the atmosphere of the court was not to his liking, and he preferred to live far from the madding crowd on Rozan, famous as the seat of the White Lotus Society, or on Thien-thai mountains, the "Platform of Heaven," teaching those whose minds were entirely detached from worldly ambitions and sensual pleasures.

Chisha Daishi and Nangaku-Eshi were of course not the only great Tendai teachers. They had famous successors. I mention only three, each of them being a restorer of the Chinese Tendai school after periods of decadence, namely, Keikei Tannen (荊溪湛然), or Myoraku Daishi (妙樂大師, 711-782) in the eighth century; Chirei (智禮), or Shimei Daishi (四明大師, 960-1028) in the tenth century; and Chi Kyoku (智旭) or Gu Eki Daishi (藕益大師, 1599-1655) in the seventeenth century. But in the long history of the Chinese Tendai school, which altogether comprises about 1000 years Chisha Daishi is undoubtedly the

dominant figure, and therefore to-day we shall concentrate our interest on him.

He, like most great teachers in classical times, wrote very little himself, but his lectures were faithfully recorded by his great disciple, Shoan (章安), or Kwanjo Daishi (灌頂大師) in Chinese pronunciation called Kwanting.¹

Two groups of Chisha Daishi's works are considered specially important, namely the so-called "San Dai Bu" (三大部) or "Three Great Parts" and the "Go Sho Bu" (五小部) or "Five Small Parts." The Tendai San Dai Bu, or in Chinese pronunciation, Thien-thai-san-ta-pu, consists, as the name indicates, of three works, namely:

1. "Hokke Gen Gi" (妙法蓮華經玄義), or the "Profound Meaning of Hokke-Sutra," in 20 fasc., Nanjio 1534, a work, which aims at explaining the essence or the true principles of the Hokke Sutra, and is in fact a systematic description of all teachings by the Buddha, or a synthetic philosophy of all the systems of Buddhism, placing the Hokkekyo, the Saddharma Puṇḍarīka Sūtra, in the centre.
2. "Hokke Mon Gu" (妙法蓮華經文句), or "The Sentences and Phrases of Hokke Kyo," in 20 fasc., Nanjio 1536, a textual commentary on the Hokke Kyo, the famous Saddharma Puṇḍarīka Sutra, as it is called in Sanskrit.
3. "Maka Shi Kwan" (摩訶止觀), or the "Great Meditation," in 20 fas., Nanjio 1538, containing, besides many profound theoretical discussions, the practical teaching of Tendai. It is a contemplative method on a philosophical foundation, something much deeper than has ever been offered to the world by Zen Buddhism.

¹ The Shanghai Almanac of 1857 mentions 76 distinct works, all of which in the year 1027, were admitted into the Chinese Buddhist Canon, which is evidently a great exaggeration (cf. Beal, *A Catena of Buddhist Scriptures*, p. 244, 5). When we look up Nanjio's catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka, i.e. the catalogue of the Buddhist scriptures which form the Chinese Canon, we find 22 works by Chisha Daishi, which in the year 1024 (about four hundred years after the death of the master) were all declared canonical.

According to the usual reckoning none of these three works comprises 20 fasc., but only 10 fasc.¹ which makes these fundamental books appear a little less imposing. However, to these three works by Chisha Daishi the commentaries by Keikei Tannen, or Tsan Zan, as the Chinese call him, have to be added, namely:

1. "Hokke Gen Gi Shaku Sen" (法華玄義釋籤), or "Commentary on Hokke Gen Gi," Nanjio 1535;
2. "Hokke Mon Gu Ki" (法華文句記), or "Notes on Hokke Mon Gu," Nanjio 1537;
3. "Maka Shi Kwan Bu Gyo Den Ku Ketsu" (摩訶止觀輔行傳弘決) or "Open Teaching in the Form of a Commentary as an Aid to the Practice of the Great Meditation" (Maka Shi Kwan), Nanjio 1539.

These three commentaries are regarded as classical or canonical, like Chisha Daishi's text itself, and are in the Japanese editions, since the Genroku era, always combined with it, the "Hokke Mon Gu" edition comprising moreover the full text of the Hokke Sutra. Then the three works, text and commentary combined, amount, in the binding as used in Japan, to 20 fasc. for "Hokke Gen Gi"; to 30 fasc. for "Hokke Mon Gu"; and to 40 fasc. for "Maka Shi Kwan,"—the full "San Dai Bu" comprising 90 fasc. in all.

These three works must not be considered only as sectarian works. They are highly appreciated by all real scholars of Chinese and Japanese Buddhism without distinction of school and creed, as the study of them is undoubtedly the best way to gain a comprehensive view of the immense realm of Buddhism and to reach the real bottom of the metaphysical problems involved in Buddhism. These scholars acknowledge that the metaphysics of Buddhism have their solid foundation in Tendai teaching, and that Tendai teaching has made Buddhist metaphysics comprehensive of all Buddhist thought,—a fact which easily suggests the special importance attached to this teaching.

¹ Nanjio's Tripitaka Catalogue evidently divides every fas. into two parts: A and B.

Besides the "San Dai Bu" or "Three Great Parts" we have, as already stated, the "Go Sho Bu," or "Five Small Parts." They comprise:

1. The "Kwanzeon Kyo Gen Gi" (觀世音經玄義), or "The Profound Meaning of the Kwannon Chapter of the Hokke Sutra," in 2 fasc., Nanjio 1555;
2. The "Kwanzeon Kyo Sho" (觀世音經疏), or "Explanation of the Meaning of the Kwannon Chapter," which is a textual commentary on the same chapter of the Hokke Sutra, in 2 fasc., Nanjio 1557;
3. The "Konkomyo Kyo Gen Gi" (金光明經玄義), or "The Profound Meaning of the Konkomyo Sutra," Sanskr. *Suvarṇa-Prābhāsa-Sūtra*, in 2 fasc., Nanjio 1548;
4. The "Konkomyo Kyo Sho" (金光明經疏), a textual commentary on the Konkomyo Sūtra, in 6 fasc., Nanjio 1552;
5. The "Kwan Mu Ryo Ju Kyo Sho" (觀無量壽經疏), a commentary on the Amitâyurdhyāna Sutra, in 1 fasc., Nanjio 1559.

This last work is from the standpoint of modern criticism, probably not by Chisha Daishi. It would be more correct to exclude it from the "Go Sho Bu" and to insert, instead of it, the very important commentary on the "Yuima Kyo" or "Vimalakīrti Sutra."

Strange to say, this famous work, of which there exist three different editions is in Nanjio's catalogue of the Chinese Tripitaka omitted from the 22 canonical works by Chisha Daishi, although there cannot be the slightest doubt of its authenticity. As this instance shows, there are among Chisha Daishi's works, as enumerated in Nanjio's catalogue some doubtful and even certainly false books, and on the other hand very important genuine works are omitted,—reason enough, not to rely exclusively on this list of Chisha Daishi's books.

Now it may not be quite useless for the proper understanding of the place which Chisha Daishi occupies in the history of Buddhism to keep in mind the following elementary facts. When Chisha Daishi evolved his grandiose system and made

himself the leader of a new school, China was already imbued with the philosophical teachings of the two Hinayana schools, namely the Abhidharma Sarvastivāda school, which in China was called the Bidon school, and the Satyasiddhi or Jojitsu school. The Ritsu or Vinaya school, which has given to Buddhism its moral code, of course had already greatly influenced Chinese Buddhism, which at the time when Chisha Daishi appeared on the scene, was already 550 years old: but the great Dosen or Nanzan Daishi, who interpreted the Hinayana code of morality in the Mahayana spirit, was not yet born, when Chisha Daishi died. As to the two Indian Mahayana schools,—the Madhyamika school and the Yogacarya school they find their Chinese expression in the Sanron school and in the Hosso school. The founder of the Sanron school, the great Kajo Daishi, was a contemporary of Chisha Daishi and probably personally known to him: but the great Genjo Sanzo, or Hsiuen Tsang, the founder of Hosso had like Nanzan Daishi not yet appeared, and the same is to be said of Genju Daishi, the great systematiser of the Keron school. In Chisha Daishi's time we have the Jiron Sect, which later on developed into the Keron Sect, and the Shoron Sect, Jiron and Shoron being both derived from Asangha's Yogacarya school, but not yet any Hosso Sect, which also is a branch of the Yogacarya school. The Nirvana school, based on the Mahayana "Mahā-Parinirvāṇa sutra" had, in Chisha Daishi's time, evidently already lost its independent existence. But Zen Mysticism was already powerfully entrenched in China, and the same is to be said of the Jodo or Pure Land teaching, which, however, had not yet developed any definite school—the Jodo and the Nembutsu schools, like the Shingon or Tantric school, belonging to a much later time.

THE RELIGION OF TENDAI.

We turn now to the discussion of Tendai teaching. Tendai teaching being a religion as well as a philosophy, we first deal with the religion of Tendai.

The Tendai school from a religious point of view, is based

on sutras, that means on the words attributed to Buddha himself as contained in the holy and canonical texts of Buddhism. The Tendai school highly respects all sutras and rejects none. But it has a special veneration for two sutras, the "Saddharma-Pundarika Sūtra," or "The Lotus of the True Teaching," and the "Mahā-Pari-Nirvāṇa Sūtra" or "Book of the Great Decease,"—the first called in Japanese "Myō Ho Ren Ge Kyo," or more shortly "Hokke Kyo," and the second "Dai Nehan Gyo," or as abbreviated "Dai Kyo," the "Great Sutra."

Of the Hokke Kyo we still possess the Sanskrit text which already has been translated twice into a European language: once into French by Burnouf and another time into English by Kern. Besides the Sanskrit text there exist three old Chinese translations, of which the one made by Kumārajīva (of the latter Tshin Dynasty, 384-417), is even more famous than the Sanskrit original,—at any rate in the East. The Tendai school, like the Nichiren sect, is based on this translation by Kumārajīva. It shows considerable differences from the Sanskrit text and unfortunately no translation of it into any European language has yet been published.

The Hokke Kyo in the translation by Kumārajīva (Nanjio 134) comprises eight volumes. Chisha Daishi further combined with it two other sutras, each comprising one vol., namely the "Mu Ryo Gi Kyo" or "Amitārtha Sūtra" (Nanjio 133) and the "Fugen Kwan Gyo" or "Samantabhadra Bodhisattva Dhyana Sutra" (Nanjio 394) which form, so to say, the prologue and the epilogue of the Hokke Kyo itself. This enlarged work is the Hokke Kyo in ten vol., on which the faith of the Chinese and Japanese Tendai sects and that of the Nichiren sect is based.

To the Hokke Kyo, the most popular of all Buddhist texts used in China and Japan, the name "The Lotus Evangel" has been attached by certain foreigners, who have become familiar with it. Arthur Lloyd used to compare it even with St. John's Gospel. I shall not stress the point. But the meaning of the comparison will appear when I recall to your mind, that the Sakyamuni of the Hokke Kyo is no more the itinerant preacher in flesh and blood, who for fifty years walked through the

fields of India, but a being, divested of all historical individuality and identified with the cosmic principle, with the Truth itself. This Sakyamuni of the Hokke Kyo is no Buddha of physical body, but the Buddha of original enlightenment from all eternity. He did not die in past time, nor will he be born in the future. He is one and the same with those whom he enlightens. His mind contains all phenomena in time and space. His essence is oneness, and there is nothing besides him. Therefore, the present world is Buddha's world, the present human body is Buddha's body, the passions are enlightenment.

The clouds of ignorance and worldly desires, which cover our mind, have only to be dispelled, and enlightenment will appear immediately as Buddha's enlightenment is hiding in our mind. So, we and all living beings are already Buddha, but in a latent state; we could never become *de facto* Buddha, if Buddhahood were not already in us. This great teaching of the Hokke Kyo that every being possesses Buddhahood and will become real Buddha, involves the principle that there is only one truth, or, to speak in the language of the Hokke Kyo, that there is only one vehicle, namely the Buddha Vehicle, and not three distinct Vehicles,—the so-called Śravaka-, Pratyeka-Buddha- and Bodhisattva-Vehicles. As these three Vehicles are one, so is all mankind only one,—all man, even all living beings forming a universal community of reciprocal participation, a mutual partnership. Our misery, the misery of nations and states, is caused by being blind to this fundamental oneness, and our highest duty consists in striving zealously, with all our might, to realise this oneness.

With this teaching of the Hokke Kyo, for which already Emon, the first patriarch of Tendai teaching, is said to have shown a special predilection, the Tendai school combines the teaching of the "Nehan Gyo" or "Mahā-Pari-Nirvāṇa Sutra" (Nanjio 113, 114), a Mahayana text, which must not be confounded with the Hinayana text of the same name. In this Sutra, very similar in spirit to the Hokke Kyo, and delivered when Buddha laid himself down for the last rest between the twin Sala trees—a most positive interpretation is given to the

idea of Nirvana, which for a long time, was only negatively, or we may perhaps better say, quite colourlessly, conceived by Buddhism. Nirvana, in this Sutra, is identified with Bodhi, with the highest enlightenment itself, or what comes to the same thing, with Buddhahood. It is no longer unqualified deliverance from Samsara, the stream of becoming and decaying: it is still less 'annihilation,' but a positive state, which possesses four virtues, namely, Eternity, Supreme Happiness, Self-Existence, and Purity, or to use the Japanese terms: Jo, Raku, Ga, and Jo (常樂我淨). Of these four terms,—which stand in clear contradistinction to the terms Temporariness, Agony, Non-Ego, and Impurity, characterising all things worldly according to the teaching of Hinayana—the term Ga, or Ego, is of special interest. Hinayana Buddhism, like Mahayana Buddhism, denies most emphatically the existence of any individual self or Atman. The Anatman theory, the theory that man has no permanent individuality whatever, but is only a bundle of five bodily and mental aggregates which dissolve after death,—this theory is indeed the corner-stone of Buddhist philosophy. But here we find acknowledged an Ego, Ga (我), which, distinct from and in juxtaposition to the ordinary Ego, is called the True Ego (Shin Ga 真我), or the Great Ego (Dai Ga 大我), and is identified with Buddha, the cosmic truth. For the first time we hear of a "true" Ego in Buddhism in connexion with the Vatsiputriya school, the so-called heretical school of Buddhism, which in spite of being a Hinayana school maintained the existence of a self, different from the ordinary self and not perishing at death, but transmigrating. But the true ego of the Vatsiputriya school and of the four schools derived from it was after all a phenomenological entity, while the true ego of the Mahā-Parinirvāṇa Sutra is a metaphysical entity.

The Buddha of the Nehan and the Hokke Kyo is Sakya-muni. The Tendai school, however, does not believe only in Sakyamuni: its great founder, Chisha Daishi, was an earnest worshipper of Amida too, and prayed on his death-bed to be reborn in the Western Paradise, the Pure Land of Amitābha. And when we look at the Tendai theory of the three Buddha-

bodies or Tri-Kāya, we find Sakyamuni identified with the body of change or Nirmāṇa-Kāya, Loshana identified with the body of bliss or Sambhoga-Kāya and Vairoshana identified with the body of law or Dharma-Kāya. But that by no means proves that Tendai teaching is a polytheistic teaching, as Sakyamuni, Loshana, Vairoshana and Amida are only so many names for one and the same universal principle, regarded from different points of view.

The conviction of the unity of the whole universe and of all living beings is for a true Tendai believer, not a cold abstract theory, but a deep religious conviction. It pervaded the whole personality of Chisha Daishi and impressed it with a wonderful sweetness. You all remember St. Francis of Assisi preaching to the birds. Chisha Daishi preached to the fishes, and he not only preached to them, but delivered them from the avarice and cruelty of men by buying up the fishing-rights from the fishermen on the sea-shore near Tientai-mountains in Tchekiang, where the monastery of the Tendai sect was erected. The fishes in the vicinity of this monastery could now live in peace, and their comrades in the ponds of other Buddhist sanctuaries profited from this example. Still to-day you can see how on Itsukushima Island in Lake Biwa fishes are daily set free into the lake; in other temple grounds we see large fish ponds, where the inmates live unmolested and happy, blessed by the spirit of Chisha Daishi.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF TENDAI.

Several Characteristics and Main Divisions.

We now turn to the philosophy of the Tendai school.

The first question, which arises here, is: Have we any right at all to speak of a Tendai philosophy? Tendai teaching, as we have first seen, is based on Buddhist books. Therefore, it is certainly not *voraussetzungslos*, free of all premises. But learned men tell us that philosophy, in order to be philosophy, must be *voraussetzungslos*, free of all premises. At any rate, that was the current opinion among scholars during the last

generation, who made a watertight distinction between belief and knowledge, between *Glauben* and *Wissen*; considering the one as the domain of religion, the other as the domain of philosophy.

In return, we may be permitted to point out that a least one premise is common to all philosophers and shared even by the most extreme agnostics: namely, the supposition that knowledge, having an objective value, is attainable, as without such supposition any striving after truth would be absurd. Therefore, philosophy without any presupposition does not exist. Moreover, this watertight distinction between religion and philosophy does not seem the fashion any more amongst present-day philosophers. To give only one instance: A well-known and very liberal-minded professor from the University of Gieszen, Dr. August Messer, in an excellent little hand-book, called *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart* (Present Time Philosophy)—divides his subject into three parts:

1. Religious-ecclesiastical philosophy, subdivided into Roman Catholic philosophy and Protestant philosophy;
2. Rationalist or scientific philosophy;
3. Irrationalist philosophy or the philosophy of sentiment, intuition and action.

Now if we are allowed to speak of Christian philosophy, we are certainly fully entitled to speak of Buddhist philosophy and especially of Tendai philosophy. Chisha Daishi, the supreme master of it, may be reckoned amongst philosophers at his face-value if we do not limit the term philosophy to rationalist and scientific philosophy only.

To this worldly wisdom Chisha Daishi of course was opposed, as Buddha was opposed to the sixty-two teachings of the Indian philosophers. Chisha Daishi also quite naturally considered Buddhism as the highest teaching, much higher than any wisdom of the "Ge Do" or Heretics, because with him Buddha's teaching was the only wisdom, which brought salvation, the only *Heilswahrheit*.

But—and this point is of special importance: in spite of taking his stand on the holy texts of Buddhism, the founder

of the Tendai school was no blind believer in their words or in any former interpretation given to these words.

He used first to form his own opinions independently; then, after having formed them he used to look for some Sutra or Sastra text which was able to serve as authority for his opinion, and he was satisfied even if the text had merely a remote resemblance to his opinions. In any case his opinion comes first and the text afterwards. Logical reasoning, dialectic argumentation and meditative intuition, which according to the orthodox view, must only be secondary expedients to enlighten the meaning of the text,—they take the front-rank and modify text-sentences until they fit in with Chisha Daishi's system.

So it happens, that Chisha Daishi's philosophy can be considered rather as an original philosophical system, dressed in the cloak of Buddhism, than as a system, which renouncing all independent thinking, blindly tries to conform to tradition or to any established ecclesiastical authority. To make things clear by a comparison: The Vedanta system stands, as the name indicates, on the Veda, but it is nevertheless considered as a truly philosophical system, freely evolved by independent thought.


In the same way the Tendai teaching, in spite of being based on Buddhism, is in its essence an original creation, pervaded by the thought of a philosophical genius.

The philosophy of Chisha Daishi can be considered from three points of view, in so far as it is:

1. A synthesis of the whole Buddhist teaching;
2. Pure theory or metaphysics;
3. A practical teaching.

This threefold division is not Chisha Daishi's own classification, whose books have no index and are not in any way arranged in a systematical order as it is the fashion with the books-written by our modern scholars. But the division I adopt follows naturally from any deeper study of Chisha Daishi's philosophy and is certainly the most convenient one for a comprehensive survey of the Tendai teaching.

TABLE I

THE FIVE PERIODS AND THE EIGHT TEACHINGS (*Goji Hakkyo* 五時八教)

I. THE SYNTHESIS OF THE WHOLE BUDDHIST TEACHING.¹

We will speak first of the synthesis of the whole Buddhist teaching. This synthesis itself is threefold, namely:

1. According to the time when the different Sutras were preached by Buddha;
2. According to the methods used by Buddha in preaching;
3. According to the principles taught by Buddha.

The term used by Chisha Daishi to denote this threefold synthesis, is Go-Ji Hak-kyo (五時八教), i.e. "The Five Periods and the Eight Teachings." By the Five Periods he understands the synthesis according to time; by the Eight Teachings he understands the synthesis according to methods and principles, each of these two latter synthetical doctrines consisting of four distinct teachings.

The Five Periods.

The Five Periods are:

1. The period, in which Buddha preached the "Kegon Kyo," 華嚴經 or Avatamsaka Sutra, one of the most famous Mahayana texts.
2. The period, in which Buddha preached "Agon Kyo," 阿含經 or the four Āgamas and other Sutras of the Hinayana;
3. The period, in which Buddha preached the "Hōdō Kyo," 方等經 or Mahā-Vaipulya Sutras, which name comprises a great many different Mahayana Sutras;
4. The period, in which Buddha preached the "Dai Hannyo Kyo" 大般若經 or Maha Prajñā-Pāramitā Sutras, also of Mahayana character;
5. The period, in which Buddha preached the "Hokke and Nehan Kyo" 法華涅槃經 or the Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka Sutra and the Mahā-Parinirvāṇa Sutra of the Mahayana Canon.

¹ In order to facilitate the understanding of the Tendai system, three tables have been prepared. For this part, see Table I.

Let us consider these five periods more closely to understand what meaning Chisha Daishi connects with each of them.

According to the founder of the Tendai school, after Buddha had reached complete enlightenment, sitting under the tree of enlightenment, he remained for some time in a state of beatitude, enjoying his newly-gained knowledge. Then still in an ecstatic frame of mind, he preached the Kegon Kyo or Avatamsaka Sutra which contained the full truth, which Buddha had gained after his struggle with Mara, the demon of darkness. This sutra Buddha preached in nine meetings and in seven different places without moving from his place of quiet meditation under the tree of enlightenment, to innumerable Bodhisattvas, gods and human beings. But only the beings of highest intellectual capacity, namely the Bodhisattvas, could understand this sutra, which is a teaching of pantheistic idealism, to the effect that the mind, Buddha, and all living beings have the same nature as the absolute spirit, the *Weltseele*, which is poured through the universe, the whole world being nothing else than a revelation of the absolute spirit. Of this great teaching the audience of lower capacity could not understand even a word, and without asking questions, they ran away upset and disconcerted as if they had been knocked on the head.

After Buddha had convinced himself in this way that human beings and those lower than human beings, were not ripe for the deepest Mahayana truth, he started to preach the Hinayana sutras, which conformed to the understanding of common mankind. The truth, which Buddha was now preaching, was not the full truth, but the accommodated truth, containing the elementary principles of Buddhism,—namely the so-called Four Noble Truths, The Eightfold Path and the Twelffold Chain of Causation. This doctrine was contained in the many Agama Sutras, preached in the second period, and could be understood by the beings of lower capacity. Not only kings and princes, warriors and merchants, peasants and labourers, but also dragons and snakes, Yakshas and Demons came in crowds to listen to this teaching, and soon the followers of the Enlightened One amounted to many thousands.

Buddha now became aware that he could risk advancing one step further. He suggested to his audience, that the sutras, which had been preached by him in the Deer Park and in other places, made famous by the Pali Canon, did not contain the last word which he had to say, but that beyond the range of ideas involved in the Agama Sutras, there was a higher truth, to which one had to penetrate in order to gain real enlightenment and deliverance. This higher truth was the Mahayana teaching. The Buddha, however, very wisely refrained from preaching the Mahayana truth once more in its whole fullness, as he had done in the so-called Keron Period, but stated only the general character of the Mahayana truth: namely, that far higher than the ideal of the Arhat, who was striving for his own salvation, there is the ideal of the Bodhisattva, who first strives for the salvation of others and only in the second instance thinks of his own salvation. In this period Buddha compares the Hinayana and Mahayana doctrines, and by pointing out the superiority of Mahayana, endeavours to break the self-satisfaction and pride of the believer in Arhatship. This period is the so-called Hōdō (方等) or Vaipulya Period—a name which indicates that the teaching of this period is a “right,” “broad” and “equal” teaching: “right” teaching meaning a teaching of absolute truth and absolute love, “broad” teaching meaning a universal teaching, and “equal” teaching meaning a teaching of the sameness of Buddha and men, of the Absolute and the Relative, of the Noumenon and the Phenomena.

In the following period, the fourth, the Buddha attacks very abstract and metaphysical problems. He asks: “What is the nature of the absolute?” which was taught in the third period, and he answers: The absolute is free from all attributes and is unconditioned; it cannot be defined, because it surpasses all human conceptions; it is the “void” or “*sūnyatā*.” This teaching which, very wrongly, has been characterised by European scholars as a teaching of absolute Nihilism, belongs to the so-called half-developed or provisional Mahayana doctrine and is contained in the Mahā-Prajñā-Pāramitā Sūtra or Dai-Hannya-Kyo, which in Hsiuen Tsang’s Chinese translation comprises not

less than 600 volumes. It maintains that, from an absolute point of view, there are no opposites, and that all distinctions are only conventional distinctions made by our imperfect apparatus for thinking. They are, to speak in Kantian style, only *Anschauungsformen*, peculiar ways of looking at the world, which are inborn in us, but have no objective reality. Therefore, opposites like Subject and Object, Ignorance and Enlightenment, Samsara and Nirvana, Mara and Buddha, are only artificial constructions, the distinction between Hinayana and Mahayana being likewise only a conventional one. In the third or Hodo period, the difference between Hinayana and Mahayana had been pointed out by Buddha. As now, in this Hannya period, the unity underlying Hinayana and Mahayana doctrines is shown by him, it is clear that the Hannya teaching means an advance beyond the Hodo teaching. This advance was moreover of a very practical purport, as hitherto many Buddhist believers had considered Mahayana as an ideal which was far too high for their own limited talent and only suitable for superhuman beings. These timid believers, by learning the truth of the relativity of contrasts, gained sufficient courage to identify themselves with the so-called Mahayana teaching.

The negative formulation of the absolute, preached in the fourth period, was replaced by a positive formulation in the fifth and last period, which began only after Buddha had already spent forty years in preaching. In the Hannya Period, Buddha had stated the absolute non-existence of contrasts; in the Hokke and Nehan Period, he stated the absolute identity of contrasts. In the first period, the Kegon Period, this teaching of identity had already been anticipated by Buddha. In the Kegon Sutra, however, he formulated it as pantheistic idealism; in the Hokke and Nehan Sutra he formulated it as pantheistic realism. From the point of view of the fifth period, the teachings of the former three periods are only preparatory teachings or "hoben," i.e. artifices. True reality or "shin jitsu" is the teaching of the fifth period only. But in the last instance there is no difference between the preparatory teachings and the true teaching, between "hoben" and "shin jitsu": when we open

"hoben," there appears "shin jitsu," as the kernel of a nut appears, as soon as we open its shell.

To these five periods, which I have just described, definite terms of years have been allocated by Chisha Daishi, so that the fifty years of Shaka's teaching are just covered by these five periods. According to this arrangement, the Keron period comprises three weeks, the Agon period twelve years, the Hodo and Hannya period together thirty years, the Hokke period eight years, and the Nehan period one day and one night.

Later Tendai teachers elaborated this time-table still further and assigned a special term for the Hodo, and a special term for the Hannya period, some of them limiting the Hodo period to sixteen and the Hannya period to fourteen years, others limiting the Hodo period to eight or ten years and the Hannya period to twenty-two or twenty years.

This whole time-table is not an arbitrary invention, but follows directly or indirectly from different sutra texts. What Chisha Daishi himself thought of it, becomes clear from his statement that the limitation of the five periods by years must be understood not only in its common meaning, but also in its mystical meaning. Therefore, when Chisha Daishi, adopting the "Muryo Gi Kyo" statement, says that more than forty years passed before Sakyamuni began to teach the true teaching, namely the Hokke Sutra, we are quite at liberty to interpret these forty years as four hundred years.

That would mean that Shaka preached the Hokke Sutra several hundred years after his death, an idea impossible to the ordinary mind, but not impossible to the Mahayana believer, who considers that Shaka's death, as he distinctly says himself in the "Nehan Gyo," was only an artifice or *hoben*,—that Shaka really did not die, but continued to preach through the mouth of inspired speakers and writers,—that he preached in fact as long as the output of fundamental Mahayana texts lasted.

If we make allowance for the mystical interpretation, we can also find an intelligent meaning in the arrangement which places the Keron Sutra, one of the latest Mahayana Sutras, at the beginning of the five periods and before the Hinayana

sutras. But time forbids to enter into the discussion of such niceties.

The Four Methods.

We turn now to a description of the second part of Chisha Daishi's system, from which we shall see how the founder of the Tendai School systematised the whole of Buddhism according to the methods, which had been used by Buddha in preaching. These methods or styles of teachings are four, and they are called:

1. Ton-kyo (頓教), or the sudden teaching (*tun* in Chinese);
2. Zen-kyo (漸教), or the gradual teaching (*tsien*);
3. Himitsu-kyo (秘密教), or the secret teaching (*pi-mi*);
4. Fujō-kyo (不定教), or the undetermined teaching (*pu-ting*).¹

1. The sudden method means the method which refrains from all preparatory instruction and is suitable only for beings of highest ability, who can immediately grasp the truth. It was the method adopted by Buddha in preaching the Kegon Kyo or Avatamasaka Sutra.

2. The gradual method, or the method which advances step by step, intends to lead men of mediocre ability gradually up from Hinayana to Mahayana; it is of a threefold kind, being subdivided into beginning, middle, and end. The "beginning" of this gradual instruction coincides with the Agon—or Hinayana period; the "middle" with the Hodo—or Vaipulya period; the "end" with the Dai Hannya—or Mahā-Prajñā-Paramitā period. The Hokke and Nehan teaching which is identical with the highest Mahayana teaching, is neither sudden nor gradual, but is beyond all methods, as this teaching represents the ultimate object of Buddha and is therefore exempt from all "artifices" or "hōben."

¹ Edkins translates "ton" by "compliant," but it clearly means "sudden" or "abrupt" (cf. Edkins' "Chinese Buddhism" p. 182.) For "undetermined," "fu jo," Edkins uses the term "indeterminate," which evidently comes to the same thing.

3. The secret method does not of course mean Tantric method, as Tantrism was entirely unknown to Chisha Daishi. By secret method he understood the method which Buddha uses, when he speaks secretly to somebody, and when he can only be properly understood by the individual to whom he addresses himself. The "secret" or "himitsu" method in Tendai Daishi's system is explained by the phrase: "The hearers and the teaching are both unknown,"—i.e. the hearers do not know each other, and the teaching is not known to all hearers in common, but only to every hearer individually.

4. The "undetermined method," or "fu-jō kyō," on the other hand, is explained by the phrase: "The hearers are known, but not the teaching,"—i.e. the teaching, as in the case of "himitsu-kyō", is only known to each individually, according to everybody's individual understanding, but the hearers know each other's faces and forms, while in "himitsu kyo" they do not know each other.

These two methods, the secret and the undetermined, were used when Buddha had to teach beings of different intellectual capacity and of different degrees of spiritual perfection at one and the same time,—when he had to instruct very mixed audiences composed not only of ordinary men, but of beings belonging to the ten different worlds which are inhabited by human beings, Devas, Nagas and Dragon Kings, by Hungry Ghosts and Fighting Demons, etc. These different beings, forming one and the same audience, needed different teachings, and in order that Buddha could speak to everybody separately, he isolated the hearers,—the "undetermined" method forming as it were a single isolation, while the "secret" method can be regarded as a double isolation.

These two methods presuppose an almighty Buddha who has the supernatural power of concealing men from each other or to make them known to each other,—a Buddha who does not speak with one voice only, as he does in preaching the Hokke Kyo, but who is able, whenever it pleases him, to speak with so and so many voices at one and the same time, addressing every hearer individually and conforming his speech to everybody's

requirements,—a Buddha, who does not speak at a given moment in one place only, but at the same moment in innumerable places, or who is quiet in one place and speaks in innumerable other places, or who is quiet in innumerable other places and speaks in one place,—a Buddha who does not teach in our small limited world only, but in the whole universe.

When he uses the secret or undetermined method, the Buddha teaches, as we said, different teachings at one and the same time. He may preach at a given moment one single sutra, as he did in history, and then this one sutra will imply so and so many meanings to the hearers of different understanding according to each one's capacity. Or he may preach many different sutras simultaneously, adapting each text to such hearer as can understand it.

To some hearer he may preach the Kegon Sutra, to others the Agon, Hodo or Hannya Sutras, according to each one's need. But the Hokke and Nehan Sutras are entirely left aside, when the Buddha uses these methods. That means to say that the secret and undetermined methods, like the sudden and gradual ones, are only concerned with "hōben" (Sanskrit, *Upāya*), i.e. with skilful device, but not with the highest and true teaching,—they have to do only with the means to the end, but not with the end itself.

Like the gradual method, the secret and undetermined methods explain away all seeming contradictions in Buddha's teaching. Some former Buddhist metaphysicians had maintained the theory, that these seeming contradictions were merely different ways of understanding the Buddha, who speaks with one voice only and does not use various preachings. Chisha Daishi rejects this theory. He boldly acknowledges that Buddha purposely speaks with many voices, but that these many voices at last are harmonised into one voice in the Hokke and Nehan period.

According to this view, as maintained by Chisha Daishi, the differences in Buddha's teaching are not to be ascribed to the different interpretations by the hearers, but to Buddha's own intention, who by his wonderful power at one and the same

time communicates quite different meanings to different hearers, when speaking to a mixed audience.

The voice, physically considered, may be the same. But what this voice expresses and carries to the mind and heart of every hearer, can be very different. So, in his "hōben" teaching Buddha speaks at one and the same moment many different languages in various degrees of profoundness, and it is not to be considered as an effect of their own perversion, when the hearers understand him differently; but, on the contrary, the hearers understand Buddha differently, because Buddha speaks at one and the same time to every one differently, exactly as everyone can understand him. When Buddha conceals from each other the individuals forming his audience, as he does in using the "secret" method, his intention is to put everybody at ease, to avoid making anybody in the audience feeling ashamed, because the Buddha preaches to him a teaching which is inferior when compared with the teaching addressed to other hearers. A school-boy of an elementary or middle school (corresponding to the men of the two Vehicles, namely to the Śrāvakas and Pratyeka-Buddhas) would not like to be taught together with university students (corresponding to the Mahayana Bodhisattvas), he would prefer to be taught, when the other hearers, who receive the higher teaching and who might laugh at the ignorance of a mere beginner in scholarship, are not present. Therefore, the Buddha skilfully arranges it, that nobody knows and sees each other.

In other cases, the Buddha finds it more convenient and considers it the best way, to work out the salvation of everybody, by addressing his different teachings to an audience in which everybody knows each other, and then he uses the "undetermined" method.

This "undetermined" method is meant, when the Buddha speaks of his style of preaching in the following words: "On a certain happy day Krishna wedded all virgins at the same time, appearing to eachone of them as her husband. Sixteen thousand and one hundred was the number of his wives and in as many individual shapes the god embodied himself, so that every

girl believed: 'I alone have been selected by the Lord.' When I, (so continued the Bhagavat), preach the doctrine and in front of me is sitting a congregation of several hundreds of monks and nuns and of male and female lay-believers, listening to me, then everyone of all these hearers thinks: 'Only for me the ascetic Gautama has preached the teaching.' Because on the individual mind of every seeker of peace I direct the strength of my spirit, tranquillise it, harmonise it, and adjust it. So I am always acting and in this way I adopt the sixteen thousand and one hundred-fold bridegroom-position of Krishna—by spiritualising it, ennobling it, and perfecting it.¹

The teaching of methods qualifies the teaching of periods. It goes without saying that a definite order of sermons is only applicable, when the preacher sticks to a definite method (*jō*), and that any definite arrangement of the sermons becomes impossible when the preacher follows an indefinite method (*fu-jō*). So the five period-classification only holds good in the case of "jō," while it cannot be maintained in the case of "fu-jō."

As long as Buddha's preaching falls in with the five period classification he is limiting his freedom by adhering to one pre-conceived plan, to which he subordinates his work of salvation. But he is not bound to follow always this periodical order. He may reject it and resume his entire freedom of action and preach in a quite undetermined way. That he does when he preaches to the ten worlds, in which an immense variety of conditions exist, and to which no definite plan is applicable.

The "open" teaching (i.e. when the hearers are known to each other) and the "secret" teaching (i.e. when the hearers are not known to each other) may both be considered as determined or underdetermined. Consequently we have:

1. The open and determined teaching, namely, "ton" and "zen";
2. The open and undetermined teaching, namely, "fu-jō";
3. The secret and determined teaching, which, however, is illogical, and therefore, does not find any room in Buddha's preaching;

¹ Quoted from Karl Gjellerup: *Der Pilger Kamanita*, pp. 247, 248.

4. The secret and undetermined teaching, namely, "himi-tsu."

The Four Principles.

The most original part of Chisha Daishi's threefold system is undoubtedly his doctrine of principles (化法), to which we now direct our attention. The five-period classification is after all only an improvement on classifications made before Chisha Daishi by Indian and Chinese scholars, and the classification according to methods is also based on foundations laid in former times. But in this classification according to principles, Chisha Daishi is entirely original.

Moreover, this classification according to principles is the most important of the three, as it pervades the whole theoretical and practical teaching of Chisha Daishi. It is, like the doctrine of methods, a fourfold classification, summarised in four fundamental terms:

1. Zō-kyo (藏教 *tsang-chiao*), or the Tripitaka teaching;
2. Tsū-kyo (通教 *t'ung*), or the common teaching;
3. Betsu-kyo (別教 *pieh*), or the special teaching;
4. En-kyo (圓教 *yuan*), or the perfect teaching.¹

"Zō-kyo" or "Tripitaka" teaching, means the Hinayana

1 "Zō" means literally "store" or "collection," i.e. collection of books (Sanskrit, *Piṭaka*), namely, the Hinayana Tripiṭaka,—not "the variously catalogued phenomena, which occupy the disciple in the early stages of his progress," as Eliot supposes. "Tsū" means "passing through," namely, from Hinayana to Mahayana; still we would not like to use as an equivalent the term, "progress," as Edkins does, or to adopt the terms "transition" or "communication," which Eliot proposes in addition to the term "progress"; we prefer instead the term "common," which seems to us to express best here the inner meaning of the term "tsū" i.e. that which is common to Hinayana and Mahayana. "Betsu" means "separate," "distinct," or "special." "En," which means literally "circular" or "round," involves the meaning of "completion," "completeness" and "all-roundness" and will best be rendered by the term "perfect." Cf. Edkins' *Chinese Buddhism* p. 182, and Sir Charles Eliot's *Hinduism and Buddhism*, Vol. III, p. 311.

teaching, which is intended for the Śrāvakas and Pratyeka-Buddhas only and, therefore, is also called the Two-Vehicle Teaching. "Tsū-kyo," the "communicating" or "common" teaching means the teaching which is common to Hinayana and Mahayana, as it forms, so to speak, the gate, through which the believer passes out of Hinayana into Mahayana. We may also call it Elementary Mahayana or Three-Vehicle Teaching, as it addresses itself to the Śrāvakas, Pratyeka-Buddhas and Bodhisattvas in common: another reason for calling it the "common" teaching. "Betsu kyo" or the "special" teaching is only preached for the Bodhisattvas specially and includes all such doctrines which might be characterised as the middle or developed stage of Mahayana. The highest stage of Mahayana is represented by "En kyo" or the "perfect" teaching, which is only intended for Bodhisattvas of highest capacity. It is also called Pure Mahayana Teaching.

In what relation do these principles stand to the five periods?

The Kegon Period involves both the special and the perfect teaching: therefore, it is called "twofold" or "ken" (兼). The Agon Period involves only the Tripiṭaka teaching: therefore, it is called "simple" or "tan" (単). The Hodo Period involves all four teachings: therefore, it is called "related with all" or "tai" (對). The Hannya Period involves the last three, namely, the common, the special, and the perfect teaching: therefore, it is called "partly possessing" or "tai" (帶). And the Hokke Period involves the perfect teaching only: therefore, it is called "pure" or "jun" (純). In preaching the Nehan Gyo, Buddha first recapitulated all four teachings: therefore this first part of Nehan Gyo is called "renewed preaching" or "tsui setsu" (追説). But in the second part of Nehan Gyo he exclusively preached the perfect teaching, as he had done already in the Hokke Kyo, breaking again all differences by the principle of unity: therefore, this second part of Nehan Gyo is called "renewed destruction" or "tsui min" (追泯).

Now all that may sound trashy to unsophisticated minds. But as a matter of fact this threefold classification of the whole of Buddhism according to periods, methods, and principles, indicates

in an admirable way the development and growth of religious and philosophical ideas in Buddhism. All these strange terms, which I find necessary to inflict upon my hearers, denote the different ways of looking at the Buddhist religion, and express the innermost content of Buddhist thought in its progressive development through a period of 1000 years since Sakyamuni's death. This threefold classification by Chisha Daishi, far from being a phantastic chimera, really means a great and ingenious effort to bring order and system into a vast and seemingly contradictory mass of ideas, and to understand the history of Buddhist dogmas and theories as an evolution from primitive conceptions to higher and higher views. To do justice to Chisha Daishi, we must consider his threefold system, especially his *zō-tsū-betsu-en*-classification, as a classification of the different attempts to solve the fundamental metaphysical problem, which were made by Buddhism during its long history.

"Zō kyo" or the Tripitaka teaching attacks this problem analytically. It dissolves the Subject and the Object of this world of experience,—or the Ātman and the Dharmas, as they are called in Buddhist philosophy,—into their smallest parts, and proves that the Subject or the individual Ego is only a constant stream of momentary states of consciousness, where one wave supersedes another wave, and that the Objects or Things are momentary combinations of elements, which incessantly unite and disintegrate again. There is no constant subject, no constant object from this analytical point of view, only a continual becoming and passing away, an endless repetition of birth and death, regulated by the law of cause and effect. We can only escape from it by renouncing our thirst for existence; that is the Nirvāna of Zo Kyo, which is a mere negative conception, as it means deliverance from this flux of cause and effect.

"Tsū kyo," understood as elementary Mahayana teaching, deals with the fundamental metaphysical problem synthetically. It does not dissolve the Ātman and the Dharmas into their smallest parts, but considers them as a whole. The idea of non-existence or emptiness of the subject and of the object is here derived from the consideration that the categories of our think-

ing are themselves empty (Sk. *Śūnyatā*, Jap. "kū" 空) and of a mere conventional nature as our whole thinking is moving in contrasts: every negation presupposes an affirmation and in every affirmation a negation is concealed. Our whole thinking, from this "tsū kyo" point of view, is only a meaningless play with concepts, a hunting for empty illusions. We have here a subjective conception of emptiness, while "zō kyo" or Hinayana teaching was a purely objective conception of emptiness. Being a subjective conception of emptiness, "tsū kyo" only denies our illusions, but does not deny reality itself. It says: our subjective conceptions of the Ego and of the objective reality are illusions, but it does not say that the Ego and the objective reality themselves are illusions; it does not deny that there is a subjective and objective reality independent of our illusions.

"Betsu kyo" (pronounced, bekkyo), or the teaching of speciality, places the idea of an absolute reality, which in "tsū kyo" emerges only on the boundary of our thinking, in the foreground, and for the first time the universe is considered, from an absolute point of view, as a totality. The phenomena, which in "zō kyo" or Hinayana teaching had a quite isolated existence and were not in any way considered as inherent in an independent absolute substance, now for the first time are considered as parts of a whole. These parts are related to each other, inasmuch as they are derived from one and the same origin: Tathatā as cause with the help of avidyā as condition creating the phenomena or parts. But still they are parts, and like children of one and the same mother, the phenomena of the special teaching have all their own individuality.

"En kyo" or the teaching of perfect harmony, does away with this individuality of parts by identifying all phenomena with themselves. The dualism of the parts and the whole now disappears, and with it disappears the indirect identity between the phenomena and the absolute, which is replaced by a direct identity: now in every particle of dust, in every single-moment's thought, the whole universe is contained.

II. PURE THEORY OR METAPHYSICS.

The Three Truths.

We turn to the second part of Tendai philosophy, namely, to the theoretical part, and to a teaching, which has been called the very marrow of Tendai philosophy, namely to the doctrine of the three truths or "San Dai" (三諦). These three truths express the three fundamental forms of existence of all dharmas, the term "dharma" meaning not only physical, but psychical things as well, in short anything existing in the material and moral world.

The three forms of existence of all dharmas are:

1. Emptiness, or *kū* 空 (Chinese, *k'ung*);
2. Temporal existence, or *ke* 假 (Chinese, *kia*);
3. The Middle, or *chū* 中 (Chinese, *chung*).¹

When I take all dharmas and make them entirely free from all my subjective views and passions by immersing them in the sea of unconditionality, then these entirely unconditioned dharmas are the truth of "*Kū*" (空) or emptiness. This truth is also called the truth of breaking, as it breaks with all subjective illusions. It is the negative form of existence of all dharmas and corresponds to what we are accustomed to call the state of transcendence or universality.

This emptiness or unconditionality of dharmas of course does not mean "nothingness." If it were nothingness, how could it break all illusions? Emptiness is indeed so far away from nothingness, that it postulates the idea of temporal existence. "The particular," as Prof. Anezaki² has justly remarked, "derives its being from the universal nature of things, while

¹ The terms "hypothetical," "false," and "invented," used by Edkins as equivalents for the term "*ke*," are misleading and to be rejected. Instead of the term "medial" or "central" used by Edkins for the term "*chu*," we prefer the term "middle." (Cf. Edkins: *Chinese Buddhism*, p. 160, 172, 184).

² Cf. Anezaki: *Nichiren*, p. 150. Appendix II: "Tendai's Doctrines of the Middle Path and Reality."

the universal could not fully realise its true nature without manifesting itself in a particular."

This particular is not the phenomenal world in ordinary meaning, but a phenomenal world, which is an antithesis of the universal world or emptiness. Therefore, Chisha Daishi calls it by the name "*Ke*" (假) to distinguish it from the phenomenal existence in common meaning, which is called "*U*" (有). This "*Ke tai*" or truth of temporal existence is also called truth of establishment, because it establishes all dharmas temporally. It is the positive form of existence of all dharmas and corresponds to what we are used to call the state of immanence or particularity.

This thesis of emptiness and antithesis of temporal existence find their synthesis in the truth of the middle or "*Chu*" (中), which harmonises universality and particularity, transcendence and immanence, the negative and positive in one absolute entity.

It may be helpful for the understanding of this problem, to use the metaphor of the magnet, which has a negative and a positive polarity and is itself a perfect harmonisation of both. Goethe at several times has expressed his world-view by this simile, and we may also use it here. Only I must ask you to keep in mind that it expresses neither the deepest view of Goethe himself nor the deepest Tendai truth.

The Three Truths of the "Empty," of the "Temporal Existence" and of the "Middle" were first discovered by Emon, the first patriarch of the Tendai School, and the way he discovered them is described as follows:

The Zen teacher, Emon, said: "I walk alone in the valley of the Yellow River and of the Wei River; there is no man whom I call my teacher. If I get sūtras, I shall make the Buddha my teacher; if I get śāstras, then I shall make the Bodhisattvas my teachers." After uttering these proud words, which show that Emon considered himself superior to all contemporary learners and only looked for truth in the canonical texts of Buddhism, he entered a great Buddhist library. Here he first burned incense and scattered flowers. Then with his back to the books he drew one at haphazard from the vast collec-

tion. The work, which he thus blindly selected, was the famous "*Madhyamika Śāstra*" by the great Indian patriarch, Nāgārjuna—in Chinese, called "Chu Kwan Ron," in English "The Commentary on the Middle Meditation," translated into German by Walleser. Emon opened it and the gātha which his eyes first met, ran thus:

"The dharmas are born from cause and condition.

"I (Nāgārjuna) teach: they are identical with emptiness.

"They are also called temporal existence,

"And they also have the meaning of the middle way."

Emon understood the profound significance of these lines and was in an ecstasy of joy. He transmitted his doctrine of "*One thought and three kinds of meditations*" (Jap. *Isshin-San-Gwan* (一心三觀), which he found formulated in this gātha, to Nangaku Eshi, and Eshi of the Southern Mountain transmitted it to Chi-kai of Tendai. In this way this gātha of twenty Chinese characters came to be acknowledged as the highest criterion and metaphysical standard by the Tendai School. Keikei Tannen says: "This gātha of the *Madhyamika Śāstra* contains the one inexpressible truth and its meaning universally stretches through all Sūtras," the word "sūtras" meaning, of course, "Mahayana Sūtras."

*The Three Truths in the Light of the Four Principles.*¹

To this gātha Chisha Daishi applied his own doctrine of principles, deepening and systematising thereby the thought of Nāgārjuna. The "Zō" principle had to be put aside, as in "Zō kyo" or Hinayana Teaching only the first truth, namely emptiness (*kū*) is involved, and not the two other truths, which the gātha also proclaims, namely temporary existence and the middle way (*ke* and *chū*). Of course, there is also a middle way in Hinayana. But this Hinayana middle way is only another name for emptiness—emptiness of the Ātman and emptiness of the Dharmas—and has no other philosophical meaning.

¹ Table II and III attached here give a schematic view of the interrelation between the Four Principles and the Three Truths.

TABLE II
THE FOUR PRINCIPLES AND THE THREE TRUTHS
(*Ko-to-shi-kyo* 化法四教 and *San-dai* 三諦)





TABLE III
THE FOUR PRINCIPLES (四教) AND THE THREE TRUTHS (三諦)
(*Kc-ho-shi-kyo* 化法四教 and *San-dai* 三諦)



We hear also of temporary existence in Hinayana. This temporary existence, however, is not the manifestation of the Absolute, as the gāthā of the Madhyamika Śāstra understands it, but is of a purely phenomenal or relative character.

Therefore, only tsū-, betsu- and en-kyo, the common, the special, and the perfect principles were applicable to the gāthā, and by making use of them, Chisha Daishi obtained three different interpretations of the three truths involved in the gāthā.

As these three interpretations are of supreme importance in Tendai Philosophy, I shall briefly describe them. Let us first consider the gāthā from the point of view of "Tsūkyo" or the common teaching. The common teaching can be considered in two ways: as "mere emptiness" (*tan ku* 但空) and then it is on the same level as Hinayana teaching and has only relative meaning; or as "not mere emptiness" (*fu-tan-ku* 不但空), and then it is elementary Mahayana and has absolute meaning. What concerns us here, is the common teaching of "not mere emptiness," that means the teaching of emptiness, which leads us up to the two other truths of the temporary existence and of the middle. According to this view the first two lines of the gāthā acknowledge that the self-nature or essence of the dharmas, i.e. the physical and mental elements, is empty, because they are born from cause and condition. The argument is: If the essence of the dharmas were not empty, they would exist by themselves, without waiting for their birth by causes and conditions. The third line says that these same dharmas, which are non-existent through their real nature, show temporarily the form of existence, or to express it a little differently: the true nature of all dharmas is not phenomenal existence (*u*, 有) itself, but only appears temporally (*ke* 假) in the form (*so* 相) of phenomenal existence (*u*). So we find here a distinction made between the "true nature" (*jitsu-so* 實相) and the "temporary form" (*ke-so* 假相) of the dharmas, the true nature, which is empty, assuming the outside show of existence, which, however, is only temporal and not absolute reality.

The fourth line of the gāthā says: All dharmas have also the meaning of the middle way. Of course! If they are real

emptiness (*jitsu-ku* 實空) as well as temporary existence (*ke-u* 假有), but at one and the same moment neither the one nor the other, then there must be something inexpressible beyond them, which harmonises emptiness and temporary existence. As we can easily see, from this point of view of "Tsū-kyo" or common teaching, emptiness is not 'the one and all' of Buddhist teaching, like in "Zō-kyo" or Hinayana teaching. Besides emptiness the temporal existence and the middle are acknowledged by the common teaching,—but only indirectly. So we may say: In the common teaching the idea of emptiness is the main issue and centre, the ideas of temporary existence and of the middle are only side-issues and on the periphery,—or: the emptiness is the substance, temporary existence and the middle are only shadows of this substance.

We consider now the gāthā from the point of view of "Betsu kyo" or the special teaching.

In "Betsu kyo," the temporary and the middle are not only side-issues and existing merely on the periphery, as it was the case in "Tsū kyo" or common teaching, but all three have independent existence; they are arranged horizontally in space and perpendicularly in time, i.e., they exist side by side, and the practitioner must first go through the truth of emptiness, then climb up to the truth of temporary existence, and finally he will reach the truth of the middle.

In this teaching of speciality, the empty and the temporary existence form a couple and are differentiated:—they belong to the realm of matter (*ji* 事); the middle, however, does no more know such dualism, being the one absolute and equal truth;—namely the absolute reason (*ri* 理). When we consider the 10,000 phenomena from the point of view of emptiness and temporary existence (*kū* and *ke*), they are eternally differentiated; but when we make them go back to their fundamental origin, namely to the truth of the middle (*chū*), they are absolutely equal to each other.

This teaching first introduces into the realm of Buddhist metaphysics the positive conception of absolute truth, called by different names, "true likeness" (Japanese, *shin-nyo* 眞如; in

Sanskrit, "tathatā), "real form," "Dharma-body," "Dharma-nature," "Store-house of the Tathagata," or "Vairoshana," all these terms being identical with the term "chū," the middle.

This middle appeared in the former teaching of "Tsū kyo" only like a thief in the night, it did not dare to show itself openly, and emptiness could come in contact with it only furtively and in the dark. Now in the teaching of "Betsu kyo" the full charm of the middle can be exercised on the empty in full daylight as both are publicly acknowledged and honoured members of the Mahayana tribe. Emptiness can now abandon itself to the middle without shame, like a bride to the bridegroom.

Consequently, the first two lines of the gāthā of the Madhyamika Śāstra which speak of the emptiness of the dharmas, assume now a very different signification, compared with the former interpretation. The dharmas, after they have entered into emptiness, gain the help of "mu-myō" (無明) or "non-brightness," in Sanskrit, avidyā, in English, ignorance—and by ignorance, which is the condition, they assume temporary existence. At last, they enter into the middle way, by identifying ignorance with absolute truth, "mu-myō" with "shin-nyo," "avidyā" with "tathatā."

We come to the last interpretation of the gāthā, as we find it in "En kyo" or the perfect teaching, which, as you will remember, is identical with the Tendai teaching proper.

According to this teaching, the three truths of the empty, the temporary existence, and the middle are no more arranged in horizontal and perpendicular order, as was the case in "Betsu kyo," but they are perfectly amalgamated and melted together: the empty being directly identical with the temporary existence or the middle, and the temporary existence being directly identical with the empty and the middle.

The emptiness of the dharmas, according to this teaching, means that all the innumerable dharmas are without any differentiation and perfectly amalgamated with each other in the absolute truth of true likeness (*shin-nyo*). This true likeness never increases nor decreases, it is not born, nor does it die, but

nevertheless is constantly changing its forms. It is similar to a great ocean, whose water is of a constant quantity and stability, but whose waves are for ever changing, rising, and disappearing. The waves of the ocean are the nature of the water itself; similarly the changing forms of the dharmas are the nature of Shin-nyo itself, and not caused by the help of some other extraneous factor, namely, by Mu-nyo: Mu-nyo is directly identical with Shin-nyo. As the absolute perfection comprises these two truths of emptiness and temporary existence, it is also the middle truth.

The "En kyo" view of the three truths, to the superficial observer, comes very near to the "Betsu kyo" view of the three truths, and yet there is a great difference between them, as great as between heaven and earth. The special teaching only acknowledges the dharmas as empty, after they have been absorbed by the absolute truth. The perfect teaching considers that all dharmas are in the absolute truth from the beginning and are therefore empty from the very first, fundamentally and originally.

"Emptiness," according to the special teaching, has an *a posteriori* meaning; according to the perfect teaching, it has an *a priori* meaning. The same may be said of the "temporary existence." The special teaching considers that the dharmas, after having entered the truth of emptiness, pass over to the temporary truth, and finally enter the middle truth, these being three distinct stages. The perfect teaching considers the "empty," the "temporary," and the "middle" as perfectly identical with each other.

The special teaching teaches, that "the three thousand dharmas, which exist by their nature from the very beginning" (*hon rai sho gu no san zen*, 本來性具ノ三千) and "the three thousand dharmas, which are created things" (*ji zo no san zen*, 事造ノ三千) are different from each other; the perfect teaching acknowledges the identity of both. That is to say: The special teaching considers the *a priori* (*sho gu* 性具) and the *a posteriori* (*ji zo* 事造) as distinct and different; the perfect teaching considers them as one and the same, the *a posteriori*

being only another manifestation of the *a priori*. Therefore, the perfect teaching never calls the *a posteriori* "temporary production," but emphatically says that the absolute world or the realm of original existence and the world of phenomena or the realm of causes and conditions are the same, or that our present world is Buddha's world.

To sum up: In the special teaching the phenomenal world is *indirectly* identical with the noumenal world, but there is no direct identity; although the phenomena are in the last instance a manifestation of the absolute, still the phenomenal world is actually differentiated and limited, while the noumenal world is undifferentiated and limitless. In the perfect teaching, on the contrary, there is no indirect, but *direct* identity between the noumenal world and the phenomenal world: the middle of the perfect teaching including both the empty and the temporal and being involved in the empty and in the temporal. In the same way, the three thousand (i.e., all) dharmas exist, according to the perfect teaching, not only in the temporal, but also in the empty and in the middle.

Moreover this perfect amalgamation of the three truths of the "empty," "the temporal" and "the middle" is, as Chisha Daishi tells us, not a clever construction of his own fertile brain, but has objective existence and did not wait for any human being to come into being. It existed before philosophers discovered it and meditated on it.

As you can easily see now, the world view of Goethe, which I mentioned before and which is expressed by the simile of the magnet, might be called "Betsu" teaching, because in this view of the world the dualism of two extremes still subsists and is only indirectly neutralised by reducing the two extremes to one unifying original entity.

But Goethe did not stubbornly adhere to this world-view. In his pantheistic poems he clearly proceeds a step further and expresses himself in a way, which we may characterise as "En" view and which evidently is the highest view of Goethe. According to this "En" view, no more dualism at all is to be found in the universe: the negative is here not only directly identical with

the positive, but even directly identical with the amalgamation of the positive and of the negative. That means in Tendai terms:

1. The empty is directly identical with temporal existence and the middle.
2. The temporal existence is directly identical with the empty and the middle.
3. The middle is directly identical with the empty and temporal existence, the ultimate truth being the amalgamation of these three threefold identities expressed by the formula of "*en nyu san dai*" (圓融三諦) or "the perfectly amalgamated three truths."—(1=3, 3=1).

The Identity of the Human Mind and of the Universe.

It will probably be presumed by you that the "Chu Ron" or "Madhyamika Śāstra" (Nanjio 1179), from which Emon selected his gāthā, is the main canonical commentary of the Tendai school. But as a matter of fact, the Śāstra on which the Tendai philosophy is mainly based, is not Nāgārjuna's "Chu Ron," but the "Dai Chi Do Ron" or "Mahā-Prajñā-Pāramitā Śāstra" (Nanjio 1169), also attributed to Nāgārjuna. The "Chū Ron" is one of the three, in fact the most important of the three commentaries, on which the San Ron- or Madhyamika School is founded, and gives on the whole a negative formulation of the highest metaphysical reality. The "Dai Chi Do Ron" or "Mahā-Prajñā-Pāramitā Śāstra," on the contrary, gives a positive formulation of the ultimate reality and was, therefore, selected by the Tendai school as its main canonical commentary.

This preference given to the "Dai Chi Do Ron" by Tendai, is easy to understand, when we consider that the Tendai philosophy is an offshoot of the Madhyamika philosophy: the negative foundations of this Indian school having become inverted by the Chinese Tendai school and adopting a positive meaning. The middle way taught by the Madhyamika school was absolute emptiness; in Tendai philosophy the middle way is identical

with the three thousand dharmas, i.e., *the whole universe, which exists in our thought of only one moment*:

“Ichi-nen San-zen (一念三千),

San-zen Ichi-nen (三千一念)”—

“One thought is the three thousand,

The three thousand are one thought”

is a fundamental principle of the Tendai teaching, expressing the identity of the subject and of the object, or the truth that the human mind and the universe are both one and the same absolute reality.

The number, 3000, mentioned above, needs an explanation.

A fundamental doctrine of Tendai philosophy, based on some statement by the Hokke Kyo in Kumārajīva's translation, says that every dharma possesses *Ten Attributes*—the so-called “Jū Nyo Ze” (十如是, literally “ten-like-this”)—namely:

1. So (相)=form, i.e., outer appearance;
2. Sho (性)=nature, i.e., inner essence;
3. Tai (體)=body, i.e., substance, namely, physical body and mind, which are supporting the other nyoze's;
4. Riki (力)=power, i.e., in latent and dynamical meaning;
5. Sa (作)=action, i.e., application of *riki* or power;
6. In (因)=cause, i.e., direct or main cause;
7. En (緣)=condition, i.e., indirect or assisting cause;
8. Kwa (果)=effect, i.e., effect of the direct cause, namely of *in*;
9. Ho (報)=reward, i.e., effect of both *in* and *kwa*;
10. Hon-matsu-ku-kyo-to (本末究竟等) = “beginning” (i.e., “so”=form) and “end” (i.e., “ho”=reward) are melted into each other, i.e., this Nyo-ze No. 10 representing the harmonising principle, by which the other nine Nyo-ze's from “so” to “ho” are all amalgamated with each other.

So, the ten “Nyo-ze” are like a ring, in which we cannot distinguish any beginning or end, or in which any such distinction has only a conventional meaning.

The first nine "Nyo-ze" are *ji* (事=matter) while "Nyo-ze" No. 10 is *ri* (理=absolute reason), by which the other nine are harmonised and in which they find their true being and final reconciliation. Therefore, the nine material attributes are no other than the "reason of equality" (byō-dō-no-ri 平等之理) itself. That means to say: In the last instance, the ten "Nyo-ze" are equal to each other and every one of the ten "Nyo-ze" involves the nine others without exception.

The "Ju Nyō-ze" System amalgamates bewilderment (*mei* 迷) and understanding (*go* 悟); it manifests the principle that "matter and reason are not different" and that "the temporal and the real are one and the same." By this teaching of the "Ju Nyō-ze," the "Eight Teachings" of Tendai—(*Hakkyo*) become transformed into the "One Vehicle"—(*Ichī jō*).

In the "reason of equality" (or "Nyo-ze" No. 10) the three truths of "Kū," "Ke," "Chu," of the empty, the temporal, and the middle are involved, as these three truths themselves are the absolute reason (*ri*), which is also commonly called "real form," (*Jitsu Sō* 實相). From the point of view of "emptiness" the "Ju Nyō-ze" are "true nothingness" (*shin kū* 真空); from the point of view of "temporal existence" the "Jū Nyō-ze" are "wonderful existence" (*myō ke* 妙假); from the point of view of the "middle," the "Jū Nyō-ze" are "the dharma-world of the middle way" (*chū dō hō kai* 中道法界).

However, as the three truths of "Kū," "Ke" and "Chū" are identical with each other and exist perfectly in each other—not perpendicularly, and not horizontally, not before and not after, but completely amalgamated—therefore, everyone of the ten "Nyo-ze" possesses these three truths harmonised perfectly and without exception.

Buddha preached the ten "Nyo-ze," in order to explain that all dharmas are real form (*Sho-hō jitsu-sō* 諸法實相), namely, Absolute Reality, or "True Likeness" (*Shin-Nyo* 真如) itself, which idea is also exemplified in the Tendai philosophy by the identification of the ten "Nyo-ze" with the ten "Shin-Nyo," i.e., the ten characteristics of Tathatā.

This teaching of the "Jū Nyō-ze" is so fundamental, that

the sentence of the Upāya Chapter of the Hokke Sutra, in which it appears, has been called the "Abbreviated Hokke Sutra,"—the meaning of the full Hokke Sutra being condensed in this sentence, according to the Tendai view. But, on the other side, this teaching is so profound that the Hokke Sutra says: "Only Buddha and Buddhas can go to the bottom of the real form of all dharmas, that is of the so-called "Nyo-ze Sō," "Nyo-ze Sho, etc."

With the teaching of the ten Nyo-ze there is intimately connected in the Tendai philosophy the teaching of the *Ten Worlds* or "Jikkai" (十界), which Chisha Daishi borrowed from the Kegon Sutra.

According to this doctrine, there are not only six ways of existence, as the Hinayana Buddhism taught, but ten ways of existence, by adding four more to the original six:

1. Jigoku, or Hell; 2. Gaki, or Hungry Ghosts; 3. Chiku Shō, or Animal Life; 4. Asuras, or Fighting Demons; 5. Nin, or Human Beings; 6. Ten, or Heavenly Gods; 7. Shōmon, or Śrāvakas; 8. Enkaku, or Pratyeka-Buddhas; 9. Bosatsu, or Bodhisattvas; 10. Butsu, or Buddhas.

As the tenth "Nyo-ze" comprises all other nine "Nyo-ze's," and as in every one "Nyo-ze" the other nine are involved, so the tenth world comprises all the other nine worlds and in every world the other nine are involved. According to the superficial view, the first nine worlds are temporal (*gon* 權) and the tenth world is real (*jitsu* 實): but when we consider their true essence, then the ten worlds are not different from each other, but originally equal, as all ten worlds possess the "temporal" and the "real" in an incomprehensible way. So, Hell is not different from the Buddha-world, both being identical from the point of view of the middle way.

Thus, the same view of the identity of contrasts, which we found already applied to the ten "Nyo-ze," we find also applied to the ten Worlds.

Now, everyone of the ten worlds involves the ten "Nyo-ze." As every dharma-world involves the nine other dharma-worlds, we get 10×10 dharma-worlds or 100 dharma-worlds possessing

each the ten "Nyo ze," which brings the number of "Nyo-ze's" up to 1000. Moreover, every world (*kai*, Sanskrit, *dhātu*) comprises three separate realms (*seken* 世間, Sanskrit, *loka*): namely, the Five Bundles (*goun* 五蘊, Sanskrit the five *skandhas*), All Living Beings (*shujo* 衆生), and Country and Earth (*kokudo* 國土), which again comprise the ten "Nyo-ze." We have therefore to multiply the 1000 "Nyo-ze" by three getting 3000 "Nyo-ze," or 3000 dharmas, the precise formula being: $10 \text{ Nyo-ze} \times 10 \text{ Kai} \times 10 \text{ Kai} \times 3 \text{ Seken} = 3000 \text{ dharmas}$. These 3000 dharmas exist, as already stated, in "one mind," i.e., in every thought, feeling, and volition of even one moment's duration:

"One thought is the three thousand;
The three thousand are one thought!"

Other Identities.

The doctrine described above lays down a twofold identity. Another threefold identity is established by a famous formulation of the Tendai school, which says that *Buddha, the mind, and all living beings*¹ are one and the same absolute reality. When the absolute reality is the knowing and distinguishing force in myself, it is called the "mind"; when revealed in the external animate world, it is called "all living beings"; when it is revealed in the work of enlightenment and

¹ Not "Buddha, the universal mind, and all things," as Armstrong says, who characterizes Tendai teaching as "Absolute Idealism," while it is (roughly characterized) Absolute Realism. "The mind," according to the orthodox Tendai school, as represented by Shimeï Daishi, means here not at all the "universal" mind, but on the contrary the "individual" human mind with all its shortcomings. The third of the Triad is "all other living beings," (Japanese, *shu jō*; sanskrit, *sattva*), and not "all things,"—all things, (i.e. "the many kinds of five aggregates," or the universe) being the objects, which, according to this particular doctrine, are created by Buddha, the individual mind, and all living beings. As the object, however, involves the subject, the "creators" can at the same time be considered as "created," anyone of the Triad creating the two others, or being created by the two others. (Cf. R. C. Armstrong, "The Doctrine of the Tendai Sect," in *The Eastern Buddhist*, Vol. III, No. 1, April-June, 1924 pp. 43-44).

considered as effect, it is called "Buddha";—such revelation being of course no revelation in a literary meaning, i.e., something which exists only *a posteriori*, as the One Absolute Reality, according to our former statements, involves the identity of the *a posteriori* and the *a priori*.

It is only another formulation of the same truth of identity, when Tendai proclaims the sameness of "ri" (理) and "ji" (事),—i.e. of reason and matter,—by "ri" meaning the absolute reason, and by "ji" the physical as well as the psychical dharmas, or human mind as well as matter. This formulation amounts to a proclamation of the identity of the noumenon and the phenomena, of the eternal and of the temporal, of Nirvana and Samsara.

All these identities are involved in the identity of the "empty," of the "temporal being," and of the "middle," and find their highest religious formulation in the identity of the *Dharmakāya*, the *Sambhogakāya* and the *Nirmānakāya*, or of the three Buddha-bodies, namely, the spiritual body, the compensation body, and the transformation body.

It would be very interesting to point out here striking similarities between the Tendai teaching and the Indian philosophy and Taoist teaching on the one side, and with the Christian metaphysics and the German transcendental philosophy on the other side. But our time does not allow us such excursions, as it does not allow me to deal any further with the purely theoretical part of Tendai teaching, which in my work on Tendai philosophy, comprises not less than twenty-four chapters.

III. THE PRACTICAL TEACHING.

It will be indispensable, however, to say at least a few words on the third part of Tendai philosophy, on the practical teaching, which corresponds to what modern philosophers, like the already-mentioned Professor Messer, call "irrationalistic philosophy," or "philosophy of sentiment, intuition, and action."

At the outset, let me correct here two misconceptions. It

has been stated repeatedly, for instance, by Sir Charles Eliot in his book *Hinduism and Buddhism*, that "Chi-kai followed originally Bodhidharma's teaching," before evolving his own meditative system.¹

Of Nangaku Eshi, it is said by Edkins (*Chinese Buddhism* p. 170): "He was a monk of one of the sects that followed the teaching of Bodhidharma."

But in the biography of Chisha Daishi and in the works left by his teacher, Nangaku Eshi, we do not find anything which would justify the views that these two patriarchs of the Tendai school, commonly called "Zen ji" or "Zen Teachers," were at any time of their lives under the spell of Dharma Daishi's Zen teaching. Of the meditative system of Chisha Daishi, and here I come to the second misconception which I want to correct, the excellent Buddhist scholar, Beal, has given an outline in his *Catena of Buddhist Scriptures*. But unfortunately he selected for translation the "Small Meditation" or the "Shō Shi Kwan (小止觀)" by Chisha Daishi, also called "Dō Mō Shi Kwan (童蒙止觀)" or "Meditation for Childhood," in two fasc. Nanjio 1540 which, as the name indicates, was considered by the author himself as a mere A B C book for beginners. The "Great Meditation" or "Maka Shi Kwan (摩訶止觀)" by Chisha Daishi, which with Keikei's commentary, comprises forty volumes and really contains the practical Tendai philosophy, was not even mentioned by Beal, so that the reader gains the entirely erroneous impression that the "Small Meditation" is the last word that Chisha Daishi had to say on Meditation.

In Dharma Daisha's Zen School, meditation is the one and only thing. In Chisha Daishi's Tendai School meditation or, as it is called here, "Shi Kwan (止觀)," i.e. "fixedness of mind and observation"² in Sanskrit, Samatha (=calm) and Vipāś-

¹ Eliot, Vol. III, p. 310 says: "Chi-kai followed originally Bodhidharma's teaching, but ultimately rejected the view, that contemplation is all sufficient."

² The three translations offered by Edkins for the term "Shi Kwan" (Chinese, *chi-kwan*) namely: "Reflection carried to its limiting point," or "Limited or perfected observation," or simply "Perfected observation,"

yana (=insight)³ is also indispensable, but not more and not less than philosophy proper. While in the Zen School meditation is only a discipline, in the Tendai School meditation is associated with philosophy. While Zen Buddhism acknowledges intuition only, Tendai Buddhism acknowledges both intellect and intuition considering them as the two wheels of the vehicle, which carries us to enlightenment.

It goes without saying that Tendai meditation, making full allowance for philosophy, i.e., for religious ecclesiastical philosophy, is of a much more intellectual character than Zen meditation and must make a much stronger appeal to intellectual people. The philosophical conceptions of the "empty," the "temporal existence," and the "middle," which are the central ideas of Tendai theory are also the main objects of Tendai meditation. And these three meditations are all involved simultaneously in the mind of one moment: "Isshin Sangwan (一心三觀),—"*One Mind Three Meditations*"—being the fundamental formula of the practical Tendai teaching.

What this meditation in "En" 圓 teaching means, we can best understand when we compare it with the meditation in "Betsu" teaching.

According to "Betsu" teaching: When the practitioner fully understands the truth of emptiness, he annihilates the ordinary bewilderments of feeling and thinking; when he fully understands the truth of temporal existence, then he annihilates the innumerable "sand and dust" bewilderments; when he fully understands the truth of the middle way, then he annihilates the delicate bewilderments of ignorance (*avidyā*). The whole path of saintship is traversed according to a definite order, consisting of fifty-two definite steps: before the practi-

are all not to the point. (Cf. Edkins' *Chinese Buddhism*, p. 172, 179 181.) Beal translated the term "Chi Kwan" by "Knowledge and meditation" which is also incorrect. (Cf. Beal's *A Catena of Buddhist Scriptures from the Chinese*, p. 250).

³ These two Sanskrit terms must of course not be understood here in narrow Hinayana meaning, but have distinct Mahayana colour, as the term "Maha" (=Mahā), placed in front of them, indicates.

tioner has gained the wisdom of emptiness, he cannot gain the wisdom of temporal existence, and before he has gained the wisdom of temporal existence, he cannot gain the wisdom of the middle way.

In the "En" teaching, on the contrary, enlightenment is suddenly and completely gained without any definite order.

The mind, by which and on which we meditate, is our normal, everyday mind, which has only to be purified, in order to become identified with the highest truth. This normal, human mind possesses, according to the Tendai view, three possibilities of gaining knowledge: namely, by hearing or reading, by intellectual operation, and by intuition. From these three sources of knowledge all worldly wisdom as well as all Buddhist knowledge, is derived: even in the highest Buddhist teaching, namely the "En" or perfect teaching, we still find hearing wisdom and thinking wisdom associated with intuitive wisdom. This last way of *Erkenntnis* may, from a relative or conventional point of view, be considered as the highest one; from an absolute point of view, it is of the same order as the two former ones; in fact, all three are fundamentally one.

Like the pure theory or metaphysics and like the synthesis of the whole Buddhist teaching, so is the practical teaching of Tendai based on sutras and śāstras, as can be seen from a statement by Keikei Tannen, who says in his "Shi Kwan Gi Rei" (止觀義例, "The Meaning and Rule of the Great Meditation"):

"The three meditations (*San Gwan*) exist originally on the foundation of "Yo-Ra-Ku" (Sutra)¹. . . . Moreover the meaning [of "San Gwan"], which is adopted [by the Tendai school] considers the "Hokke" [Sutra] as its bones, the "Chi Ron" [Dai-Chi-Do-Ron] as its compass, the "Dai Kyo" [Dai-Nehan Kyo] as helper, the "Dai Bon" [Dai-Bon-Hannya Kyo] as rule of meditation: all sutras help to bring them [the three meditations] to perfection."

However, we must keep in mind, what we have already said at the beginning of our very rudimentary outline of Tendai

¹ Bosatsu Yo Raku Hon Go Kyo, Nanjio 1541, 2 fas.

philosophy: What Chisha Daishi took from the sutras and śāstras were only bricks with which he constructed his philosophical building, according to his own plan,—using the building materials *ad libitum*, never making himself the slave of them, but always mastering them as a supreme genius.

Time forbids to say any more on the practical Tendai teaching. As in my outline of the theoretical part I had to omit all special problems, so I must leave aside here all technical details, which really form the practical Tendai teaching.

My only purpose to-day was to make my audience acquainted with a few fundamental ideas of Tendai teaching. But even this information is so scanty, that at the end of my lecture I have the feeling of having given you nothing.

In Conclusion.

Let me conclude by a short and very famous passage from Chisha Daishi's "Great Meditation," which still to-day is used as a daily prayer by all Tendai priests, and is commonly called the "En-Don Chapter" (圓頓章) of the "Maka-Shikwan."

It may help you to form an opinion on the worth or worthlessness of Tendai teaching. It reads:

"To practise the perfect and sudden meditation (*en-don shi-kwan*) means, to meditate from the first moment on the True Reality [i.e., on the Absolute]. Any object meditated on is the middle way [i.e., absolute truth] itself, and there is nothing but truth. Tranquillise your subjective condition, until it becomes harmonised with the absolute universe! Identify your subjective wisdom with the absolute universe! Then any single colour or odour will be nothing other than the middle way. The ego, the Buddhas, and all animate beings are also the same [i.e., the middle way or the meditation on the middle way]. The five Skandhas [i.e., the five aggregates forming every human being: body, sentiments, perception, Sanskara and consciousness] and the twelve Āyatanas [i.e., the six senses and six objects of the senses] are all Tathatā [i.e., Suchness or the Absolute]. Consequently, there is no pain to be relieved of! Ignorance and

passions are enlightenment itself. Consequently, there is no need to cut off the origin of suffering [i.e., the passions]. The extreme ideas [i.e., of emptiness and temporary existence] or the wrong ideas [i.e., the heresies] are the middle or the right meditation; there is no way to practice. Birth and death are Nirvana. Consequently, there is no annihilation of passions, in order to become enlightened. There is no pain and no passion: therefore, nothing is worldly. There is no way and no annihilation of passions: therefore, there is nothing superworldly. There is only the One True Reality, there is nothing besides True Reality. The absolute calm of the Dharma Nature [i.e. the absolute Reality] is called fixedness of mind [Japanese, *shi*, Sanskrit, *Śamatha*): the quiet but eternal wisdom [of the Dharma-Nature] is called intuition [Japanese, *kwan*, Sanskrit, *Vipaśyana*]. We may speak of beginning and end [in the practice of meditation]; but [really] there is no such difference. That is called "En-Don Shi Kwan" [the perfect and sudden meditation]."

There is a saying: "To a Tendai-man anything is wonderful." How could it be otherwise as for a Tendai-man anything is the Absolute Reality itself? It is also said. "The whole Tendai teaching can be summarised by this one little word, "wonderful." The term, "wonderful" (Japanese, *myō* 妙) implies the meaning "inexpressible." I may, therefore, be excused, if I could not express what I had hoped to express.

BRUNO PETZOLD

THE VIMALAKĪRTI SUTRA

(Translated by HOKEI IDUMI)

CHAPTER XI

THE LIFE OF A BODHISATTVA

At that time the Buddha was preaching the law in the grove of Āmrāpālī. Then suddenly the earth was seen broad and magnificent and the whole assembly became tinted with golden colour. Ānanda asked the Buddha, "O Blessed One, for what reason is such an auspicious omen that this earth is seen broad and magnificent, and why has the whole assembly become tinted with golden colour?" The Buddha spoke to Ānanda and said: "It is for this reason that Vimalakīrti and Mañjuśrī, revered and surrounded by the whole assembly, intend to come here, by first producing this auspicious omen."

Then Vimalakīrti spoke to Mañjuśrī: "Let us go and see the Blessed One and revere and honour him together with those Bodhisattvas." Mañjuśrī said; "Well said! let us go; now it is the due time." Then Vimalakīrti through his supernatural power, holding in the palm of his right hand the whole assembly together with the lion-thrones, went to the place where the Buddha was; having arrived there, he got down on the earth; he saluted him touching his feet with bowed head; and walking round him seven times keeping him to his right side, stretching his folded hands towards him with intent mind, he stood on one side; then all those Bodhisattvas leaving their seats greeted the Buddhas, each touching his feet with bowed head and walking round him seven times and stood on one side; and all the great disciples, Śakra, Brahman, and the four guardian gods also, leaving their seats, saluted the Buddha touching his feet with bowed heads and stood on one side.

Then the Blessed One duly returned his salutation to those

Bodhisattvas and commanded them to resume their seats. The whole [assembly] obeying his command resumed the seats. Then the Buddha spoke to Śāriputra: "Hast thou seen that which was wrought by the mighty supernatural power of those Bodhisattvas and those excellent men?" [He replied]: "Yes, I have seen." "What dost thou think of it?" "O Blessed One, I see it; but it is inconceivable to me and beyond my mind and beyond my power of measurement."

Then Ānanda asked the Buddha: "O Blessed One, the perfume which we now inhale has never been inhaled before; what perfume may it be?" The Buddha spoke to Ānanda and said: "This [perfume] issues from the pores of the skin of those Bodhisattvas." Then Śāriputra spoke to Ānanda and said: "Even from the pores of our skin this perfume is issuing." Ānanda asked: "Whence comes this perfume?" [He] said: "Vimalakīrti, the wealthy householder, had received the portion of food from the Buddha of Sarvagandhasugandha and those who partook of the food in his house produce such a perfume from every pore of [the skins of their bodies]."

Ānanda asked Vimalakīrti: "How long does this perfume last?" Vimalakīrti replied: "It will last until the food is exhausted." "When is this food exhausted?" "Seven days will pass before the energy of this food will be exhausted; again Ānanda, if a Śrāvaka who has not yet entered into the ranks of steadfastness partake of this food, he can attain to the ranks of steadfastness before it is exhausted; if [a Śrāvaka who] has entered into the ranks of steadfastness partake of this food, he can obtain liberation of mind before it is exhausted; if one who has not yet cherished the thought towards the Mahāyāna partake of this food he can cherish the thought before it is exhausted; if one who has cherished the thought [towards the Mahāyāna] partake of this food, he can attain to the acquiescence in the eternal law before it is exhausted; if one who has attained to the acquiescence partake of this food, he can attain to the state in which he is bound by one birth only before it is exhausted; just as a medicine called 'the excellent flavour' which has such a peculiarity that one who has taken it can exterminate all

poison of passions before it is exhausted, even so this food exterminates all poison of passions before it is exhausted."

Ānanda spoke to the Buddha and said: "O Blessed One, I have never heard that the food of perfume performs such religious work." The Buddha said: "Indeed it is so, indeed it is so! O Ānanda there is a Buddha country which performs religious work by means of the light of Buddha; there is another which performs religious work by means of the Bodhisattvas who are therein; there is another which performs religious work by means of the beings whom the Buddha teaches; there is another which performs religious work by means of a Bodhi tree; there is another which performs religious work by means of clothes and beds; there is another which performs religious work by means of food; there is another which performs religious work by means of gardens, forests and terraces; there is another which performs religious work by means of the thirty-two signs of perfection and the eighty minor marks of excellence; there is another which performs religious work by the body of Buddha; there is another which performs religious work by means of the sky; by these means all beings are persuaded to the practice of discipline; there is another which performs religious work by means of parables, such as dreams, phantoms, shadows, echoes, reflections in a mirror, moon in water; there is another which performs religious work by means of sounds, words or letters; there is another pure land of Buddha which performs religious work by means of silence, wordlessness and uncreatedness. Thus O Ānanda, conduct, movement and all that which has been done by all the Buddhas are nothing but religious works; O Ānanda there are the four evils, the eighty-four thousand ways of passion which all beings suffer from; yet Buddhas perform religious works even with these. This is said to enter the doctrine of all the Buddhas.

"A Bodhisattva who has entered this doctrine seeing all the pure and excellent lands of the Buddhas neither attaches himself to it nor covets nor is arrogant and seeing all the impure lands of the Buddhas he neither grieves nor cares for nor avoids them. He raises the pure mind towards all the

Buddhas rejoicing in and revering them as those whom he has never seen before. All Buddha-Tathāgatas are equal in virtues, but only in order to teach all beings they manifest the Buddha-lands in different ways.

“O Ānanda, behold all those Buddha-lands; there is variety on the earth, but there is none in the sky, even so there is variety in the physical bodies of the Buddhas, but there is none in their unobstructed wisdom. O Ānanda, all the Buddhas are equal in their physical bodies, in their dignity and births, in their discipline, meditation, wisdom, liberation, and wisdom of liberation, in their ten powers, the [fourfold] fearlessness, and the attributes of their extraordinary qualities, in their greatness of mercy and compassion, in their attitudes, conduct, and longevity of life, in their discourses, teachings, in the perfection of beings, in the purification of the Buddha-lands, and in the equipment of Buddha quality. Therefore the Buddhas are called Samyak-sambuddhas, Tathāgatas, and Buddhas. O Ānanda, if I should explain fully the meaning of these three words, it would be impossible for thee to comprehend even though thou shouldst live for a kalpa; it would be impossible to comprehend it even for all beings in the three great Chiliocosms, who may obtain the excellent memory like Ānanda himself, and who may be endowed with the life of a kalpa. Thus, O Ānanda, the Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi of Buddha is infinite and his wisdom and eloquence are inconceivable.”

Ānanda spoke to Buddha and said: “From this time forth I will never call myself as one who has learned much.” Buddha spoke to Ānanda: “Nay, thou shouldst not be discouraged. And why? Among Śrāvakas I speak of thee as one who has learned much, but not among Bodhisattvas. Stay a while, O Ānanda, as intelligent ones are not to measure Bodhisattvas. Even though all the oceans could be measured, yet meditation, wisdom, memory, eloquence, and all the virtues of Bodhisattvas could never be measured. O Ānanda, ye [Śrāvakas] ought to leave alone the deeds of Bodhisattvas. The supernatural power which this Vimalakirti manifested for a moment could not be manifested by all the Śrāvakas and Pratyeka-Buddhas even with

their utmost effort counting through hundreds of thousands of Kalpas."

Then those Bodhisattvas who have come from Sarvagandha-sugandha spoke to Buddha with folded hands and said: "O blessed One, when we saw this land we cherished the thought that it was inferior to ours; but now we repent and renounce this thought. And why? The necessary means of all the Buddhas are so inconceivable that they manifest in order to save all beings different lands of their own according to the needs of all beings. O Blessed One, we pray that thou shouldst give some few words on the law that we may think of [thee] Tathagata when we return to our land."

Buddha then spoke to those Bodhisattvas: "There is a doctrine which is hindered neither by things limited and things unlimited; and this ye ought to know. What is meant by things limited? They are things created. What is meant by things unlimited? They are things uncreated. A Bodhisattva ought neither to abandon the created nor to attach himself to the uncreated. What is it not to abandon the created? It is this; not to abandon great mercy and compassion; to cherish the thought of omniscience and never to be negligent; even to teach all beings without weariness; ever to remember and practise the law of the fourfold acceptance; not to spare body and life for the protection of the true law; to accumulate a stock of merit without weariness; ever to have the mind abiding in peace with the necessary means and the transference of one's merit to others; to seek the law diligently; to preach the law without sparing; not to fear entering a life of birth and death as he strives to honour all the Buddhas; to be far above either sorrow in poverty or joy in prosperity; not to despise novices; to revere sages like the Buddhas; to make those who fall into passion return to the right thought; not to deem the pleasure of renunciation the best; not to get attached to one's own pleasures but to rejoice at other's pleasures; to regard meditation as the hell; to regard a life of birth and death as a pleasure garden; to regard those who come to seek [the law] as good teachers; to abandon all possessions with the thought for the acquirement

of omniscience; to cherish the thought of rescue and protection when seeing those who break the precepts; to regard the Pāramitās as parents; to regard the laws of requisities for attaining the supreme knowledge as kinsfolk; to do good without limit; to perfect one's own land of Buddha with all adornments of the pure land; to be endowed with perfect signs by practising infinite charity; to purify the body, speech and mind by removing all wickedness; to undergo bravely the countless kalpas of birth and death; never to be weary in hearing of the infinite virtue of Buddha; to slay the enemy of passion with the sword of wisdom; to be far above the Skandhas, the Āyatanas and the Dhātus; to care for all beings for their eternal liberation; to vanquish the army of evil with great diligence; ever to seek the wisdom of unconscious reality; not to abandon things of the world abiding in self-contentment with the fewest possible desires; to follow the world without injuring one's dignity; to lead beings by means of the supernatural wisdom; not to forget what has been learned being in possession of a retentive memory; to exterminate doubts as entertained by all according to their capacities; to preach [the law] without impediments with the perfect eloquence that fulfills every desire; to enjoy the happiness, belonging to gods and men by practising the tenfold goodness with a pure heart; to open the way of the Brahman god by practising the fourfold infinite [mind]; to pray [to Buddha] to preach the law that he may rejoice at it and praise goodness; to obtain the voice of Buddha whereby the body, speech and mind are improved; to obtain the dignity of Buddha whereby good virtues are intensely practised, ever in enhancement of his behaviour; to found an order of Bodhisattvas by teaching the Mahāyāna; not to lose the stock of merit with a mind free from dissipation;—when these things are practised by a Bodhisattva, he is said not to have abandoned the created.

“What is it not to abide in the uncreated? It is not to regard emptiness as something attained even though one practises emptiness; not to regard formlessness and aimlessness as something attained even though one practises them; not to regard causelessness as something attained even though one practises it; not

to shun the accumulating merits though realising transiency [of things]; not to abhor birth and death though meditating on pains of this world; never to become weary of teaching others though realising selflessness [of things]; not to pass to annihilation forever though meditating on annihilation; to practise goodness both in the body and mind though meditating on abandonment; to take refuge in the law though there is no refuge; to care for all beings with the laws of the world though seeing that life has no existence; not to exterminate passions though seeing passionlessness [of things]; to teach beings with the laws of practice though seeing that there is no practice; not to abandon great compassion though seeing emptiness; not to follow the Hinayana though seeing the ranks of certainty; not to neglect merit, meditation and wisdom so long as the original vow is not fulfilled, though seeing that all things are false, having neither substance nor personality nor master nor form; to practise such things is said of a Bodhisattva not to be abiding in the uncreated.

“Again he abides not in the uncreated as he is endowed with a stock of merit; he abandons not the created as he is endowed with wisdom; he abides not in the uncreated as he possesses the great mercy and compassion; he abandons not the created as he fulfils the original vow; he abides not in the uncreated as he accumulates the medicine [of the law]; he abandons not the created as he distributes the medicine [of the law]; he abides not in the uncreated as he knows the maladies of beings; he abandons not the created as he extirpates the maladies of beings; All the Bodhisattvas, excellent men practising such things, neither abandon the created, nor abide in the uncreated; this is the way of the law called the liberation from the extinguishable as well as from the inextinguishable—ye ought to know.”

Then those Bodhisattvas, having heard this law preached [by Buddha], were filled with great joy, strewed beautiful flowers of many colours and many perfumes all over the three great Chiliocosms, and having honoured Buddha, his doctrine, and the Bodhisattvas, worshipped the Buddha by touching his feet with their bowed heads, praised him saying they had never

heard the like before, and spoke thus; "Śākyamuni Buddha has here well exhibited his necessary means." Having spoken thus, they suddenly disappeared and returned to their country.

CHAPTER XII

BUDDHA AKSHOBHYA

Then the Blessed One asked Vimalakīrti: "Thou wishest to see the Tathāgata; in what manner dost thou regard the Tathāgata?" Vimalakīrti said: "Just as I regard the reality of my body even so do I regard the Tathāgata. I regard the Tathāgata in this manner: he came not in the past, will not go in the future, and stays not in the present; I regard him neither as form nor as thatness of form, nor as the nature of form; neither as sensation nor as conception nor as confirmation; neither as consciousness nor as thatness of consciousness nor as the nature of consciousness; he is not caused by the four elements; he is even as the void; he is not an aggregate of the six Āyatanas as he is far above eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and mind; he is beyond the three worlds of existence; he is separated from the three dirts; he is in accordance with the three ways of liberation; he is endowed with intelligence yet he is as if not intelligent; he is neither of oneness nor of duality; he is neither of selfhood nor of otherness; he is neither formless nor attached to form; he is neither on this shore nor on that nor in midstream; yet he teaches all beings; he is never annihilated even though realising complete annihilation, he is neither this nor that; he is depending neither on this nor on that; he is known neither by intelligence nor by consciousness; he is neither darkness nor light; he is neither name nor form; he is neither strong nor weak; he is neither pure nor impure; he is not in a definite place yet he is not separated from place; he is neither created nor uncreated; he neither manifests himself, nor is he explainable; he neither gives nor grudges; he neither observes nor violates the precepts; he is neither patient nor not impatient; he is neither diligent nor slothful; he is neither collected nor confused; he is neither intelligent nor ignorant;

he is neither true nor false; he neither comes nor goes; he neither goes out nor returns; he is beyond all modes of speech; he is neither a stock of merit nor not a stock of merit; he is neither describing of homage nor undeserving of homage; he neither possesses; nor abandons; he is neither endowed with form nor formlessness; he is identical with truth and equal to the nature of the law; he can neither be measured nor be weighed, being far above all degrees and measures; he is neither great nor small; he is neither to be seen nor to be heard; neither to be felt nor to be known; he is liberated from all bondage; he is equal both to the intelligent and to the ignorant; he does not discriminate in anything; in all things he has no attainment, no loss, no corruption, no suffering; in him there is no acting, no doing, no birth, no death; no fear, no sorrow; no joy, no dislike; he knows no past, no future, no present; he is not to be discriminated nor manifested by any words; O Blessed One, such is the personality of the Tathāgata; thus should one regard him; those who regard him thus are said to have right understanding, those who regard him otherwise are said to have false understanding."

Then Śāriputra asked Vimalakīrti: "Whence hast thou come to be born here? Vimalakīrti said: "Is there either going or coming in the law which thou hast obtained?" Śāriputra said, "There is neither going nor coming." [Vimalakīrti said]: "When there is neither going nor coming, why dost thou ask me saying 'whence hast thou come to be born here?' what dost thou think when a conjurer produces either a man or a woman, is there any going or coming?" Śāriputra said: "There is neither going nor coming; hast thou not heard that Buddha taught that the form of all things was like a phantom?" He replied: "Even so it is; when the form of all things is like a phantom, why dost thou ask me saying 'whence hast thou come to be born here?' O Śāriputra, to leave is a form of destruction shown in unreal objects; to be born is also a form of continuation shown in unreal objects. A Bodhisattva never exterminates his stock of merit even when he goes out, he never lets evils grow even when he is born."

Then Buddha spoke to Śāriputra and said; "There is a land called Abhirati; the Buddha there is called Akshobhya. This Vimalakīrti comes from that land and is born here." Śāriputra said: "I have never heard the like before, O Blessed One, why should this man wish to leave his pure land and come here into a world full of anger and danger?" Vimalakīrti spoke to Śāriputra: "What dost thou think when the sun rises? does it unite with darkness?" He replied: "Nay, when the sun rises there is no longer darkness." Vimalakīrti again asked: "Why does the sun go round the Jambūdvīpa?" He replied: "In order to remove darkness by its brightness." Vimalakīrti said: "Even so is with a Bodhisattva; though he is born in the land of impurity in order to teach all beings, he is never united with the darkness of ignorance, and he only exterminates the darkness of the passions of all beings."

At that time all the assembly earnestly longed to see the Tathāgata Akshobhya and his assembly of Bodhisattvas and Śrāvakas in the land of Abhirati. Buddha knowing the thought of all the assembly spoke to Vimalakīrti and said: "O noble youth, for the sake of all this assembly, let the Tathāgata Akshobhya and his assembly of Bodhisattvas and Śrāvakas in the land of Abhirati be manifested here, all are earnestly longing to see them."

Then Vimalakīrti thought to himself: "I will without rising from my seat, manifest all the land of Abhirati including the Cakravāḍa mountains, the sun, moon, and stars, palaces of deities, serpent-gods, goblins, Brahman deities, the assembly of Bodhisattvas, Śrāvakas, towns, villages, men and women, young and old, even the Tathāgata Akshobhya himself in the Bodhi tree and excellent lotus flowers which perform religious works in all the ten quarters; and the three jewelled stairs which connect this Jambūdvīpa with the Trayastrimśa heaven, and by which all the deities descend to honour the Tathāgata Akshobhya and hear him preach, and by which all beings of this Jambūdvīpa ascend to Trayastrimśa heaven and see the deities of that heaven and the world Abhirati endowed with these infinite virtues; I will snatch that world with my right hand as the turner of

porcelain snatches his clay and bring it here including its highest heaven Akanishtha as well as its lowest sea level, and show them to all the assembly as one shows a garland in his hand." Having thought thus he entered a contemplation and exercising his supernatural power, he transferred the land Abhirati into this world. The Bodhisattvas, Śrāvakas, deities and men in that world who possessed the supernatural power, cried out together and said: "O lord, we are being carried away!" Buddha Akshobhya said: "It is not I that is doing this; it is due to the supernatural power of Vimalakīrti." The other beings who did not possess the supernatural power did not recognise it and knew nothing about their being carried away; there was neither increase nor decrease in the land of Abhirati though it was transferred into this world; there was also no squeezing or compression in this world; it remained as before.

Then Buddha Śākyamuni spoke to the assembly and said: "Have you seen the Tathāgata Akshobhya and his magnificent land Abhirati and his Bodhisattvas pure in life, and disciples who are pure and stainless?" They replied: "O verily we see." Buddha then said: "If a Bodhisattva wishes to obtain such a pure land of Buddha, he should know the path on which the Tathāgata Akshobhya walks."

When the world Abhirati was manifested, fourteen Nayutas of men in this Sahā world cherished the thought of supreme enlightenment. They all wished to be born in the land of Abhirati, and Buddha Śākyamuni gave them his assurance and said: "Ye shall all be born in that land." Then [Akshobhya of] the world Abhirati having finished what he had to do in this world returned to his abode. [This] was witnessed by all the assembly.

Buddha spoke to Śāriputra and said: "Hast thou seen the Abhirati world and the Buddha Akshobhya?" He replied: "O Blessed One, verily I have seen them; may all beings obtain the pure land even as the land of the Buddha Akshobhya, and obtain the supernatural power even as that of Vimalakīrti. O Blessed One, we have received so great a privilege that we could see this man and make ourselves acquainted with him and honour him; but all beings who even hear this scripture in the present

age or after passing of Buddha will also obtain excellent profit. How much more meritorious would it be for them who having heard it, would comprehend, hold, recite, preach, and practise it according to the law. If there be one who has held this scripture in his hand he is said to obtain the mine of the law-treasure. When he recites or explains the meaning of it and practises it according to the doctrine, he will be protected by all the Buddhas. If there be one who honours such a man, he is said to honour the Buddha. If there be one who copies and holds this scripture, his room will be inhabited by the Tathāgata. If there be one who rejoices in hearing this scripture, he will attain omniscience. If he comprehends even one Gāthā of four lines of this scripture and preach it to others, he will receive from Buddha the assurance of attaining supreme enlightenment."

CHAPTER XIII

ON PAYING HOMAGE TO THE LAW

Then Śakra, the king of deities, who was among the assembly spoke to Buddha and said: "Though I have heard several hundred thousands of scriptures while I was waiting on Buddha and Mañjuśrī, yet have I never heard such a scripture as this—the Sūtra of ultimate reality ascertained by the supernatural faculty of Inconceivable Self-Existence. If I understand the meaning proclaimed by Buddha rightly, he who hears, comprehends, holds, and recites this scripture will obtain the law without fail; how much more would it be to practise according to the doctrine! He can close [the gate of] the unhappy existences; he is protected by all the Buddhas; he can repress all the heresies, conquer the enmity of evil, realise the Bodhi, abide in the Bodhi-maṇḍala, and walk in the path along which Tathāgata has walked. O Blessed One, if there be one who holds, recites, and practises this Sūtra, according to the doctrine, I will honour and serve him together with my kinsfolk; whenever this scripture may be found, either in the village, town, forest, or wilderness, I will go thither in order to hear the law together with my kinsfolk and will

cause him to believe who has not believed before, and will protect him who already believes."

Buddha spoke to him and said: "Rightly said! Rightly said! O king of deities, I share thy joy; here in this scripture the inconceivable and supreme enlightenment of all the Buddhas of the past, the present, and the future is fully set forth. Therefore, O king of deities, he who holds, recites, and reveres the scripture is said to honour all the Buddhas of the past, the present, and the future.

"O king of deities, if there be many Tathāgatas so many in number even as the bushes, whether of sugar-cane, bamboo, reed, paddy, or hemp, and the three great Chiliocosms may be full of them, and a son or daughter of a noble family will honour, revere, praise, and pay homage to them and dedicate their dwellings to them for the space of one kalpa or thereabout, and after the passing of those Buddhas, he or she will elect a Stūpa of seven jewels containing the perfect body of each of the Tathāgatas as wide as the four worlds and as high as the heaven of Brahman, erecting a pole adorned with all magnificence and do homage to them with all the rarest flowers, all kinds of incense, garlands, banners and music, for the space of one kalpa or thereabout; what dost thou think, O king of deities, is the merit planted by this man much or little?" Śakra, the king of deities, said: "Much indeed, O Blessed One, it is impossible to enumerate his merits even in one hundred thousand millions of kalpas." Buddha spoke to the king of deities: "It should be known that the merits of a son or daughter of a noble family who hearing this scripture of Inconceivable Emancipation comprehends, holds, recites and practises it would obtain greater merits than those. And why? The Bodhi of all the Buddhas springs forth from it; and the essence of the Bodhi is infinite. For this reason the merits are immeasurable."

Buddha again spoke to the king of deities: "Once in the past immeasurable Asamkhyeya kalpas ago, there was a Buddha called Bhaishajyarāja, a Tathāgata, an arhat, one who is perfect in knowledge, and a Sugata, knower of the world, an incomparable one, the tamer of men, teacher of gods and men, Buddha

and Bhagavat. The world was called Mahāvvyūha. The length of life of that Buddha was twenty shorter kalpas. There were thirty-six million nayutas of disciples and twelve millions of Bodhisattvas. O Indra, king of deities, at that time there was a Cakravartin king named Ratnacchatra endowed with the seven treasures, who was the lord of four worlds. There were born of him a thousand princes who were all comely, courageous, and able to repress their enemies. Then Ratnacchatra [the king] with his kinsfolk, honoured the Tathāgata Bhaishajyarāja dedicating a dwelling to him during five kalpas; when those five kalpas had elapsed, he spoke to his thousand princes and said: 'Ye should also honour the Buddha with profound mind even as I do.' Then those thousand princes according to their father's command honoured the Tathāgata Bhaishajyarāja during five kalpas dedicating a dwelling to him and other things. There was one among those princes named Candracchatra who [one day] sat alone and thought to himself: 'Can any homage be superior to this [homage]?' Then through the supernatural power of that Buddha there appeared in the sky a deity who declared: 'No homage is superior to homage to the law.' He asked: 'What is the homage of the law?' The deity replied: 'Thou hadst better go to the Tathāgata Baishajyarāja to inquire concerning this matter; he would fully tell thee what is meant by the homage to the law.' Then Candracchatra the prince having gone to the Tathāgata Bhaishajyarāja, greeted him touching his feet with bowed head, seated on one side and asked the Buddha: 'O Blessed One, of all homages homage to the law is most excellent; what is meant by the homage to the law?'

"Buddha replied: 'O noble youth, homage of the law is this: the profound scriptures preached by Buddha are so subtle and so difficult to understand that all the world is unwilling to accept and believe them; so they are pure without blemish; they are unobtainable by mere discrimination or thought; they are enclosed in the treasury of virtues of a Bodhisattva; they are sealed with the seal of Dhāraṇī; they lead to the state from which one never retreats; they perfect the six Pāramitās; they rightly discriminate the meaning [of all things]; they are in accordance

with the law of Bodhi; they are superior to all other scriptures; they lead to great mercy and compassion; they are far above all the temptation of evils and heresies; they are in harmony with the law of causation; they transcend self, individuality, personality and durability; they are empty, formless, aimless and causeless; they are capable of elevating beings to a seat in the Bodhimāṇḍala and roll the wheel of the law; praised by all deities, serpent gods, and Gandharvas; they are capable of leading beings to the mine of virtues of Buddha; they comprehend all wisdom of the wise and the holy; they preach the paths walked by Bodhisattvas; they are based on the doctrine that all things are real; they unmistakably proclaim the doctrine of transiency, sorrow, emptiness, selflessness, and annihilation; they are capable of saving all who are guilty of trespassing the precepts; they are capable of causing fear to evil ones; heretics and those who are greedy; they are praised by all the Buddhas and saints; they turn against the sorrows of birth and death, and show the happiness of Nirvāṇa; they are preached by all the Buddhas of the three worlds in the ten quarters—if a man hear such scriptures as these, comprehend, hold, recite, and through the power of the necessary means, discriminate, explain, and make them manifest clearly to all beings, and thereby preserve the law, he for these reasons is said to pay homage to the law.

“Again, to practise according to the teaching of all the law, to be in accordance with the twelve chains of causation, to be far above all heresies, to attain to the acquiescence in the eternal law, to be absolutely selfless, to be without personality, yet to be free from dissension, free from discord concerning the law of cause and effect, to be free from ideas of possession, not to depend on words but to depend on meaning, not to depend on knowledge but to depend on wisdom, not to depend on incomplete scriptures but to depend on complete scripture, not to depend on man but to depend on the law, to be in accordance with the nature of things, not to cherish any heretical views, to have no abode, and no refuge, to regard the twelve chains of causation as working in an endless circle thus as follows:—as ignorance is completely annihilated, all component things are

completely annihilated, until we come to, as birth is completely annihilated, old age and death are also completely annihilated. This is paying homage to the law, which is superior to all other homages.' ”

Buddha again spoke to Indra, the king of deities, and said: “Candracchatra the prince, having heard such doctrines as these from the Buddha Bhaishajyarāja, attained to acquiescence in meekness; then he having removed the jewelled raiment and ornaments from his body, offered them to Buddha and spoke to him saying: ‘O Blessed One, after the complete passing of Tathāgata I will pay homage to the law and protect the true law; I pray that thou through thy power, wouldst show me thy compassion and raise me that I may be able to repress the enmity of evil and realise the life of a Bodhisattva.’ Knowing his profound thought Buddha prophesied for him and said: ‘Thou wilt guard the fortress of the law in the latter days. O Indra, king of deities, then Candracchatra the prince, seeing the purity of the law and hearing the prophecy from Buddha, became a mendicant because of his faith; diligently practised the true law, and in due course obtained the five supernatural powers, and walking in the path of Bodhisattva, attained the unimpeded eloquence of Dhāraṇī, after the passing of the Buddha, through his supernatural power and the power of eloquence of Dhāraṇī, during ten shorter kalpas, propagated the wheel of the law which the Tathāgata Bhaishajyarāja caused to roll.

“Having protected the law and having been diligent in practice, Candracchatra the Bhikshus taught millions of millions of men enabling them to raise their minds which never retreat from supreme enlightenment, and enabled fourteen nayutas of men to cherish deeply the thought of Śrāvaka and Pratyeka-Buddha, and caused countless beings to be born in the heavens.

“O Indra king of deities, thou shouldst not think that Ratnacchatra the [Cakravartin] king, is the other than the Tathāgata Ratnatejas who has attained to the Buddhahood; the thousand princes are but the thousand Buddhas in the Bhadrakalpa, beginning with Krakucchanda down to the last Tathāgata Ruci. The Bhikshus Candracchatra is no other than myself.

"Thus, O Indra king of deities, thou shouldst know the essence of this [doctrine] that paying homage to the law is superior to all other homages, and unique and incomparable. Therefore, O Indra king of deities, by paying homage to the law thou shouldst honour the Buddha."

CHAPTER XIV

THE COMMISSION OF THE LAW

At that time Buddha spoke to Maitreya and said: "O Maitreya I now give over to thee the Sūtra leading to supreme enlightenment, which I have gathered during countless millions of Asamkyeya kalpas of the past. In the generations that follow after the passing of Buddha, ye should all widely proclaim and propagate this scripture through your supernatural powers in this Jambūdvīpa and never permit it to become extinct. And why? If there be in the later generations, either sons or daughters of a noble family, or deities or serpent-gods, or goblins, or Gandharvas, or Rakshasas, who cherishing the thought of supreme enlightenment, find pleasure in the great law, but fail to hear such scripture as this, great benefits would be lost to them. Such men as these, hearing such scriptures, will surely entertain great faith in them, cherish the rare thought [or enlightenment], and reverently preach them in detail to all beings so that they will derive benefits therefrom.

"O Maitreya, it should be known that there are two kinds of Bodhisattvas. Who are they? The one is those who are fond of phrase and rhetoric, the other is those who can really and unflinchingly attain to the truth with all its deep meaning. Those who delight in phrase and rhetoric should be known as but novices among Bodhisattvas. Those who can understand [the knowledge of] such a profound scripture as this, stainless and free from attachment, and who are ever fearless, able to enter it, by hearing become pure in mind, hold it, recite it, and practise it according to its teaching, should be regarded as having been long in discipline in the ways of Bodhisattvahood.

“O Maitreya, there are two ways by which novices among Bodhisattvas may fail to attain to the conviction in this profound doctrine. What are they? First, when they hear this scripture which has never been heard before, they may fear and doubt that they may not be able to follow it, and not believing it they may slander it saying: I have never heard the like before; whence comes it? Secondly, although they may hold and explain this profound scripture, yet they are not intimate with it, nor do they honour it, nor do they revere it, but often do they find fault with it. Those who behave either in one way or in the other should be known as novices among Bodhisattvas; they harm themselves and can never conquer their minds in the profound doctrine.

“Again, O Maitreya, there are two ways by which Bodhisattvas though comprehending the profound doctrine yet harm themselves and can never attain to the acquiescence in the eternal law. What are they? To despise novices among Bodhisattvas and not to teach them is the one, and although they comprehend the profound doctrine, yet to explain it according to their own ideas is the other; these are the two ways.”

Maitreya Bodhisattva having heard these words spoke to Buddha and said: “O Blessed One, I have never heard the like before. It is indeed as Buddha has spoken. I will remove with my utmost effort such false conceptions as these and hold fast on the works of supreme enlightenment, which were accumulated by Tathāgata during these countless Asaṃkhyeya kalpas of the past. If there be in the future a son or daughter of a noble family who shall seek the Mahāyāna I will enable them to put even in their own hands this scripture, so that they can hold it, recite it, and fully explain it for the sake of others. O Blessed One, if there be in the future any one who can hold it, recite it, and fully explain it for the sake of others, it should be known that he is established by the supernatural power of Maitreya.”

Buddha said: “Rightly said! Rightly said! O Maitreya, it is indeed as thou sayest. I rejoice in it sharing thy joy.” Then all the Bodhisattvas stretching forth their folded hands

said to Buddha: "We, after the passing of Tathāgata, will widely proclaim and propagate the law of supreme enlightenment in the lands of all the ten quarters, and enable those who preach the law to obtain this scripture."

Then the four guardian gods spoke to Buddha. "O Blessed One, if there be any who recite and explain this scripture anywhere, either in the town or village or forest or wilderness, I will go thither together with all of my retinue and kinsfolk, in order to hear the law and to protect him, so that as far as a hundred yojanas of his presence no [evil] may have opportunity to tempt him."

Then Buddha spoke to Ānanda: "Thou shouldst widely proclaim and propagate this scripture." Ānanda said: "Well [O Lord], I have already grasped the essence of this scripture; but, O Blessed One, what should this scripture be called?" Buddha spoke to Ānanda: "This scripture should be called 'That Which is preached by Vimalakīrti (*Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa*)' and also 'The Doctrine of Inconceivable Emancipation.' Thou shouldst remember thus."

When Buddha preached this scripture Vimalakīrti, the wealthy householder, Mañjuśrī, Śāriputra, Ānanda, and all the deities, Asuras, and all of the great assembly, having heard that which was preached by Buddha, greatly rejoiced in it, believed in it, and practised it.

THE END.